馬躍如，易 丹，胡韓莉

基于服務(wù)質(zhì)量控制的養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)研究

馬躍如，易 丹，胡韓莉

（中南大學(xué) 商學(xué)院，湖南 長(zhǎng)沙 410083）

本文針對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)中的服務(wù)質(zhì)量控制問(wèn)題，構(gòu)建了基于養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈各主體服務(wù)質(zhì)量與老年人服務(wù)滿意度的懲罰契約模型與收益共享契約模型，比較研究了兩種契約對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的影響。研究表明：老年人的不滿意度的提升會(huì)降低提供商和集成商的服務(wù)質(zhì)量與利潤(rùn)，同時(shí)也會(huì)提高養(yǎng)老服務(wù)價(jià)格；在懲罰契約情境下，提高懲罰比率對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈基本無(wú)影響，而在收益共享契約情境下，提高收益共享比率有助于改善服務(wù)質(zhì)量，同時(shí)也會(huì)提高服務(wù)價(jià)格和降低供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤(rùn)；通過(guò)調(diào)節(jié)協(xié)調(diào)契約中的參數(shù)可以改善養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的整體利潤(rùn)。懲罰契約和收益共享契約在不同適用條件下會(huì)根據(jù)實(shí)際運(yùn)營(yíng)情況的變化而表現(xiàn)出不同強(qiáng)度的協(xié)調(diào)作用。

養(yǎng)老服務(wù); 供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào); 服務(wù)質(zhì)量; 懲罰契約; 收益共享契約

0 引言

國(guó)務(wù)院印發(fā)的《"十三五"國(guó)家老齡事業(yè)發(fā)展和養(yǎng)老體系建設(shè)規(guī)劃》顯示：預(yù)計(jì)到2020年，全國(guó)60歲以上老年人口將增加到2.55億人左右，占總?cè)丝诒戎氐?7.8%左右，老年撫養(yǎng)比將提高到28%左右。家庭養(yǎng)老功能弱化、老年人身體狀況及空巢老人問(wèn)題凸顯，催生養(yǎng)老行業(yè)需求的強(qiáng)勢(shì)增長(zhǎng)并顯現(xiàn)供給的顯著不足[1-2]。國(guó)務(wù)院頒布的《關(guān)于全面放開(kāi)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)市場(chǎng)提升養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量的若干意見(jiàn)》等系列養(yǎng)老服務(wù)政策，強(qiáng)調(diào)要全面放開(kāi)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)市場(chǎng)，大幅提升養(yǎng)老服務(wù)和產(chǎn)品的有效供給能力，使供給結(jié)構(gòu)更加合理，強(qiáng)調(diào)以供應(yīng)鏈模式引領(lǐng)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)行業(yè)發(fā)展，使服務(wù)質(zhì)量得到有效提升，人民群眾對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)的滿意度顯著改善。與傳統(tǒng)養(yǎng)老模式不同的是，養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈引入了服務(wù)集成商這一主體，服務(wù)集成商將部分養(yǎng)老服務(wù)模塊外包給專(zhuān)業(yè)的服務(wù)提供商。如湖南省長(zhǎng)沙市雨花區(qū)政院社區(qū)居家養(yǎng)老服務(wù)中心將餐飲和理療服務(wù)外包給湖南省著名養(yǎng)老服務(wù)企業(yè)—湖南省紅楓養(yǎng)老服務(wù)有限公司，天心區(qū)則將上門(mén)為老人提供助潔、助殘等家政服務(wù)外包給私人運(yùn)營(yíng)的天心區(qū)居家養(yǎng)老服務(wù)中心，更有諸多養(yǎng)老服務(wù)機(jī)構(gòu)將餐飲服務(wù)外包給私人運(yùn)營(yíng)，為老年人提供“團(tuán)膳”，而自身則專(zhuān)注于提供專(zhuān)業(yè)的老人護(hù)理服務(wù)。通常，養(yǎng)老服務(wù)業(yè)務(wù)模塊可能采取的外包形式有：餐飲、洗衣、護(hù)理、社工、醫(yī)療、物業(yè)以及整體外包等。目前，我國(guó)已有眾多地區(qū)通過(guò)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)外包模式引入社會(huì)資本，不僅可為社區(qū)老人提供專(zhuān)業(yè)的優(yōu)質(zhì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)，而且能一定程度的減輕公共財(cái)政負(fù)擔(dān)甚至創(chuàng)造收益。此類(lèi)運(yùn)營(yíng)模式將老年人的服務(wù)需求、服務(wù)需求整合、服務(wù)供給等主要環(huán)節(jié)串聯(lián)起來(lái)，對(duì)其中的信息流、資金流和服務(wù)流進(jìn)行控制，以此將服務(wù)提供商（基本生活照料、醫(yī)療服務(wù)、精神慰藉等）、服務(wù)集成商（以下簡(jiǎn)稱(chēng)"提供商"，"集成商"）和老年人整合起來(lái)形成一條功能較完備的養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈[3-4]。由于涉及利益主體較多，如何約定集成商、提供商的權(quán)責(zé)和義務(wù)成為實(shí)現(xiàn)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈成功運(yùn)營(yíng)的關(guān)鍵。如在現(xiàn)實(shí)中，有不少養(yǎng)老機(jī)構(gòu)將餐飲部門(mén)外包，但對(duì)養(yǎng)老機(jī)構(gòu)餐飲部門(mén)管理的理念不同，委托方認(rèn)為餐飲不賺錢(qián)又不好管理，找了并不專(zhuān)業(yè)且以營(yíng)利為目的的餐飲公司管理，雙方均承擔(dān)了對(duì)“盈利”較高的壓力，最后擠壓的是老人的餐飲質(zhì)量，對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)機(jī)構(gòu)的入住率產(chǎn)生了重大的負(fù)面影響，最終降低了機(jī)構(gòu)的盈利能力。因此如何通過(guò)實(shí)現(xiàn)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)，優(yōu)化利益分配和提供高質(zhì)高效的養(yǎng)老服務(wù)是本文研究的重點(diǎn)。

