雷麗彩，高 尚，蔣 艷

網(wǎng)約車新政下網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)與網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)的演化博弈分析

雷麗彩，高 尚，蔣 艷

（湘潭大學(xué)商學(xué)院，湖南 湘潭 411105）

近年來，網(wǎng)約車等新業(yè)態(tài)的興起給乘客帶來了新體驗(yàn)，同時(shí)也導(dǎo)致新舊矛盾交織以及利益關(guān)系碰撞。本文運(yùn)用演化博弈理論分析方法，建立了新政實(shí)施背景下網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)和司機(jī)間的演化博弈模型，并對(duì)其博弈行為演化過程及演化穩(wěn)定策略進(jìn)行探討。理論研究和仿真結(jié)果表明：政府部門對(duì)網(wǎng)約車市場(chǎng)的大力調(diào)控可以有效保護(hù)網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)“嚴(yán)格管理”的積極性，（合法營運(yùn),嚴(yán)格管理）成為唯一的演化穩(wěn)定策略；但是當(dāng)政府調(diào)控力度較小時(shí)，網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)“嚴(yán)格管理”的凈收益小于其“消極管理”的凈收益，使得其“嚴(yán)格管理”的積極性降低，從而滋長(zhǎng)、縱容網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)“非法營運(yùn)”行為的發(fā)生，（非法營運(yùn),消極管理）也可能成為演化博弈的穩(wěn)定策略。要實(shí)現(xiàn)網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)“嚴(yán)格管理”率和司機(jī)“合法營運(yùn)”率達(dá)到理想狀態(tài)并可以長(zhǎng)期保持，應(yīng)該加大對(duì)策略對(duì)（非法營運(yùn),消極管理）的識(shí)別并給予網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)“非法營運(yùn)”以較高的懲罰，并對(duì)網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)“嚴(yán)格管理”輔以適當(dāng)?shù)难a(bǔ)償措施。

網(wǎng)約車運(yùn)營；網(wǎng)約車新政；演化博弈；演化穩(wěn)定策略

0 引言

隨著全球信息技術(shù)的快速發(fā)展和“互聯(lián)網(wǎng)+”時(shí)代的到來，網(wǎng)絡(luò)化潮流正在席卷全世界，以 Airbnb、Uber和滴滴出行為代表的共享經(jīng)濟(jì)（Sharing Economy）迅速崛起，使人類生活的各個(gè)方面都受到巨大的影響，城市居民的交通出行領(lǐng)域也不例外。在共享經(jīng)濟(jì)之風(fēng)的勁吹下，網(wǎng)絡(luò)約租車（以下簡(jiǎn)稱“網(wǎng)約車”）也應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。網(wǎng)約車，也叫互聯(lián)網(wǎng)專車，在交通運(yùn)輸部發(fā)布的《網(wǎng)絡(luò)預(yù)約出租汽車經(jīng)營服務(wù)管理暫行辦法（征求意見稿）》中被定義為“以互聯(lián)網(wǎng)技術(shù)為依托構(gòu)建服務(wù)平臺(tái)，接入符合條件的車輛和駕駛員，通過整合供需信息，提供非巡游的預(yù)約出租汽車服務(wù)”[1]。2016年7月28日，交通運(yùn)輸部聯(lián)合公安部等七部門正式公布了《網(wǎng)絡(luò)預(yù)約出租汽車經(jīng)營服務(wù)管理暫行辦法》（以下皆簡(jiǎn)稱為“新政”），網(wǎng)約車獲得合法身份；8月1日，滴滴和Uber（中國）宣布合并。新政的出臺(tái)以及壟斷巨頭的醞釀?wù)Q生，意味著網(wǎng)約車行業(yè)將面臨更多的行政許可和更少的補(bǔ)貼，同時(shí)也將觸發(fā)網(wǎng)約車行業(yè)的利益相關(guān)者（stakeholders）如乘客、司機(jī)與網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)以及傳統(tǒng)出租車行業(yè)的新一輪自主博弈。因此，在新政實(shí)施背景下研究網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)與網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)之間的演化博弈行為，為政府有關(guān)部門制定相應(yīng)的監(jiān)管措施提供更好的決策支持，具有比較重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。

