編者按：1831年5月，年輕的托克維爾 （Alexis de Tocqueville） 第一次踏上美國(guó)國(guó)土。這是一場(chǎng)“自我放逐”之旅。他與波旁王朝的關(guān)系剪不斷、理還亂，在新共和國(guó)的政權(quán)下難免受到懷疑，于是，托克維爾和長(zhǎng)他三歲的古斯塔夫 · 德 · 博蒙 （Gustavede Beaumont） 主動(dòng)請(qǐng)命跑來新大陸研究刑事和監(jiān)獄制度。此后的9個(gè)月，他倆結(jié)伴走過了當(dāng)時(shí)美國(guó)24個(gè)州中的17個(gè)，以及日后成為美國(guó)國(guó)土的3個(gè)地區(qū)（密歇根、威斯康星和西弗吉尼亞），同200多名來自各行各業(yè)的人會(huì)面。

托克維爾1832年3月返回法國(guó)，帶著海量的材料和糾結(jié)的想法。他花了8年時(shí)間把他的零散印象寫成一本書。

托克維爾認(rèn)為，每個(gè)民族都有自己的出身來源，其特有的偏見、激情和習(xí)性都是這樣發(fā)展而來的。個(gè)體的人同樣如此。托克維爾是法國(guó)貴族出身。父母曾在熱月政變3個(gè)月后被抓進(jìn)惡臭的監(jiān)獄里關(guān)了10個(gè)月，而后無罪釋放。這加深了他們對(duì)舊制度的眷戀，于是竭力確保兒子所受的教育是堅(jiān)定地站在波旁王朝和羅馬天主教這邊的。然而，托克維爾讀到法國(guó)哲學(xué)家的作品后發(fā)生了信仰危機(jī)；但他終生未反對(duì)或貶低過宗教。他從美國(guó)寫來的信里說：“因?yàn)橐恍┕餐瓌t和千絲萬(wàn)縷的家庭關(guān)系，我注定是個(gè)保皇黨人，我感到自己和一個(gè)幾乎總在放縱、屢屢做出不光彩行為的群體捆綁在一起。他們犯下的過錯(cuò)，我很難不往心里去，即便我竭盡全力譴責(zé)他們?！?/p>

在美國(guó)的9個(gè)月里，托克維爾和博蒙從海關(guān)的不拘小節(jié)觀察到美國(guó)遠(yuǎn)不如法國(guó)那樣官僚化；他們也從新港的四五家銀行瞥見美國(guó)蓬勃發(fā)展的商業(yè)文化。此外，他們還見識(shí)到了美國(guó)人因?yàn)榘l(fā)達(dá)的航運(yùn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)而“對(duì)距離有令人難以置信的蔑視”，以及“條條大路都可通向財(cái)富”、“對(duì)致富的渴望解釋了他們?yōu)楹螌?duì)政治毫無興趣”，還有物質(zhì)主義如何悖論式地與極端宗教狂熱同時(shí)存在等等。（編譯/黎文）

在美國(guó)，行政權(quán)象其所代表的國(guó)家主權(quán)一樣，是有限的和例外的——在法國(guó)，行政權(quán)象國(guó)家主權(quán)一樣，可以擴(kuò)及一切事務(wù)——國(guó)王是立法者之一——總統(tǒng)只是法律的執(zhí)行者——兩種權(quán)力的任期產(chǎn)生的其他差異——總統(tǒng)被束縛在行政權(quán)的范圍內(nèi)——國(guó)王在這方面是自由的——盡管有此種種不同，但法國(guó)更近似共和國(guó)，而美國(guó)更近似君主國(guó)——比較兩國(guó)依附于行政權(quán)的官員人數(shù)。

[1] 行政權(quán)對(duì)國(guó)家命運(yùn)所起的作用甚大，所以我必須先在這里詳細(xì)討論一下它在美國(guó)占有什么地位。為了對(duì)美國(guó)總統(tǒng)的地位有個(gè)清晰明確的概念，最好拿美國(guó)總統(tǒng)的地位同歐洲的一個(gè)立憲君主國(guó)國(guó)王的地位作一比較。

在進(jìn)行這種對(duì)比時(shí)，我不太重視權(quán)力的外在標(biāo)志，因?yàn)檫@種標(biāo)志容易轉(zhuǎn)移研究者的視線，對(duì)研究者很少有引導(dǎo)作用。