有關(guān)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈與服務(wù)質(zhì)量的研究還處于起步階段，主要集中于集成商服務(wù)質(zhì)量決策[5-6]、提供商選擇[7]與道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制[8]、養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量風(fēng)險(xiǎn)識(shí)別[9]、養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量評(píng)價(jià)[10]、養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量影響因素[11-12]、護(hù)理人員調(diào)度[13]等方面。如張智勇等[5]在需求規(guī)模存在差異性的情況下，對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)集成商和服務(wù)提供商的最優(yōu)質(zhì)量決策分別進(jìn)行了探討，并分析了二者之間的相互影響；進(jìn)一步的，通過(guò)假設(shè)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)提供商提供某一水平的服務(wù)質(zhì)量并保持不變，研究在養(yǎng)老服務(wù)市場(chǎng)需求變化的情況下，養(yǎng)老服務(wù)集成商如何通過(guò)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和博弈來(lái)做出最優(yōu)服務(wù)質(zhì)量決策的問(wèn)題[6]；田北海和王彩云[14]認(rèn)為社會(huì)化養(yǎng)老服務(wù)是家庭養(yǎng)老功能下降的必然產(chǎn)物，并基于嵌入性分析視角，探討了老年人對(duì)社會(huì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)的需求特征及影響因素；李素利等[11]則通過(guò)實(shí)證研究，探討了政府農(nóng)村養(yǎng)老保障服務(wù)能力對(duì)服務(wù)質(zhì)量的影響；章曉懿[15]通過(guò)對(duì)政府與民間組織合作模式理論的梳理，分析了政府與社會(huì)組織合作提供養(yǎng)老服務(wù)的條件及各種合作模式所具備的顯著特征，并指出了未來(lái)可能的發(fā)展方向。

