周艷菊，胡鳳英，周正龍

零售商主導(dǎo)下促進(jìn)綠色產(chǎn)品需求的聯(lián)合研發(fā)契約協(xié)調(diào)研究

周艷菊，胡鳳英*，周正龍

（中南大學(xué)商學(xué)院，湖南 長(zhǎng)沙 410012）

針對(duì)綠色環(huán)保產(chǎn)品價(jià)格過高，阻礙其成為主流消費(fèi)品這一現(xiàn)實(shí)問題，在綠色經(jīng)濟(jì)背景下，探討零售商向負(fù)責(zé)綠色研發(fā)成本投入的制造商提供不同聯(lián)合研發(fā)契約時(shí)的供應(yīng)鏈均衡策略和協(xié)調(diào)問題。以零售商主導(dǎo)的雙邊壟斷型綠色供應(yīng)鏈為研究對(duì)象，在考慮消費(fèi)者環(huán)保意識(shí)、產(chǎn)品綠色度水平、價(jià)格等多種因素影響需求的基礎(chǔ)上，分別探討批發(fā)價(jià)契約、成本分擔(dān)契約和兩部制契約對(duì)綠色產(chǎn)品需求、供應(yīng)鏈成員利潤(rùn)及渠道利潤(rùn)的影響。結(jié)果表明，成本分擔(dān)契約無(wú)法實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈成員利潤(rùn)的Pareta改進(jìn)；一定條件下，兩部制契約可以實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈成員利潤(rùn)的雙贏，并提高綠色產(chǎn)品的市場(chǎng)需求。此外，雖然消費(fèi)者環(huán)保意識(shí)的提高并不總是會(huì)帶來(lái)綠色產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)需求的增加，但卻總是會(huì)使得綠色供應(yīng)鏈的利潤(rùn)提高；并且較高的消費(fèi)者環(huán)保意識(shí)將激勵(lì)企業(yè)追求一個(gè)較低的綠色成本系數(shù)，從而促使企業(yè)積極進(jìn)行綠色技術(shù)創(chuàng)新努力。

綠色供應(yīng)鏈；消費(fèi)者環(huán)保意識(shí)；零售商主導(dǎo)；契約協(xié)調(diào)；最優(yōu)需求量

0 引言

在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)可持續(xù)發(fā)展背景下，隨著綠色理念的倡導(dǎo)和推廣，環(huán)境問題和綠色經(jīng)濟(jì)日益受到社會(huì)各界的廣泛關(guān)注和重視。各國(guó)政府紛紛出臺(tái)了排污許可、碳排放限制、碳稅和碳交易等不同的環(huán)境規(guī)制，以及產(chǎn)品的節(jié)能、低碳認(rèn)證措施。隨著政策的重視，公眾的環(huán)保意識(shí)和綠色偏好也在不斷增強(qiáng)。例如英國(guó)碳信托的調(diào)查研究表明，大部分的消費(fèi)者有購(gòu)買綠色產(chǎn)品的意愿[1]；根據(jù)中國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè)信息網(wǎng)《2016年度中國(guó)綠色消費(fèi)市場(chǎng)規(guī)模及發(fā)展情況分析》[2]，截止到2015年年底，中國(guó)綠色消費(fèi)者總數(shù)達(dá)6500萬(wàn)，近四年增長(zhǎng)14倍；此外，86%的消費(fèi)者認(rèn)同自己的環(huán)保意識(shí)和行為相對(duì)幾年前明顯提升，75%的消費(fèi)者曾在過去一年使用過節(jié)能環(huán)保產(chǎn)品[3]?，F(xiàn)實(shí)中公眾環(huán)保意識(shí)的提高，也促使一些學(xué)者在運(yùn)營(yíng)管理的研究中開始關(guān)注消費(fèi)者的環(huán)保意識(shí)，例如Basiri和Heydari[4]、Zhang等[5]、周艷菊等[6]和熊中楷等[7]等文獻(xiàn)考慮到消費(fèi)者環(huán)保意識(shí)對(duì)產(chǎn)品需求的影響。

