薛洪君

A new pattern of world commerce is becoming clearer—as are its costs.一種新的世界商業(yè)模式正日漸清晰——其代價亦然。

When America took a protectionist1 turn two years ago， it provoked warnings about the miseries of the 1930s2. Today those ominous predictions look misplaced. In 2018 global growth was decent， unemployment fell and profits rose. In November US President Donald Trump signed a trade pact with Mexico and Canada. Such complacency is mistaken. Today’s trade tensions are compounding a shift that has been under way since the financial crisis in 2008-09. As we explain， cross-border investment， trade， bank loans and supply chains have all been shrinking or stagnating relative to world GDP. Globalisation has given way to a new era of sluggishness. Adapting a term coined by a Dutch writer， we call it “slowbalisation”.

The golden age of globalisation， in 1990-2010， was something to behold. Commerce soared as the cost of shifting goods in ships and planes fell， phone calls got cheaper， tariffs were cut and the financial system liberalised. International activity went gangbusters4， as firms set up around the world， investors roamed and consumers shopped in supermarkets with enough choice to impress Phileas Fogg5.

Globalisation has slowed from light speed to a snail’s pace in the past decade for several reasons. The cost of moving goods has stopped falling. Multinational firms have found that global sprawl burns money and that local rivals often eat them alive. Activity is shifting towards services， which are harder to sell across borders： scissors can be exported in 20ft-containers， hair stylists cannot. And Chinese manufacturing has become more self-reliant， so needs to import fewer parts.

Geopolitical rivalry is gripping the tech industry， which accounts for about 20% of world stockmarkets. Rules on privacy， data and espionage are splintering6. Tax systems are being bent to patriotic ends—in America to prod7 firms to repatriate8 capital， in Europe to target Silicon Valley. America and the EU have new regimes for vetting foreign investment. America has weaponised the power it gets from running the world’s dollar-payments system， to punish foreigners such as Huawei. Even humdrum9 areas such as accounting and antitrust are fragmenting.

Trade is suffering as firms use up the inventories they had stocked in anticipation of higher tariffs. But what really matters is firms’ long-term investment plans， as they begin to lower their exposure to countries and industries that carry high geopolitical risk or face unstable rules. There are now signs that an adjustment is beginning. The global value of cross-border investment by multinational companies sank by about 20% in 2018.

The new world will work differently. Slowbalisation will lead to deeper links within regional blocs. Supply chains in North America， Europe and Asia are sourcing more from closer to home. In Asia and Europe most trade is already intra-regional， and the share has risen since 2011. Asian firms made more foreign sales within Asia than in America in 2017. As global rules decay， a fluid patchwork of regional deals and spheres of influence is asserting control over trade and investment. The European Union is stamping10 its authority on banking， tech and foreign investment， for example.

Fortunately， this need not be a disaster for living standards. Continental-sized markets are large enough to prosper. Some 1.2bn people have been lifted out of extreme poverty since 1990， and there is no reason to think that the proportion of paupers11 will rise again. Western consumers will continue to reap large net benefits from trade. In some cases， deeper integration will take place at a regional level than could have happened at a global one.

Yet slowbalisation has two big disadvantages. First， it creates new difficulties. In 1990-2010 most emerging countries were able to close some of the gap with developed ones. Now more will struggle to trade their way to riches. And there is a tension between a more regional trading pattern and a global financial system in which Wall Street and the Federal Reserve12 set the pulse for markets everywhere. Most countries’ interest rates will still be affected by America’s even as their trade patterns become less linked to it， leading to financial turbulence. The Fed is less likely to rescue foreigners by acting as a global lender of last resort13， as it did a decade ago.

Second， slowbalisation will not fix the problems that globalisation created. Automation means there will be no renaissance of blue-collar jobs in the West. Firms will hire unskilled workers in the cheapest places in each region. Climate change， migration and tax-dodging will be even harder to solve without global co-operation.

Globalisation made the world a better place for almost everyone. But too little was done to mitigate its costs. The integrated world’s neglected problems have now grown in the eyes of the public to the point where the benefits of the global order are easily forgotten. Yet the solution on offer is not really a fix at all. Slowbalisation will be meaner and less stable than its predecessor. In the end it will only feed the discontent.

兩年前，美國轉(zhuǎn)向貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義，引發(fā)了諸多的警告：當(dāng)心20世紀(jì)30年代的災(zāi)難重演。今天看來，這些不祥預(yù)言并不合乎情勢。綜觀2018年，全球仍保持一定增長，失業(yè)減少，利潤增加。11月，美國總統(tǒng)特朗普同墨西哥、加拿大簽署了貿(mào)易協(xié)定。但若因此沾沾自喜就錯了。當(dāng)前全球貿(mào)易關(guān)系緊張，加劇了自2008—2009年金融危機(jī)肇始至今一直持續(xù)著的一種變化。正如我們介紹的，與全球GDP相比，跨境投資、貿(mào)易、銀行貸款和供應(yīng)鏈均一路萎縮或陷于停滯。全球化已讓位于一個新的蕭條時代。我們借用一位荷蘭作家創(chuàng)造的新詞，稱之為“全球化放緩”。

