Richard Wolin

Abstract：Throughout his career, Habermas sought to remain faithful to the idea of a non-dogmatic and reflexive Marxism-Marxism as “critique.”Although Habermas never adopted the framework of social phenomenology per se, by the same token, his reception of the later Husserl’s notion of the lifeworld would play a central methodological role in his later work, enabling him to parry the well-entrenched scientistic biases of philosophy and social science.In “Knowledge and Human Interests”(1965), his inaugural lecture at University of Frankfurt, Habermas embraced Husserl’s critique of modern science’s misguided “mathematicization of nature.”Yet his systematic employment of Husserl would not occur until Theory of Communicative Action (1981).There, the notion of the “Lifeworld”(Lebenswelt)as an inexhaustible repository of non-thetic, implicit meanings signifies a reservoir of semantic resistance vis--vis the predatory subsystems of “money”and “power”(Geld und Macht)that, under late capitalism, increasingly assume hegemony.Habermas coined the phrase, the “colonization of the lifeworld,”to describe the process whereby informal spheres of human interaction are increasingly subjected to regulation and control by superordinate economic and bureaucratic structures.For Habermas, the discourse of social phenomenology, as it derived from the later Husserl, ultimately supplanted the role that “hermeneutics”had formerly played in his work—that is, as a methodological alternative to the objectivating approach that the social sciences.For Habermas, the attempt to remedy philosophy’s positivistic self-misunderstanding was more than an abstract, theoretical concern.At stake was the growing “scientific-technical organization of the lifeworld,”whose expansion had begun to threaten to the normative self-understanding of the West, which, in Habermas’s view, revolved around the mutually complementary ideals of individual autonomy and democratic self-determination.In this respect, Habermas’constructive encounter with the later Husserl was wholly consistent with his overall project of developing a “Critical Theory with a practical intent.”

Keywords：Habermas; Critical Theory; Hermeneutics

Husserl came to social phenomenology relatively late in life, with his 1936 manuscript on the

Crisis

of

the

European

Sciences

and

Transcendental

Phenomenology

.Two decades laterits reception helped to inspire the emergence of

phenomenological

Marxism

.In Central Europe, this paradigmstood as a reflexive alternative to official Marxism qua “diamat”(dialectical materialism)which, in the lands of “really existing socialism,”had congealed into a dogmatic and repressive “science of legitimation.”Phenomenological Marxism’s leading representatives were Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Karel Kosik, Tran Duc Thao, and Enzo Paci.In the Czech context, one might go so far as to say that, given Kosik’sprominence, it played an important role in the Renaissance of Marxist humanism that culminated in the notion of “Socialism with a Human Face”and the Prague spring.

The “crisis of Marxism”was reflected in Marxism’s objectivistic self-understanding as “scientific socialism,”an approach that downplayed subjectivity and thus seemed to negate human freedom, as the regimes governed by orthodox Marxismdid in actual practice.Husserl’s notion of intentionality offered a compelling alternative to the prevailing scientism, and it was this aspect that was embraced by the phenomenological Marxists in their search for a philosophical orientation that could counter the reigning methodological dogmatism.Insofar as Husserl’s concept of intentionality identified the constitutive function of the transcendental ego as a sine qua non for experience and cognition, it represented a thoroughgoing challenge to all variants of positivism.

These preoccupations are central to Husserl’slatework on the

Crisis

of

the

European

Sciences

, in which he identifies the “mathemati-cization of nature”as the main culprit.As Husserl observes：“The exclusiveness with which the total worldview of modern man, in the second half of the nineteenth century, let itself be determined by the positive sciences and be blinded by the ‘prosperity’they produced, meant an indifferent turning-away form the questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity.Merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people.It excludes in principle precisely the questions which man, given over in our unhappy times to the most portentous upheavals, finds the most burning：questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence.”(Husserl 6)

Hermeneutics

Underlying Habermas’s reception of Dilthey’s work during the 1960s is both a scholarly context as well as a political context.The scholarly context pertains to the revival of debates concerning “

explanation

vs.

understanding

”(?vs)in the human sciences.Whereas the empirical sciences seek to “explain”social phenomena and historical events by subjecting them to causal-nomological accounts, the

