亚洲免费av电影一区二区三区,日韩爱爱视频,51精品视频一区二区三区,91视频爱爱,日韩欧美在线播放视频,中文字幕少妇AV,亚洲电影中文字幕,久久久久亚洲av成人网址,久久综合视频网站,国产在线不卡免费播放

        ?

        碳交易市場(chǎng)中的碳稅策略研究

        2014-07-31 00:49:43孫亞男
        關(guān)鍵詞:博弈模型碳交易碳稅

        摘要為實(shí)現(xiàn)節(jié)能減排和產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)平穩(wěn)調(diào)整,我國(guó)需要走經(jīng)濟(jì)可持續(xù)發(fā)展的“低碳之路”,這就需要選擇并設(shè)計(jì)市場(chǎng)化減排政策工具。本文通過探討碳交易市場(chǎng)中的碳稅策略,提出復(fù)合碳交易體系更加符合我國(guó)國(guó)情。在此背景下,通過構(gòu)建復(fù)合碳排放交易體系下的雙寡頭企業(yè)的合作和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)三階段博弈模型,對(duì)如何制定碳稅稅率促使社會(huì)福利最大化,不同碳減排研發(fā)策略下,企業(yè)如何確定碳計(jì)劃減排量以及制定產(chǎn)品價(jià)格,以滿足自身利益最大化等問題進(jìn)行了分析;同時(shí),對(duì)政府征收碳稅稅率的影響進(jìn)行敏感性分析,比較企業(yè)采取合作和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)兩種不同碳減排研發(fā)策略時(shí),碳稅稅率的變化對(duì)產(chǎn)品價(jià)格、碳計(jì)劃減排量、企業(yè)利潤(rùn)、社會(huì)福利方面的影響。本文認(rèn)為,在碳交易市場(chǎng)中征收碳稅對(duì)于降低碳排放量,增加企業(yè)收益具有促進(jìn)作用,這說明在科學(xué)合理的政府政策配置下,采用合理的市場(chǎng)機(jī)制,可以實(shí)現(xiàn)低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展;其實(shí)現(xiàn)過程,需要建立碳交易市場(chǎng),依靠碳排放權(quán)交易制度,促使企業(yè)主動(dòng)選擇“提高計(jì)劃碳減排量”的方式逐年降低碳排放量,同時(shí),在加強(qiáng)社會(huì)監(jiān)督和嚴(yán)格執(zhí)行碳超量排放處罰機(jī)制的條件下,采用碳稅方式提高計(jì)劃碳減排量,而要達(dá)到最優(yōu)減排量,政府還需積極引導(dǎo)和促使企業(yè)不斷提高碳減排研發(fā)效率,并積極開展合作研發(fā)減排;而在推行過程中,應(yīng)選擇碳稅稅率征收空間較大的高產(chǎn)能行業(yè),特別是產(chǎn)品成本和低碳度較低的行業(yè)作為試點(diǎn),優(yōu)先開征碳稅;在壟斷行業(yè)中,政府必須采取必要的規(guī)制政策,以確保市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的有效性和遞延性,維護(hù)公共利益。同時(shí),推廣過程中必須重視對(duì)消費(fèi)者低碳偏好的培養(yǎng),這將有利于企業(yè)提高產(chǎn)品價(jià)格,應(yīng)對(duì)碳減排帶來的生產(chǎn)成本壓力,減少碳稅征收的阻力,為政府開征碳稅贏得空間和時(shí)間,促進(jìn)能源結(jié)構(gòu)的優(yōu)化和產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)的平穩(wěn)調(diào)整,實(shí)現(xiàn)低碳環(huán)保與經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的和諧統(tǒng)一。

        關(guān)鍵詞碳交易;碳稅;碳減排量;低碳度;博弈模型

        中圖分類號(hào)F273文獻(xiàn)標(biāo)識(shí)碼A文章編號(hào)1002-2104(2014)03-0032-09doi:10.3969/j.issn.1002-2104.2014.03.006

        在國(guó)際氣候政治背景下,倡導(dǎo)節(jié)能減排,走低碳發(fā)展之路是符合中國(guó)未來發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略的重要決策。為此,我國(guó)政府提出“2020年中國(guó)碳強(qiáng)度將比2005年降低40%-45%”的減排目標(biāo)。在此目標(biāo)要求下,我國(guó)政府需要構(gòu)建符合中國(guó)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)特點(diǎn)的碳減排政策,既能滿足節(jié)能減排的目標(biāo)要求,又能滿足低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)下對(duì)能源結(jié)構(gòu)的優(yōu)化和產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)的調(diào)整,實(shí)現(xiàn)節(jié)能減排與經(jīng)濟(jì)同步平穩(wěn)發(fā)展的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)[1]。

        當(dāng)前碳減排的政策工具較多,依據(jù)作用范圍和應(yīng)用方式等不同分類標(biāo)準(zhǔn),可以分為國(guó)際政策工具、國(guó)內(nèi)政策工具、市場(chǎng)化工具以及非市場(chǎng)化工具[2]。本文將探討國(guó)內(nèi)層面的市場(chǎng)化工具對(duì)我國(guó)碳減排的影響。基于市場(chǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)手段主要包括兩種,一種是以石化能源的含碳量為計(jì)稅依據(jù)征收的碳稅;另一種是以碳排放總量控制的排放權(quán)交易。從政府執(zhí)行層面分析,碳稅是達(dá)到碳減排目標(biāo)所需投入成本最小的政策工具,但相比排放權(quán)交易政策來說,對(duì)能源密集型壟斷企業(yè)負(fù)面影響較大,易導(dǎo)致強(qiáng)烈反對(duì)。同時(shí),因經(jīng)濟(jì)主體差異,根據(jù)總體目標(biāo)來確定稅率也存在困難。因此,征收碳稅往往會(huì)導(dǎo)致政府的碳減排目標(biāo)較難實(shí)現(xiàn)。碳排放權(quán)交易工具與碳稅價(jià)格制定方式不同,在碳排放總量固定的基礎(chǔ)上,單位排放價(jià)格隨供求發(fā)生變化而變化,這勢(shì)必導(dǎo)致企業(yè)無法依據(jù)減排成本來合理安排技術(shù)創(chuàng)新和相關(guān)市場(chǎng)投資決策,其結(jié)果將影響市場(chǎng)上能源密集型產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格波動(dòng),進(jìn)而影響我國(guó)能源結(jié)構(gòu)優(yōu)化和產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)平穩(wěn)調(diào)整目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn)。因此,融合上述兩種市場(chǎng)化策略工具的優(yōu)點(diǎn),將以價(jià)格為基礎(chǔ)的碳稅和以數(shù)量為基礎(chǔ)的碳排放權(quán)交易結(jié)合起來的復(fù)合碳減排政策更符合中國(guó)的國(guó)情。在此背景下,定量分析上述復(fù)合排放權(quán)交易體系對(duì)企業(yè)的市場(chǎng)決策影響,并在此基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行政府碳減排政策設(shè)計(jì),是當(dāng)前我國(guó)低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)研究亟待解決的問題之一。

