Ma Ding

(Department of Modern History Graduate School of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences，Beijing 102488)

Ⅰ.Introduction

Huang Dong and Liu Yajun make some research on American’s withdrawing from Tsingtao in the Inside Story of USA Military’s Retreating from Tsingtao and the Inspection on the Polices of USA Military’s Retreating from Tsingtao from 1945-1949 respectively.Zi Zhongyun also expounds it in one chapter of his book Tracing the Source— the Origin and Development of US Postwar Diplomatic Policy to China.However，the above-mentioned research results only provide a general discussion on the problem，and fail to expound the divergence between the US State Council and the US Military，which exerts important influence on the decision of American’s withdrawing from Tsingtao.Based on previous research results，this paper expounds the decision-making process of American’s retreating from Tsingtao in details on the basis of historical documents，and divides the process into three phases according to the characteristics of polices.This paper pays special attention to the divergence between the State Council and the US Military and its influence on the decision of American’s withdrawing from Tsingtao.Besides，this paper elaborates the difference in opinions between US civil and military officials stationed in Tsingtao and the high level of Washington.

After the victory of Anti-Japanese War，the US had continued and broadened its cooperation with KMT.In addition to the Marine Corps in Tsingtao，the US also sent marine advisory panel to Tsingtao to train KMT navy.Since then，the training scale had been gradually enlarged and naval training center was set up in Tsingtao by KMT by the support of the US.

Great changes had taken place since the beginning of Civil War in 1948.CCP had entered the stage of strategic counteroffensive，which threw KMT into a critical situation，especially in North China where CCP held traditional advantages.The rapid transformation of the situation of Civil War inevitably influenced the US navy stationed in Tsingtao in the name of training Chinese navy，and the confrontation situation between KMT and CCP in Shandong put the problem of American’s retreating from Tsingtao into the agenda of Washington.

Ⅱ.America’s flip-flopping over the co-defense of Tsingtao by A-merica and the KMT

In March，1948，Shandong corps of eastern China field army unfolded an offensive in Tsingtao-Jinan Railway Line，and since then Shandong corps had taken control of it.Tsingtao was isolated and West Pacific Command became nervous.Commander of West Pacific Bergre made pessimistic judgement in his report of the Tsingtao situation to the Department of Navy.Considering the unfavorable situation，Bergre put forward four optional schemes.

In the four schemes，Bergre preferred the first one，namely giving assistance to KMT to protect the important facilities in the urban and suburban areas.He explained that it was vital to the US’s status and interest in China and Far East to stay in Tsingtao.

Director for Far East of the State Council Butterworth pointed out that it was likely to arouse serious consequence to send this command to one of the most troublesome places in the world without being informing the Secretary of State or the president.He suggested that the Secretary of State，together with the Defense Minister and the president should withdraw the command sent to Tsingtao and submit the problem of Tsingtao garrison to National Security Council.

Despite that KMT garrison in Tsingtao were not capable of resisting the attack of CCP，the US Military still refused to retreat and made decision to make preparation for waging war with PLA.

In June，the US Military accepted the requirement of the State Council and abandoned the first scheme，prepared to retreat from Tsingtao in case of emergency.

There was a flip-flopping over the policy of Tsingtao from March to June.At first，the US Military didn’t attach enough importance to the complex political consequences of its involvement into China’s Civil War，and rashly accepted suggestion given by west Pacific Commander Department of the Navy.However，the State Council was not satisfied with the irresponsible command that might involve the US into China’s Civil War and pointed out the irrationality of this command in terms of politics and military，thus urging withdrawing the command.At last，the US Military was forced to withdraw the command made on 12th，May.The US high level was not in a hurry to make the ultimate decision about the future of Tsingtao US Military because the Office of Naval Intelligence thought that Tsingtao would not be attacked so soon.However，the US high level had to make the ultimate decision with PLA’s taking back Jinan in September.

Ⅲ.Seeking decent withdrawing

The Tsingtao Consul-General pointed out once again in 29th，September that it was difficult for the US Military to retreat from Tsingtao without losing face.They suggested that local navy and Marine Corps ignore the face problem and retreat as soon as possible back to Japan.

Compared with the anxious US officials in the front line of Tsingtao who were eager to get rid of the unfavorable situation，the high level of the US government in Nanjing and Washington were not in a hurry to retreat.They paid more attention to macro-level problem，namely maintaining the reputation of the US in the anti-communist battle line and the morale of KMT.

The command made on 23th，October and November by Joint Chiefs of Staff did not explicitly show their determination to retreat，but focused on the ability of US Military to retreat rapidly and the deployment of strengthening this ability.Actually，they were making preparation to evitable retreat.Despite that it was the best choice for US Military to retreat from Tsingtao，US high level was worried that the retreat would harm US’s reputation and the status of KMT.Therefore，they tried hard to ensure that their preparation work of retreat did not look like the sign of retreat.In order to confuse the public and make others believe that their preparation work is actually defense deployment，they even sent reinforcement to Tsingtao from Guam on purpose.However，whatever they did，the US high level was quite clear that the Tsingtao garrison was not able to compete with PLA East China Field Army.They admitted that retreat from Tsingtao was inevitable.What the US badly needed now was a retreat opportunity that could help them save face，and at the beginning of December，the KMT Navy“offered”such an opportunity for American.

