張翠華，李慧思

考慮產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量差異的制造商入侵決策研究

張翠華，李慧思

（東北大學(xué) 工商管理學(xué)院，遼寧 沈陽 110819）

隨著電子商務(wù)和物流行業(yè)的迅速發(fā)展，網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道越來越受到制造商的青睞，然而制造商入侵所引發(fā)的渠道競爭并沒有得到零售商的普遍認(rèn)可，大多數(shù)零售商視制造商入侵為一種威脅。本文以一個制造商和一個零售商組成的二級供應(yīng)鏈為背景，考慮產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量差異以及零售商具有公平敏感性，研究了制造商入侵決策以及零售商公平敏感性對供應(yīng)鏈節(jié)點企業(yè)決策和供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)收益的影響。本文首先建立了制造商決策基本模型、制造商同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵模型以及制造商異質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵模型，然后運用博弈理論和方法，求得制造商和零售商在Stackelberg-Nash博弈下的均衡解，最后對均衡結(jié)果進(jìn)行算例仿真分析，得到相關(guān)結(jié)論。研究表明，入侵總能使制造商獲益，并且異質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵優(yōu)于同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵；在一定條件下制造商入侵同樣能使零售商獲益，但零售商獲益與否與其自身公平敏感性類型有關(guān)。

制造商入侵；質(zhì)量差異；質(zhì)量敏感；公平敏感性；Stackelberg-Nash博弈

0 引言

制造商投資建立直銷渠道（例如網(wǎng)上商店，目錄銷售以及工廠折扣店等），將產(chǎn)品直接銷售給顧客，這種現(xiàn)象通常被叫做入侵（encroachment）[1-2]。在經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化愈演愈烈的時代背景下，供應(yīng)鏈成員間的競爭與合作關(guān)系面臨一系列新的矛盾和問題，供應(yīng)鏈成員在其生產(chǎn)、經(jīng)營以及管理活動中，不僅要考慮與供應(yīng)鏈其它成員的合作，還要考慮潛在入侵者對自身決策和收益的影響。隨著電子商務(wù)和物流行業(yè)的迅猛發(fā)展，許多制造商在原有傳統(tǒng)零售渠道的基礎(chǔ)上開設(shè)了網(wǎng)上直銷渠道，然而由于制造商入侵所引發(fā)的渠道競爭并沒有得到零售商的普遍認(rèn)可，大多數(shù)零售商視制造商入侵為一種威脅[2]。為了避免渠道沖突，緩解制造商和零售商之間的矛盾，維持合作關(guān)系，很多制造商被迫停止在網(wǎng)上直銷渠道的銷售，例如李維斯終止了網(wǎng)上直銷渠道http://www.levis.com和http://www.dockers.com的銷售，而將網(wǎng)上銷售交給幾個電子零售。

隨著制造商入侵引發(fā)的矛盾日益凸顯，學(xué)術(shù)界對制造商入侵問題的研究也逐漸興起。Arya等[2]首先研究了制造商入侵行為對制造商利潤、零售商利潤以及消費者剩余的影響，同時給出了制造商入侵條件，研究表明，在一定條件下制造商入侵會使制造商、零售商以及消費者同時獲益。此后學(xué)者們從不同的角度出發(fā)，對制造商入侵展開研究。Albert等[3]將產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量水平作為決策變量建立制造商入侵模型，給出了產(chǎn)品最優(yōu)質(zhì)量水平以及制造商入侵條件；Yoon[4]研究了制造商進(jìn)行R&D投資進(jìn)而產(chǎn)生外溢效應(yīng)情況下的制造商入侵問題；Li等[1,5]研究了不對稱信息條件下的制造商入侵問題；Chen等[6]研究了零售商具有風(fēng)險規(guī)避特性且制造商生產(chǎn)成本是私有信息條件下的制造商入侵問題；Li等[7]研究了零售商具有公平偏好條件下的制造商入侵問題；以上研究均是上游制造商向下游零售商進(jìn)行入侵，Li和Zhou[8]則研究了制造商向上游供應(yīng)商入侵問題。

現(xiàn)有制造商入侵問題研究大多假設(shè)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量為外生變量，并且當(dāng)制造商選擇入侵時，其在直銷渠道和零售渠道銷售的產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量是同質(zhì)的。產(chǎn)品差異化對于企業(yè)營銷活動具有重要意義[9-10]，而質(zhì)量作為影響市場需求的重要因素，制造商在入侵時采取質(zhì)量差異化戰(zhàn)略可以緩解競爭壓力。關(guān)于質(zhì)量差異問題，劉家國等[11]研究了再制造產(chǎn)品與新產(chǎn)品之間存在質(zhì)量差異條件下的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈價格決策；Chen等[12]研究了產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量存在差異情形下的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈價格和質(zhì)量決策問題。