        本文主要包括以下幾個(gè)部分:首先,在清晰描述已有問題的基礎(chǔ)上,構(gòu)建復(fù)合碳排放交易體系下的雙寡頭企業(yè)的合作和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)三階段博弈模型;其次,在考慮碳稅稅率和碳排放總量控制的情況下,分析政府如何制定碳稅稅率促使社會(huì)福利最大化,分析不同碳減排研發(fā)策略下,企業(yè)如何確定碳計(jì)劃減排量以及制定產(chǎn)品價(jià)格,以滿足自身利益最大化;第三,對(duì)政府征收碳稅稅率的影響進(jìn)行敏感性分析,比較企業(yè)采取合作和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)兩種不同碳減排研發(fā)策略時(shí),碳稅稅率的變化對(duì)產(chǎn)品價(jià)格、碳計(jì)劃減排量、企業(yè)利潤(rùn)、社會(huì)福利方面的影響。最后,本文給出對(duì)上述問題研究的結(jié)論及討論。

        孫亞男:碳交易市場(chǎng)中的碳稅策略研究中國(guó)人口·資源與環(huán)境2014年第3期1問題描述及模型建立

        征收碳稅和許可碳排放權(quán)交易是當(dāng)前各國(guó)常用的碳減排政策工具。世界上許多國(guó)家,如瑞典、荷蘭、意大利等多個(gè)國(guó)家已開始征收碳稅[3]。在推動(dòng)排放權(quán)交易方面,歐盟走在世界前列。歐盟的EUETS交易系統(tǒng),有一全套成熟的交易規(guī)則,制定了在歐盟地區(qū)適用的歐盟氣體排放交易方案;中國(guó)正逐步建立全國(guó)性的碳排放權(quán)交易市場(chǎng)。目前正加快推進(jìn)在北京、上海、天津、重慶、湖北、廣東及深圳等七個(gè)省市的碳排放權(quán)交易試點(diǎn)工作,鼓勵(lì)條件具備的地區(qū)先行先試碳排放權(quán)交易[4]。征收碳稅和許可碳排放權(quán)交易其實(shí)質(zhì)上是借助市場(chǎng)的力量,以價(jià)格和數(shù)量為基礎(chǔ)將碳排放的外部成本內(nèi)部化,通過改變企業(yè)贏利函數(shù)而影響企業(yè)決策的行為[5]。因此,當(dāng)政府建立碳排放權(quán)交易市場(chǎng)和征收碳稅控制碳排放時(shí),政府與企業(yè)間的博弈策略成為碳減排政策設(shè)計(jì)的關(guān)鍵。

        基于我國(guó)現(xiàn)實(shí)政策設(shè)計(jì)的需求和對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)問題的認(rèn)識(shí),本文研究碳排放權(quán)交易市場(chǎng)中,政府如何制定碳稅稅率使得社會(huì)福利最大化,企業(yè)如何確定碳計(jì)劃減排量和產(chǎn)品價(jià)格,以最大化自身收益;同時(shí)比較企業(yè)在碳交易排放權(quán)和碳稅稅率約束條件下,進(jìn)行減排研發(fā)合作或競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)社會(huì)福利、企業(yè)利潤(rùn)、產(chǎn)品價(jià)格、碳計(jì)劃減排量等方面的變化。為多視角全面地探析上述問題,本文也將引入消費(fèi)者低碳偏好和產(chǎn)品低碳度等因素,定量的分析政府與企業(yè)間的博弈策略[6]。

        1.1問題描述

        考慮當(dāng)前碳交易市場(chǎng)的現(xiàn)狀和碳稅征收面臨的主要困境,本文假設(shè)由生產(chǎn)同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品的雙寡頭企業(yè)組成行業(yè)市場(chǎng)。市場(chǎng)是由容量為N的消費(fèi)者構(gòu)成。企業(yè)產(chǎn)品在生產(chǎn)過程中,由于二氧化碳等溫室氣體的排放,會(huì)產(chǎn)生環(huán)境污染。政府為控制企業(yè)碳排放量,通過建立碳排放權(quán)交易市場(chǎng)和征收碳稅的方式作為制約機(jī)制。在碳排放權(quán)交易市場(chǎng)中,政府按照行業(yè)水平免費(fèi)分配給企業(yè)一定的碳排放權(quán),只有當(dāng)企業(yè)擁有足夠的碳排放權(quán)時(shí),企業(yè)才可以生產(chǎn)。碳排放權(quán)不足時(shí)需要購(gòu)買,剩余時(shí)企業(yè)可以自主進(jìn)行銷售獲利。同時(shí),政府對(duì)產(chǎn)品碳排放征收碳稅。

        企業(yè)在碳排放權(quán)和征收碳稅的制約下,需要通過投入一定的減排研發(fā)來減少碳排放量,降低外部成本上升對(duì)企業(yè)產(chǎn)品成本的壓力。通過降低產(chǎn)品碳排放量,獲取在碳排放權(quán)交易市場(chǎng)和產(chǎn)品銷售市場(chǎng)上的產(chǎn)品價(jià)格優(yōu)勢(shì)。產(chǎn)品的碳排放量大小用低碳度指標(biāo)進(jìn)行衡量,低碳度是用來描述產(chǎn)品從生產(chǎn)、銷售直至最終消亡過程中溫室氣體排放水平的相對(duì)程度[7]。用θ表示消費(fèi)者希望購(gòu)買到的產(chǎn)品低碳度,θ∈[θ1,θ2],其中θ1表示產(chǎn)品的最低低碳度,θ2表示產(chǎn)品的最大低碳度,并假設(shè)θ服從均勻分布。

        市場(chǎng)上的消費(fèi)者因其環(huán)保意識(shí)的差異,對(duì)低碳產(chǎn)品的購(gòu)買傾向存在不同。價(jià)格偏好型消費(fèi)者只關(guān)心產(chǎn)品價(jià)格,希望購(gòu)買低價(jià)格的產(chǎn)品,對(duì)產(chǎn)品的環(huán)保程度并不關(guān)心;而環(huán)保偏好型消費(fèi)者更加注重產(chǎn)品的環(huán)保程度,傾向于購(gòu)買低碳環(huán)保產(chǎn)品,并樂于支付較高的產(chǎn)品價(jià)格。因此,消費(fèi)者低碳偏好的不同對(duì)于政府政策制定和企業(yè)生產(chǎn)決策將產(chǎn)生重要影響。消費(fèi)者對(duì)產(chǎn)品低碳度每增加一個(gè)單位愿意支付的費(fèi)用記為k。

        依據(jù)上述描述,本文將建立生產(chǎn)同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品的雙寡頭企業(yè)與政府之間的三階段博弈模型。在碳排放權(quán)交易市場(chǎng)中,采用逆向求解,分別討論政府分配碳配額條件下,企業(yè)產(chǎn)品的定價(jià)策略;在減排研發(fā)合作或者競(jìng)爭(zhēng)情況下,企業(yè)計(jì)劃減排量的選擇策略;以及政府碳稅稅率的設(shè)計(jì)和制定策略。

        1.2模型假設(shè)

        企業(yè)產(chǎn)品定價(jià)與生產(chǎn)成本、消費(fèi)者低碳偏好、碳交易價(jià)格、碳稅以及單位產(chǎn)品碳配額等相關(guān)。這其中,企業(yè)產(chǎn)品定價(jià)與單位產(chǎn)品碳配額負(fù)相關(guān),與政府征收的碳稅稅率正相關(guān);在企業(yè)初始單位產(chǎn)品碳排放量小于政府單位產(chǎn)品碳配額時(shí),企業(yè)產(chǎn)品定價(jià)與碳交易價(jià)格負(fù)相關(guān),而在企業(yè)初始單位產(chǎn)品碳排放量大于政府單位產(chǎn)品碳配額時(shí),與碳交易價(jià)格正相關(guān)。

