Speechwriters are rarely figures of public note. The job is more often than not a quiet grind. Americans are predisposed to distrust the words that leave the lips of politicians， and the opacity of the speechwriting process can heighten those suspicions. Here are some misconceptions about our role.

MYTH NO. 1 Politicians are puppets.

Richard Nixon—who was out-orated and ultimately defeated by John F. Kennedy in 1960—dismissed JFK as a “puppet who echoed his speechmaker，” the great Ted Sorensen. The charge didnt stick; Kennedys natural eloquence and wit were apparent in every ad-lib.

“Are some public officials simply mouthpieces？” wonders Kathleen Hall Jamieson， who teaches political communications at the University of Pennsylvania. Its not unreasonable to assume that if someone isnt writing for himself， hes not thinking for himself.

Yes， something consequential was lost when political leaders abandoned the practice of working out their thoughts on paper， as Abraham Lincoln did. Writing， for him， was how he clarified his beliefs and determined a course of action. Still， its wrong to assume that todays politicians are mere puppets or parrots. Speechwriting， for the most part， is intensely collaborative： Writers and speakers trade outlines and drafts， reconsider the flow or the focus of an argument， refine （and sometimes ruin） a good line.

MYTH NO. 2 Speechwriters are stenographers.

When speechwriters arent portrayed as puppet-masters， theyre seen as note-takers—transcribers—who record and then polish what the speaker provides. At a White House party on the evening of the 1997 State of the Union address， Clinton threw his arm around Michael Waldman， his chief speechwriter， and introduced him to a guest as one of “the guys who typed my speech.” The verb was not incidental. Many politicians have ambivalent relationships with their speechwriters—relying on them while resenting that fact. “I used to write my own speeches， you know，” Ronald Reagan once reminded Peggy Noonan.

However， smart speakers demand more than a stenographer. Elected officials have policy and political advisers， and the most effective speechwriters conduct themselves as speech advisers—making recommendations about the form， content， purpose and intended audience of remarks. Sam Rosenman， who wrote speeches for Franklin Roosevelt， said that FDR “expected us to criticize and argue with him， and to suggest changes in language and ideas.” Any writer who didnt， Rosenman added， was “useless to” Roosevelt and “might as well go home.”

MYTH NO. 3 “Off the cuff” means “from the heart.”

One of the weirdest obsessions of the Republican Party—is a piece of technology more than 60 years old： the teleprompter. The GOP is opposed to it. True， many Republicans use one， but the partys semi-official position was articulated by Fred Davis， a media strategist， in 2011： A teleprompter， he said， is “a sign of inauthenticity. Its a sign that you cant speak on your own two feet.”

Anti-teleprompterism is not purely cynical; it reflects a widespread frustration with contrivance in politics. We have come to equate “off the cuff” with “from the heart，” as a former White House colleague of mine has put it. Which is just silly. Much of what Donald Trump blurts out is demonstrably false， while a well-crafted speech can be deeply revealing. Consider Steve Jobss commencement speech at Stanford University in 2005， in which he spoke about “l(fā)ove and loss” and living with cancer. He read it from a sheet of paper—though it wouldnt have been any less genuine if hed read it from a screen.

MYTH NO. 4 We cant believe a word theyre saying.

Our collective skepticism—to put it politely—about the truth of what politicians have to say is well grounded in the betrayals of the past half-century， from the “l(fā)ight at the end of the tunnel” in Vietnam2 to the Watergate break-in and coverup， the Iran-contra3 scandal and the Lewinsky affair.

This kind of chicanery has become commonplace in politics. Yet observers might be surprised by the conscientiousness of most public servants， or by the scope and serious-mindedness of the fact-checking operation in the White House or a typical campaign. Data is checked and rechecked by the economic team; anecdotes are thoroughly vetted and scrapped if they seem suspect; grand claims are qualified in ways that result in accurate， if sometimes awkward， phrase-making. Clinton wanted to set a goal in his 2000 State of the Union address of making America the safest country in the world. He had to settle for “the safest big country in the world”; senior policy advisers warned that the United States was never going to top little Iceland or Denmark.? ? ? ? ? ? ?■

演說寫手是鮮為公眾關注的群體，這項工作通常都是默默的苦差：本來，政客一開口，美國人民就心生疑竇，加之撰稿的過程不透明，就更令人疑竇叢生了。這里說說人們對我們寫手作用的誤解。

迷思一：政治人物是線偶。

1960年，理查德·尼克松在辯論中輸給約翰·F.肯尼迪，后在選舉中敗北。他把肯尼迪貶為“演說寫手的應聲線偶”，這位寫手就是牛人泰德·索倫森。但尼克松的說法站不住腳，每一次即興演說中，肯尼迪天生的口才和機智顯而易見。