上述研究主要從微觀或者宏觀視角探討了養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈成員的服務(wù)質(zhì)量決策、養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量影響因素等問(wèn)題，但關(guān)于養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的研究比較少。事實(shí)上關(guān)于供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的研究成果有很多，包括收益共享契約、成本共享契約、回購(gòu)契約[16]、獎(jiǎng)懲契約、回購(gòu)–質(zhì)量成本分擔(dān)契約[17]等，只有部分文獻(xiàn)研究了養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題，如寧晟宇等[18]通過(guò)建立質(zhì)量風(fēng)險(xiǎn)模型，研究了養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈成員之間不同的質(zhì)量激勵(lì)合同對(duì)服務(wù)質(zhì)量和收益的影響，并探討了合同成立的潛在條件；桑秀麗等[19]基于Stankelberg博弈理論，研究由一個(gè)地方政府和兩個(gè)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)提供商組成的養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的補(bǔ)貼分配策略；張智勇等[20]假設(shè)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)需求是價(jià)格和提供商服務(wù)質(zhì)量的線性函數(shù)，討論了獎(jiǎng)懲契約對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量決策和供應(yīng)鏈成員收益的改善作用。上述研究主要是在考慮提供商或集成商服務(wù)質(zhì)量的基礎(chǔ)上，分析了包括質(zhì)量激勵(lì)合同、獎(jiǎng)懲契約等單一契約模式下的養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題，并未綜合考慮所有成員服務(wù)質(zhì)量對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈產(chǎn)生的影響，也未考慮在單一契約適用范圍之外該如何進(jìn)行養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)，更未見(jiàn)將收益共享契約應(yīng)用于養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的研究。而Cachon和Lariviere[21]的研究表明收益共享契約的協(xié)調(diào)作用是顯著的，在大多數(shù)情況下有助于實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)最大化。如Cai等[22]在需求對(duì)服務(wù)質(zhì)量敏感的情況下，應(yīng)用收益共享契約對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行協(xié)調(diào)；Bai等[23]則證明了收益共享契約比成本共享契約對(duì)服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)作用更強(qiáng)。本文將重點(diǎn)關(guān)注懲罰契約和收益共享契約對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題。

區(qū)別于以往研究，本文從以下三個(gè)方面進(jìn)行了擴(kuò)展：第一，綜合考慮提供商與集成商的服務(wù)質(zhì)量對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈決策的影響，現(xiàn)實(shí)中養(yǎng)老服務(wù)需求不僅受價(jià)格的影響，還受養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈中所有成員的服務(wù)質(zhì)量的影響[20]，因此將養(yǎng)老服務(wù)市場(chǎng)需求設(shè)置為關(guān)于提供商與集成商服務(wù)質(zhì)量以及價(jià)格的線性函數(shù)；第二，在懲罰契約情境下，基于老年人反饋的服務(wù)不滿意度信息，考察其對(duì)提供商和集成商養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量、定價(jià)及利潤(rùn)等決策的影響；第三，比較研究收益共享契約與懲罰契約對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的影響，分析不同模式下供應(yīng)鏈的最優(yōu)服務(wù)質(zhì)量與定價(jià)決策，以及不同契約模式的適用條件；第四，探討了不同契約的適用條件，并揭示了集成商和提供商在養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈中的主導(dǎo)地位和對(duì)整體利潤(rùn)的貢獻(xiàn)度，會(huì)根據(jù)雙方簽訂的契約類(lèi)型發(fā)生變化，而養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量的提升雖然在一定程度上會(huì)導(dǎo)致提供商或集成商服務(wù)成本的增加，但養(yǎng)老服務(wù)需求增加的速度遠(yuǎn)大于成本增加的速度，因此對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈各成員均衡利潤(rùn)的影響微乎其微，為基于服務(wù)質(zhì)量控制的養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)政策的制定與實(shí)施提供理論借鑒。

1 問(wèn)題描述與基本假設(shè)