        從以上結(jié)果中可以看出,政府促進(jìn)低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速發(fā)展,需要兼顧環(huán)保和經(jīng)濟(jì)的內(nèi)生一致性特點(diǎn),政府在決策過程中,可以考慮以下策略:

        (1)隨著免費(fèi)分配的單位產(chǎn)品碳配額的增加,企業(yè)產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格優(yōu)勢(shì)越明顯,企業(yè)擴(kuò)大規(guī)模的積極性越高,對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的帶動(dòng)和促進(jìn)作用越好。

        (2)設(shè)計(jì)和制定政府免費(fèi)分配的單位產(chǎn)品的碳配額時(shí),需要以企業(yè)初始單位產(chǎn)品碳排放量作為設(shè)計(jì)基礎(chǔ),在高耗能和高污染的行業(yè)內(nèi),建議政府免費(fèi)分配的單位產(chǎn)品的碳配額要小于企業(yè)初始單位產(chǎn)品碳排放量,此時(shí)碳交易價(jià)格與行業(yè)內(nèi)企業(yè)產(chǎn)品定價(jià)正相關(guān),利用市場(chǎng)機(jī)制,通過碳交易價(jià)格有效控制碳排放量,避免行政干預(yù)帶來的負(fù)面影響;而在低耗能和無污染行業(yè),則采用相反的策略設(shè)計(jì),適當(dāng)?shù)奶冀灰變r(jià)格則對(duì)企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的提升有一定的促進(jìn)作用。

        (3)隨著碳稅稅率的增加,企業(yè)產(chǎn)品定價(jià)不斷提高,企業(yè)產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格優(yōu)勢(shì)下降,將對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)有一定的負(fù)面作用。為此,政府在制定碳稅稅率時(shí),不宜過大,盡可能設(shè)計(jì)在一個(gè)消費(fèi)者可以承受的物價(jià)上漲壓力范圍之內(nèi)。

        (4)培養(yǎng)消費(fèi)者對(duì)低碳產(chǎn)品的偏好,將促進(jìn)企業(yè)利潤(rùn)的增加。在市場(chǎng)容量不變的情況下,隨著消費(fèi)者對(duì)產(chǎn)品低碳度每增加一個(gè)單位愿意支付費(fèi)用的增加,企業(yè)產(chǎn)品定價(jià)可以不斷提高,企業(yè)利潤(rùn)也將隨之增加,對(duì)促進(jìn)行業(yè)發(fā)展具有推動(dòng)作用。

        2.2第二階段:企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量選擇策略

        在政府不斷增加碳排放成本和控制碳排放數(shù)量的情況下,企業(yè)謀求自身利潤(rùn)最大化的一個(gè)重要舉措則是通過減排研發(fā)的投入,不斷降低企業(yè)產(chǎn)品生產(chǎn)成本,增強(qiáng)企業(yè)的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。在該階段,生產(chǎn)同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品的雙寡頭企業(yè)在面對(duì)減排研發(fā)時(shí),可以選擇合作研發(fā)或者排他獨(dú)立研發(fā),即采取合作策略或者競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略。選擇競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略時(shí),雙寡頭企業(yè)的計(jì)劃減排量與市場(chǎng)碳交易價(jià)格和碳稅成正比,與企業(yè)減排研發(fā)成本系數(shù)成反比,但與企業(yè)技術(shù)溢出率無關(guān)。因此,促進(jìn)企業(yè)減排研發(fā)能力的提升,提高碳交易價(jià)格以及碳稅稅率,都是企業(yè)在選擇競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略時(shí),有效提高企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量的方式。

        企業(yè)間選擇不同的研發(fā)策略時(shí),影響企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量的因素略有不同,為控制和逐步提高企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量,政府在決策過程中,可以考慮以下策略:

        (1)通過不斷提高碳交易價(jià)格,促進(jìn)企業(yè)逐步提高計(jì)劃碳減排量,降低碳排放量。在碳交易市場(chǎng)中,隨著碳交易價(jià)格的提高,企業(yè)提高計(jì)劃碳減排量的主觀意愿也將逐漸增強(qiáng)。因?yàn)樘冀灰變r(jià)格的提高,企業(yè)通過提高企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量,可以在碳交易市場(chǎng)中獲得更高的收益,這將直接增加企業(yè)利潤(rùn)。作為企業(yè)而言,提高碳交易價(jià)格,是一個(gè)從價(jià)、量?jī)蓚€(gè)方面,通過企業(yè)利潤(rùn)的變動(dòng)促進(jìn)企業(yè)提高計(jì)劃減排量的途徑,屬于市場(chǎng)機(jī)制范疇。

        (2)通過不斷提高碳稅稅率,促進(jìn)企業(yè)逐步提高計(jì)劃碳減排量。隨著碳稅的增加,企業(yè)生產(chǎn)成本將增加,這使得企業(yè)不得不降低碳排放量,進(jìn)而可能逐步提高企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量。在這個(gè)過程中,企業(yè)受到政府指導(dǎo)下的市場(chǎng)化調(diào)控手段的影響,被動(dòng)的選擇提高企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量的方式降低碳排放量,需要指出的是,在社會(huì)監(jiān)督和處罰制度相對(duì)完善的情況下,企業(yè)將優(yōu)先選擇通過提高計(jì)劃碳減排量的方式降低碳排放量。因此,通過提高碳稅稅率的方式,提高企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量,需要相應(yīng)比較完備的制度保障作為基礎(chǔ)。

        (3)通過促進(jìn)企業(yè)合作減排研發(fā),逐步提高企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量。通過比較式(13)和式(15)可以容易得出,在不變的交易價(jià)格和碳稅稅率條件下,企業(yè)選擇合作策略時(shí)的計(jì)劃碳減排量高于選擇競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略時(shí)的計(jì)劃碳減排量。在這個(gè)過程中,需要政府出臺(tái)促進(jìn)企業(yè)合作減排研發(fā)所必需的政策支持和制度保障。通過持續(xù)提高企業(yè)合作碳減排研發(fā)能力,促進(jìn)企業(yè)提高計(jì)劃碳減排量。

        (4)通過降低企業(yè)研發(fā)成本系數(shù),提高企業(yè)減排研發(fā)效率,將有助于提高企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量。企業(yè)減排研發(fā)效率的提升,必然帶來企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量的提高,需要說明的是,當(dāng)企業(yè)擁有較高的社會(huì)責(zé)任時(shí),這種碳減排研發(fā)投入和效率的提升將成為必然。否則,仍需要更加綜合的減排策略,促使企業(yè)提高減排研發(fā)效率,降低研發(fā)成本。

        依據(jù)我國(guó)當(dāng)前的經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)環(huán)境,需要采取綜合的政策策略,實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)優(yōu)先選擇通過提高計(jì)劃碳減排量的方式,降低碳排放量,并選擇通過合作減排研發(fā)的同時(shí),持續(xù)提高減排研發(fā)效率,最大程度的降低碳排放量。為此,通過建立碳交易市場(chǎng),政府可依靠碳交易制度促使企業(yè)主動(dòng)選擇提高計(jì)劃碳減排量;同時(shí)政府采用碳稅稅收方式,通過財(cái)政手段和政策導(dǎo)向,促進(jìn)企業(yè)進(jìn)行合作減排研發(fā)以及自主提高研發(fā)效率,實(shí)現(xiàn)最大程度的碳減排目標(biāo)。