賓西法尼亞大學教授政治傳播課的凱瑟琳·霍爾·賈米森提出一個問題，“有些官員是否僅為傳聲筒？”若說一個人不親自捉筆，思想就不是他自己的，也不是沒有道理。

確實，政治領袖不再自己動筆整理思想，是個重大缺憾。亞伯拉罕·林肯就不同，對他來說，動筆是闡明觀點和決定行動方向的方法。但如果把當今政治人物說成提線木偶或學舌鸚鵡，那也不對。總體而言，寫演講稿是需要高度配合的工作：寫手與演說人交流提綱和草稿，推敲論證邏輯或重點，打磨（有時是毀掉）金句。

迷思之二：演說寫手是記錄員。

寫手不是被當成木偶提線人，就是被看作記錄員，抄抄寫寫，記錄演說者所言，然后再加以潤飾。1997年國情咨文演說后的白宮晚會上，克林頓攬住他的演說主筆麥克爾·瓦爾德曼，向一位來賓介紹：“我的講話，是他們敲出來的?！庇谩扒谩弊植⒎桥既唬S多政治人物與演說寫手的關系很矛盾——離不開寫手，卻又耿耿于懷。羅納德·里根有一次提醒佩姬·努南，“要知道，以前的講話稿可是我自己寫的”。

但精明的演說人要的可不僅僅是個記錄員。當選官員手下都有政策和政治顧問，那些演說撰稿高手會把自己經(jīng)營成演說顧問——從演說的形式和內容，到演說目的和目標受眾，他們都會給出建議。效力于富蘭克林·羅斯福的山姆·羅森曼說，羅斯福“希望我們對他的觀點進行批評和爭論，對語言和觀點提出修改意見”。羅森曼還說，如果不這么做，那么這個人對羅斯福就“百無一用”，“很可能得走人”。

迷思三：即席講話等于真心話。

一項已有60多年歷史的技術一直讓共和黨糾結不已，這就是提詞器。共和黨是反對用提詞器的。不錯，許多共和黨人在用，但媒體謀士弗雷德·戴維斯在2011年闡述了該黨的半官方立場。他說，提詞器“透著假，說明你沒有脫稿講話的本事”。

反對提詞器倒不純屬吹毛求疵，只是反映出人們已普遍反感政治中的造作。我的一位前白宮同事說，我們已經(jīng)開始把“即席”與“真心”畫上了等號。這簡直荒謬：特朗普張口就來，但顯然講的很多都不靠譜;而一篇精心寫就的演說卻能發(fā)人深省。喬布斯2005年在斯坦福大學開學典禮上的演講就是一例，他談到“愛與失”，講述了與癌癥共存的經(jīng)歷。演講時他拿的是紙稿，但若換成提詞屏，那種真誠也絲毫不會減弱。

迷思四：政客的話，一個字也不能信。

對政客言辭真實性的集體懷疑（這是客氣的說法）是有充分理由的。過去半個世紀，我們屢屢遭到背叛，從越戰(zhàn)中“隧道盡頭看到光亮”的承諾到水門事件中的入室竊聽偷拍未遂和事后種種掩飾，從伊朗門事件到萊溫斯基性丑聞。

此類騙局在政界已成家常便飯。但如果了解大多數(shù)公務人員是有良知的人，了解白宮或正常競選中核查事實時的投入和較真，那么觀察家們可能會感到意外。經(jīng)濟團隊會反復核實數(shù)據(jù);各種軼聞會徹底查證，存疑者棄之不用;重要提法會進行定性，以求造詞準確，盡管有時讓人覺得別扭。2000年，克林頓在國情咨文中提出要把美國建成世界上最安全的國家，但資深幕僚們說，這一方面美國永遠也趕不上小小的冰島或丹麥，克林頓最后只好接受“世界上最安全的大國”這一措辭。? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?□

（譯者為“《英語世界》杯”翻譯大賽獲獎者）

1杰夫·謝索爾曾任克林頓總統(tǒng)的演說寫手。

2 1967年，隨著美軍傷亡日漸增多，美國國內反戰(zhàn)聲浪越來越大，而約翰遜總統(tǒng)、白宮高官乃至美軍援越司令部指揮官卻都樂觀地宣稱，越南戰(zhàn)爭正在到達一個轉折點，美國正在贏得戰(zhàn)爭（“We are winning”）。1967年11月21日，威廉·威斯特摩蘭將軍（Gen. William Westmoreland）在演講中說，已經(jīng)看到了“勝利的曙光”（light at the end of the tunnel）。1968年1月31日凌晨3時，北越發(fā)動了規(guī)?？涨暗拇汗?jié)攻勢（Tet Offensive），對南越幾乎所有的大小城市發(fā)起進攻，讓美國和南越軍隊猝不及防。對戰(zhàn)持續(xù)數(shù)月，導致美國人對越南戰(zhàn)爭徹底喪失信心，威斯特摩蘭和約翰遜關于“勝利即將到來”的承諾便成了笑話。? 3“伊朗門”是指發(fā)生在美國80年代中期的政治丑聞。里根政府向伊朗秘密出售武器，將軍火交易得到的3000萬美元轉移到尼加拉瓜反政府武裝（Contra）手中，此事被揭露后造成嚴重政治危機。因新聞界將其與尼克松水門事件相比，故此亦稱為伊朗門事件（Irangate）。