Geisteswissenschaften

, conversely seek to

interpret

them via the non-objectivating technique of understanding (

Verstehen

).Qua method, understanding seeks, above all, to heed the motivations and intentions of historical actors.In Dilthey’s rendition of

Verstehen

, the technique of “empathy”or

Einf

ü

hlen

was also paramount.This procedure suggested that it was necessary for the historian or interpreter to intuit or identify with the mind set of the actors whose motivations she was trying to comprehend.As a philosopher of culture Dilthey was also the foremost generational representative of-, displaying all of the quirks and limitations of that perspective.Foremost among these limitations was’

rather

frank

devaluation

of

ratiocination

and

conceptualization

.Bluntly put,

intellection

, in all its guises and manifestations,

constituted

a

falsification

of

the

vibrant

immediacy

of

“

life.

”As a philosopher of cognition (

Erkenntnistheoretiker

), Dilthey viewed it as his task to “detranscendentalize”the transcendental subject, or

ego

cogito

, that had been epistemologically venerated by Descartes and Kant.He vigorously contested the transcendental ego’s

material

impoverishment

, which he interpreted as a denigration of,

or

“

lived

experience

,”a condition that he associated with the acute

experiential

vacuity

of

a

hyper

-

rationalized

,

Western

.

As Dilthey remarks in seminal passage from

Einfuhrung

in

die

Geistewissen

-

schaften

：“

No

real

blood

flows

in

the

veins

of

the

knowing

subject

constructed

by

Locke

,

Hume

,

and

Kant

;

it

is

only

the

diluted

juice

of

reason

,

a

mere

process

of

thought.

”(Dilthey 162)Dilthey viewed the very act of

cognitive

apprehension

,

or

“

science

,”

as

a

betrayal

of

“

life

”()

.

Yet how could one in good conscience aspire to “science”or “knowledge,”if all theory were, as Dilthey claimed, intrinsically an act of betrayal or falsification? In his critique of historical reason Dilthey sought to formulate objective concepts that would make historical life intelligible.Yet isn’t this very act of

subsuming

the

singularity

of

lived

experience

under the general concepts of “

life

,”“

expression

,”

and

“

experience

”itself a violation and, as such, objectionable.Even if historicism’s claims about the epistemological superiority of “l(fā)ife”over “ratiocination”were true, from a normative perspec-tive, we would nevertheless remain perplexed：

awash

in

the

flux

of

experience

,

and

thus

lacking

a

fixed

and

reliable

point

of

orientation

to

guide

us

(Schn?delbach 145).Behind such attitudes and contentions it was not difficult to discern the distinctive echoes of vintage

German

-i.e., the

anti

-

Western

,

anti

-

civilizationalethos

that would rise to fever pitch during the 1920s with the work of Spengler, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, and Martin Heidegger.Like other representatives of German historicism Dilthey was a cultural relativist.Late in life, he elaborated his doctrine of-or

worldviews

：

the

mental

parameters

that

defined

a

given

period

or

epoch.

According to this perspective, “values”were intrinsically arbitrary and could never be objectively grounded or justified.For Habermas, Dilthey’s hermeneutics represented what one might call a usable past.By emphasizing the specificity and irreducibility of

Verstehen

, Dilthey’s hermeneutics could be enlisted in the methodological and political struggle against the depradations of modern scientism, which had sought to extend its instrumental attitude toward physical nature to the domain of human social action.According to Habermas, “

Whereas

the

empirical

-

analytical

methods

aim

at

disclosing

and

comprehending

under

the

transcendental

viewpoint

of

technical

control

,

hermeneutic

methods

aim

at

mutual

understanding

in

ordinary

language

communication

and

in

action

according

to

common

norms.

”(Schn?del-bach 176)Surprisingly, the “ideological”objections that the Critical Theory tradition had frequently raised about Dilthey’s work-reservations that had vigorously called into question the “

conventionalism

,”or over-identification with tradition, as well as the

value

-

relativism

of the hermeneutic approach-were absent in Habermas’s account.Instead, his criticism of Dilthey paralleled his critique of the other intellectual protagonists discussed in

