:

(4)

, written by Ishikawa Tatsuzo after his interviews with the troops in Nanjing and Shanghai, is a literary representation of the Fall of Nanjing, which exposed the Japanese army’s atrocities around the attack of Nanjing. The work was banned in Japan, but was soon translated in China in 1938 by Zhang Shifang, Xia Yan and Bai Mu. It was published several times over the years and was regarded as a masterpiece that could inspire the Chinese army and people to fight against Japan. After the reform and opening up, under the background that the historical memories of war was forgotten and distorted, and the Japanese government’s evasion of its war responsibility,was translated into Chinese again. It was endowed with different social meanings in different periods, and its Chinese translation and publication process shows the translator’s spirit of assuming the social responsibility.

-’“”

(15)

A series of studies and basic understandings have been formed between 1990s and 2005 about the the implementation of the Japanese army’s “comfort women” system in Hainan, and new arguments have rarely been seen since then. At present, it is estimated that there were at least 5000 to 7000 female victims and the number of Japanese military comfort stations in Hainan is 93, with a total of 168 local cases of the victims in Hainan. Through statistical and quantitative analysis of historical data, it can be seen that the Japanese army’s “comfort women” system was carried out around the needs of the Japanese army’s “Southward Advancement”. The Japanese army’s military operations, and the official overseas immigration activities directly affect the distribution and types of comfort stations. Due to the in-depth participation of the Taiwan Development Companys and the oppression of the “Service Teams for Field Logistics”, the comfort stations in Hainan had the characteristics of diversity in terms of its means of establishment, forced recruitment and sources of “comfort women”. The implementation of the “comfort women” system in Hainan was a crucial part of Japan’s war support system and a concrete representation of Japan’s systematic state crimes.

“-”

(30)

The “mutual support” of the army, and the government as well as the people is a fine tradition of base areas led by the Communist Party of China during the War of Resistance against Japan, which strengthened the close ties among the people, the government of base area and the CPC-led armed forces for the resistance against Japan. It played an important role in the development of the base area of resistance against Japan from being small to big, and the army of CPC from being weak to strong. After the outbreak of the total war of resistance against Japan, the base areas established by the Shandong Branch of CPC continued to grow, and the Japanese puppet troops continued to “sweep” and “encroach on” the base areas.

Under the severe situations, the “mutual support” work in the base areas became one of the important ways for the CPC to fight against the Japanese puppet army. During the process of implementing the “mutual support” work, there were some contradictions among the party, government, army and people, which affected the development and expansion of the base areas and armed forces for the resistance against Japan. Therefore, Shandong Branch of the CPC formulated relevant policies, requiring the Eighth Route Army to improve military-civilian and military-government relations by reaching out to the masses and respecting the government of base areas. The government of Shandong Base Area of Resistance against Japan relived the worries of the public through pre-war mobilization and post-war guarantees. In this way, a system of “integrated responsibility” of the party, government, military and civilians was constructed, which strengthened the connection among the party, government, military and civilians, promoted the smooth development of the “mutual support” work, and laid a solid foundation for the victory of the war of the resistance against Japan.

——--

(40)

During the total war of resistance against Japan, the CPC gradually attached importance to the underground work in the occupied cities. In the later period of the War of Resistance against Japan, it even regarded it as an equally important work as that in the base areas, and strengthened the training of underground workers in the occupied cities. Finding suitable persons was a key factor. To solve this problem, the City Work Department of Shanxi-Chahaer-Hebei and Shandong Base Areas of Resistance against Japan carried out general mobilization within the party, corrected various ideological deviations of underground workers through education, improved their ideological quality and comprehensive ability via education on the revolutionary morality and professional training, etc. and at the same time, adopted the preferential policy for the family members of the underground workers to relieve their worries. Through a series of measures, the number of trained underground workers developed rapidly with the quality improved to a certain extent, which improved the work in the occupied cities.

