WANG Jun，LI Jin-hong

(a.College of Management，b.College of Tourism andCultural Industry，Guizhou University，Guiyang 550025 China)

Construction and Reflection of Ecological Compensation Mechanism of Nature Reserve：Based on Game Analysis of Interests of All Parties

WANG Jun1，LI Jin-hong2

(a.College of Management，b.College of Tourism andCultural Industry，Guizhou University，Guiyang 550025 China)

Background The construction of nature reserve is an important guarantee for maintaining regional ecological balance and practicing green development．Ecological compensation mechanism plays an important role in processing the external problems of ecological products in nature reserves．At present，there are many problems in ecological compensation mechanism of nature reserve carrying out like as the supporting measures are not perfect，the compensation object behavior is difficult to be constrained，the interest targets are different between compensation subjects and objects，etc．So it is necessary to reflect on the ecological compensation mechanism of nature reserves in China．

Methods Based on analyzing the decision-making behavior of interests of all parties in ecological compensation mechanism，this paper constructed the game model of two groups of core interests under the ecological compensation policy of the nature reserve in China．At first，the game between the management of protected areas and community residents was discussed．Then the behavior of the management department and enterprise in he ecological compensation mechanism was analyzed．In addition，combining with the reality of the situation，this study reflected the incentive paradox in the ecological compensation policy of the nature reserve in China．

Results Through the game analysis of 3 party interests，this paper obtained 2 analysis results：Firstly，in the game between the management of protected areas and community residents，no credible promise makes the ecological compensation policy difficult to achieve the expected benefits．In the case of reasonable compensation to the residents of the community，it will help to achieve the harmony development between community residents and protected areas through 3 measures as increasing the supervision of community residents and the amount of punishment，improving the community residents awareness of environmental protection and reducing the opportunity cost of community residents．Beyond that，the behavior choice of community residents is affected by 2 factors as the amount of punishment and the probability of investigation．Therefore，the supporting measures of ecological compensation mechanism are also very important．Secondly，in the game between protected area management department and enterprises，due to the phenomenon of incentive paradox exist，thus，increasing the fine of enterprises can not really inhibit the pollution behavior of enterprises in the long time．On the contrary，it will increase the probability of local protected area management department of dereliction of duty．So the governments of higher levels should fully consider the existence of incentive paradox when they formulate relevant policies about ecological compensation．In the meantime，the governments of higher levels should refine the official assessment system，pay attention to local ecological benefits，and improve the political cost of mismanagement in the local protected area management departments．

Conclusions and Discussions This paper proposed the reconstruction routes of ecological compensation mechanism of nature reserves in China．Firstly，the official assessment system and increase the punishment should be improve．Secondly，the government should strengthen publicity and education to improve the environmental protection consciousness of community residents．In addition，the government should take measures to increase the income of the residents．Thirdly，the local government should improve the legal systems and innovative regulatory mechanisms．Fourthly，in the ecological compensation mechanism，it is necessary to further clarify the responsibility of the main body and clear the information channels．

nature reserve；ecological compensation；game theory

Original Articlein王君，李錦宏．中國(guó)自然保護(hù)區(qū)生態(tài)補(bǔ)償機(jī)制構(gòu)建與反思：基于各方利益主體的博弈視角．林業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題，2017，37(2)：39-44．

10.16832/j.cnki.1005-9709.2017.02.008