Knowledge

and

Human

Interest

：Marx, Peirce, and Freud.Habermas suggested that, like these other thinkers, Dilthey’s approach had succumbed to a “scientistic self-misunderstanding.”Thus despite his penetrating insights concerning the methodological limitations of the natural sciences, Dilthey ultimately succumbed to the predominant illusions of his epoch and sought to legitimate the practice of hermeneutics in the language of scientific objectivity.Paradoxically, he suggested that hermeneutics’claim to methodological superiority was due to the fact that, in the realm of the human sciences, its results could guarantee a greater measure of “objectivity”than could the competing, “naturalizing”approaches that were borrowed from the domain of the

Naturwissens

-

chaften

.Habermas refers to this peculiar methodolo-gical blind spot as Dilthey’s “covert positivism”(Schn?delbach 179).In

Truth

and

Method

, Gadamer went far toward redressing one of the major drawbacks of Dilthey’s hermeneutics：its methodological objectivism or latent positivism.Gadamer countered Dilthey’sscien-tistic self-misunderstanding by rejecting the methodological ideal of finality or completion-the Rankean notion that one should interpret historical events “as they really were,”through the eyes of the actors-in favor of a more open-ended, dialogical and hermeneutically situated model of understanding.

Yet as Habermas shows, in deftly avoiding one set of methodological failings, Gadamer proceeded to open himself up to another series of complications and compromises.

Habermas took exception to the arch-conservative implications of Gadamerian hermeneu-tics, viewing its

glorification

of

tradition

as

unacceptable

, insofar as,

historically

,

traditions

concealed

relations

of

domination

that

were

inconsistent

with

the

(

Kantian

)

precepts

of

autonomy

and

self

-

determination

.Playing Kant to Gadamer’s Burke, he insisted on the ineliminable prerogatives of “

reflection

”(

Reflexion

)：

thusthe

principles

of

democratic

citizenship

mandated

that

only

those

traditions

were

acceptable

that

could

be

explicitly

and

rationally

agreed

to

by

those

who

were

subject

to

its

dictates

and

decrees.

Thus Gadamer’s unabashed “

prejudice

in

favor

of

prejudice

”was flatly irreconcilable with the values of social emancipation.In Habermas’s view, Gadamer’s inflexible defense of tradition (

Uberlieferung

)was ultimately reminiscent of the discredited worldview of the German

Obrigkeitsstaat

(authoritarian state)—a mentality that was conducive to the cultivation of “

subjects

”(

Untertane

)rather than “

citizens

”(ü)who possessed the capacity for self-rule.As Habermas points out, “understanding”(

Verstehen

)worthy of the name does not mean blindly surrendering to the authority of tradition, but always entails its critical appropriation.

When

all

is

said

and

done

,

Gadamer

’

s

glorification

of

prejudice

and

tradition

demonstrates

that

he

values

authority

over

reason

,

preservation

of

the

status

quo

over

the

ideal

of

political

self

-

determination.

Thus whether one chooses Dilthey, Gadamer, or Heidegger, one sees that the hermeneutic tradition suffers certain as

.

This aversion to universal reason was one of the legacies of the German intellectual-Germany’s self-understanding as a

Kulturnation

in opposition to the purportedly superficial practices of

r

?

sonnieren

that predominated in the West.Many aspects of the hermeneutic approach were geopolitically conditioned and betrayed what one might call

an

anti

-

civilizational

affect

—

a

disposition

that

surfaced

,

above

all

,

in

the

valorization

of

“

life

”(

Leben

)

over

“

reason.

”As a philosopher, Habermas under-took to cure German political culture of these longstanding prejudices-intellectual habitudes that had had such a deleterious impact on the nation’s moral and political development.With these considerations in mind, it is not surprising to find that, when in

Theory

of

Communicative

Action

(1981), Habermas reconceived the theoretical framework he had originally developed in

Knowledge

and

Human

Interests

,

the

references

to

hermeneutics

disap

-

pear

almost

entirely

.Instead, in a momentous conceptual shift, he relies on the tradition of

social

phenomenology

as developed by the late Husserl in

The

Crisis

and by Alfred Schütz and Thomas Luckm-ann in

Structures

of

the

Lifeworld

.In retrospect, this change in perspective seems entirely plausible, since Habermas’s social theoretic reformulation of the critique of instrumental reason parallels Husserl’s interrogation of the worldview of modern science in the

Crisis

.In

Theory

of

Communicative

Action

Habermas reconceptualizes his earlier critique of the

technological

“

scientization

of

politics

”

in

terms

of

the

theme

of

the

“

colonization

of

the

lifeworld.