網(wǎng)約車從出現(xiàn)伊始，就在全世界各地引發(fā)了媒體和社會(huì)大眾的廣泛關(guān)注和爭(zhēng)議，也是學(xué)者們討論的熱點(diǎn)問題之一。近年來，國內(nèi)外已有不少學(xué)者對(duì)于政府監(jiān)管下的網(wǎng)約車安全監(jiān)管及其規(guī)制范式進(jìn)行了研究[2]：如侯登華在闡述網(wǎng)約車經(jīng)營模式和發(fā)展階段的基礎(chǔ)上，比較分析了新加坡、美國、英國和法國等對(duì)網(wǎng)約車的監(jiān)管路徑[3]。周麗霞介紹了Uber的運(yùn)營模式，提出從準(zhǔn)入條件、司機(jī)要求、車輛要求、保險(xiǎn)服務(wù)和隱私保護(hù)等方面借鑒美國對(duì)Uber的監(jiān)管經(jīng)驗(yàn)[4]。羅清和等在總結(jié)西方發(fā)達(dá)國家“規(guī)制（Regulation）——放松規(guī)制（Deregulation）——再規(guī)制（Re-regulation）”的經(jīng)驗(yàn)基礎(chǔ)上，提出了適合我國國情的網(wǎng)約車監(jiān)管路徑選擇[5]。尹貽林和楊旋從博弈論的角度探討了新興移動(dòng)打車軟件對(duì)我國傳統(tǒng)出租車市場(chǎng)均衡的影響[6]。政府對(duì)出租車市場(chǎng)的監(jiān)管所帶來的經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)也被廣泛研究[7]，如Cetin和Eryigit通過實(shí)證研究表明，政府監(jiān)管提高了出租車市場(chǎng)的牌照價(jià)格，導(dǎo)致出租車費(fèi)上升[8]。Bengtsson通過試驗(yàn)研究表明有效的政府管制能提高效率，從而實(shí)現(xiàn)帕累托改進(jìn)[9]。

以上研究從理論探討和案例分析角度為網(wǎng)約車的運(yùn)營監(jiān)管實(shí)踐提供了可資借鑒的方法和建議，但是這些研究大多停留在定性的描述和推理階段，關(guān)于網(wǎng)約車涉及的多元利益相關(guān)者之間博弈關(guān)系的研究尚未引起足夠的關(guān)注。雖然演化博弈理論被廣泛應(yīng)用到社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)和管理領(lǐng)域的各類實(shí)際問題中[10]，如地方政府與企業(yè)的高耗能產(chǎn)業(yè)退出機(jī)制[11]，我國土地囤積與土地監(jiān)察的困境[12]，碳減排標(biāo)簽政策[13]，雙寡頭再制造的進(jìn)入決策[14]，研發(fā)外包決策[15]，重大突發(fā)事件的防控措施[16]，合作溢出的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為[17]，出行方式選擇行為[18]，逆向拍賣的分組評(píng)標(biāo)行為[19]，食品供應(yīng)商與制造商的質(zhì)量投入博弈[20]，技術(shù)創(chuàng)新模式選擇[21,22]，創(chuàng)新中小企業(yè)與商業(yè)銀行的信貸博弈[23]，供應(yīng)商和制造商的綠色采購博弈[24]，煤礦安全監(jiān)管博弈[25,26]，石油市場(chǎng)支配地位博弈[27]，網(wǎng)絡(luò)化智能電網(wǎng)的需求側(cè)管控博弈[28]以及農(nóng)民創(chuàng)業(yè)者供給村莊公共品的行為[29]]等，將該理論應(yīng)用于電子商務(wù)交易行為的研究雖然也取得了一定的成果[30-32]，但是鮮有關(guān)于網(wǎng)約車市場(chǎng)利益相關(guān)者之間演化博弈行為的研究。而網(wǎng)約車市場(chǎng)是一個(gè)典型的雙邊市場(chǎng)，市場(chǎng)中形成了一個(gè)以網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)為中介，聯(lián)結(jié)司機(jī)和乘客的三位一體的商業(yè)生態(tài)系統(tǒng)，三者相互依賴，相互影響。

因此，在新政實(shí)施和行業(yè)壟斷巨頭醞釀?wù)Q生的背景下，網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)和網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)會(huì)發(fā)生怎樣的自主博弈行為呢？在這一過程中，影響雙方博弈的均衡結(jié)果和穩(wěn)定性的因素有哪些？為了回答上述問題，本文嘗試借助演化博弈理論，深入研究新政出臺(tái)背景下網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)和網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)之間的行為演化關(guān)系，在政府的監(jiān)管調(diào)控下，分析影響演化博弈均衡結(jié)果的關(guān)鍵因素，為政府制定科學(xué)合理的網(wǎng)約車安全監(jiān)管機(jī)制提供借鑒和參考。

