Marcus D. King, Ph.D.

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Shared Security through U.S./Chinese Cooperation on Climate Change Security and Risk Reduction

Marcus D. King, Ph.D.

John O. Rankin Associate ProfessorDirector, Master of Arts in International AffairsElliott School of International Affairs The George Washington University 1957 E Street NW; Suite 501 – CWashington DC, 20052mdking@gwu.edu(202) 994-0216

In concluding remarks of the June 2013 U.S.-Chinese Summit, President Barak Obama declared that neither China nor the U.S. can deal with the challenge of climate change by itself. These statements came at a time when each leader was grappling with droughts, caused or exacerbated by climate change. Reservoirs, rainfall totals and snowpack on the mountaintops remain critically low in California. China’s state meteorological service reports the most severe drought conditions in over 50 years in the southwestern region of Chongqing and neighboring Sichuan province. Some areas of Ningxia province have had no effective rain in 600 days. Harvest yields are declining in both nations.

While climate change’s physical and socioeconomic impacts within China and the U.S. are consequential, climate change also shapes regional security as the U.S. rebalances it foreign policy to Asia. Statements and analysis from the U.S. security establishment recognize strategic implications of a shift in climate. In March 2013, after a meeting with academics, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Locklear, provided an unexpected answer when asked to name the biggest long-term security threat in the Pacific region. He said significant upheaval related to the warming planet is probably the thing that will cripple the security environment. He added that the imperative to align military capabilities to deal with climate change must be interjected into a U.S. multilateral dialogue with China and India. The U.S. Defense Secretary and U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator raised the need for increased regional coordination for humanitarian support for climate-related disasters during an ASEAN defense ministers’ summit meeting in March 2014.

These statements are supported by recent forecasts. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the primary strategic guidance document for the U.S. Department of Defense, predicted that climate change will drive resource competition while placing additional burden on global economics, societies, and governance institutions. It argued that while climate change alone may not directly cause conflict, its effects are threat multipliers that will lead to violence that aggravates stressors such as poverty, political instability, and social tensions. All of the factors are manifest in parts of Asia.

The QDR is coincidental with the April 2014 release of part of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report; reviewed by 2500 scientists. This assessment differs from previous versions because it provides predictions not only on the science of climate change but on its geopolitical human security consequences. The report notes that climate change-induced sea level rise can create contested claims to territory and in extreme cases, destroy the existence and viability of small island states. Some of these islands are the physical basis for maritime claims in the disputed South China Sea. Low lying urban centers in the U.S. and China are both highly vulnerable to sea level rise. The low elevation coastal zone (an area of 10m or less above sea level) contains at least 41% of China’s population, 60% of its wealth and 70% of its megacities.

Despite the urgent need reduce climate change risks, the international climate regime has emphasizes climate change mitigation over preparation for its worst consequences. This priority has been reflected through subsidiary funding mechanisms such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and multilateral development institutions’ investments in clean energy projects. The benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation are undeniable but distant. The assessment horizon of tools at the disposal of policymakers tends to be about 20 years. Regional climate models, demographic projections and the intelligence forecasts predicting sociopolitical decline and conflict have reasonable fidelity only within that timeframe: their conclusions are alarming. Therefore, successful adaptation and risk reduction strategies must draw on existing resources to demonstrate significant near-term impact, whereas the momentum of climate change dictates that benefits of mitigation measures are not likely to be felt until the end of the century, sadly even if mankind never burns a molecule of oil gas or coal again.

U.S./China cooperation on climate change security risk reduction could occur on several levels, but an initial lack of results is cause for concern. The U.N. Security Council convened in 2007 and 2011 on the subject of whether climate security fell within its mandate. The U.S. emphasized good governance, economic development and capacity building as critical responses to climate change in the face of manifest evidence peace and security implications through the reversal of development gains and creation of statelessness in the Asian Pacific, but failed to specify whether remedial steps could be taken under the cognizance of the body. China, Russia and more than 100 developing countries opposed UNSC consideration on grounds that the body does not have the means to address the issue and does not operate under the principal of common but differentiated responsibilities. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is based on this principal that in cases where nations have benefitted economically from natural resource exploitation, they carry the responsibility to mitigate past environmental damage and help developing nations avoid further environmental damage.

The U.S. military is another institution concerned with climate change and Asia regional security primarily for two reasons. First that it could be drawn into local or regional conflict in Asia where climate change was an accelerant of instability. Second, that it might be called upon to respond more frequently to environmental disasters. The latter concern is shared by the Chinese military, at least from a domestic context. While the first outcome of war should be avoided by principle, Asian countries should seek new approaches to reduce the need for the second type of intervention. There is no solid evidence that the Admiral Locklear’s imperative to engage Chinese counterparts in dialogue is coming to fruition.

Implementing disaster risk reduction measures, building resilience, and planning for adaptation are activities most appropriate for civilian agencies but many in Asia are relatively ill-equipped for this task. The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) supports other U.S. agencies' engagement in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group by providing subject matter expertise. Recently, the agency has entered into cooperative agreements to conduct training institute for emergency response. Currently, FEMA its activities are limited to technical and informational exchanges so it has limited authority to conduct overseas operations. Increased budget authority and possible amendment of these regulations that also prohibit other nations’ agencies from providing direct disaster relief assistance on U.S. soil would be an important step forward. It is not hard to imagine a scenario where a U.S. Pacific territory is endangered and critical U.S. rescue assets are too remote to prevent further tragedy.

A new type of engagement on climate risk reduction in Asia is beginning to take place in the civil society sector that may provide forums for U.S./Chinese cooperation and discussion. Think-tanks, foundations and faith-based organizations have been successfully in peace building through environmental cooperation on other issues. Corporations have developed public private partnerships and market-based incentives with government to provide targeted and locally-supported assistance in the water sector.

U.S. Chinese environmental cooperation demands a new strategy. Environmental security -- the proactive minimization of threats to the biosphere and the people that inhabit it -- can provide a new framework for engagement. Just like in an ecological system, the complex Asian security architecture connects every component in dependent ways that are not easily understood. The zero-sum theory of international security maintains that as one country become more secure another becomes less so. This is inherently untrue in international environmental politics where exacerbation of phenomenon such as climate change, particulate air pollution and water pollution creates a negative sum equation where all parties loose. States no longer have the option of zero-sum calculations as ecosystems continue to degrade. Goods such as clean air cannot be forcibly obtained or effectively coerced from neighboring states.

Reliance on actors such as the UNSC and the military alone is an insufficient approach toward bilateral dialogue and cooperation. A new grand strategy including new actors such as corporations, faith-based organizations and existing civilian agencies should be enlisted to address the challenge. Each national foreign policy tool including: development; diplomacy and defense should be called into use to support this strategy.

Panel II: New Great Power Relations and shared security between the U.S. and China

The second panel is titled “New Great Power Relations and shared security between the U.S. and China,” and takes as its starting point the June 2013 summit between President Xi Jinping and President Barak Obama. Experts on both sides will, discuss how the U.S. and China might develop new joint approaches to regional security, focusing specifically on maritime challenges, enhancing peace in Northeast Asia and with respect to climate change.