當(dāng)一個(gè)君主國(guó)逐漸變?yōu)楣埠蛧?guó)的時(shí)候，王權(quán)雖已實(shí)際上消失了很久，但行政權(quán)仍使國(guó)王保留著頭銜、榮譽(yù)、甚至財(cái)富。英國(guó)人斬了一位國(guó)王的首級(jí)，把另一位國(guó)王從寶座上攆走以后，依然習(xí)慣于跪著對(duì)這些君主的繼承人談話。

另一方面，當(dāng)一些共和國(guó)落到一個(gè)獨(dú)夫控制之下時(shí)，這個(gè)獨(dú)裁者卻能依然生活簡(jiǎn)樸，不尚虛榮，作風(fēng)謙遜，好象自己并未處于萬(wàn)人之上。當(dāng)皇帝們大權(quán)在握，對(duì)其同胞的財(cái)產(chǎn)和生存進(jìn)行專橫統(tǒng)治時(shí)，人民在談話中稱他們?yōu)閯P撒，而他們本人卻又能屈尊到朋友家里作客。

因此，應(yīng)當(dāng)揭開面紗，深入到內(nèi)部。

[2] 在美國(guó)，主權(quán)由聯(lián)邦和各州分享；而在法國(guó)，主權(quán)是一個(gè)整體，不能分割。我認(rèn)為，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)與法國(guó)國(guó)王的最大、最主要不同即由此而來。

在美國(guó)，行政權(quán)象其所代表的國(guó)家主權(quán)一樣，是有限的和例外的；而在法國(guó)，行政權(quán)象國(guó)家主權(quán)一樣，可以擴(kuò)及一切事務(wù)。

美國(guó)人有一個(gè)聯(lián)邦政府，而法國(guó)人則有一個(gè)全國(guó)政府。

[3] 這就是由此自然產(chǎn)生的美國(guó)總統(tǒng)地位不如法國(guó)國(guó)王地位的第一個(gè)原因，但還不是唯一原因。第二個(gè)重要原因，是兩者所代表的主權(quán)內(nèi)涵不同。確切地說，可以把主權(quán)定義為制定法律的權(quán)限。

在法國(guó)，國(guó)王實(shí)際上是主權(quán)的化身，因?yàn)榉刹唤?jīng)他批準(zhǔn)就不能生效。同時(shí)，他也是法律的執(zhí)行者。

美國(guó)總統(tǒng)雖然也是法律的執(zhí)行者，但他并不實(shí)際參加立法工作，因?yàn)樗煌獠⒉环恋K法律的存在。因此，他決不是主權(quán)的化身，而只是主權(quán)的代理人。

在法國(guó)，國(guó)王不僅是主權(quán)的化身，而且也參加立法機(jī)構(gòu)，從其中得到一份權(quán)力。他參加國(guó)會(huì)的一個(gè)議院的議員提名，并能以自己的意志終止另一個(gè)議院議員的任期。美國(guó)總統(tǒng)不參加立法機(jī)構(gòu)的組建工作，也不能解散立法機(jī)構(gòu)。

國(guó)王與國(guó)會(huì)分享法律的提案權(quán)。

總統(tǒng)卻沒有這樣的提案權(quán)。

國(guó)王在國(guó)會(huì)的兩院中各有其一定人數(shù)的代表，這些代表在國(guó)會(huì)中解釋他的觀點(diǎn)，支持他的意見，使他的施政綱領(lǐng)獲勝。

總統(tǒng)不能成為國(guó)會(huì)的議員，他的閣僚也同他一樣，均被排除在國(guó)會(huì)之外。他只能通過間接的辦法使自己的影響和意見進(jìn)入國(guó)會(huì)這個(gè)大衙門。

因此，法國(guó)的國(guó)王與立法機(jī)構(gòu)處于平等地位，立法機(jī)構(gòu)沒有國(guó)王不能活動(dòng)，而國(guó)王離開立法機(jī)構(gòu)也不能活動(dòng)。

而總統(tǒng)就象一個(gè)低級(jí)的和從屬的權(quán)力，被置于立法機(jī)構(gòu)之外。

[4] 在所說的行政權(quán)上，總統(tǒng)的地位似乎與法國(guó)國(guó)王的地位很接近。但即使在行使這項(xiàng)權(quán)力的時(shí)候，總統(tǒng)也由于地位低下等重要原因而屈辱。