此外，現(xiàn)有制造商入侵問題研究大多假設(shè)供應(yīng)鏈成員是完全理性的。而在實際經(jīng)濟(jì)運行中，經(jīng)濟(jì)主體具有一定程度的公平偏好。例如，Scheer等[13]對417家美國汽車經(jīng)銷商和289家荷蘭汽車經(jīng)銷商進(jìn)行研究后發(fā)現(xiàn)，無論是優(yōu)勢不公平還是劣勢不公平，荷蘭的汽車經(jīng)銷商均會對其做出反應(yīng)，而美國的汽車經(jīng)銷商只關(guān)心劣勢不公平。Huseman等[14]將個體對公平的不同偏好定義為公平敏感性，這種偏好導(dǎo)致個體對公平或者不公平的結(jié)果有穩(wěn)定且個性化的反應(yīng)。影響公平敏感性主要有兩類因素：個人因素和區(qū)域文化因素[15-17]。

綜上，本文區(qū)分制造商同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵和異質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵兩種不同情形，并且零售商具有公平敏感性，研究制造商入侵決策以及零售商公平敏感性對供應(yīng)鏈節(jié)點企業(yè)決策和供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)收益的影響。與現(xiàn)有入侵研究相比，本文假設(shè)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量為內(nèi)生變量，考慮產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量差異，區(qū)分同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵和異質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵兩種不同情形；此外，本文將Huseman的公平敏感性理論同F(xiàn)ehr和Schmidt[18]的公平偏好效用損失函數(shù)共同引入到制造商入侵問題中，探討了零售商公平敏感性對制造商入侵決策的影響。

1 問題描述與假設(shè)

本文研究的是由一個制造商和一個零售商組成的供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)，制造商負(fù)責(zé)生產(chǎn)并對產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量進(jìn)行控制。制造商不選擇入侵時，將產(chǎn)品批發(fā)給零售商，由零售商進(jìn)行銷售；當(dāng)制造商選擇入侵時，建立直銷渠道，同時通過零售渠道和直銷渠道進(jìn)行銷售，制造商入侵情形下的供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu)如圖1所示。

圖1 制造商入侵情形下供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu)

Figure 1 The structure of a supply chain under manufacturer encroachment

1.1 符號說明

本文所使用的相關(guān)符號說明如下：

1.2 相關(guān)假設(shè)

本文所研究的問題基于以下假設(shè)條件：

假設(shè)3. 假設(shè)消費者對產(chǎn)品的價格和質(zhì)量敏感，并且消費者能夠準(zhǔn)確地感知產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量水平，本文假設(shè)代表性消費者效用函數(shù)如下所示：

根據(jù)以上假設(shè)，得到制造商和零售商的利潤如下：

本文在Fehr和Schmidt[18]的公平偏好效用損失函數(shù)模型基礎(chǔ)上，引入公平敏感性系數(shù)，構(gòu)建零售商的效用損失函數(shù)如下：

2 模型建立和求解

2.1 基本模型

結(jié)合式(2)和式(7)，得到制造商不入侵時零售商的利潤如下：

將式(9)和式(10)代入式(8)，整理得到零售商存在公平敏感性時的效用如下：

將式(13)和式(14)代入式(12)得到最優(yōu)零售渠道價格：

2.2 制造商同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵模型

結(jié)合式(4)和式(7)，得到制造商同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵時的零售商利潤如下：

將式(16)和式(17)代入式(8)，整理得到制造商同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵時零售商的效用如下：

將式(21)和式(22)代入式(19)和式(20)中得到：

在研究制造商同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵情形時，需要保證直銷渠道數(shù)量和零售渠道數(shù)量同時大于0，即需要滿足以下條件：

2.3 制造商異質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵模型

結(jié)合式(4)和(7)，得到制造商異質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵時零售商的利潤如下：

將式(26)和式(27)代入式(8)，整理后得到零售商的效用如下：

將式(31)至式(33)代入式(29)和式(30)中得到：

在研究制造商異質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵情形時，需要保證直銷渠道數(shù)量和零售渠道數(shù)量同時大于0，即需要滿足以下條件：

3 算例仿真與分析

（1）零售商公平敏感性對均衡結(jié)果的影響

Figure2 The relationship between the equilibrium results and the retailer's equity sensitivity coefficient

（2）直銷渠道單位銷售成本對制造商利潤、零售商效用的影響

綜上所述，制造商利潤和零售商效用與直銷渠道單位銷售成本有關(guān)，當(dāng)直銷渠道單位銷售成本在一定范圍內(nèi)，且零售商為特定類型時（同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵情形時自負(fù)型、自信型和自卑型；異質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵情形時僅自卑型），入侵可以實現(xiàn)制造商和零售商利潤（效用）帕累托改善。

Figure3 The relationship between manufacturer and retailer profit (utility) and unit cost of sales in direct selling channels