”In the view of most commentators, Husserl’s

Crisis

, represented a radical new departure.As Paul Ricoeur enquired in his study of Husserl：“How can a philosophy of the cogito, of the radical return to the ego as the founder of all being, become capable of a philosophy of history?”(Ricoeur 145)Conversely, in the eyes of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the

Crisis

represented a genuine breakthrough, since by abandoning the program of eidetic phenomenology or the search for timeless essences, Husserl had succeeded in exposing phenomenology to new possibilities and horizons.Of course, in the

Crisis

, although one can unquestionably sense the political tumult of the 1930s hovering in the background, Husserl was only indirectly concerned with real history.Instead, his main focus is on the

meaning

of history when viewed “eidetically.”His concern was that, in an essential sense, the West had lost its way-by which he meant the telos that had been established during the halcyon days of the Greek Enlightenment.

The

idea

that

or

reason

should

govern

the

world

—

as

opposed

to

myth

,

fate

,

or

brute

force

—

was

a

Greek

innovation

that

had

been

codified

by

the

Socratic

School.

Yet, since the late nineteenth century, there could be no denying the fact that

the

West

’

s

trust

in

reason

had

been

tarnished.

In its wake, to quote Max Weber, a set of “

warring

gods

”had arisen,

which

sought

to

supplant

the

virtues

of

intellection

with

irrational

appeals

to

the

forces

of

“

blood

”

and

“

race.

”Under the circumstances, Husserl, who previously had paid scant attention to moral philosophy, was compelled to undertake a general, metahistorical enquiry concerning

the

fate

of

reason.

Yet the real conceptual innovation offered by this rich and fascinating text pertains to Husserl’s development of the idea of the “l(fā)ifeworld”(

Lebenswelt

), a bedrock of implicit meanings or taken-for-granted normative assumptions and practices that underlie more formalized domains of social interaction.The lifeworld is the indispensable horizon and basis of human experience.As such, it possesses an existential primacy in light of which all other spheres of life appear as secondary elaborations or constructions.As Husserl explains：“

the

life

-

world

...

is

pregiven

to

us

,

the

waking

,

practically

interested

subjects

,

always

and

necessarily

,

as

the

universal

field

of

all

actual

and

possible

praxis

,

as

horizon.

”(Ricoeur 142)

The lifeworld is the realm of original self-evidences ...All conceivable verification leads back to these modes of self-evidence ...lies in these intuitions themselves as that which is actually, intersubjectively experienceable and verifiable; it is not a subtruction of thought; whereas such a substruction, insofar as it makes a claim to truth, can have actual truth only by being related back to such self-evidences.(Rico-eur 127-28)

As individuals, there are two basic attitudes we can assume toward the self-evidences of the lifeworld：

a

na

?

ve

attitude

and

one

that

is

reflective.

It is the latter that Husserl associates

with

the

philosophical

point

of

view

and which, for this reason, he judges to be superior.The na?ve attitude declines to go beyond the lifeworld in its immediate givenness.It remains immersed in these experiences and rests content with its immersion.Conversely,

the

reflective

attitude

represents

what

one

might

call

the

beginning

of

wisdom.

Rather than accepting the lifeworld as given, it systematically enquires into the “how”of the lifeworld, its fundamental modalities of givenness.Husserl aptly describes this approach as a “

transfor

-

mation

of

the

thematic

consciousness

of

the

world

that

breaks

through

the

normality

of

straightforward

living.

”(Ricoeur 144)

Subsequently

,

what

was

once

self

-

evident

and

unproblematic

cease

to

be

so.

The reflective approach is the fruit of what Husserl refers to in the

Crisis

as the

transcendental

epoch

ē：a standpoint that permits the phenomenologist to break with the familiarity of the natural attitude.

For

a

philosophical

analogy

,

one

might

have

recourse

to

the

celebrated

“

cave

allegory

”

in

Plato

’

s

,

in

which

one

prisoner

breaks

free

from

his

chains

in

order

to

perceive

the

shadow

-

play

that

his

fellow

prisoners

take

for

reality

or

the

truth.

From

a

Hegelian

perspective

,

the

reflective

attitude

expresses

the

transition

from

consciousness

to

self

-

consciousness.