企業(yè)作為人類社會(huì)活動(dòng)中的重要參與者，在面對(duì)環(huán)境規(guī)制、國(guó)際貿(mào)易綠色壁壘，以及公眾日趨增強(qiáng)的環(huán)保意識(shí)等多重壓力下，不得不訴諸于綠色供應(yīng)鏈管理實(shí)踐。為了在綠色經(jīng)濟(jì)背景下保持可持續(xù)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)，許多企業(yè)嘗試通過引入清潔能源、進(jìn)行綠色研發(fā)投資等方式提供比普通產(chǎn)品更加節(jié)能環(huán)保的綠色產(chǎn)品。例如，知名的運(yùn)動(dòng)用品制造商阿迪達(dá)斯從包裝材料和制造材料上進(jìn)行優(yōu)化，從而使生產(chǎn)的產(chǎn)品更加環(huán)保；一直踐行綠色節(jié)能理念的家電領(lǐng)軍企業(yè)海爾，繼2012年實(shí)施光伏發(fā)電項(xiàng)目之后，在2015年率先推出了除霾率高達(dá)99.8%以上且具備節(jié)能效果的中央空調(diào)。雖然企業(yè)的這些綠色舉措可以從市場(chǎng)先機(jī)、企業(yè)聲譽(yù)和盈利能力等方面提高企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力和市場(chǎng)占有率；但產(chǎn)品綠色質(zhì)量的提高往往需要企業(yè)投入高昂的綠色研發(fā)成本，加之供應(yīng)鏈雙重邊際效應(yīng)的存在，綠色產(chǎn)品在市場(chǎng)上的價(jià)格往往高于普通產(chǎn)品。Suchard和Polonski[8]早期的研究報(bào)告表明，在美國(guó)，占67%比例的人口青睞于綠色環(huán)保型產(chǎn)品；但他們?cè)敢鉃榫G色產(chǎn)品多支付的價(jià)格漲幅僅為5%-10%。根據(jù)智研數(shù)據(jù)研究中心發(fā)布的《2013年中國(guó)綠色消費(fèi)市場(chǎng)發(fā)展分析》研究報(bào)告[3]，在中國(guó)，約66%的消費(fèi)者認(rèn)為綠色環(huán)保產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格過高，這成為阻礙綠色產(chǎn)品成為主流消費(fèi)品的重要原因之一。所以，在綠色經(jīng)濟(jì)背景下，關(guān)注如何降低綠色產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格從而改善綠色產(chǎn)品的需求狀況，對(duì)生產(chǎn)企業(yè)和整個(gè)社會(huì)綠色經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展都具有重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。