        2.3第一階段:政府碳稅稅率選擇策略

        碳稅稅率的制定與消費(fèi)者低碳偏好,產(chǎn)品低碳度,成反比;與產(chǎn)品成本,碳交易價(jià)格,以及企業(yè)初始單位碳排放量成正比。在鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)減排研發(fā)合作策略背景下,碳稅稅率與企業(yè)技術(shù)溢出率成反比;而企業(yè)選擇競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略時(shí),碳稅稅率與企業(yè)技術(shù)溢出率成正比。而與企業(yè)減排研發(fā)率的關(guān)系,需要依據(jù)具體參數(shù)而決定。同時(shí),從式子(17)和(18)中可以得出:t*

        (1)制定相應(yīng)政策鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)合作研發(fā)減排,這樣一方面可以高效的降低企業(yè)碳排放量,另一方面也因此通過較低的碳稅稅率,降低企業(yè)稅負(fù),提升企業(yè)在市場(chǎng)中的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,兼顧經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展與環(huán)境保護(hù)的和諧發(fā)展,通過合作創(chuàng)新研發(fā),促進(jìn)產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)的調(diào)整,實(shí)現(xiàn)向低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)的轉(zhuǎn)型。

        (2)企業(yè)技術(shù)溢出率隨企業(yè)減排研發(fā)策略的不同,與碳稅稅率的相關(guān)性發(fā)生變化,合作策略時(shí)成反比,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略時(shí)成正比。這說明,當(dāng)企業(yè)合作減排研發(fā)時(shí),企業(yè)間合作效果越好,政府可以征收的碳稅空間越大,越有利于政府開征碳稅;當(dāng)企業(yè)獨(dú)立排他的進(jìn)行減排研發(fā)時(shí),企業(yè)技術(shù)水平越高,政府可以征收的碳稅空間越大,越有利于政府開征碳稅。因此,不論采用何種策略進(jìn)行減排研發(fā),隨著企業(yè)技術(shù)能力的不斷提高,政府開征碳稅的時(shí)機(jī)和空間則越成熟。

        (3)鼓勵(lì)消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買低碳產(chǎn)品,同時(shí)通過提高企業(yè)減排研發(fā)能力,不斷提高產(chǎn)品低碳度,將有利于政府以較低的稅率開征碳稅,減少政府開征碳稅時(shí),來自企業(yè)、消費(fèi)者等方面的阻力,順利實(shí)施碳稅政策。

        (4)鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)提高生產(chǎn)力,降低產(chǎn)品成本,同時(shí)通過政策引導(dǎo)和財(cái)政支持,促進(jìn)企業(yè)降低產(chǎn)品單位碳排放量,同時(shí)保持較低的碳交易價(jià)格,將有利于政府以較低的稅率開征碳稅。因此,在碳交易市場(chǎng)中,可以選擇有較高生產(chǎn)能力的行業(yè),特別是產(chǎn)品成本相對(duì)較低,同時(shí)產(chǎn)品單位碳排放量較小,即在生產(chǎn)能力高、碳排放標(biāo)準(zhǔn)高的行業(yè)內(nèi)優(yōu)先開征碳稅,將有利于政府逐步推行碳稅制度。

        3應(yīng)用影響分析

        在策略分析和選擇的基礎(chǔ)上,碳稅稅率的變化將對(duì)企業(yè)產(chǎn)品定價(jià)、企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量以及企業(yè)利潤(rùn)等方面產(chǎn)生明顯影響,分析和判斷這種變化所帶來的影響對(duì)于政府制定、推出和完善碳稅制度具有重要的價(jià)值,因此,在無法具體獲取市場(chǎng)和企業(yè)實(shí)際數(shù)據(jù)的前提下,本文將采用MATLAB軟件對(duì)模型進(jìn)行數(shù)值分析,探討政府碳稅稅率的變化對(duì)市場(chǎng)和企業(yè)的影響,為政府決策提供參考依據(jù)。

        基于對(duì)已有碳交易市場(chǎng)、其他國(guó)際碳稅稅率等情況的調(diào)研,同時(shí)保證模型存在最優(yōu)值的條件下,對(duì)模型中非決策參數(shù)設(shè)定一個(gè)有效的參數(shù)值

        3.1對(duì)企業(yè)產(chǎn)品價(jià)格的影響

        隨著碳稅稅率的增加,企業(yè)產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格和需求量都略有增加,但增加的幅度并不顯著,如圖1所示(X軸表示稅率t,以下各圖相同。),同時(shí),不同策略下碳稅對(duì)產(chǎn)品價(jià)格的影響差異也不太明顯。對(duì)不同企業(yè)產(chǎn)品價(jià)格的差異主要源自企業(yè)生產(chǎn)成本和產(chǎn)品低碳度的差異,特別是企業(yè)產(chǎn)品之間低碳度的差異對(duì)產(chǎn)品價(jià)格的影響較顯著。因此,政府征收碳稅對(duì)已有企業(yè)產(chǎn)品價(jià)格的影響較小,而企業(yè)要保持自身產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格優(yōu)勢(shì),在不斷降低產(chǎn)品成本的同時(shí),還需要不斷擴(kuò)大自身產(chǎn)品與其他企業(yè)產(chǎn)品之間的低碳度優(yōu)勢(shì),而這也需要通過低碳研發(fā)、應(yīng)用低碳材料等降低碳排放的技術(shù)、市場(chǎng)等手段實(shí)現(xiàn)上述目的。

        3.3對(duì)企業(yè)利潤(rùn)的影響

        隨著碳稅稅率的增加,企業(yè)的利潤(rùn)有明顯增加。在不同的減排研發(fā)策略下,企業(yè)利潤(rùn)也隨之改變,如圖3所示,兩種策略比較可以看出,在合作策略下企業(yè)利潤(rùn)的增加比例比競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略下的企業(yè)利潤(rùn)高約9.42%。在碳交易市場(chǎng)中,隨著碳稅稅率的增加,企業(yè)利潤(rùn)不減反增,主要原因在于碳稅稅率的增加,使得企業(yè)碳減排量持續(xù)增加,剩余的碳排放權(quán)通過碳交易市場(chǎng)為企業(yè)帶來了“碳利潤(rùn)”。因此,政府首先建立碳交易市場(chǎng),通過保持適當(dāng)?shù)奶冀灰變r(jià)格,控制碳排放量的同時(shí),通過征收碳稅,對(duì)于企業(yè)利潤(rùn)具有促進(jìn)作用。這也進(jìn)一步證明,在科學(xué)合理的政府政策配置下,通過市場(chǎng)機(jī)制可以實(shí)現(xiàn)低碳環(huán)保與經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的和諧統(tǒng)一發(fā)展。