It serves as a metaphor for the

conversion

experience

that

distinguishes

the

philosophical

point

of

view

from

common

sense

perspective

of

the

everyday

life.

The

epoch

ē

affords

access

to

what

Husserl

describes

as

the

“

miracle

”

of

transcendental

subjectivity

：the realization that the world does not exist as a self-subsistent entity, as na?ve consciousness might assume.Instead, its being is dependent on the constitutive function of intentional consciousness.

Thus

,

following

the

precedents

of

Descartes

and

Kant

,

Husserl

alleges

that

the

world

never

appears

as

such.

Instead

our

interaction

with

it

is

conditioned

a

priori

by

the

transcendental

and

constitutive

modalities

of

intentionality.

Here, the concept of intentionality is pivotal insofar as it suggests epistemological limits to the third-person, observer perspective favored by both the natural sciences as well as the positivistically biased social sciences (

Geisteswissenschften

).In other words：the world-and the socio-cultural world, in particular-cannot be objectively reduced to the “totality of (self-subsistent)facts”if such “facts”are ultimately dependent on the intentionality of consci-ousness.In

Theory

of

Communicative

Action

the lifeworld stands as a realm of informal social meanings and unproblematical cultural assumptions which social actors are able to draw upon freely in order to arrive at shared understandings and to realize their individual and collective projects.Habermas’s normative concerns parallel Husserl’s insofar as both philosophers seek to parry the risks and temptations of

scientific

overreach

：an ever-escalating process whereby more and more aspects of human social life forfeit their autonomy as well as their existential integrity at the hands of highly formalized organiza-tional systems.In the discourse of classical sociology such developments were a central topos.In his pathbreaking studies on

Suicide

and the

Division

of

Labor

, Durkheim addressed it under the rubric of the

transition

from

mechanical

to

organic

solidarity.

In a number of key works, Max Weber harbored similar fears and concerns.

He famously concluded

The

Protestant

Ethic

and

the

Spirit

of

Capitalism

by denigrating the ethos of the modern

Fachmensch

or specialist as a cultural setback when considered against the backdrop of the Renaissance ideal of the well-rounded personality.His critique of the

fateful

one

-

sidedness

of

modern

cultural

development

—

the

triumph

of

“

objective

”

over

“

subjective

”

culture

-led him to formulate his conception of modernity

as

a

process

of

twofold

“

loss

”：a “l(fā)oss of meaning”and a “l(fā)oss of freedom”(

und

)

.

“

Loss

of

meaning

”derives from the process of rationalization, whereby the mores and convictions of traditional society are

increasingly

subjected

to

the

corrosive

force

of

intellectualist

criteria

as

well

as

the

universal

solvent

of

scientific

reason.

“

Loss

of

freedom

”results from the universal

triumph

of

bureaucracy

as a seemingly inescapable mode of social organization.Thus increasingly

fewer

spheres

of

life

are

able

to

escape

the

straightjacket

of

formal

reason.

Bureaucracy’s rise means that

increasingly

fewer

aspects

of

social

and

vocational

life

are

left

to

individual

inclination

,

whim

,

initiative

,

or

choice.

Instead, nearly all aspects of social life are

regulated

and

predetermined

-down to the innermost “

corpuscu

-

lar

”

level

, as Michel Foucault observes with reference to the growth of “biopower”in the modern world.Reliance on the lifeworld concept allows Habermas to analyze such developments in ways that

the

hermeneutic

approach

—

with

its

shortsighted

and

limited

glorification

of

the

ineffable

immediacy

of

“

life

”-did not.Thereby, he can indict the improper overreach of “

functionalist

reason

”：the illicit interferences of rational-purposive approaches to social action (

zweckra

-

tionalesHandeln

)in areas of society that are rooted in the lifeworld：the

family

,

culture

,

community

life

,

and

voluntary

associations

, whose informal modalities are increasingly subjected to the formal media of money and power.

Habermas

develops

the

idea

of

the

“

colonization

of

the

lifeworld

”

to

highlight

the

illegitimate

and

destructive

violations

of

the

lifeworld

’

s

integrity

by

the

forces

of

instrumental

rationality

deriving

from

the

subsystems

of

the

economy

and

state

administration.