1990—2010年，這是全球化的黃金時代，可謂引人注目。船只和飛機(jī)貨運(yùn)成本走低，電話費(fèi)日趨便宜，關(guān)稅削減，加上金融系統(tǒng)的放寬，使得商業(yè)突飛猛進(jìn)。國際商業(yè)活動激增，各類公司全球開花，投資者無所不至，超市為消費(fèi)者提供貨品的選擇之多，足以打動菲萊亞斯·福格。

過去十年，全球化從光速發(fā)展減慢到了蝸牛一般的速度，有幾多原因。貨物運(yùn)輸?shù)某杀疽淹Ｖ瓜陆?。跨國公司發(fā)現(xiàn)，全球肆意擴(kuò)張不光燒錢，還常落得被當(dāng)?shù)馗偁帉κ嘱L吞。業(yè)務(wù)正逐步轉(zhuǎn)向服務(wù)類，而對其實(shí)施跨境營銷較難：剪刀能裝進(jìn)20英尺集裝箱出口，發(fā)型師則不行。中國制造業(yè)已然更加自給自足，需進(jìn)口的零部件減少。

地緣政治對抗正席卷約占全球股市20%的技術(shù)工業(yè)。有關(guān)隱私、數(shù)據(jù)和間諜行為的規(guī)則正在分崩離析。稅收體系被扭曲只為報國——在美國用以刺激企業(yè)把資本調(diào)回本國;在歐洲則以硅谷為攻擊目標(biāo)。美國和歐盟推出了新的外資審查制度。美國作為世界美元支付系統(tǒng)的維護(hù)者，已不惜拿這種威勢作武器，懲罰諸如華為這樣的外國企業(yè)。甚至?xí)嫼头磯艛噙@類安常習(xí)故的領(lǐng)域也不斷走向分化。

隨著企業(yè)逐步用光為防關(guān)稅提高而囤積的庫存，貿(mào)易受到損害。不過真正關(guān)乎大局的是企業(yè)的長期投資計劃，它們正紛紛著手調(diào)低對存在較高地緣政治風(fēng)險或規(guī)則不穩(wěn)定的國家或行業(yè)的依賴。目前已出現(xiàn)啟動調(diào)整的跡象。2018年，跨國公司全球跨境投資總額下降約20%。

新世界將依循不同的運(yùn)作方式。“全球化放緩”會導(dǎo)致區(qū)域性集團(tuán)的內(nèi)部聯(lián)系加深。北美、歐洲和亞洲的供應(yīng)鏈將更多地從靠近家門口的地方采購。亞洲和歐洲大多數(shù)貿(mào)易早已是區(qū)域內(nèi)貿(mào)易，并且份額自2011年以來呈增長趨勢。2017年，亞洲企業(yè)的國外銷售額中，亞洲國家的占比比美國更高。隨著全球規(guī)則效力變?nèi)酰貐^(qū)協(xié)議層出不窮，勢力范圍劃分不一，仿佛不斷變化的拼綴圖，掌控起貿(mào)易和投資。例如，歐盟正收攬對銀行、技術(shù)和外國投資的管轄權(quán)。

幸運(yùn)的是，這并不一定會殃及人們的生活水平。大陸級的市場足夠大，能夠自行繁榮。1990年以來，大約有12億人受助擺脫赤貧，同時沒有理由認(rèn)為貧困人口的比例會再度回升。西方消費(fèi)者將繼續(xù)從貿(mào)易中獲取巨大的凈收益。在某些情況下，在區(qū)域?qū)用鎸?shí)現(xiàn)比全球?qū)用娓钊氲囊惑w化。

不過，“全球化放緩”有兩大弊端。第一，它會制造新的難題。1990至2010年間，大多數(shù)新興國家都得以在某種程度上縮減了與發(fā)達(dá)國家的差距。現(xiàn)今更多的國家會更難靠貿(mào)易致富。再者，一方面是貿(mào)易模式愈發(fā)區(qū)域化，一方面是全球金融體系下各方市場唯華爾街和美聯(lián)儲馬首是瞻，兩者之間無疑存在對立。對大多數(shù)國家來說，即便自身貿(mào)易模式可以逐步與美國脫鉤，但其利率仍會繼續(xù)受美國影響，進(jìn)而引發(fā)金融動蕩。不過，美聯(lián)儲已不太可能再像十年前那樣充當(dāng)全球最終貸款人，來拯救其他國家。

第二，“全球化放緩”解決不了全球化造成的問題。自動化意味著西方不會再出現(xiàn)藍(lán)領(lǐng)工種的復(fù)興。企業(yè)將從每個地區(qū)最廉價的地方招募非技術(shù)工人。沒有了全球合作，氣候變化、移居和避稅等問題將更難解決。

全球化讓世界更美好，惠及幾乎每一個人。但減低其代價的工作卻鮮有人做。一體化世界中那些被忽略的問題在公眾眼中日益凸顯，以致人們輕易忘卻了全球秩序的好處。而提出的解決方案遠(yuǎn)非奏效之舉?！叭蚧啪彙睂⒈人暗碾A段更嚴(yán)苛動蕩，到頭來只會助長不滿情緒。

（譯者為“《英語世界》杯”翻譯大賽獲獎選手）