        3.4對(duì)社會(huì)福利的影響

        隨著碳稅稅率的增加,社會(huì)福利出現(xiàn)了較大程度的下降。這是政府制定和推出碳稅的最大阻礙,也是政府決策過程中必須考慮的問題。從模型假設(shè)和數(shù)值計(jì)算的結(jié)果中可以看到,在壟斷市場(chǎng)中,壟斷使消費(fèi)者剩余向生產(chǎn)者剩余轉(zhuǎn)移。處于壟斷地位的企業(yè)為謀求自身利潤(rùn)最大化,必然通過壟斷造成較低產(chǎn)量和較高價(jià)格,使消費(fèi)者剩余減少,并造成社會(huì)性損失。佩茲曼認(rèn)為,產(chǎn)業(yè)部門比消費(fèi)者更有積極性去影響政府決策[9],為此,在碳稅的制定和實(shí)施過程中,為更多的維護(hù)公共利益,政府必須對(duì)壟斷企業(yè)圖4碳稅對(duì)社會(huì)福利的影響。同時(shí),如表4所示,在當(dāng)前的模型假設(shè)下,即在壟斷市場(chǎng)中,初期通過犧牲碳排放量的策略,將碳稅制定在較低的稅率范圍內(nèi),鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)之間進(jìn)行碳減排研發(fā)競(jìng)爭(zhēng),將更有利于政府征收碳稅。

        4結(jié)論與討論

        本文通過對(duì)碳交易市場(chǎng)中的碳稅、計(jì)劃碳減排量、消費(fèi)者低碳偏好、產(chǎn)品低碳度以及不同的減排研發(fā)策略等因素進(jìn)行綜合分析,構(gòu)建了政府和企業(yè)之間的“碳稅稅率—碳減排量—價(jià)格決策”三階段博弈模型。通過逆向求解模型,對(duì)碳稅、碳計(jì)劃減排量和產(chǎn)品價(jià)格三個(gè)決策變量進(jìn)行策略分析,得出以下主要結(jié)論:

        (1)在碳交易市場(chǎng)中,隨著政府免費(fèi)分配的單位產(chǎn)品碳配額的減少,碳稅稅率的增加,以及在市場(chǎng)容易不變的情況下,消費(fèi)者低碳偏好的增加,產(chǎn)品價(jià)格將隨之增加。

        (2)在高污染和高耗能行業(yè),政府免費(fèi)分配的單位產(chǎn)品碳配額應(yīng)小于企業(yè)初始單位產(chǎn)品碳排放量,此時(shí)碳交易價(jià)格將與產(chǎn)品定價(jià)正相關(guān);而在綠色環(huán)保和低耗能行業(yè),應(yīng)采取相反的策略,因此,在碳交易市場(chǎng)中,利用碳交易價(jià)格調(diào)節(jié)機(jī)制,可有效促進(jìn)國(guó)家實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整和能源結(jié)構(gòu)優(yōu)化的目標(biāo)。

        (3)在碳交易市場(chǎng)中,隨著碳交易價(jià)格的增加,碳稅稅率的增加,以及企業(yè)碳減排研發(fā)成本的降低,企業(yè)碳計(jì)劃減排量將增加。在此基礎(chǔ)上當(dāng)企業(yè)選擇減排研發(fā)合作策略時(shí),隨著企業(yè)技術(shù)溢出率的增加,企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量將增加;而企業(yè)選擇減排研發(fā)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略時(shí),企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量與企業(yè)技術(shù)溢出率無關(guān)。

        (4)在碳交易價(jià)格和碳稅稅率不變的情況下,企業(yè)選擇減排研發(fā)合作策略時(shí)的計(jì)劃碳減排量高于選擇競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略時(shí)的計(jì)劃碳減排量。

        (5)企業(yè)選擇合作減排研發(fā)策略,提高企業(yè)減排技術(shù)研發(fā)能力,以及鼓勵(lì)消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買低碳產(chǎn)品,將有助于政府以較低的稅率開征碳稅。

        (6)在碳交易市場(chǎng)中,碳稅稅率的變化對(duì)企業(yè)計(jì)劃碳減排量、企業(yè)利潤(rùn)以及社會(huì)福利影響顯著,對(duì)企業(yè)產(chǎn)品價(jià)格影響較小。

        基于上述研究結(jié)論,本文認(rèn)為:

        (1)碳交易市場(chǎng)中,征收碳稅對(duì)于降低碳排放量,增加企業(yè)收益具有促進(jìn)作用。這也說明,在科學(xué)合理的政府政策配置下,通過合理的市場(chǎng)機(jī)制,可以實(shí)現(xiàn)低碳環(huán)保與經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的和諧統(tǒng)一。

        (2)在碳交易市場(chǎng)的建立過程中,培養(yǎng)消費(fèi)者的低碳偏好十分重要。一方面,培養(yǎng)消費(fèi)者低碳偏好有利于企業(yè)提高產(chǎn)品價(jià)格以應(yīng)對(duì)碳減排帶來的生產(chǎn)成本壓力,促進(jìn)能源結(jié)構(gòu)的優(yōu)化和產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)的平穩(wěn)調(diào)整;另一方面,培養(yǎng)消費(fèi)者低碳偏好為政府開征碳稅贏得了空間和時(shí)間,很大程度上減少了碳稅征收的阻力[10]。

        (3)為實(shí)現(xiàn)我國(guó)政府提出的2020年的碳減排目標(biāo),首先需要建立碳交易市場(chǎng),依靠碳排放權(quán)交易制度,促使企業(yè)主動(dòng)選擇“提高計(jì)劃碳減排量”的方式逐年降低碳排放量,同時(shí),在加強(qiáng)社會(huì)監(jiān)督和嚴(yán)格執(zhí)行碳超量排放處罰機(jī)制的情況下[11],采用碳稅方式提高計(jì)劃碳排放量,而要達(dá)到最優(yōu)減排量,需要促使企業(yè)之間合作研發(fā)減排,并不斷提高碳減排研發(fā)效率。

        (4)在碳交易市場(chǎng)中,可以選擇較高產(chǎn)能的行業(yè),特別是產(chǎn)品成本和低碳度較低的行業(yè),優(yōu)先開征碳稅。因?yàn)樯鲜鲂袠I(yè)碳稅稅率征收空間較大,有利于政府逐步推行碳稅制度。

        (5)在壟斷市場(chǎng)中,政府征收碳稅將使得社會(huì)福利減少。其根源在于壟斷使消費(fèi)者剩余向生產(chǎn)者剩余轉(zhuǎn)移,造成社會(huì)性損失。為此,為維護(hù)公共利益,政府必須對(duì)壟斷行業(yè)采取必要的規(guī)制政策,確保市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的有效性和遞延性[12]。

        本文后續(xù)研究將圍繞以下幾個(gè)方面開展,首先,對(duì)模型中經(jīng)驗(yàn)假設(shè)做進(jìn)一步的驗(yàn)證,比如對(duì)低碳度服從均勻分布的假設(shè)進(jìn)行驗(yàn)證;其次,考慮碳交易價(jià)格的動(dòng)態(tài)變化對(duì)策略選擇和決策的影響,擴(kuò)展模型的實(shí)用性;最后,考慮在不完全信息下對(duì)模型的改進(jìn),進(jìn)一步提高研究結(jié)論的普適性。雖然本文的研究具有一定的局限性,但其研究結(jié)論對(duì)于低碳環(huán)境下的政府和企業(yè)決策具有積極的借鑒作用和指導(dǎo)意義。

        (編輯:于杰)

        參考文獻(xiàn)(References)

        [1]徐承紅. 低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)與中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展之路[J]. 管理世界,2010,(7):171-172.[ Xu Chenghong. Lowcarbon Economy And the Path of Economic Development in China [J]. Management World, 2010, (7):171-172.]