Nevertheless, there are shortcomings to the lifeworld approach, as developed by social phenomenologists like Husserl and Schutz, which, in

Theory

of

Communicative

Action

, Habermas seeks to surmount.Despite the pluralistic implications of the lifeworld concept, phenomenology remains wedded to the perspective of transcendental subjectivity, which perceives the world from the standpoint of individually thinking and acting subjects.Hence, phenomenology’s well known difficulties when it comes to the problem of “other minds”or intersubjectivity.Habermas wishes to circumvent these obstacles by reformulating the lifeworld idea in keeping with the tenets of

communicative

reason

, for which

intersubjectivity

remains a touchstone.But also, from the phenomenological standpoint, reason and rationality remain extraneous concerns; they have no place in discussions of the lifeworld, where implicit knowledge, rather than rationality, predominates.Via his

communicative

reformulation

of

the

lifeworld

ideal

, Habermas is able to introduce into the discussion a normative dimension that in phenomenological approaches—

with

their

predo

-

minant

orientation

toward

rather

than

-typically remains absent.

As

a

norm

,

communicative

reason

suggests

that

the

denizens

of

the

lifeworld

dispose

over

specific

criteria

of

reasonableness

and

fairness

that

may

be

invoked

to

adjudicate

the

validity

of

the

agreements

and

understandings

they

reach.

Thus whereas the notion of the lifeworld, as a constant feature of human societies, is, strictly speaking, transhistorical,

with

the

transition

from

commun

-

ity

to

society

,

its

“

rationality

potentials

”

expand

—

as

do

its

potentials

for

justice

as

fairness.

One of the keys to Habermas’s argument revolves around a process that he denominates the “

linguistification

of

the

sacred

.”Among traditi-onal societies in which religion remains a primary mode of securing legitimation,

the

aura

of

the

sacred

serves

to

immunize

social

authority

from

discursive

challenges

, which undercuts the communicative ideal of understanding oriented toward mutual agreement.Conversely, with the advent of secularization, these ideological barriers dwindle.

Illegitimate

claims

to

social

authority

are

deprived

of

the

patina

of

divinity

behind

which

they

have

been

traditionally

able

to

dissemble

their

normative

and

political

gist.

In

their

place

there

emerges

a

new

potential

for

a

non

-

hierarchical

,

consensual

resolution

of

disputes

,

along

with

egalitarian

prospects

of

democratic

will

-

formation.

Habermas formulates these issues in a key passage in

Theory

of

Commun

-

icative

Action

, volume II：Universal discourse points to an idealized lifeworld reproduced through processes of mutual understanding that have been largely detached from normative contexts and transferred over to rationally motivated yes/no positions.This sort of growing autonomy can come to pass only to the extent that

constraints

of

material

reproduction

no

longer

hide

behind

the

mask

of

a

rationally

impenetrable

,

basic

,

normative

consensus

,

that

is

,

stand

behind

the

authority

of

the

sacred

[...] A lifeworld rationalized in this sense would by no means reproduce itself in conflict-free forms.But the conflicts would appear in their own names; they would no longer be concealed by convictions immune from discursive examination.(145)

By the same token, ultimately, the lifeworld approach shares one of the central methodological shortcomings of its hermeneutic cousin, a failing that we have already discussed under the rubric of “hermeneutic idealism.”This appellation suggests that the model of intentionality and implicit meanings offers inadequate means for conceptualizing problems of power and domination.What is also needed is an analysis of “system integration”that complements the emphasis on symbolic meanings that derive from the phenomenological approach.Systems theory’s methodological point of departure is not the intentionality of the individual social actor or actors.Instead, it adopts the functionalist perspective of the self-maintaining system that it inherits from nineteenth-century social evolutionism.Its socio-political ideal is “homeostasis,”a normative standpoint that it borrows from the life sciences-above all, biology.Habermas’s project of a “critique of functionalist reason”aims to roll back or curtail the illicit interferences of the instrumental imperatives that derive from the self-maintaining systems of economy and power in the lifeworld qua repository of implicit meanings.