首先，法國(guó)國(guó)王的權(quán)力在任期上就優(yōu)越于美國(guó)總統(tǒng)的權(quán)力。要知道，任期是權(quán)力的一項(xiàng)重要因素。人們只對(duì)行將長(zhǎng)期存在的東西表示愛戴和敬畏。

美國(guó)總統(tǒng)是一個(gè)選任四年的行政官，而法國(guó)國(guó)王則是一個(gè)世襲的君主。

[5] 美國(guó)總統(tǒng)在行使行政權(quán)時(shí)，自始至終受到一種忌妒性的監(jiān)督。他可以締結(jié)但不能批準(zhǔn)條約，他可以提名但不能直接任命官員。

法國(guó)國(guó)王在行政權(quán)方面是絕對(duì)主人。

美國(guó)總統(tǒng)對(duì)自己的行動(dòng)負(fù)責(zé)，法國(guó)法律規(guī)定國(guó)王的人身是不可侵犯的。

當(dāng)然，不管是法國(guó)國(guó)王，還是美國(guó)總統(tǒng)，都要受到作為一種指導(dǎo)力量的輿論的影響。這個(gè)力量在法國(guó)不如在美國(guó)那樣明顯，未全被人公認(rèn)，沒有正式寫在法律里面，但這種力量確實(shí)在法國(guó)發(fā)生著作用。這種力量，在美國(guó)通過選舉和法院判決發(fā)生作用，在法國(guó)通過革命發(fā)生作用。盡管兩國(guó)的憲法不同，但有一點(diǎn)在兩國(guó)是相同的，即輿論實(shí)際上都是具有統(tǒng)治作用的力量。因此，說到底，法律的原動(dòng)力在兩國(guó)都是一樣的，盡管這個(gè)原動(dòng)力在兩國(guó)的發(fā)展有過于自由和不夠自由之別，而發(fā)展的結(jié)果又總是有所不同。從本性來說，這個(gè)原動(dòng)力實(shí)質(zhì)上是共和主義的。所以我認(rèn)為，擁有國(guó)王的法國(guó)之近似共和國(guó)，甚于擁有總統(tǒng)的美國(guó)之近似君主國(guó)。

[6] 在以上的敘述中，我只是著重指出了主要的不同點(diǎn)。如果我要深入到細(xì)節(jié)，則對(duì)比的結(jié)果還會(huì)更加驚人。但是，這已經(jīng)說得過長(zhǎng)了，而我本來還想往短說的。

[7] 我已經(jīng)指出，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)的權(quán)力只限于在其擁有的那部分主權(quán)內(nèi)行使，而法國(guó)國(guó)王的權(quán)力則在全部主權(quán)的范圍內(nèi)行使。

我可以證明，盡管法國(guó)國(guó)王的統(tǒng)治權(quán)已經(jīng)大得驚人，并通過無數(shù)渠道深入到管理私人利益，但他在行使這項(xiàng)權(quán)力時(shí)又超過了其自然極限。

除了國(guó)王統(tǒng)治權(quán)的這個(gè)影響之外，我還能指出任用大批公職人員所帶來的后果。這些公職人員，幾乎都是代替國(guó)王行使行政權(quán)的?，F(xiàn)在，法國(guó)公職人員的總數(shù)已超過以往任何時(shí)期，高達(dá)138000人，應(yīng)把其中的每個(gè)人都視為權(quán)力的分子。美國(guó)總統(tǒng)沒有任用公職人員的專權(quán)，而且任用的人數(shù)沒有超過12000人。

IN WHAT THE POSITION OF A PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES DIFFERS FROM THAT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL KING OF FRANCE. Executive power in the United States as limited and exceptional as the sovereignty that it represents—Executive power in France， like the state's sovereignty， extends to everything—The King a branch of the legislature—The President the mere executor of the law—Other differences resulting from the duration of the two powers—The President checked in the exercise of executive authority—The King independent in its exercise-In spite of these differences， practice is more akin to a republic than the Union to a monarchy—Comparison of the number of public officers depending upon the executive power in the two countries.