目前，學(xué)術(shù)界在綠色供應(yīng)鏈管理方面已取得了豐碩的研究成果；眾多學(xué)者基于不同角度研究了綠色供應(yīng)鏈在行為運(yùn)籌方面的問題。Maditati等[9]、Islam等[10]、顧志斌和錢燕云[11]等從內(nèi)涵界定、生產(chǎn)運(yùn)籌、模型優(yōu)化和實(shí)證分析等方面對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外綠色供應(yīng)鏈的已有研究進(jìn)行了梳理和總結(jié)，并對(duì)未來(lái)的研究方向做出設(shè)想。江世英和李隨成[12]、高舉紅等[13]關(guān)注權(quán)利結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)綠色供應(yīng)鏈的影響，前者[12]以零售商主導(dǎo)的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈為研究對(duì)象，分析了當(dāng)產(chǎn)品需求受綠色度和銷售努力影響時(shí)，低價(jià)促銷和綠色營(yíng)銷兩種策略對(duì)最優(yōu)決策和利潤(rùn)的影響；后者[13]構(gòu)建了不同權(quán)利結(jié)構(gòu)下兩級(jí)綠色供應(yīng)鏈的博弈模型，并研究了收益共享機(jī)制下博弈均衡解的變化。Zhang和Liu[14]、曹裕和劉子豪[15]等都在兩級(jí)綠色供應(yīng)鏈的研究基礎(chǔ)上，將研究進(jìn)一步拓展到三級(jí)綠色供應(yīng)鏈模式下。具體地，Zhang和Liu[14]關(guān)注綠色成員企業(yè)在三級(jí)綠色供應(yīng)鏈模式下的協(xié)調(diào)問題；曹裕和劉子豪[15]則在信息不對(duì)稱背景下，對(duì)三級(jí)綠色供應(yīng)鏈在非合作和合作博弈模式下實(shí)施綠色管理時(shí)的可行性進(jìn)行分析。此外，劉會(huì)燕和戢守峰[16]關(guān)注綠色供應(yīng)鏈之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，他們以兩條相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的綠色供應(yīng)鏈為研究對(duì)象，在考慮消費(fèi)者綠色偏好下，探討了不同鏈與鏈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)下的最優(yōu)定價(jià)和產(chǎn)品綠色度決策。以石平等[17]、李媛和趙道致[18]、江世英等[19]為代表的文獻(xiàn)則研究了公平關(guān)切和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避等行為因素對(duì)綠色供應(yīng)鏈最優(yōu)策略和效用的影響。此外，Esmaeili等[20]、Yang和Xiao[21]、Cao等[22]、Xu等[23]研究了政府政策對(duì)綠色供應(yīng)鏈短期和長(zhǎng)期生產(chǎn)定價(jià)決策的影響；以Wang等[24]、Huang等[25]、Zhang等[26]、Ghosh 和Shah[27]等為代表的文獻(xiàn)則關(guān)注上游制造商或供應(yīng)商主導(dǎo)下綠色供應(yīng)鏈的契約協(xié)調(diào)問題。

以上關(guān)于綠色供應(yīng)鏈方面的文獻(xiàn)為本文的研究提供了重要的借鑒，并且它們大都基于制造商主導(dǎo)、零售商跟隨的這一傳統(tǒng)假設(shè)。然而，隨著零售業(yè)的迅速發(fā)展以及需求多樣化和個(gè)性化的趨勢(shì)，傳統(tǒng)上制造商的優(yōu)勢(shì)地位正逐漸被下游零售商平衡和超越，以沃爾瑪、特易購(gòu)、國(guó)美等為代表的零售巨頭逐漸在供應(yīng)鏈中處于主導(dǎo)地位。所以，研究零售商主導(dǎo)下的綠色供應(yīng)鏈具有實(shí)際意義。雖然江世英和李隨成[12]、高舉紅等[13]少數(shù)文獻(xiàn)探討了零售商主導(dǎo)綠色供應(yīng)鏈中的定價(jià)決策問題；但與這些研究不同的是，本文以零售商主導(dǎo)的綠色供應(yīng)鏈為研究對(duì)象，針對(duì)綠色產(chǎn)品價(jià)高不利于需求的這一現(xiàn)實(shí)問題，研究是否可以通過契約設(shè)計(jì)來(lái)改善這一問題，從而促使企業(yè)有動(dòng)力積極地進(jìn)行產(chǎn)品的綠色研發(fā)投入和生產(chǎn)。具體地，本文在考慮產(chǎn)品價(jià)格，消費(fèi)者環(huán)保意識(shí)和綠色度水平等多種現(xiàn)實(shí)因素影響需求的情形下，探討不同契約對(duì)零售商主導(dǎo)綠色供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的影響；并關(guān)注不同契約引入前后，綠色產(chǎn)品價(jià)格和需求量的變化；最后，分析綠色供應(yīng)鏈中的一些重要參數(shù)對(duì)契約協(xié)調(diào)、最優(yōu)需求量和渠道利潤(rùn)的影響，并得出一些管理啟示，以期為企業(yè)在綠色經(jīng)濟(jì)背景下的決策和整個(gè)社會(huì)綠色經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展提供參考依據(jù)。

