杰西·羅瑟斯坦 賈瑞德·伯恩斯坦

The biggest threat posed by the covid-19 outbreak is， of course， the health risks it poses. But that is not the only risk： Avoidance， social distancing and panic may have enormous economic consequences， large enough to significantly slow growth， push up unemployment and even tip the economy into a recession.

On this front， the most vulnerable people are low-wage workers in low-income households without paid leave. Many employers are already telling their white-collar workers to work from home. But low-wage workers such as janitors， food service workers and retail cashiers cant work remotely， and they also often work for contractors2 with less-enlightened policies. If these workers are temporarily idled by specific quarantines， school closures affecting their children or workplace closures motivated by general social distancing efforts， they wont get paid. Their families tend to have little savings and live in an economically precarious state even in good times. Without work， these families face near-term risks of intense economic hardship and possible eviction.

So we need a quickly implementable policy that will maintain earnings for those who most depend on them. Many of these workers will be employed but temporarily idled; others may lose jobs as their employers try to manage shocks to their own businesses.

Unemployment insurance （UI） is the first line of defense in a downturn. In fact， workers who are able and available for work but are barred from their workplaces or otherwise idled are often eligible for unemployment benefits. But the UI system is not ready for the scale of claims that could result， and some state systems may not be set up to accommodate quarantined workers or caregivers. Often， UI benefits arent paid for several weeks， but workers will need money before that. Moreover， many low-wage workers who are most in need of assistance have interrupted work histories that do not qualify them for UI benefits.

A better solution is for employers to continue paying workers directly during shutdowns. In most cases， employers will want the workers back once the threat of the virus recedes， and continuation of wage and salary payments will help meet these workers and their households needs while supporting consumer spending in the broader economy.

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics， about 40 percent of private-sector workers paid below the median lack paid leave benefits. Thats about 23 million workers， with average hourly wages around $14. To help them through what we believe will be an extremely challenging period， we propose the creation of a temporary， national paid-leave program， funded by the federal government， for workers idled due to the coronavirus.

Heres how it would work. Employers would continue to pay workers who are prevented from working by the virus， through direct deposits or paychecks in the mail. They would report this to their state UI system， which would reimburse them through tax credits or direct payments and would in turn be reimbursed by the federal government.

Based on our experience working in the Obama administration on UI expansions during the Great Recession， this would be administratively challenging， but manageable， especially with extra federal dollars to expand UI administrative capacity. The specific implementation might vary across states. For example， California already has a state paid-leave program and might find it easier to administer this program through that. But the idea would be to reimburse employers for paying their workers through their coronavirus-caused leave， with as little disruption as possible.

This program would need to be strictly time limited—it is not intended to be permanent. It would be tied to local health authorities or the CDCs recommendations about prudent responses. It would be important to have two separate triggers： One when authorities recommend that sick or vulnerable individuals stay home， which would trigger benefits just for these workers and for affected caregivers; and another if authorities recommend that larger groups take these social-distancing measures， which would trigger benefits for everyone affected.

The program would provide an essential lifeline for workers. It would also support employers， many of whom recognize the hardship that shutdowns will impose on loyal workers but whose hands will be forced as quarantines reduce their revenue streams to a trickle. An assist from the government will help these employers do what they know is right and will make it easier to restart their businesses when the health threat passes.

Because so much more is unknown than known about the spread of the virus and potential public health responses， coming up with a reliable cost estimate for our proposal is impossible. But if half of lower-wage workers without paid leave cant go to work， replacing their paychecks would have a monthly cost of around $20 billion. If quarantines are localized to particular areas， the cost would be much lower， but an attractive attribute of the program is that it would contract or expand with need.

Borrowing costs for the federal government are remarkably low right now， so the program would be inexpensive to finance. But even were that not the case， wed still pull for this sort of intervention. Ripple effects from quarantines risk devastating our economy， as workers without incomes have nothing to spend. “Countercyclical spending”—temporarily ramping up government support in periods of economic disruptions—has a long and venerable track record of helping both economically vulnerable families and the broader economy.

As this crisis unfolds， the Trump administration will be forced to launch some sort of fiscal response to offset the economic impact of the virus. The question is： Will the measures it deploys be targeted to those who need them， or will it default to their knee-jerk， muscle-memory， tax-cut mode？ Millions of households who are on the precipice3 of economic despair depend on policymakers getting this right.

新冠肺炎爆發(fā)所造成的最大威脅，毫無(wú)疑問是隨之而來(lái)的健康風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。但那并非唯一風(fēng)險(xiǎn)：回避、社交隔離和恐慌可能會(huì)帶來(lái)巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果，大到足以嚴(yán)重拖慢增長(zhǎng)、推高失業(yè)率，乃至使經(jīng)濟(jì)陷入衰退。

在這方面，最脆弱的群體是來(lái)自低收入家庭沒有帶薪假期的低薪工人。 許多雇主已讓其白領(lǐng)雇員在家工作。 但是，低薪工人（例如清潔工、餐飲業(yè)服務(wù)工人和零售業(yè)收銀員）無(wú)法遠(yuǎn)程工作，而且他們通常也為政策不太開明的合同雇主工作。如果這些人因具體的隔離措施、孩子學(xué)校停課或關(guān)閉工作場(chǎng)所等一般性社交隔離措施而賦閑，他們將沒有報(bào)酬。 他們的家庭往往積蓄微薄，即使在好年景也難免捉襟見肘。 失去工作，這些家庭短期內(nèi)就會(huì)面臨劇烈的經(jīng)濟(jì)困難，乃至被房東驅(qū)逐。

因此亟需可以迅速落實(shí)的政策，以使得對(duì)收入最依賴的人群能維持收入。這些工人中許多人將被雇用，但暫時(shí)空閑;其他人可能會(huì)失去工作，因?yàn)楣椭饕O(shè)法應(yīng)對(duì)自己生意面對(duì)的沖擊。