        [2]劉小川,汪曾濤. 二氧化碳減排政策比較以及我國(guó)的優(yōu)化選擇[J].上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào),2009,11(4):73-80.[ Liu Xiaochuan, Wang Zengtao. The Comparison of Policies of Carbon Emission Reduction and Chinese Optimized Choice [J]. Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 2009, 11(4):73-80 ]

        [3]European Environmental Agency(EEA). Environmental Taxes Implementation and Environmental Effectiveness [M]. Copenhagen: EEA ,1996.

        [4]張娜. 深圳擬建碳交易市場(chǎng)[N/OL]. 深圳:人民網(wǎng),2012-09-19[2013-07-09]. http://sz. People.com.cn/n/2012/0919/c202846-17500371.html.[Zhang Na. Shenzhen Will Build Carbon Trade Market [N/OL]. Shenzhen: People, 2012-09-19[2013-07-09]. http://sz.people.com.cn/n/2012/0919/c202846-17500371.html. ]

        [5]Pigou A C. The Economics of Welfare [M]. London: Macmillian, 1952.

        [6]Yang H J, Zhang J. The Strategy of Advancing the Cooperation Satisfaction Among Enterprises Based on Low Carbon Supply Chain [J]. Energy Procedia, 2011, (5): 1125-1229.

        [7]李媛,趙道致,祝曉光.基于碳稅的政府與企業(yè)行為博弈模型研究[J].資源科學(xué),2013,35(1):125-131.[ Li Yuan, Zhao Daozhi, Zhu Xiaoguang. A Game Model of Government and Enterprise Behaviour Based on a Carbon Tax [J]. Resources Science, 2013, 35(1):125-131. ]

        [8]Cohen C M, Klepper S. The Anatomy of Industry R&D Intensity Distributions [J]. The American Economic Review, 1992, 82(4):121-133.

        [9]Sam Peltzmann. Toward a More General Theory of Regulation[J]. The Journal of Law and Economics, 1976, 19: 122-132.

        [10]Andrew B. Market Failure, Government Failure and Externalities in Climate Change Mitigation: The Case for a Carbon tax[J]. Public Administration and Development, 2008, 28(5): 393-401.

        [11]Metcalf G, Weisbach D. The Design of a Carbon Tax [J]. Harvard Environmental Law Revies, 2009, 33(2): 499-506.

        [12]樊勇,張宏偉. 碳稅對(duì)我國(guó)城鎮(zhèn)居民收入分配的累退效應(yīng)與碳補(bǔ)貼方案設(shè)計(jì)[J]. 經(jīng)濟(jì)理論與經(jīng)濟(jì)管理,2013,(7):81-91.[ Fan Yong, Zhang Hongwei. Income Distribution Impacts of Carbon Tax on Chinese Urban Residents and the Design of Carbon Subsidy Scheme [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2013, (7):81-91. ]

        [13]Andrew B. Market Failure ,Government Failure and Externalities in Climate Change Mitigation :the Case for a Carbon Tax[J]. Public Administration and Development, 2008, 28(5): 393-401.

        [14]孫亞男. 基于社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)結(jié)構(gòu)演化的產(chǎn)學(xué)研合作項(xiàng)目治理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)研究[D]. 山東:山東大學(xué),2012:110-117.[ Sun Yanan. Research on IndustryUniversityInstitute Cooperation Project Governance Risk Based on the Social Network Structure Evolution [D]. Shandong: Shandong University, 2012:110-117. ]

        [15]于維生,張志遠(yuǎn).中國(guó)碳稅政策可行性與方式選擇的博弈研究[J].中國(guó)人口·資源與環(huán)境,2013,23(6):8-16.[ Yu Weisheng, Zhang Zhiyuan. Feasibility and Mode Selection of Carbon Tax Policy in China Based on Game Theory [J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2013, 23(6):8-16. ]

        [16]高萍. 開征碳稅的必要性、路徑選擇與要素設(shè)計(jì)[J].稅務(wù)研究,2011,(1):50-54.[ Gao Ping. Necessity, Path and Elements on the Proposed Carbon Tax in China [J]. 2011, (1):50-54.]

        [17]Cao J, Ho M, Jorgenson D. The Local and Global Benefits of Green Tax Policies in China[J]. Review of Environmental Economic and Policy, 2009,3(2):189-208.

        [18]姚昕,劉希穎. 基于增長(zhǎng)視角的中國(guó)最優(yōu)碳稅研究[J].經(jīng)濟(jì)研究,2010,(11):48-58. [ Yao Xin, Liu Xiying. Optimal Carbon Tax in China with the Perspective of Economic Growth [J]. Economic Research Journal, 2010, (11):48-58. ]

        [19]崔軍. 關(guān)于我國(guó)開征碳稅的思考[J]. 稅務(wù)研究,2010,(1):41-45.[ Cui Jun. The Thinking about Carbon Tax in China [J]. Taxation Research, 2010, (1):41-45. ]

        AbstractTo achieve the goals of energy saving and emission reduction and industrial restructuring smoothly, China needs to go “Lowcarbon Road”, which is a sustainable economic development road in China. This requires selection and design of marketoriented reduction policies tool. With exploring on carbon tax policy in the carbon trading market, the article proposes that the composite carbon emissions trading system is more suited to Chinas national conditions. In this context, by building a threestage game model of duopoly enterprises of cooperation and competition within composite carbon emissions trading system, the article discusses on how to develop carbon taxes to contribute to social welfare maximization, and how to determine the planned carbon reducing emission and product prices within different carbon development strategies to satisfy their own selfinterest and so on; Then, the article conducts a sensitivity analysis for carbon tax rate changes, which is to analyze the impact of tax rate changes for product prices, planned carbon reducing emissions, corporate profits, and social welfare within cooperation and competition carbon research and development strategy. The article concludes that there are promotions for carbon tax to reduce carbon emission and improve the profit of enterprises in the carbon trading market, and these demonstrate to adopt reasonable market mechanism can achieve sustainable development of lowcarbon economy within a scientific and reasonable government policy configuration; during the process of implementation, we need to establish carbon trading market, which facilitates enterprises to choose “to improve the planned carbon reducing emissions” approach to reduce carbon emissions year after year. Then with the conditions of the powerful social supervision and the strict implementation of punishment mechanism of carbon excess emissions, we consider that the government should use carbon tax to improve the amount of planned carbon reducing emissions, and with the optimal carbon reducing emission, the government should conduct and promote the enterprises to constantly improve carbon emissions R&D efficiency,and to positily carry out cooperation and R&D for carbon reducing emissions; during the process of practice,we should select highyield industry with the larger collection space of carbon tax, in particular select the industry with lower products cost and lowcarbon degree as pilot, which is to impose carbon tax preferentially; in monopoly industry, the government must take the necessary regulatory policies to ensure the effectiveness and succession of market mechanisms, and to maintain the public interest. At the same time, the government should pay more attention to develop consumer appetite for lowcoarbon, which will help enterprises raise prices to cope with the product cost pressure caused by carbon reducing emissions, help the government reduce the resistance of the carbon tax, win space and time for the carbon tax, and promote the smooth adjustment of energy structure and optimization of industrial structure and the harmony within lowcarbon and environmental protection and economic development.