表1 變量符號(hào)與說(shuō)明

2 模型構(gòu)建與求解

2.1 無(wú)契約情境

提供商和集成商的利潤(rùn)函數(shù)分別為

養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤(rùn)函數(shù)為

2.2 懲罰契約情境

在懲罰契約情境下，提供商的利潤(rùn)函數(shù)為

集成商的利潤(rùn)函數(shù)為

定理1：

在懲罰契約情境下，有下列結(jié)論：

推論1：

在懲罰契約情境下，有下列結(jié)論：

提供商和集成商的養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量都與服務(wù)質(zhì)量的需求影響系數(shù)、服務(wù)改善成本影響系數(shù)密切相關(guān)，且是老年人不滿意度和懲罰成本分?jǐn)偙壤膯握{(diào)函數(shù)，意味著隨著懲罰分?jǐn)偙壤脑龃?，也即養(yǎng)老服務(wù)提供商承擔(dān)的老年人不滿意懲罰成本越大，其制定的養(yǎng)老服務(wù)批發(fā)價(jià)格也越高，以此將懲罰成本部分的轉(zhuǎn)移給集成商。此外，在一定條件下，老年人不滿意比例與提供商、集成商的服務(wù)水平成負(fù)向關(guān)系，這意味著服務(wù)質(zhì)量低可能導(dǎo)致老年人不滿意比例增大，而老年人不滿意比例的增大可能影響提供商和集成商提升服務(wù)質(zhì)量的積極性。

2.3 收益共享契約情境

在收益共享契約條件下，集成商的利潤(rùn)函數(shù)為

提供商的利潤(rùn)函數(shù)為

同理可得

定理2：在收益共享契約情境下，有下列結(jié)論：

3 數(shù)值分析

3.1 不同契約模式下關(guān)鍵參數(shù)的影響分析

圖1 懲罰契約情境下對(duì)各變量均衡解的影響

圖2 懲罰契約情境下對(duì)各變量均衡解的影響

圖3 收益共享契約情境下對(duì)各變量均衡解的影響

3.2 不同契約情境下養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的比較分析

圖4 不同情境下對(duì)均衡利潤(rùn)的影響

圖5 不同情境下對(duì)均衡利潤(rùn)的影響

圖6 不同情境下對(duì)均衡養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量的影響

圖7 不同情境下對(duì)均衡養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量的影響

表2 不同情境下和對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈均衡利潤(rùn)的影響分析

4 結(jié)束語(yǔ)

隨著國(guó)家一系列養(yǎng)老服務(wù)政策的出臺(tái)，養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)與管理將成為服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈領(lǐng)域的一個(gè)新的研究點(diǎn)，而目前理論界對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈管理的研究卻相對(duì)較為薄弱，因此探討?zhàn)B老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)具有重要的理論與現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文基于養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量對(duì)需求、成本、老年人滿意度等因素的影響，建立養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)模型，分析了懲罰契約、收益共享契約的適用條件；比較了對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量決策和各成員利潤(rùn)的改善作用，得到以下研究結(jié)論：

第一、懲罰契約對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)作用有限，需要根據(jù)現(xiàn)實(shí)情況的變化對(duì)該契約的設(shè)置進(jìn)行優(yōu)化以提高懲罰契約的協(xié)調(diào)能力；第二、養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的大部分利潤(rùn)總是由提供商獲得，集成商只獲得少部分利潤(rùn)，只有在收益共享情境下，集成商的經(jīng)濟(jì)地位才有所提升，表明養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈中成員主導(dǎo)地位的確定需要根據(jù)集成商和提供商簽訂的契約類(lèi)型來(lái)確定，以此帶動(dòng)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈整體均衡利潤(rùn)的增加；第三、養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈各成員的服務(wù)質(zhì)量對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)需求的影響越大，對(duì)服務(wù)質(zhì)量的改善作用就越明顯，這說(shuō)明在市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境下，要保證養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的健康運(yùn)營(yíng)，必須充分重視服務(wù)質(zhì)量的核心作用；第四、養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量的提升雖然在一定程度上會(huì)導(dǎo)致提供商或集成商服務(wù)成本的增加，但養(yǎng)老服務(wù)需求增加的速度遠(yuǎn)大于成本增加的速度，因此對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈各成員均衡利潤(rùn)的影響微乎其微。