In

Theory

of

Communicative

Action

, he describes the reifying or “de-moralizing”effect of system-induced interferences in the lifeworld as follows：A demoralized, positive, compulsory law [...] makes it possible to steer social action via delinguistified media [...] The transfer of action coordination from language over to steering media means an uncoupling of interaction from lifeworld contexts.Media such as money and power [...] encode a purposive-rational attitude toward calculable amounts of value and make it possible to exert generalized, strategic influence [...] while

bypassing

processes of consensus-oriented communic-ation.[As a result] the lifeworld contexts in which processes of reaching understanding are always embedded are devalued in favor of media-steered interactions.(

Theory

of

Communicative

Action

154)Thus under conditions of advanced capitalism, domination (

Herrschaft

)assumes the form of strategic rationality.By virtue of its central role in processes of system maintenance, it acquires an aura of “objectivity”and is thereby substantially immunized against claims of democratic legitimacy.Consequently, the

functional

imperatives of instrumental reason trump the

discursive

claims of communicative reason as they are rooted in the lifeworld.The end result of this process is what Habermas calls

the

“”(

Theory

of

Communicative

Action

180,183).

By

substituting

impersonal

mechanisms

of

strategic

action

for

communicative

reason

,

the

coloniza

-

tion

of

the

lifeworld

facilitates

the

.

This occurs insofar as

we

associate

the

capacity

for

moral

action

with

the

values

of

collective

self

-

determination

and

individual

autonomy.

Yet

individual

autonomy

diminishes

the

more

that

the

amoral

steering

media

of

money

and

power

degrade

the

discursive

fabric

of

the

lifeworld

qua

fount

of

intersubjectivity

and

communicative

rationality.

Critical Remarks

One of Habermas’s primary goals in

Theory

of

Communicative

Action

is to redress the question of the absent normative foundations of the Frankfurt School.Yet in this regard, there seems to be a fundamental ambivalence at the heart of his approach—an ambivalence that has, in certain respects, persistently haunted Critical Theory.

Bluntly put：do these normative foundations possess an immanent or transcendent status? Are they rooted in universal principles or are they, instead, socially embodied.If they are “transcend-ent,”then they risk assuming the character of standards or precepts that have been independently derived and determined by the philosopher or theorist.If, conversely, they are sedimented in the logic of social development, they threaten to become overly concrete：the expression of a particular cultural tradition or a given social formation.As a result, their claim to universality diminishes correspondingly.

Habermas, for his part, has shown himself to be extremely uncomfortable with the idea of timeless, unconditional claims to validity as a lapse into foundationalism.Instead, he has on numerous occasions expressed solidarity with trends in “postmetaphysical thinking.”Consequently, his attitude toward the question of ultimate foundations (

letzteBegr

ü

ndungen

)has persistently oscillated between a transcendental and empirical orientation, as can be seen by his employment of the oxymoron “quasi-transcendental”to characterize his aims.Yet normative claims that are quasi-transcendental

seem

alternately

too

strong

and

too

weak

, insofar as they seek the unimpugnability of ultimate foundations without the attendant metaphysical baggage.

Yet here, it is unclear exactly what role the lifeworld, as a realm of informal and taken-for-granted habitudes and meanings, is meant to play in validating

the

normative

telos

of

communicative

reason

：

uncoerced

reciprocal

agreement

,

mutual

understanding

free

from

ideological

constraints

or

distortion.

As a diffuse congeries of values, significations, and background conditions,

there

is

nothing

inherently

“

rational

”

about

the

life

-

world

.Instead, one can readily imagine that the lifeworld’s suitability for the ends of communicative transparency would change radically depending on the extent to which it has been institutionally “rationalized,”or exposed to the mechanisms and

norms

of

democratic

publicity

(?

ffentlichkeit

)—a point that Habermas generally seems willing to concede.Thus one can readily conceive of lifeworlds that function in ways that are extremely arbitrary or repressive; lifeworlds in which the distortional effects of tradition prevent the norms of equality and reciprocity that Habermas reveres from flourishing.In sum, ultimately, one must judge the fabric of a given lifeworld on the basis of its normative content,

since

lifeworlds

that

are

obstinately

mired

in

custom

,

habit

,

and

tradition

can

easily

present

themselves

as

obstacles

to

,

rather

than

facilitators

of

,

the

ends

of

social

emancipation.

Thus

lifeworlds

can

be

“

ethical

,”

or

cohere

internally

,

without

being

“

moral

”—

that

is

,

without

adhering

to

broader

norms

of

justice

or

fairness.