        Key wordscarbon trading; carbon tax; carbon emissions; lowcarbon degree; game model

        [7]李媛,趙道致,祝曉光.基于碳稅的政府與企業(yè)行為博弈模型研究[J].資源科學(xué),2013,35(1):125-131.[ Li Yuan, Zhao Daozhi, Zhu Xiaoguang. A Game Model of Government and Enterprise Behaviour Based on a Carbon Tax [J]. Resources Science, 2013, 35(1):125-131. ]

        [8]Cohen C M, Klepper S. The Anatomy of Industry R&D Intensity Distributions [J]. The American Economic Review, 1992, 82(4):121-133.

        [9]Sam Peltzmann. Toward a More General Theory of Regulation[J]. The Journal of Law and Economics, 1976, 19: 122-132.

        [10]Andrew B. Market Failure, Government Failure and Externalities in Climate Change Mitigation: The Case for a Carbon tax[J]. Public Administration and Development, 2008, 28(5): 393-401.

        [11]Metcalf G, Weisbach D. The Design of a Carbon Tax [J]. Harvard Environmental Law Revies, 2009, 33(2): 499-506.

        [12]樊勇,張宏偉. 碳稅對(duì)我國(guó)城鎮(zhèn)居民收入分配的累退效應(yīng)與碳補(bǔ)貼方案設(shè)計(jì)[J]. 經(jīng)濟(jì)理論與經(jīng)濟(jì)管理,2013,(7):81-91.[ Fan Yong, Zhang Hongwei. Income Distribution Impacts of Carbon Tax on Chinese Urban Residents and the Design of Carbon Subsidy Scheme [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2013, (7):81-91. ]

        [13]Andrew B. Market Failure ,Government Failure and Externalities in Climate Change Mitigation :the Case for a Carbon Tax[J]. Public Administration and Development, 2008, 28(5): 393-401.

        [14]孫亞男. 基于社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)結(jié)構(gòu)演化的產(chǎn)學(xué)研合作項(xiàng)目治理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)研究[D]. 山東:山東大學(xué),2012:110-117.[ Sun Yanan. Research on IndustryUniversityInstitute Cooperation Project Governance Risk Based on the Social Network Structure Evolution [D]. Shandong: Shandong University, 2012:110-117. ]

        [15]于維生,張志遠(yuǎn).中國(guó)碳稅政策可行性與方式選擇的博弈研究[J].中國(guó)人口·資源與環(huán)境,2013,23(6):8-16.[ Yu Weisheng, Zhang Zhiyuan. Feasibility and Mode Selection of Carbon Tax Policy in China Based on Game Theory [J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2013, 23(6):8-16. ]

        [16]高萍. 開征碳稅的必要性、路徑選擇與要素設(shè)計(jì)[J].稅務(wù)研究,2011,(1):50-54.[ Gao Ping. Necessity, Path and Elements on the Proposed Carbon Tax in China [J]. 2011, (1):50-54.]

        [17]Cao J, Ho M, Jorgenson D. The Local and Global Benefits of Green Tax Policies in China[J]. Review of Environmental Economic and Policy, 2009,3(2):189-208.

        [18]姚昕,劉希穎. 基于增長(zhǎng)視角的中國(guó)最優(yōu)碳稅研究[J].經(jīng)濟(jì)研究,2010,(11):48-58. [ Yao Xin, Liu Xiying. Optimal Carbon Tax in China with the Perspective of Economic Growth [J]. Economic Research Journal, 2010, (11):48-58. ]

        [19]崔軍. 關(guān)于我國(guó)開征碳稅的思考[J]. 稅務(wù)研究,2010,(1):41-45.[ Cui Jun. The Thinking about Carbon Tax in China [J]. Taxation Research, 2010, (1):41-45. ]

        AbstractTo achieve the goals of energy saving and emission reduction and industrial restructuring smoothly, China needs to go “Lowcarbon Road”, which is a sustainable economic development road in China. This requires selection and design of marketoriented reduction policies tool. With exploring on carbon tax policy in the carbon trading market, the article proposes that the composite carbon emissions trading system is more suited to Chinas national conditions. In this context, by building a threestage game model of duopoly enterprises of cooperation and competition within composite carbon emissions trading system, the article discusses on how to develop carbon taxes to contribute to social welfare maximization, and how to determine the planned carbon reducing emission and product prices within different carbon development strategies to satisfy their own selfinterest and so on; Then, the article conducts a sensitivity analysis for carbon tax rate changes, which is to analyze the impact of tax rate changes for product prices, planned carbon reducing emissions, corporate profits, and social welfare within cooperation and competition carbon research and development strategy. The article concludes that there are promotions for carbon tax to reduce carbon emission and improve the profit of enterprises in the carbon trading market, and these demonstrate to adopt reasonable market mechanism can achieve sustainable development of lowcarbon economy within a scientific and reasonable government policy configuration; during the process of implementation, we need to establish carbon trading market, which facilitates enterprises to choose “to improve the planned carbon reducing emissions” approach to reduce carbon emissions year after year. Then with the conditions of the powerful social supervision and the strict implementation of punishment mechanism of carbon excess emissions, we consider that the government should use carbon tax to improve the amount of planned carbon reducing emissions, and with the optimal carbon reducing emission, the government should conduct and promote the enterprises to constantly improve carbon emissions R&D efficiency,and to positily carry out cooperation and R&D for carbon reducing emissions; during the process of practice,we should select highyield industry with the larger collection space of carbon tax, in particular select the industry with lower products cost and lowcarbon degree as pilot, which is to impose carbon tax preferentially; in monopoly industry, the government must take the necessary regulatory policies to ensure the effectiveness and succession of market mechanisms, and to maintain the public interest. At the same time, the government should pay more attention to develop consumer appetite for lowcoarbon, which will help enterprises raise prices to cope with the product cost pressure caused by carbon reducing emissions, help the government reduce the resistance of the carbon tax, win space and time for the carbon tax, and promote the smooth adjustment of energy structure and optimization of industrial structure and the harmony within lowcarbon and environmental protection and economic development.

        Key wordscarbon trading; carbon tax; carbon emissions; lowcarbon degree; game model

        [7]李媛,趙道致,祝曉光.基于碳稅的政府與企業(yè)行為博弈模型研究[J].資源科學(xué),2013,35(1):125-131.[ Li Yuan, Zhao Daozhi, Zhu Xiaoguang. A Game Model of Government and Enterprise Behaviour Based on a Carbon Tax [J]. Resources Science, 2013, 35(1):125-131. ]

        [8]Cohen C M, Klepper S. The Anatomy of Industry R&D Intensity Distributions [J]. The American Economic Review, 1992, 82(4):121-133.

        [9]Sam Peltzmann. Toward a More General Theory of Regulation[J]. The Journal of Law and Economics, 1976, 19: 122-132.

        [10]Andrew B. Market Failure, Government Failure and Externalities in Climate Change Mitigation: The Case for a Carbon tax[J]. Public Administration and Development, 2008, 28(5): 393-401.

        [11]Metcalf G, Weisbach D. The Design of a Carbon Tax [J]. Harvard Environmental Law Revies, 2009, 33(2): 499-506.

