蔡 覺(jué) 敏
(天津外國(guó)語(yǔ)大學(xué),天津 300221)
論米歇爾《道德經(jīng)》譯本對(duì)道家之“道”的當(dāng)代闡釋
蔡 覺(jué) 敏
(天津外國(guó)語(yǔ)大學(xué),天津 300221)
米歇爾的《道德經(jīng)》譯本體現(xiàn)了他從西方文化角度審視東方,強(qiáng)調(diào)道家觀點(diǎn)與西方文化相異之處,其文本詮釋注重以下幾個(gè)方面,一是對(duì)“道”之本源性的理解,二是對(duì)概念、邏輯推理等理性思維的否定,三是對(duì)“本我”的強(qiáng)調(diào),四是主張因任自然的“道”性生活。這種對(duì)文本的詮釋體現(xiàn)了西方文化對(duì)“道”的欣賞。
米歇爾; 《道德經(jīng)》; 道; 當(dāng)代闡釋
20世紀(jì)以來(lái),西方社會(huì)發(fā)展遇到了系列新問(wèn)題,不少西方人開(kāi)始求助于中國(guó)文化,梁漱冥先生說(shuō)“此刻西洋哲學(xué)界的新風(fēng)氣竟是東方采色?!盵1](P195-196)《道德經(jīng)》海外的漸熱就是這一趨勢(shì)的體現(xiàn),當(dāng)前《道德經(jīng)》世界發(fā)行量?jī)H次于圣經(jīng),華裔眾多的美國(guó)更是譯本眾多,其中米歇爾的譯本(Tao Te Ching)廣受歡迎,多次再版,但如他自己所言,“My intention has always been to translate his mind”[2]。其書(shū)分為兩部分,第一部分為《道德經(jīng)》文本翻譯,第二部分是對(duì)譯文的注釋?zhuān)贋榉奖惚磉_(dá),后文中引用《道德經(jīng)》米歇爾譯本第一部分譯文標(biāo)明所自章節(jié);引用第二部分注釋標(biāo)明其出處。體現(xiàn)了米歇爾對(duì)“道”的個(gè)人理解,筆者認(rèn)為,其著重之處有如下方面,一是 “道”是世界本原與規(guī)律,二是“道”不可憑概念、判斷等邏輯思維而致,三是合“道”之“我”方為“本我”,四是體“道”的生活應(yīng)是因任自然隨遇而安的快樂(lè)生活。值得注意的是,對(duì)“道”這些內(nèi)容的側(cè)重體現(xiàn)了其不同于傳統(tǒng)中國(guó)文化的西方視角。下面,本文試分析其“道”之詮釋的特點(diǎn)。
道家認(rèn)為,“道”是宇宙本體,無(wú)形無(wú)貌,不可言傳,既是萬(wàn)物的源起,又內(nèi)在地決定事物的發(fā)展。米歇爾對(duì)“道”的理解大體上也不離于此,但其西方文化視角使之更關(guān)注“道”之為本體與西方本體的不同,即“道”的自然性、整體性和變化不居。
首先,“道”是世界本體,但道生萬(wàn)物出于自然,并非如上帝創(chuàng)世一樣地“創(chuàng)造”?!暗馈笔侨f(wàn)物之祖,萬(wàn)物源于道,又歸于道:“In the beginning was the Tao. All things issue from it; all things return to it.”(52章) 它沒(méi)有形態(tài),因而可成為任何形態(tài);它微妙玄通,無(wú)法以概念來(lái)定義:“Form that includes all forms, image without an image, subtle, beyond all conception.”(14章)在“道”是世界本原以及無(wú)形無(wú)狀這點(diǎn)上,米歇爾和中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)理解近似;但他特別強(qiáng)調(diào)其與西方創(chuàng)世論的不同之處:“All things are born from it,yet it doesn't create them.”(34章)即“道”雖然是萬(wàn)物產(chǎn)生的根據(jù),但它并不是一個(gè)創(chuàng)造者和支配者,而是包含于萬(wàn)物之中。米歇爾強(qiáng)調(diào)萬(wàn)物有其內(nèi)在的發(fā)展趨勢(shì):“Can you deal with the most vital matters by letting events take theircourse?”(10章)“See the world as your self. Have faith in the way things are.”(13章)“道”之造物與工匠之造物是不同的:“It is more like a mother than like an artisan, giving birth rather than making. It acts without any conscious plan or purpose.”[2](P99)“道”之造物象母親生育一樣,生孩子是件自然的事情,且孩子有自身的生命,匠人之造物是有匠人的主觀意志的,而且所造物自身沒(méi)有生命發(fā)展之可能。這一點(diǎn)正是中西文化區(qū)別根源所在。古希臘認(rèn)為抽象知識(shí)是世界源泉,蘇格拉底、柏拉圖等以生命追求智慧,基督教則認(rèn)為上帝是世界的創(chuàng)造者,這些不同階段的文化內(nèi)在相通:“正是西方世界具有從奧爾弗斯教、畢達(dá)歌拉斯到柏拉圖的文化傳統(tǒng),才順理成章地接受了基督教?!盵3](P4)他們都認(rèn)為現(xiàn)實(shí)世界之后另有一推手即理性或者上帝,這種力量外在于事物。米歇爾強(qiáng)調(diào)“道”并非“創(chuàng)造”,正是注意到事物的本原與發(fā)展都內(nèi)在于自身——這正是東西方對(duì)事物發(fā)展的不同看法。