1 變量假設(shè)和符號(hào)說(shuō)明

表1 符號(hào)說(shuō)明

2 上下游聯(lián)合綠色研發(fā)博弈模型

2.1 集中模式下的模型

命題1給出集中模式下整合企業(yè)的最優(yōu)決策。

2.2分散模式下的博弈模型

2.2.1批發(fā)價(jià)契約下的最優(yōu)決策

分散模式下，零售商和制造商均依據(jù)自身利潤(rùn)最大化制定最優(yōu)決策。采用逆向歸納法進(jìn)行求解，命題2給出批發(fā)價(jià)契約下的最優(yōu)決策。

聯(lián)立方程組可以解得

結(jié)合命題1和命題2，將批發(fā)價(jià)契約和集中情形下的最大渠道利潤(rùn)和綠色產(chǎn)品需求進(jìn)行比較，可以得到如下的引理1。

引理1：在考慮消費(fèi)者環(huán)保意識(shí)和產(chǎn)品綠色度情形下，批發(fā)價(jià)契約不能實(shí)現(xiàn)零售商主導(dǎo)綠色供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)；且批發(fā)價(jià)契約下綠色產(chǎn)品的最大市場(chǎng)需求僅為集中情形下的1/2。

2.2.2成本分擔(dān)契約下的最優(yōu)決策

采用逆向歸納法進(jìn)行求解，命題3給出成本分擔(dān)契約下的最優(yōu)決策。

聯(lián)立方程組可以解得

結(jié)合命題2和命題3，可以得到如下的引理2。

引理2：在考慮產(chǎn)品綠色度影響產(chǎn)品需求情形下，成本分擔(dān)契約不滿足參與約束條件，因此不能作為促進(jìn)綠色產(chǎn)品需求的有效協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制。

2.2.3兩部制契約下的最優(yōu)決策

相應(yīng)地，零售商和制造商的利潤(rùn)函數(shù)分別為：

采用逆向歸納法進(jìn)行求解，命題4給出兩部制契約下的最優(yōu)決策。

將(21)式代入到(20)式制造商的利潤(rùn)函數(shù)中，有

將式(21) (23)代入到式(19)中，可以將零售商的最優(yōu)化問題表示為

先對(duì)約束條件(25)式求解，得

表2 不同契約下均衡時(shí)的最優(yōu)策略

結(jié)合命題2和命題4，可以得到如下的引理3。

引理3：在一定條件下，兩部制契約可以實(shí)現(xiàn)制造商和零售商利潤(rùn)的Pareto改進(jìn)，并提高綠色產(chǎn)品的市場(chǎng)需求水平。

表3 不同契約下綠色產(chǎn)品的需求和利潤(rùn)

3 數(shù)值算例

3.1 消費(fèi)者環(huán)保意識(shí)對(duì)渠道利潤(rùn)和綠色產(chǎn)品需求的影響

圖1 參數(shù)對(duì)渠道利潤(rùn)的影響

圖2 參數(shù)對(duì)綠色產(chǎn)品需求的影響

3.2 綠色成本系數(shù)對(duì)渠道利潤(rùn)和綠色產(chǎn)品需求的影響

圖3 參數(shù)對(duì)渠道利潤(rùn)的影響

圖4 參數(shù)對(duì)綠色產(chǎn)品需求的影響

3.3 參數(shù)和對(duì)渠道利潤(rùn)和綠色產(chǎn)品需求的綜合影響

圖5 參數(shù)和對(duì)的綜合影響

圖6 參數(shù)和對(duì)的綜合影響

3.4 靈敏度分析

表4 參數(shù)變化時(shí)不同模式下的最優(yōu)價(jià)格和需求

表5 參數(shù)變化時(shí)不同模式下的最優(yōu)利潤(rùn)