本文的研究為基于服務(wù)質(zhì)量控制的養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)管理提供了理論借鑒，并揭示了以下管理啟示：懲罰契約和收益共享契約的適用條件會(huì)根據(jù)實(shí)際運(yùn)營(yíng)情況的變化而表現(xiàn)出不同強(qiáng)度的協(xié)調(diào)作用，甚至出現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)效果遜于無(wú)契約決策的情況。因此運(yùn)營(yíng)者應(yīng)根據(jù)現(xiàn)實(shí)情況的變化靈活運(yùn)用契約對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行協(xié)調(diào)，充分發(fā)揮各種契約的協(xié)調(diào)作用，以持續(xù)的實(shí)現(xiàn)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)最大化的目標(biāo)。如在養(yǎng)老機(jī)構(gòu)的餐飲外包中，由于衛(wèi)生和安全最得老年人關(guān)心，湖南省紅楓養(yǎng)老服務(wù)有限公司與將養(yǎng)老服務(wù)委托承包的多個(gè)社區(qū)約定將老年人不滿意度分梯度，約定每個(gè)梯度的懲罰比率，以此達(dá)到約束其行為，保證老年人餐飲質(zhì)量并樹(shù)立良好的市場(chǎng)形象的目的。而在養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的運(yùn)營(yíng)過(guò)程中，要有效提升養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤(rùn)，必須充分發(fā)揮提供商的帶動(dòng)作用，并積極創(chuàng)造條件激發(fā)集成商的能動(dòng)性，提高其對(duì)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈整體盈利能力的促進(jìn)作用。養(yǎng)老服務(wù)外包給服務(wù)提供商后，成本控制與質(zhì)量改善的主動(dòng)權(quán)把握在提供商一方，因此通過(guò)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)契約來(lái)激勵(lì)提供商控制成本、改善質(zhì)量，以此帶動(dòng)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤(rùn)的增加就顯得尤為重要。此外，成本因素將不再是養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈在運(yùn)營(yíng)過(guò)程中考慮的最主要因素，服務(wù)質(zhì)量才是保證養(yǎng)老服務(wù)產(chǎn)業(yè)又好又快發(fā)展的核心因素。在質(zhì)量強(qiáng)國(guó)的發(fā)展時(shí)代，提高養(yǎng)老服務(wù)質(zhì)量所帶來(lái)的效益將比一味降低成本帶來(lái)的效益要大得多。因此，只有保證養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供給端的優(yōu)良服務(wù)質(zhì)量，才能有效刺激養(yǎng)老服務(wù)需求，實(shí)現(xiàn)養(yǎng)老服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)，才能更好的促進(jìn)社會(huì)化養(yǎng)老的健康有序發(fā)展。

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Research of old-age service supply chain coordination based on service quality control

MA Yueru, YI Dan, HU Hanli

(School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China)

The "Report on the Development of China's Pension Industry" states that from 2020 to 2030, the population of Chinese people over age 60 will grow from 260 million to 370 million. "Empty nest seniors" account for nearly 50% of the elderly population, and the proportion of senior citizens with fully or partially compromising disabilities will reach 18.3%, showing social characteristics of aging, empty-nesting, and disability. China has entered a period of rapid development of an aging society, and the issue of old-age care has

increasing attention from the government and society. The weakening of the family old-age care function and the physical health condition of the elderly - and the problems associated with “empty nest seniors” - are prominent, which has led to a strong growth in demand in the pension industry, and a significant shortage of supply. Different from the traditional old-age care service model, the old-age service supply chain has introduced the main body of service integrators. The service integrators outsource some of the old-age service modules to professional service providers. Since there are many stakeholders involved, how to define the rights and obligations of integrators and providers has become the key to the successful operation of the old-age service supply chain. Existing research has mainly discussed the issues of service quality decision-making, and the factors affecting the quality of the old-age service supply chain members from a micro or macro perspective, but relatively few studies have been done on the coordination of the old-age service supply chain. Therefore, how to optimize the distribution of benefits and provide high-quality and efficient pension services through the coordination of the supply chain of old-age services is the focus of this paper.