失業(yè)保險(xiǎn)（UI）是低迷時(shí)期的第一道防線。其實(shí)，有能力且可以工作但被禁止進(jìn)入工作場(chǎng)所或因其他原因閑散的工人通常有資格領(lǐng)取失業(yè)救濟(jì)金。 但UI系統(tǒng)尚未準(zhǔn)備好應(yīng)對(duì)可能產(chǎn)生的索賠規(guī)模，而且某些州系統(tǒng)也沒準(zhǔn)備好吸納被隔離的工人或看護(hù)人員。UI福利通常幾周后才支付，但工人們?cè)谀侵熬蜁?huì)缺錢。此外，許多最需要幫助的低薪工人工作經(jīng)歷不連續(xù)，因而沒有領(lǐng)取UI福利的資格。

優(yōu)化解決方案之一，是由雇主在停工期間繼續(xù)直接向工人發(fā)薪。多數(shù)情況下，一旦病毒威脅消失，雇主就會(huì)希望工人返崗，繼續(xù)支付薪資有助于滿足這些工人及其家庭的需求，且有利于宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)中的消費(fèi)者支出。

根據(jù)（美國(guó)）勞工統(tǒng)計(jì)局的數(shù)據(jù)，在工資低于中位數(shù)的私營(yíng)部門工人中，約40%沒有帶薪假福利。這群工人總數(shù)大約有2300萬(wàn)，平均小時(shí)工資約為14 美元。我們認(rèn)為會(huì)有一段極端挑戰(zhàn)時(shí)期，為了幫助因冠狀病毒而賦閑的工人安然渡過，我們建議設(shè)立一個(gè)由聯(lián)邦政府出資的臨時(shí)性的全國(guó)帶薪休假計(jì)劃。

運(yùn)作方式如下：雇主繼續(xù)通過直接打款或郵寄支票的方式，向因病毒感染而無(wú)法工作的工人付薪。他們將其申報(bào)給所在州失業(yè)保險(xiǎn)系統(tǒng)，系統(tǒng)將通過稅收抵免或直接付款予以報(bào)銷，并最終向聯(lián)邦政府報(bào)銷。

根據(jù)我們?cè)诖笏ネ似陂g在奧巴馬政府中進(jìn)行的失業(yè)保險(xiǎn)擴(kuò)張工作的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，這項(xiàng)工作管理上具有挑戰(zhàn)性，但可以操作，尤其是用額外的聯(lián)邦資金來(lái)擴(kuò)充失業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的管理能力。具體實(shí)現(xiàn)可能因州而異。例如，加利福尼亞州已經(jīng)有其州帶薪休假計(jì)劃，并且可能會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)通過既有計(jì)劃更容易管理本計(jì)劃?？傊?，這個(gè)理念就是，雇主在冠狀病毒引起的賦閑期間發(fā)生的人工支出應(yīng)予報(bào)銷，盡量減少中斷。

本計(jì)劃設(shè)立嚴(yán)格的時(shí)限——計(jì)劃不是永久性的。計(jì)劃將與地方衛(wèi)生部門或CDC關(guān)于謹(jǐn)慎應(yīng)對(duì)的建議相掛鉤。重要的是要有兩個(gè)單獨(dú)的觸發(fā)因素：一是當(dāng)局建議患病或脆弱的人居家時(shí)，這只會(huì)使這些工人和受影響的看護(hù)人員獲益;二是如果當(dāng)局建議更大的群體采取這些社交隔離措施，這將會(huì)使所有受影響的人獲益。

本計(jì)劃將為工人提供不可或缺的生命線。這也將為雇主提供支持。許多雇主也能認(rèn)識(shí)到停工將使忠誠(chéng)的工人生計(jì)維艱，但也是形勢(shì)所迫，因?yàn)楦綦x措施導(dǎo)致業(yè)務(wù)收入縮水。政府的協(xié)助有助于雇主做出正確的行動(dòng)，更易于在健康威脅過去后重啟生意。

由于對(duì)病毒的傳播和潛在的公共衛(wèi)生應(yīng)對(duì)措施知之甚少，因此不可能針對(duì)我們的提案做出可靠的成本估算。但是，如果一半無(wú)帶薪假的低薪工人無(wú)法工作，承包他們的薪水每月將產(chǎn)生約200億美元的成本。如果隔離只限于特定地區(qū)，則成本會(huì)低得多，但是本計(jì)劃一個(gè)吸引人的特點(diǎn)在于，它可根據(jù)需要收縮或擴(kuò)展。

目前，聯(lián)邦政府的借貸成本非常低，因此該計(jì)劃的融資成本不高。但即使不是這樣，我們?nèi)匀粫?huì)支持這類干預(yù)措施。隔離產(chǎn)生的漣漪效應(yīng)有可能摧毀我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)，因?yàn)楣と藳]有收入就沒有錢可以消費(fèi)。 “逆周期支出”——即在經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)蕩時(shí)期臨時(shí)增加政府支持——在幫助經(jīng)濟(jì)脆弱的家庭和經(jīng)濟(jì)大環(huán)境方面有著悠久的歷史和良好的口碑。

隨著危機(jī)的蔓延，特朗普政府將被迫采取某種財(cái)政應(yīng)對(duì)措施，以抵消病毒的經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊。問題是：采取的措施是否針對(duì)需要的人，還是政府會(huì)下意識(shí)采取慣用的減稅模式？數(shù)以百萬(wàn)計(jì)的家庭正因嚴(yán)峻的經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢(shì)而瀕臨絕境，他們指望著政策制定者能不走錯(cuò)路。? ? ? □