[1] THE executive power has so important an influence on the destinies of nations that I wish to dwell for an instant on this portion of my subject in order more clearly to explain the part it sustains in America. In order to form a clear and precise idea of the position of the President of the United States it may be well to compare it with that of one of the constitutional kings of France. In this comparison I shall pay but little attention to the external signs of power， which are more apt to deceive the eye of the observer than to guide his researches. When a monarchy is being gradually transformed into a republic， the executive power retains the titles， the honors， the etiquette， and even the funds of royalty long after its real authority has disappeared. The English， after having cut off the head of one king， and expelled another from his throne， were still wont to address the successors of those princes only upon their knees. On the other hand， when a republic falls under the sway of a single man， the demeanor of the sovereign remains as simple and unpretending as if his authority was not yet paramount. When the emperors exercised an unlimited control over the fortunes and the lives of their fellow citizens， it was customary to call them C'sar in conversation； and they were in the habit of supping without formality at their friends' houses. It is therefore necessary to look below the surface.

[2] The sovereignty of the United States is shared between the Union and the states， while in France it is undivided and compact； hence arises the first and most notable difference that exists between the President of the United States and the King of France. In the United States the executive power is as limited and exceptional as the sovereignty in whose name it acts； in France it is as universal as the authority of the state. The Americans have a Federal and the French a national government.

[3] This cause of inferiority results from the nature of things， but it is not the only one； the second in importance is as follows. Sovereignty may be defined to be the right of making laws. In France， the King really exercises a portion of the sovereign power， since the laws have no weight if he refuses to sanction them； he is， moreover， the executor of all they ordain. The President is also the executor of the laws； but he does not really co-operate in making them， since the refusal of his assent does not prevent their passage. He is not， therefore， a part of the sovereign power， but only its agent. But not only does the King of France constitute a portion of the sovereign power； he also contributes to the nomination of the legislature， which is the other portion. He participates in it through appointing the members of one chamber and dissolving the other at his pleasure； whereas the President of the United States has no share in the formation of the legislative body and cannot dissolve it. The King has the same right of bringing forward measures as the chambers， a right which the President does not possess. The King is represented in each assembly by his ministers， who explain his intentions， support his opinions， and maintain the principles of the government. The President and his ministers are alike excluded from Congress， so that his influence and his opinions can only penetrate indirectly into that great body. The King of France is therefore on an equal footing with the legislature， which can no more act without him than he can without it. The President is placed beside the legislature like an inferior and dependent power.

[4] Even in the exercise of the executive power， properly so called， the point upon which his position seems to be most analogous to that of the King of France， the President labors under several causes of inferiority. The authority of the King in France has， in the first place， the advantage of duration over that of the President； and durability is one of the chief elements of strength nothing is either loved or feared but what is likely to endure. The President of the United States is a magistrate elected for four years. The King in France is a hereditary sovereign.

[5] In the exercise of the executive power the President of the United States is constantly subject to a jealous supervision. He may prepare， but he cannot conclude， a treaty； he may nominate but he cannot appoint， a public officer 15. The King of France is absolute within the sphere of executive power. The President of the United States is responsible for his actions； but the person of the King is declared inviolable by French law. Nevertheless， public opinion as a directing power is no less above the head of the one than of the other. This power is less definite， less evident， and less sanctioned by the laws in France than in America； but it really exists there. In America it acts by elections and decrees； in France it proceeds by revolutions. Thus， notwithstanding the different constitutions of these two countries， public opinion is the predominant authority in both of them. The principle of legislation， a principle essentially republican， is the same in both countries， although its developments may be more or less free and its consequences different. Thus I am led to conclude that France with its King is nearer akin to a republic than the Union with its President is to a monarchy.

[6] In all that precedes I have touched only upon the main points of distinction； if I could have entered into details， the contrast would have been still more striking.

[7] I have remarked that the authority of the President in the United States is only exercised within the limits of a partial sovereignty， while that of the King in France is undivided. I might have gone on to show that the power of the King's government in France exceeds its natural limits， however extensive these may be， and penetrates in a thousand different ways into the administration of private interests. Among the examples of this influence may be quoted that which results from the great number of public functionaries， who all derive their appointments from the executive government. This number now exceeds all previous limits； it amounts to 138，000 16 nominations， each of which may be considered as an element of power. The President of the United States has not the exclusive right of making any public appointments， and their whole number scarcely exceeds 12，000.