:-

(53)

Grassroots society has always been the main field of state governance. To better promote the healthy and efficient development of grassroots political power, and to mobilize, organize, and arm the people to actively participate in the War of Resistance, the Communist Party of China established many systems with many policies implemented in the northwestern Shanxi base area of resistance against Japan. As an effective method of work and leadership, “meeting” played a huge role in unifying thoughts, wills and actions, so it’s widely used in the CPC’s grass-roots political system. For the Communist Party of China, which was committed to consolidating and developing the base areas of resistance against Japan, the implementation of policies was far more important than its formulation, and the village was exactly the primary place where the CPC interacts with the public, and where the CPC frequently convened most of the meetings for the policy implementations. The grass-roots meeting in the northwestern Shanxi Base Area of Resistance against Japan not only directly demonstrated the public willingness to participate in the meeting and on-the-spot performance, but also indirectly showed their response to the CPC’s policies and the CPC’s experience and strategies in response to the people's demands.

“-”’

(67)

Since Japan proposed the “Twenty-One Demands” and forced the signing of the “Sino-Japanese Treaty of the fourth year of TaiShou” in 1915, though Japan was forced to return China's sovereignty over Shandong after the end of World War I, it rejected the Chinese government's request for annulment of unequal treaties, and continue to try to achieve its original requirements. Japan could be said obsessed with this goal, and try to make all the efforts to obtain it. After the September 18th Incident, the Japanese government for the first time asked Nanjing government to recognize “Twenty-One Demands” and “Sino-Japanese Treaty of the fourth year of TaiShou” as one of the important conditions for direct negotiation with China; since the establishment of the puppet Manchurian regime, through firstly the “Japan-Manchuria Secrete Covenant”, and then the “Japan-Manchuria Protocol”, Japan completely finalized and further expanded the “rights and interests of Manchuria and Mongolia” in the “Twenty-one Demands”. During the “North China Incident”, in the two negotiations with Nanjing government initiated by the Japanese diplomatic authorities, whether it was the Three Principles of Hirota or the specific requirements, they all included and even exceeded the requirements not obtained in the “Twenty-one Demands”. After launching its full-scale war of aggression against China, the Japanese army established puppet regimes in both North and Central China, and sent a large number of Japanese advisers to control them; and after the surrender of the Wang Jingwei Group, Japan continued to consolidate and expand more demands beyond the “Twenty-one Demands” for the aggression against China through the signing of the “Secret Agreement between Japan and Wang Jingwei” and the Sino-Japanese Treaty”. “Twenty-one Demands” was not only one of the causes” for Japan to launch the 15-year war of aggression against China, but also a crucial part of its aggression policy, it came to an end with Japan’s defeat and surrender.

(81)

Since the “January 28Incident” in 1932, the National Government gradually had the concept of national defense construction around the capital Nanjing. Considering the future possibility of Japanese army launching the landing operations on both the northern and southern bank of the Hangzhou Bay, between 1933 to 1936, the National Government first built the defense fortifications of Zhapu and Ganpu on the northern bank of Hangzhou Bay, and then a small number of infantry fortifications in Zhenhai and Chuanshan and other places on its southern bank, thus forming the “Zhapu-Ganpu-Ningbo Coastal Position” along the coast of Hangzhou Bay to prevent the enemy from landing. Meanwhile, Zhenhai Fortress was also relocated to the southern bank to block the enemy. In early November 1937, to reverse the predicament of the battle in Shanghai, the Japanese army avoided the defense fortifications of Zhapu and Ganpu built by the National Government before the war, and landed easily near Jinshanwei on the northern bank of Hangzhou Bay, resulting in the fact that the fortifications built before the war on the northern bank failed to play its role as expected; in the following years, the Japanese army repeatedly bombarded places like Zhenhai fortress on the southern bank and attempted to land several times. It was not until April 1941 that the Japanese army finally realized the purpose of landing. Therefore, in terms of the resistance against the Japanese landing operations, Zhenhai Fortress on the southern bank of Hangzhou Bay still played a certain role in blocking the enemy.