1 新政背景下網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)與網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)的演化博弈模型

新政的出臺(tái)盡管使網(wǎng)約車獲得了“合法身份”，但同時(shí)也意味著網(wǎng)約車行業(yè)將面臨更多的行政許可和更少的補(bǔ)貼，對(duì)于網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)和網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)也提出了更嚴(yán)格的要求。一方面，新政要求網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)按照相關(guān)規(guī)定對(duì)網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)進(jìn)行嚴(yán)格監(jiān)管，增加了網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)的運(yùn)營成本；另一方面對(duì)于網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)而言，由于網(wǎng)約車所具有的“共享經(jīng)濟(jì)”本質(zhì)，網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)本不用像巡游出租車司機(jī)一樣面對(duì)嚴(yán)格的準(zhǔn)入管制，也不需要向出租車公司繳納“份子錢”，由此吸引了大批嘗鮮者，然而，新政對(duì)網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)提出的更加嚴(yán)格的監(jiān)管和限制條件，使得網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)還沒來得及咀嚼分享經(jīng)濟(jì)的成果，就被推向去與留的十字路口。

1.1 網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)與網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)博弈模型建立

由此建立網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)和網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)之間博弈的支付矩陣如表1所示。

表1 新政背景下網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)與網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)博弈的支付矩陣

1.2 博弈模型的均衡解

根據(jù)支付矩陣，可以算出在新政實(shí)施的背景下以及政府有關(guān)部門的管制下，網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)的期望收益為：

則網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)的復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)方程為：

同理，在新政實(shí)施的背景下以及政府有關(guān)部門的管制下，網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)的期望收益為：

則網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)的復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)方程為：

2 模型演化動(dòng)態(tài)的策略穩(wěn)定性分析

2.1 情形①：網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)“嚴(yán)格管理”的凈收益大于其“消極管理”的凈收益的穩(wěn)定性分析

表2 情形①時(shí)網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)與網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)之間演化博弈的穩(wěn)定性分析

圖1 情形①時(shí)網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)與網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)之間演化博弈的復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)相位圖

Figure 1 Copying dynamic phase diagram of evolutionary game between Internet-chauffeured-car platform and internet-chauffeured-car driver in case ①

2.2 網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)“嚴(yán)格管理”的凈收益小于其“消極管理”收益時(shí)的穩(wěn)定性分析

2.2.1情形②的策略穩(wěn)定性分析

表3 情形②時(shí)網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)與網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)之間演化博弈的穩(wěn)定性分析

圖2 情形②時(shí)網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)與網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)之間演化博弈的復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)相位圖

Figure 2 Copying dynamic phase diagram of evolutionary game between net car platform and net car driver in case ②

2.2.2情形③的策略穩(wěn)定性分析

表4 情形③時(shí)網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)與網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)之間演化博弈的穩(wěn)定性分析

圖3 情形②時(shí)網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)與網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)之間演化博弈的復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)相位圖

Figure 3 Copying dynamic phase diagram of evolutionary game between internet-chauffeured-car platform and internet-chauffeured-car driver in case ②

3 仿真算例

圖4 網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)與網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)之間演化博弈的策略演化路徑圖

Figure 4 Strategy evolution path chart of evolutionary game between internet-chauffeured-car platform and internet-chauffeured-car driver

4 結(jié)論與建議

在政府監(jiān)管部門的管制下，網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)與網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)的演化博弈，面臨不同情況的初始條件會(huì)有不同的演化穩(wěn)定策略，為了使網(wǎng)約車行業(yè)朝著一個(gè)良好的發(fā)展態(tài)勢(shì)，針對(duì)嚴(yán)格管理與消極管理的網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)的凈收益差異，政府監(jiān)管部門需要改變對(duì)網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)的補(bǔ)償力度和懲罰力度，提高對(duì)網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)的監(jiān)管，使網(wǎng)約車平臺(tái)更能積極主動(dòng)的對(duì)網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)進(jìn)行嚴(yán)格管理，從而引導(dǎo)網(wǎng)約車司機(jī)正常營運(yùn)。