4 研究結(jié)論

此外，本文研究仍然存在一些局限性，可作為未來(lái)進(jìn)一步關(guān)注的方向。首先，為簡(jiǎn)化問題，本文構(gòu)建的兩層雙邊壟斷型綠色供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)相對(duì)簡(jiǎn)單，那么可在更接近現(xiàn)實(shí)的多層復(fù)雜性供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中進(jìn)一步深入研究；其次，本文中假設(shè)需求函數(shù)是關(guān)于價(jià)格和產(chǎn)品綠色度水平的線性形式，未來(lái)可進(jìn)一步放寬假設(shè)條件，考慮更一般的需求函數(shù)形式以及需求為隨機(jī)的情形；第三，本文中沒有考慮環(huán)境規(guī)制、政府政策等外部因素對(duì)綠色供應(yīng)鏈的影響，那么，在綠色經(jīng)濟(jì)背景下，關(guān)注不同環(huán)境規(guī)制對(duì)零售商主導(dǎo)綠色供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)的影響也是另一個(gè)值得研究的方向。

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Study on joint contract coordination to promote green product demand under the retailer-dominance

ZHOU Yanju, HU Fengying*, ZHOU Zhenglong

(School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410012, China)

In the context of a green economy, enterprises, as important participants in human social activities, must resort to green supply chain management practices under pressure of environmental regulation, environmental barriers to international trade, and increasing public awareness of environmental protection. In order to maintain a sustainable competitive advantage in the context of a green economy, many companies are trying to provide products that are more energy efficient and environmentally friendly than their traditional counterparts on the market. However, the improvement of a product’s “green” quality often requires significant investment into environmental research and development, coupled with the existence of the double-marginal effect of the supply chain. The price of green products in the market is often higher than that of their traditional counterparts, which has become one of the key factors hindering the progression of these products towards becoming mainstream consumer goods. This paper focuses on whether different contracts can improve the value of green products while improving the profit of supply chain members and their market demand, in the context of a green economy, and has important implications for the development of production enterprises and the entire green society.

This paper takes the retailer-led bilateral monopoly green supply chain as the research object, uses relevant knowledge of game theory to construct a Starkberg game model between manufacturers and retailers, and discusses the retailers’ cost of investment in responsible environmental research and development. Manufacturers offer strategies for balancing the supply chain and resolving coordination issues when different joint R&D contracts are available.

First, on the basis of considering various factors such as consumer environmental awareness, product “green” level and price, the optimal situation and profit problem is analyzed under the centralized situation and wholesale price contract model. Moreover, the wholesale model is used as a reference for other forms of contract. Second, the paper discusses the impact of introducing environmental R&D cost-sharing contracts, as well as two-part contracts on green product demand, supply chain member profit, and channel profit. Finally, numerical simulation is used to analyze the critical parameters of the green supply chain – consumer environmental awareness, the environmental cost coefficient, the impact of green product demand, and channel profit – in different situations.

The results of the research show that the cost-sharing contract cannot achieve the Pareta improvement in the profits of the members of the supply chain, so it cannot be used as an effective coordination mechanism to increase the demand for green products. On the other hand, under certain conditions, the two-part contract can achieve a win-win situation for the members of the supply chain and increase the market demand for green products. Furthermore, although the improvement of consumers' environmental awareness does not always lead to an increase in demand for green products, it always drives an increase in the profit of green supply chains. The impact of the environmental cost coefficient on corporate profits is affected by consumers’ degree of environmental awareness; greater awareness will, in turn, encourage companies to pursue a lower cost coefficient and actively carry out green technology innovation efforts.

Green supply chain; Consumer environmental awareness; Retailer dominance; Contract coordination; Optimal demand

2017-09-10

2018-01-05

Funded Project: Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71471178), the Kay Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China (71431006), the Major International Joint Research Program of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71210003) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (2017zzts050)

F273

A

1004-6062(2020)02-0194-011

10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2020.02.021

2017-09-10

2018-01-05

國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助面上項(xiàng)目（71471178）；國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目（71431006）；國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助重大國(guó)際合作項(xiàng)目（71210003）；中央高校基本科研業(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)專項(xiàng)資金資助項(xiàng)目（2017zzts050）

胡鳳英（1989—），女，湖北黃岡人；中南大學(xué)商學(xué)院博士研究生；研究方向：供應(yīng)鏈管理。

中文編輯：杜 ??；英文編輯：Boping Yan