        [12]樊勇,張宏偉. 碳稅對(duì)我國(guó)城鎮(zhèn)居民收入分配的累退效應(yīng)與碳補(bǔ)貼方案設(shè)計(jì)[J]. 經(jīng)濟(jì)理論與經(jīng)濟(jì)管理,2013,(7):81-91.[ Fan Yong, Zhang Hongwei. Income Distribution Impacts of Carbon Tax on Chinese Urban Residents and the Design of Carbon Subsidy Scheme [J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2013, (7):81-91. ]

        [13]Andrew B. Market Failure ,Government Failure and Externalities in Climate Change Mitigation :the Case for a Carbon Tax[J]. Public Administration and Development, 2008, 28(5): 393-401.

        [14]孫亞男. 基于社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)結(jié)構(gòu)演化的產(chǎn)學(xué)研合作項(xiàng)目治理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)研究[D]. 山東:山東大學(xué),2012:110-117.[ Sun Yanan. Research on IndustryUniversityInstitute Cooperation Project Governance Risk Based on the Social Network Structure Evolution [D]. Shandong: Shandong University, 2012:110-117. ]

        [15]于維生,張志遠(yuǎn).中國(guó)碳稅政策可行性與方式選擇的博弈研究[J].中國(guó)人口·資源與環(huán)境,2013,23(6):8-16.[ Yu Weisheng, Zhang Zhiyuan. Feasibility and Mode Selection of Carbon Tax Policy in China Based on Game Theory [J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2013, 23(6):8-16. ]

        [16]高萍. 開征碳稅的必要性、路徑選擇與要素設(shè)計(jì)[J].稅務(wù)研究,2011,(1):50-54.[ Gao Ping. Necessity, Path and Elements on the Proposed Carbon Tax in China [J]. 2011, (1):50-54.]

        [17]Cao J, Ho M, Jorgenson D. The Local and Global Benefits of Green Tax Policies in China[J]. Review of Environmental Economic and Policy, 2009,3(2):189-208.

        [18]姚昕,劉希穎. 基于增長(zhǎng)視角的中國(guó)最優(yōu)碳稅研究[J].經(jīng)濟(jì)研究,2010,(11):48-58. [ Yao Xin, Liu Xiying. Optimal Carbon Tax in China with the Perspective of Economic Growth [J]. Economic Research Journal, 2010, (11):48-58. ]

        [19]崔軍. 關(guān)于我國(guó)開征碳稅的思考[J]. 稅務(wù)研究,2010,(1):41-45.[ Cui Jun. The Thinking about Carbon Tax in China [J]. Taxation Research, 2010, (1):41-45. ]

        AbstractTo achieve the goals of energy saving and emission reduction and industrial restructuring smoothly, China needs to go “Lowcarbon Road”, which is a sustainable economic development road in China. This requires selection and design of marketoriented reduction policies tool. With exploring on carbon tax policy in the carbon trading market, the article proposes that the composite carbon emissions trading system is more suited to Chinas national conditions. In this context, by building a threestage game model of duopoly enterprises of cooperation and competition within composite carbon emissions trading system, the article discusses on how to develop carbon taxes to contribute to social welfare maximization, and how to determine the planned carbon reducing emission and product prices within different carbon development strategies to satisfy their own selfinterest and so on; Then, the article conducts a sensitivity analysis for carbon tax rate changes, which is to analyze the impact of tax rate changes for product prices, planned carbon reducing emissions, corporate profits, and social welfare within cooperation and competition carbon research and development strategy. The article concludes that there are promotions for carbon tax to reduce carbon emission and improve the profit of enterprises in the carbon trading market, and these demonstrate to adopt reasonable market mechanism can achieve sustainable development of lowcarbon economy within a scientific and reasonable government policy configuration; during the process of implementation, we need to establish carbon trading market, which facilitates enterprises to choose “to improve the planned carbon reducing emissions” approach to reduce carbon emissions year after year. Then with the conditions of the powerful social supervision and the strict implementation of punishment mechanism of carbon excess emissions, we consider that the government should use carbon tax to improve the amount of planned carbon reducing emissions, and with the optimal carbon reducing emission, the government should conduct and promote the enterprises to constantly improve carbon emissions R&D efficiency,and to positily carry out cooperation and R&D for carbon reducing emissions; during the process of practice,we should select highyield industry with the larger collection space of carbon tax, in particular select the industry with lower products cost and lowcarbon degree as pilot, which is to impose carbon tax preferentially; in monopoly industry, the government must take the necessary regulatory policies to ensure the effectiveness and succession of market mechanisms, and to maintain the public interest. At the same time, the government should pay more attention to develop consumer appetite for lowcoarbon, which will help enterprises raise prices to cope with the product cost pressure caused by carbon reducing emissions, help the government reduce the resistance of the carbon tax, win space and time for the carbon tax, and promote the smooth adjustment of energy structure and optimization of industrial structure and the harmony within lowcarbon and environmental protection and economic development.

        Key wordscarbon trading; carbon tax; carbon emissions; lowcarbon degree; game model

        猜你喜歡
        博弈模型碳交易碳稅
        氣候變化背景下我國(guó)碳稅立法模式問題探究
        基于博弈論對(duì)企業(yè)并購(gòu)行為的研究
        PPP模式下養(yǎng)老地產(chǎn)融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)博弈分析
        碳交易與節(jié)能減排政策間的相互作用研究
        基于博弈模型的PPP項(xiàng)目共擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)損失分配的研究
        國(guó)外博弈論在PPP模式研究中的應(yīng)用
        商(2016年14期)2016-05-30 22:34:33
        湖北省CCER的發(fā)展機(jī)制
        商(2016年3期)2016-03-11 13:31:29
        淺議寧夏碳金融發(fā)展
        商(2016年1期)2016-03-03 11:55:28
        中國(guó)碳排放權(quán)交易市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀、國(guó)際經(jīng)驗(yàn)與路徑選擇
        歐盟征收航海碳稅對(duì)我國(guó)航運(yùn)業(yè)的影響與對(duì)策
        中日韩欧美高清在线播放| 亚洲热线99精品视频| 久久久久久人妻一区二区三区| 99热门精品一区二区三区无码| 日韩一区二区,亚洲一区二区视频| 91偷拍与自偷拍亚洲精品86| 欧美激情一区二区三区| 国产午夜福利精品久久2021| 日韩欧群交p片内射中文| 91精彩视频在线观看| 久久99热精品免费观看麻豆| 亚洲成人av在线蜜桃| 黑森林福利视频导航| 久久精品re| 亚洲国产精品色一区二区| 亚洲综合中文字幕综合| 无码人妻av一二区二区三区| 久久精品国产91久久性色tv| 国产少妇一区二区三区| 97人妻人人揉人人躁九色| 亚洲丁香五月天缴情综合| 91福利国产在线观一区二区| 在线观看一区二区三区国产| 日韩久久无码免费毛片软件| 丰满少妇在线观看网站| 亚洲欧美日本人成在线观看| 亚洲av乱码一区二区三区人人| 人妻少妇精品视频三区二区一区| 欧美人与物videos另类xxxxx| 国产综合一区二区三区av | 蜜桃尤物在线视频免费看| 国产三级精品三级在线观看| 久久久久亚洲AV成人网毛片| 99热婷婷一区二区三区| 女人下边被添全过视频| 大地资源中文在线观看官网第二页| 成人国产乱对白在线观看| av黄色在线免费观看| 少妇人妻陈艳和黑人教练| 欧美xxxx新一区二区三区| 亚洲av本道一本二本三区|