Targeting the problem of service quality control in the coordination of the old-age service supply chain, this paper constructs a punishment contract model and a revenue-sharing contract model based on the service quality and the degree of satisfaction in old-age care service, and studies the impact of the supply chain coordination of these two contracts on old-age service. First, based on the operation model of the old-age service supply chain in practice, we describe the issues that need to be studied in this article and make basic research assumptions. Second, from a theoretical perspective, we build the punishment contract model and the revenue-sharing contract model based on the service quality of the main bodies of the old-age service supply chain and the degree of satisfaction of the elderly. Finally, the influence of key parameters on the quality and profit of the old-age service supply chain under different contract scenarios is discussed. Research shows that increased dissatisfaction among the elderly will reduce service quality and profits of providers and integrators, but will increase the price of old-age services; in the context of a punishment contract, increasing the punishment ratio has basically no effect on the supply chain of old-age services, and in the context of a revenue-sharing contract, increasing the revenue-sharing ratio improves quality and price, but the overall profit of the supply chain decreases. The overall profit of the old-age service supply chain can be improved by adjusting parameters affecting the coordination of the contracts. Punishment contracts and revenue-sharing contracts show different degrees of coordination under different feasible conditions, based on changes in actual operating conditions.

To sum up, the feasible conditions for the punishment contract and the revenue-sharing contract will result in different levels of coordination according to changes in actual operating conditions, and the coordination effect is even worse than that in the absence of a contract. Therefore, operators should flexibly use contracts to coordinate the supply chain of pension services according to changes in actual conditions, and give full discretion to the coordination role of various contracts to consistently achieve the goal of maximizing the profit of the supply chain. In the operation of the old-age service supply chain, in order to effectively improve the overall profit of the supply chain, it is necessary to give full discretion to the leading role of the provider, and actively create conditions to stimulate the initiative of the integrator to improve the overall profitability of the supply chain with a promotional effect. In addition, the cost factor will no longer be the most important factor considered in the operation of the old-age service supply chain. The quality of service is the core factor to ensure the sound and rapid development of the old-age care service industry. In the era of development of power in quality, the benefits of improving the quality of old-age care will be much greater than the benefits of reducing costs. Therefore, only by guaranteeing excellent quality of service to the end-users of old-age services can we effectively stimulate the demand for these services, realize the coordination of the old-age care service supply chain, and better promote the healthy and orderly development of socialized pension care.

Old-age service; Supply chain coordination; Service quality; Punishment contract; Revenue sharing contract

2017-12-09

2018-07-18

Supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (71573281), the Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province (2016JJ4089), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central University (2017zzts052; 531107051061) and the Key Project of Hunan Social Science Appraisal Committee (XSP18ZDI015)

F272.3

A

1004-6062(2020)04-0109-010

10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2020.04.012

2017-12-09

2018-07-18

國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目（71573281）；湖南省自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目（2016JJ4089）；中央高?；究蒲袠I(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)專(zhuān)項(xiàng)資金資助（2017zzts052、531107051061）；湖南省社會(huì)科學(xué)成果評(píng)審委員會(huì)重點(diǎn)課題資助項(xiàng)目（XSP18ZDI015）

馬躍如（1963—），男，湖南桃江人；中南大學(xué)商學(xué)院教授，博士生導(dǎo)師；研究方向：養(yǎng)老服務(wù)管理、人力資源管理。

中文編輯：杜 ?。挥⑽木庉嫞築oping Yan[１]