18’

(94)

Customs is an administrative organ set up at ports by the state to manage inbound and outbound goods, personnel and means of transport, to collect customs duties and handle related affairs. Its independence is an important manifestation of state sovereignty. In the Qing Dynasty, by means of those unequal treaties, the western powers relied on the Foreign-controlled Taxation and Tariff System to turn China’s customs into an “international government organization”. Since its founding, National Government in Nanjing strengthened the management and control of the administrative power in the customs, but still retained the foreign-controlled taxation and tariff system. After the September 18th Incident, the Japanese side took steps such as intimidation by force, plundering taxes, encroaching on customs offices as well as “taking over” in the name of the puppet Manchukuo, and gradually seized all the northeast customs. Due to the distinctiveness of China’s customs administrative system, the British Inspector General Frederick William Maze had a compromise obsession to maintain the administration integrity of the customs at the expense of the tariff custody of China’s customs, which received the support of the British government. To safeguard national sovereignty, the National Government curbed the compromise words and deeds of the General Taxation Department on one hand, and on the other hand, waited for the opportunity to seek the international intervention, and finally countered the Japanese with the closing of the customs and collecting tax at new locations.

’——-

(104)

Local armed groups are an important force in relation to the social security and stability, and in the early days of the Republic of China, local government used to reorganize the local armed groups. After the outbreak of the total war of aggression against China, the puppet government had the strategy to rectify and utilize local armed groups. They incorporated the local armed forces of “Peace Preservation Corps” into the puppet police security team, while the remaining armed self-defense groups such as the militia regiment, the secret societies ,religious groups and clubs that existed in the enemy-occupied areas were all adapted into the puppet self-defense groups. The puppet government established a relatively complete organization system of the puppet self-defense groups from villages to provinces, with training centers at all levels to improve the’ quality of itsmembers The Local Self-Defense Groups became an important armed force on which the puppet regime relied. It played an important role in maintaining the ruling order of the puppet government and assisting in “eliminating the CPC” and “self-defense”. However, since the local armed forces with numerous and jumbled low-quality personnel incorporated by the puppet government, they lorded it over the people as the “ruler”, which caused great damage to the society and civic life in the occupied areas, and further shook the foundation of the rule of the puppet government.

'(1933—1945)

(116)

Grain is an important war readiness material. From the partial invasion of North China to its defeat, Japan's control of grain in North China went through four stages, namely, the grain survey under the guidance of “the economic cooperation among Japan, China and the Manchuria”, grain development plus trade control under the policy of “Increasing Cotton and Guaranteeing Grain”, “key development” with food plundering, and the administrative purchase with armed looting to serve the “system of the decisive battle”. The change of grain control was closely related to Japan's strategic expansion and maintenance of public security in the enemy-occupied areas, and the essence was to maintain the role of a “military depot base” in the occupied areas of North China. The Japanese puppet regime carried out colonial development, plundering purchases and differential allotment, with the gradually deepened intensity of plundering, which to a certain extent met the Japan's purpose of “supporting war with war”. However, due to the reality of the agricultural situation in North China and the resistance from all walks of life, it was hard to reconcile Japan's subjective intention of control with the objective economic law, and its grain control eventually failed.

(1937—1940) ——“”

(127)

During the total war of resistance against Japan, people’s understanding of the war in the occupied areas changed dynamically. In 1938, when Xuzhou fell, multiple forces gathered in northern Jiangsu including the nationalist government, CPC, Japanese army and the puppet regime, which changed people’s view of war. Huang Tirun then served as the acting magistrate of Fengxian County in Xuzhou. He recorded the experience of the War of Resistance against Japan in the occupied areas and people’s living conditions at the grassroots level in his diary. His diary reflected not only different resistance sentiment and personal choices of local officials of the nationalist government, the changes in the mentality of the people with the Japanese army’s policy of incentives and penalties, but also the subtle and complicated relationship between the Kuomintang and CPC at the grassroots level. Observing the occupied areas of northern Jiangsu from the grassroots perspective can further restore the psychological changes and personal choices of the Kuomintang officials and people at the grassroots level in the face of war and interests.