Ⅳ.Arrangement of withdrawing step by step

On 6th December，1948，Joint United States Military Advisory Group told Nanjing Embassy that Chiang Kai-shek had already approved the retreat of China navy training base from Tsingtao，which offered an excellent reason for the retreat of the US Navy.

On 14th December，the State Council sent a memo to the National Security Council，which pointed out that the major task(training KMT navy)of the US navy stationed in Tsingtao would be ended with the retreat of KMT navy.It was a lucky opportunity which could save face for the US Military and minimize the harm to the morale of KMT government at the same time when the US Military retreated from Tsingtao.

On 23th December，the National Security Council gave order to the US Military in Tsingtao that“the US Military should stop their shore-based activity in Tsingtao because of the shift of navy training center away from Tsingtao.The State Council is discussing with the Department of Navy the timing of retreat.The retreat of shorebased activity from Tsingtao cannot be explained as the US’s decision to withdraw from China’s waters.”Thus，the US’s retreat from Tsingtao had already become finality.

While concealing the retreat action to China，the retreat of the US Military in Tsingtao was launched in order with constant commands.

On 3rd January，marine corps from Guam was evacuated，and the disassembling of air base was also launched.

Due to the peace talk of Peking，the retreat from Tsingtao was put aside.On 20th April，the peace talk failed and on the same day，PLA waged crossing river campaigns.On 13th May，the State Council announced John Leighton Stuart that the State Council had reached agreement with the Department of Navy that West Pacific Commander Department of the Navy should retreat from Tsingtao after CCP captured Shanghai.

On 2rd June，Tsingtao was liberated，and Tsingtao Military Control Commission was set up.It was worth mentioning that the US did not issue official announcement of retreat till the end nor keep their promise to the local KMT，namely informing KMT of the retreat before 48 hours of the action.

Ⅴ.Conclusion

After the Chinese People’s Liberation Army controls the Tsingtao-Jinan Railway Line in the spring of 1948，the US military base in Tsingtao was actually in danger.However，local US army did not retreat immediately，and stayed till May，1949 when the KMT fell into a hopeless situation.US military and State Council held varied views concerning the question that whether local US military should resist or retreat immediately when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army attacked Tsingtao.The or-ders they issued have changed several times，which reflects that US government could do nothing to change the major transformation in China，and on the other hand，that the US civil officials and military held different focuses on Tsingtao problem.The former paid more attention to the serious political results caused by the US military’s involvement in China’s civil war，and therefore，cautiously tried to avoid enraging patriotic Chinese people and harming the overall interest and reputation of the US in China，while the latter attached more importance to the control of the strategic area，Tsingtao，and fulfilling the traditional duty of US Marine Corps(protecting the interests of overseas US civilians)，and paid more attention to safeguarding the morale of KMT than the State Council.Generally speaking，avoiding losing America’face and harming KMT’s morale are the major concern of retreating from Tsingtao from the perspective of US high-level.The traditional overseas mission of the US Marine Corps of protecting overseas US civilians also effected the decision of the US government to some extent.As a result，when Nanjing decided to retreat from the Tsingtao navy training base，the US high-level immediately grabbed the opportunity without losing face and launched retreat step by step.When LPA crossed the Yangtze River and there was no chance for the KMT and its army，the US finally retreated the last part of military in Tsingtao，which put an end to the history when established US military existed in mainland China.

Notes:

〔1〕壽楊賓:《青島海港史》，北京:人民交通出版社，1986年。

〔2〕State Department’s Office of Historian:Foreign Relations of the United States，1948.

〔3〕C-65590，F(xiàn)rom CINCFE，Tokyo，Japan sgd.MacArthur to Dept of the Army for CSGPO to Wedemeyer，US Joint Chiefs of Staff，24 Nov，1948，北京:社科院近代史所館藏檔案，檔案號:中美關(guān)系:A4.

〔4〕ORE 47-48，CONSEQUENCE OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES FORCES FROM TSINGTAO，23 JUNE，1948，CENTRAL INTELLIGENACE AGENCY，Digital National Security Archive.

〔5〕政協(xié)文史資料研究委員會編:《文史資料選輯(第十八輯)》，北京:中華書局，1961年。

〔6〕J.S.C 1330/45，20 Dec 1948，Note by the Secretary of the Joint Chief of Staff on United States Armed Force at Tsingtao，Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff，University Publications of America，1981.

〔7〕資中筠:《美國對華政策的緣起和發(fā)展(1945-1950)》，重慶:重慶出版社，1987年。

〔8〕《毛澤東軍事文集(第五卷)》，北京:軍事科學(xué)出版社，中央文獻(xiàn)出版社，1993年。

〔9〕辛瑋等:《山東解放區(qū)大事記》，濟南:山東人民出版社，1982年。