By Page O Stoutland, Ph.D.

?

Promoting International Cooperation on Nuclear Security

By Page O Stoutland, Ph.D.

Nuclear Threat Initiative

If terrorists can obtain a sufficient quantity of weapons usable nuclear material, they could design, construct and detonate a nuclear bomb. The consequences of such a catastrophe would reverberate around the globe, with thousands of casualties, disruptions to economic markets, long-term implications for public health and the environment, and risks to civil liberties – not to mention the staggering cost of any response.

As a result, the world is taking important measurers to secure vulnerable nuclear materials around the globe. This is the most important step to prevent a terrorist nuclear attack. Global nuclear materials security, however, is not perfect. To date, reported cases of smuggling of nuclear materials have consisted of small quantities, but serve to highlight the potential risks. Furthermore, terrorist groups including Al Qaeda have actively sought to acquire nuclear weapons and materials, although they have apparently failed to obtain any significant quantity.

In addition to securing nuclear materials, it is also critical that countries be prepared to take other additional steps. For example, if terrorists were caught in the act of smuggling nuclear materials, countries must be prepared to respond so as to prevent the construction and use of a nuclear weapon.

Since its inception, the(NTI) has worked to reduce nuclear dangers and catalyze greater action by governments worldwide. As part of this effort, in a 2011 NTI sponsored meeting involving former American and Russian officials to highlight issues that would present themselves in the aftermath of a significant seizure of nuclear materials and to develop recommendations to prepare for such incidents. During the meeting, participants worked through a fictitious scenario as a way to highlight key issues in a real world event, to provide a streamlined way for participants to better understand what a real situation might involve, and to better understand other perspectives and priorities.

Nuclear Smuggling Exercise

Participants in the exercise were confronted with a hypothetical but plausible scenario.: A Russia-Tajik team seized a shipment of eight kilograms of at least 75% enriched uranium at the Afghan-Tajik border, not enough to build a nuclear weapon but potential enough to make a bomb if matched with other shipments of comparable size. One day later, U.S. Navy personnel, alerted by the Russian seizure, boarded a ship on the Mediterranean Sea and seized another shipment of highly enriched uranium (HEU) of the same quantity.

The U.S. and Russian teams strategized separately and then together about the best steps to take in those circumstances. They discussed procedures for measures such as notifying the respective presidents, alerting international partners, testing the material to confirm type and purity, and trying to identify the origin of the HEU, both to shut down the supply and make more targeted efforts to interdict other shipments. The team also strategized about what information should be made public and how, in order to build trust and prevent panic.

The purpose of the exercise was to understand the challenges the United States and Russia would face in their efforts to cooperate in a nuclear crisis and to develop recommendations on how to deal with them. The exercise was successful, not because it went smoothly but because very valuable lessons were learned. It highlighted the ways in which the joint response, if tested now by a real threat, might fail to prevent an attack. It pointed out flaws in our current posture – issues of habit, procedure, and approach that would interfere with efforts to share information, coordinate work, and act together to respond to a threat.

In the situation, there was no catastrophe, no nuclear attack. Yet, it prompted questions such as what information the two countries should share, how they should do the forensics testing, and who would get the data. It became clear to all the participants that Russia and the United States are a long way from being fully prepared to effectively cooperate on an operational level in the case on a nuclear terrorism event. During the situation, the clock was ticking. In an actual incident, time could run out.

The exercise showed that high-speed ,high-trust cooperation was required between the two nuclear superpowers. Participants need to exchange sensitive information, scientific expertise, and samples of nuclear materials so that their origin could be determined and the attack thwarted. Unfortunately, it was clear in the exercise that lower level of trust would inhibit the cooperation essential for success and that no clearly established procedures and protocols would guide exchanges of information and materials between the governments. In a real situation, the delayed caused by this could be catastrophic.

Prompted by their experience, the participants identified a number of specific recommendations that would enhance the preparedness of the United States and Russia to cooperate. The findings and recommendations are summarized in the report available at

Looking forward

Recognizing the shared equities and the international dimension of addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism, exercise of this type should be done with other countries as well. For example, while the United States and China have divergent approaches to some global problems, both countries share the overall goal of promoting peace and global stability and should consider ways in which to enhance their ability to cooperate in times of crisis.

Too often the international dialogue focuses on the differences between the U.S. and Chinese approaches to problems. For example, the United States and China have fundamentally different views about transparency and nuclear doctrine. Many bilateral meetings at both official and unofficial levels have considered these issues – while this has led to better understanding. It has yet to lead to significant change on either side.

While there are positive signs in some areas, there are not enough opportunities for the United States and China to strengthen their abilities to work cooperatively to jointly solve real world security problems. Such cooperation is needed in order to prepare for the inevitable challenges, as well as to enhance mutual understanding that may prove beneficial in some related areas as well.

Looking forward, it is likely that issues may present themselves that require immediately joint action by China and the United States. Yet, without preparation, missteps and delays could occur that could jeopardize the response.

The exercise described above is just one example of the types of cooperation that would be beneficial in addressing important shared security concerns. To enhance preparedness and reinforce the value of cooperation, the United States and China should consider how best to practice operational cooperation. In nuclear area, possible topics could include countering nuclear smuggling, addressing nuclear accidents, responding to radiological incidents and understanding of the cyber threat to nuclear facilities. U.S.-China cooperation is essential for global security, and the steps must be taken to put this into practice.