Given such questions and doubts, one cannot help but wonder whether Habermas places more methodological weight on the lifeworld ideal than it can in point of fact bear.Thus in view of the historical variegatedness of individual lifeworlds, how reliable is this concept as a basis or ground for a theory of communicative reason?

In a subsequent clarification, Habermas seems to concede too much to the

lifeworld

qua

“

ethical

life

”

or

—

that

is

,

as

a

sphere

of

random

, “

amoral

”

sociality

—when he claims that attempts to pose questions of “

ultimate

justification

”(

letzteBegr

ü

ndungen

)with respect to the lifeworld are

fundamentally

misplaced.

“

The

intuitions

of

everyday

life

,”

he

avows

, “

have

no

need

of

clarification

by

philosophers.

”Instead, “

in

this

case

,

the

understanding

of

philosophy

as

developed

by

Wittgenstein

seems

appropriate.

”(

Moral

Cons

-

ciousness

98)In other words：when it comes to the lifeworld, philosophy should not disturb the fragile heritage of tradition, even if that heritage should turn out to be a dead weight.Instead, following Wittgenstein,

philosophy

’

s

job

is

merely

to

clarify

the

nature

of

life

practices

and

the

rules

that

underlie

them

,

rather

than

to

disrupt

the

lifeworld

’

s

integrity

by

seeking

to

impose

first

principles

or

to

legislate

norms.

Yet in the preceding characterization,

the

lifeworld

seems

to

be

synonymous

with

a

approach

to

life

,

one

that

assumes

that

the

totality

of

inherited

social

facts

is

fundamentally

unalterable.

A

-

approach

to

life

,

conversely

,

suggests

the

advent

of

“

critical

consciousness

”：

a

consciousness

that

no

longer

merely

assumes

that

the

contents

of

tradition

merit

acceptance

merely

because

they

have

been

handed

down.

Hence, it seems that, in opposition to the conventionalist approach, one must adopt a principle akin to Jaspers’notion of the “axial age,”a concept that denotes the

advent

of

“

transcendence

”

as

a

precondition

for

critical

consciousness.

As Jaspers proposes in

The

Origin

and

Goal

of

History

(1949), “

transcendence

”

signifies

a

capacity

for

that

transcends

the

world

as

a

self

-

referential

totality

of

facts.

Here, it connotes the emergence of a

capacity

to

judge

the

normative

failings

and

deficiencies

of

“

ethical

life

”()

according

to

considerations

of

：

according

to

the

higher

moral

standards

of

“

justice.

”Habermas has invoked the idea of the axial age in his later writings on the philosophy of religion; although he has not indicated what role it might play a role in reformulating the idea of the lifeworld he develops in

Theory

of

Communicative

Action

.

Notes

① Dilthey,

Introduction

to

the

Human

Sciences

(Princeton：Princeton University Press, 1989); 1uoted in Dilthey,

Selected

Writings

, ed.H.Rickman (Cambridge：Cambridge University Press, 1976), 162.See also, Georg Iggers,

The

German

Conception

of

History

：

the

National

Tradition

of

Historical

Thought

from

Herder

to

the

Present

(Wesleyan University Press：1983).② “For Husserl, objectivity was always a particular ‘achievement of consciousness’(

Bewussteinsleistung

)and he was fascinated by the miracle of the process.”See Dermot Moran.

Introduction

to

Phenomenology

(New York：Routledge, 2000).60.③ See Jaspers,

The

Origin

and

Goal

of

History

(New York：Routledge, 2016).

Works Cited

Habermas, Jürgen.

Moral

Consciousness

and

Communicative

Action

.Cambridge, Mass.：MIT Press, 1992.- - -.

Theory

of

Communicative

Action

II.Trans.T.McCarthy.Boston：Beacon Press, 1987.- - -.

Theory

and

Practice

.Trans.J.Viertel.Boston：Beacon Press, 1973.Husserl, Edmund.

The

Crisis

of

the

European

Sciences

and

Transcendental

Phenomenology

.Trans.D.Carr.Evanston：Northwestern University Press, 1970.Schn?delbach.

Philosophy

in

Germany

：

1831-1933

.New York：Cambridge University Press, 1984.Ricoeur, Paul.

Husserl

：

An

Analysis

of

His

Phenomenology

.Trans.E.Ballard and L.Embree.Evanston：Northwestern University Press, 1967.