By Gong Xianfu, Vice President,

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Current Situation of International Nuclear Arms Control and Nuclear Disarmament

By Gong Xianfu, Vice President,

China International Institute for Strategic Society

Currently, international nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament process is showing both encouraging and frustrating signs, with a stress on the latter. The following is a general picture:

First, the new U.S.-Russian nuclear disarmament process faces challenges and prospect of a new round of nuclear disarmament negotiation is grim. As a result of implementing the New START signed in February 2011, as of March 1, 2014, the United States has 1585 strategic nuclear warheads deployed and 952 strategic carriers (with 778 deployed) in its service, while Russia has 1512 and 906 (with 498 deployed) in service respectively. In a bid to continue modernizing and upgrading its nuclear arsenal and create a more balanced and effective nuclear power structure, President Obama made a new nuclear disarmament proposal to further reduce strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Russia by up to one-third, down to 1000 to 1100 for them both. However, given the huge differences between the United States and Russia in missile defense systems and other fields, Russia stresses that only when it is sure that the U.S. missile defense system does not pose threat to Russia’s nuclear power will it further reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal. Failure in starting a new round of nuclear disarmament negotiations is made worse by deteriorated relationship between the United States and Russia over the crisis of Ukraine, which is detrimental to the implementation of the New START. Russian senior defense officials revealed Russia would stop accepting the U.S. inspections of its nuclear facilities required by the START treaty as a counter-measure.

Second, the five nuclear states show a distinct of engaging in both competition and cooperation, while strengthening willingness to confront external challenges unanimously. Strong internal cooperation among the five nuclear states is accompanied by increasingly complicated competition for the core interests and leadership in arms control. While the United States and Russia have shared interests in advancing multilateralism in nuclear disarmament and demanding greater nuclear transparency from China, they tit for tat for leadership over the international nuclear disarmament process and IAEA reform. As the 2015 NPT Review Conference is drawing near, pressure from non-nuclear-weapon states and their contradictions with nuclear-weapon states get more pronounced. Against this background, the five nuclear states will see greater willingness to better coordinate and confront external challenges unanimously.

Third, international multilateral nuclear arms control is fraught with difficulties, and chances of restarting FMCT negotiations are slim. As the only multilateral disarmament negotiation body in international community, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament is still unable to adopt a work plan. Without substantive progress after 16 consecutive years, launching FMCT negotiations remains elusive. Pakistan, on the pretext of the the principle of “consensus on consultation”, blocks restart of the FMCT negotiations in pursuit of its national security and strategic balance in South Asia, which has led to repeated failure of adopting a work plan.

Fourth, global nuclear nonproliferation invites little optimism, with perplexing DPRK and Iran nuclear issues. North Korea conducted the third nuclear test last year, which was a tremendous blow on the region’s security and China’s peripheral nonproliferation process. North Korea’s nuclear tests further provoke Japan and South Korea to develop their own nuclear weapons independently while serving a negative example for some countries attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Viewing the North Korean current positions, its giving up nuclear program is slim and denuclearizing peninsula is beyond a foreseeable future. On the Iran nuclear issue, despite the conclusion of an interim agreement, uncertainties loom large in its implementation. While a historic breakthrough was made last year after multiple rounds of P5+1 talks with Iran. The agreement is not a package solution to solve the issue, but is more transitional and the implementation is constrained by numerous factors. The future development of the Iran nuclear issue remains uncertain.

Fifth, with the threat of nuclear terrorism on the rise, the awareness of nuclear safety and desire for cooperation increases. With increasing complexity in the international security dynamic, international terrorist activities have rebounded forcefully and shown strong desire for nuclear technologies, materials even weapons. Given the growing risk of nuclear terrorism, nuclear security cooperation has become an important agenda to further international cooperation. Under the theme “Strengthen Nuclear Security and Prevent Nuclear Terrorism”, the Nuclear Security Summit held successfully last March reviewed progress in the field of nuclear security made by the international community since each of the previous summits, especially since the 2012 Seoul Summit and carried out in-depth discussions on issues of strengthening nuclear security such as national measures, international cooperation on and global governance of nuclear security. Thanks to the joint efforts of all participants, the Summit was a success and released the Hague Communiqué. The Nuclear Security Summit elevated the issue of nuclear security in the field of arms control. As countries are taking steps to intensify management and supervision of nuclear materials and facilities, the universality and effectiveness of international legal instruments related to nuclear security are also further strengthened.