4 結(jié)論

本文構(gòu)建了由一個制造商和一個零售商組成的二級供應(yīng)鏈制造商入侵模型，研究了制造商的入侵決策以及零售商公平敏感性對供應(yīng)鏈節(jié)點企業(yè)決策和供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)收益的影響，得到如下結(jié)論：（1）入侵總能使制造商利潤增加；在一定條件下，入侵也能使零售商獲利，使雙方利潤（效用）實現(xiàn)帕累托改善；（2）異質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵優(yōu)于同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品入侵，制造商開辟直銷渠道并在直銷渠道和零售渠道銷售質(zhì)量存在差異的產(chǎn)品能使其獲得更高的利潤；（3）制造商與自卑型零售商合作比與自負(fù)型零售商合作更有利，制造商與自卑型零售商合作能獲得較高的利潤，也比較容易實現(xiàn)雙方利潤（效用）帕累托改善，緩解入侵帶來的競爭壓力。

本文所構(gòu)建的模型和分析得到的管理啟示對相關(guān)企業(yè)具有指導(dǎo)意義。然而本文的研究也存在一定的不足之處，比如本文只考慮供應(yīng)鏈成員中處于弱勢地位的零售商具有公平敏感性，在未來的研究中可以考慮制造商也具有公平敏感性，研究當(dāng)制造商和零售商同時具有公平敏感性時對制造商入侵決策以及供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的影響。另一方面本文在模型的構(gòu)建過程中，只考慮了單一制造商和單一零售商的情況，在接下來的研究中可以探討多個制造商或者多個零售商競爭的情況，研究競爭情形下的入侵問題。

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Research on manufacturers encroachment decision-making considering quality difference of products

ZHANG Cuihua, LI Huisi

(School of Business and Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China)

Competition between retail channels has existed for a long time. This competition is regarded as a positive economic force. However, competition in the form of manufacturer encroachment has not been widely accepted by retailers. Most retailers consider manufacturer encroachment as more of a threat. In order to avoid direct conflicts with retailers, many manufacturers have terminated their sales in direct sales channels. From this perspective, it is necessary to study the issue of manufacturer encroachment, whether manufacturers should encroach, and what impact manufacturer encroachment has on the supply chain system.

This paper considers two types of manufacturer encroachment, that of homogeneous products and that of heterogeneous products, where retailers have equity sensitivity. This paper also studies the optimal encroachment decisions of manufacturers and the impact of the equity sensitivity of retailers on the decision-making of supply chain members and the revenue of supply chain system. In comparison to existing research, this paper assumes that product quality is an endogenous variable, and based on this assumption proposes two different scenarios: homogeneous product encroachment and heterogeneous product encroachment. In addition, this paper introduces equity sensitivity theory into the issue of manufacturer encroachment and discusses the impact of the equity sensitivity of retailers on product quality, product wholesale price, retail channel price, direct sales channel price, retailer utility, and manufacturer profit.

In this paper, a two-layer chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is used as an example. First, models of non-encroachment by manufacturers, homogeneous product encroachment by manufacturers, and heterogeneous product encroachment by manufacturers are established. Then, game theory and related analytical methods are applied to the above models, and the equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg-Nash game theory for the manufacturer and the retailer is obtained. Finally, an example simulation analysis is performed on the equilibrium result to obtain relevant conclusions.

The research results show that: (1) Encroachment will always increase the profit of the manufacturer; (2) The profit of the manufacturer and the utility of the retailer are related to the unit sales cost of the direct sales channel. When the unit sales cost of the direct sales channel is within a certain range, and the retailer is of a specific type (conceited, self-confident, or inferior in the case of encroachment of homogeneous products, or inferior in the case of encroachment of heterogeneous products), encroachment can achieve a Pareto improvement in profits (utility) of manufacturers and retailers; (3) Heterogeneous product encroachment is more effective than homogeneous product encroachment. Manufacturers open up direct sales channels and sell products with different qualities in the direct sales and retail channels to generate more profit; (4) Co-operation between manufacturers and inferior retailers is more profitable compared to co-operation between manufacturers and conceited retailers. Manufacturers will co-operate with inferior retailers to obtain higher profits, and it is easier to achieve a Pareto improvement in the profit (utility) of both parties, alleviating competitive pressure brought about by encroachment.

The model constructed in this paper and the management insights obtained from its analysis have guiding significance for related enterprises, but this research also has certain shortcomings. Future steps should include exploring the impact of the equity sensitivity of manufacturers and retailers on the decision-making process of manufacturer encroachment and the revenue of the supply chain system; encroachment in scenarios of competition between multiple manufacturers or multiple retailers should also be studied.

Manufacturers encroachment; Quality difference; Quality sensitive; Equity sensitivity; Stackelberg-Nash game

2018-01-25

2018-05-12

Supported by the Natural Science Foundation of China (71371043, 71771044)

F274

A

1004-6062(2020)04-0161-010

10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2020.04.018

2018-01-25

2018-05-12

國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項目（71371043、71771044）

張翠華（1971—），女，遼寧沈陽人；東北大學(xué)工商管理學(xué)院教授，博士；主要從事供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量控制研究。

中文編輯：杜 健；英文編輯：Boping Yan