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Evolutionary game analysis of car-hailing industry between platforms and drivers based on new policies of car-hailing

LEI Licai, GAO Shang, JIANG Yan

(Business School, Xiangtan University, Xiangtan 411105, China)

With the mushroomed growth of the sharing economy, platform economics represented by Airbnb, Uber, and Didi, has greatly affected all aspects of human life, especially in the area of urban residents' travel. Under the circumstance, car-hailing service also came into being. In the context of the rapid development of global information technology and the advent of the "Internet +" era, the demand for China's car-hailing market is growing. Moreover, a large number of stakeholders, such as car-hailing platforms, passengers, drivers, and traditional taxi industries are involved in the car-hailing industry. According to the behavioral decision theory, each person wants to be able to maximize its revenue, which will inevitably lead to conflicts among stakeholders. Consequently, it is of great significance to introduce and apply the control of the government to the car-hailing market. To a certain extent, the reinforcement of control will promote the healthy development of the car-hailing market.

As the promulgation of car-hailing regulation and the birth of industrial monopoly giants, the car-hailing market will face more administrative licensing and fewer subsidies. In the meanwhile, a new round of the independent game is triggered among the stakeholders. Multiple stakeholders of the car-hailing market are faced with new opportunities and challenges. The requirements for car-hailing platforms and drivers are becoming more stringent. Therefore, it is necessary to study the selection behavior of evolutionary game between car-hailing platforms and drivers, which will provide a useful reference for the government to play a regulatory role in maintaining the sustainable development of car-hailing service.

In the first part, according to the analytical method of evolutionary game theory, the evolutionary game model between car-hailing platforms and drivers is proposed, and a payoff matrix is established. On this foundation, the replicator dynamic equations are used to depict the evolutionary path of car-hailing platforms’ and drivers’ selection behavior under the control of the government. In the second part, based on the replicator dynamic equations, we consider different controls of the government over the car-hailing service to calculate the equilibrium point. We take advantage of the Jacobin matrix to analyze the stability of the equilibrium point and obtain the dynamical diagram of the evolutionary game and the evolutionarily stable strategy. In the third part, we conduct the simulation experiments of the evolutionary game mode between the car-hailing platforms and drivers，and the dynamical route of the evolutionary game is presented. Finally, the advice on government control of the car-hailing market is put forward in terms of the evolutionary game model results.

Theoretical research and simulation results indicate that the ratio of “strict management” for car-hailing platforms and the ratio of “l(fā)egal operation” for drivers achieve and maintain perfect condition, which depends on the tremendous control of the government. When the tremendous control is exerted over the car-hailing market, the net income of the “strict management” is more than that of the “l(fā)oose management” for the car-hailing platforms, which turns out that the only evolutionarily stable strategy is “Legal Operation, Strict Management,” which is what we have expected. Contrarily, when the government exerts the less control, the evolutionarily stable strategy may be “Illegal Operation, Loose Management” for lack of effective government regulation. The game falls into the prisoner’s dilemma, which goes against the sustainable development for the car-hailing industry. Based on the simulation experiments, the strategy of “Illegal Operation, Loose Management” should be identified. Simultaneously, it is necessary to impose a greater penalty on drivers with “illegal operation” and take appropriate compensation measures for car-hailing platforms with “strict management”，which will make the car-hailing platforms more active to rigidly manage drivers, and guide the “l(fā)egal operation.”

Car-hailing service; New policies of car-hailing; Evolutionary game; Evolutionary stable strategy

2017-06-03

2017-09-15

Supported by the Ministry of Education Layout Foundation of Humanities and Social Science (19YJA630030), the Excellent Youth Project of Educational Commission of Hunan Province (17B267) and the Social Science Foundation of Hunan Province (17YBA369)

F570

A

1004-6062(2020)01-0055-008

10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2020.01.007

2017-06-03

2017-09-15

教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)規(guī)劃基金資助項(xiàng)目（19YJA630030）；湖南省教育廳優(yōu)秀青年項(xiàng)目（17B267）；湖南省社科基金資助項(xiàng)目（17YBA369）

雷麗彩（1984—），女，湖南桂陽人；湘潭大學(xué)商學(xué)院副教授，南京大學(xué)圖書情報(bào)與檔案管理博士后；主要從事電子商務(wù)運(yùn)營模式、行為決策理論及其應(yīng)用方面的研究。

中文編輯：杜 ??；英文編輯：Charlie C. Chen