其次,米歇爾認(rèn)為萬(wàn)物源于道又歸于道,其在世間的不同只是暫時(shí)的:“Each separate being in the universe returns to the common source.”(16章)因而宇宙與萬(wàn)物是內(nèi)在和諧統(tǒng)一的整體,人應(yīng)認(rèn)識(shí)到人與宇宙在同一整體中:“Realizing he is one with the whole universe.”(48章)由于認(rèn)為所有事物都是 “道”的產(chǎn)物,在“道”之循環(huán)中和諧相處,他多處提到“whole”和“harmony”。他認(rèn)為圣人之掌握世界不是通過(guò)征服而是通過(guò)與對(duì)方融為一體:“The master has mastered nature; not in the sense of conquering it, but of becoming it.”[2](Pix)在詮釋“名與利孰親”時(shí),他說(shuō):“Fame or integrity, etc:but why be caught in these dichotomies? Once he has surrendered to the tao, the master accepts whatever comes to him.”[2](P113)即 “名”與“利”都處在同一整體中,人不應(yīng)該被二元論局限,將其當(dāng)作對(duì)立事物而有所偏好。米歇爾對(duì)整體觀的強(qiáng)調(diào),體現(xiàn)了西方二元論中的他對(duì)中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)思維特點(diǎn)的重視。中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)思維是整體思維,“儒道二家一方面強(qiáng)調(diào)要用直覺(jué)方法去認(rèn)識(shí)萬(wàn)物本原或宇宙整體,另一方面又主張用辯證的方法去認(rèn)識(shí)多樣性中的和諧與對(duì)立面的統(tǒng)一?!盵3](P184)道家視世界為一體,認(rèn)為事物對(duì)立統(tǒng)一,可向?qū)Ψ睫D(zhuǎn)化。傳統(tǒng)西方則認(rèn)為代表精神的理性或上帝與代表物質(zhì)的現(xiàn)實(shí)世界永遠(yuǎn)對(duì)立,不可轉(zhuǎn)化。中國(guó)文化這一點(diǎn)受到當(dāng)代西方漢學(xué)家的重視,如認(rèn)為“《老子》‘無(wú)為’的觀點(diǎn)是一種對(duì)世界整體的觀念——把包括人類(lèi)世界在內(nèi)的世界看作一個(gè)機(jī)制”[5](P5);提出在中國(guó)人的思維中,“每一個(gè)獨(dú)特的現(xiàn)象都和在其領(lǐng)域的其他現(xiàn)象相關(guān),而其所處的領(lǐng)域也和其他領(lǐng)域互相關(guān)聯(lián)?!盵6]米歇爾對(duì)“whole”的強(qiáng)調(diào)與這些哲學(xué)家的認(rèn)識(shí)是相通的。
再次,米歇爾強(qiáng)調(diào)世界是變化之流,萬(wàn)物都在“道”中循環(huán),依照“道”的方式而回歸到本根(即前文引文中的“return”),因此一直處于流動(dòng)與變化中,事物的發(fā)展充滿(mǎn)了變化,不可人為控制:“The master sees all beings arising from the same source, working out their karma(usually with great suffering), and returning to the source. And since people are in constant flux, she understands that at any moment they are capable of the most astonishing spiritual transformations.”[2](P94)這也是對(duì)西方認(rèn)為事物背后有靜止不變的真理的一種反拔。中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)思維認(rèn)為,一切事物都是處于變化之流中,認(rèn)為“我們面對(duì)的天空風(fēng)景,是一個(gè)包括人類(lèi)自身在內(nèi)的統(tǒng)一的整體,是一個(gè)自己運(yùn)動(dòng)的過(guò)程?!盵4](P163)正因此,中國(guó)多有“塞翁失馬焉知非福、三十年河?xùn)|三十年河西”之說(shuō)。西方在這方面則有不同,他們認(rèn)為絕對(duì)理性是世界本原,真理永恒不變。
米歇爾認(rèn)為大道實(shí)際上非常簡(jiǎn)單,也容易感知:“Impossible to know, yet as easy as touching your nose when you wash your face.”[2](P91)它無(wú)時(shí)無(wú)處不在,“The tao is infinet, eternal: here is everywhere. Anytime is now. Actually, she is neither behind nor ahead, but exactly even with all things.”[2](P95)但概念、分類(lèi)、推理、欲望(值得注意的是,在米歇爾的譯本中,這幾項(xiàng)經(jīng)常并列出現(xiàn))妨礙了人對(duì)道的直接感覺(jué)。他提倡應(yīng)該去掉知識(shí)與思想等,直接悟“道”。
米歇爾認(rèn)為,世界萬(wàn)物內(nèi)在相通,以概念、定義、范疇等將事物割裂成個(gè)體去分析的手法并不可取,因而他否定西方習(xí)慣的“judge、concept”等。他詮釋二十九章中“You will get lost”為:“ in moral judgments. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil is the tree of death.”[2](P107)以樹(shù)為喻,說(shuō)有了好壞之別后,樹(shù)就會(huì)死亡,這與《莊子》中混沌開(kāi)七竅而后死的故事意義相通。米歇爾認(rèn)為人心本是空白清澈不帶偏見(jiàn),“Our mind is like a glass of clear water... Originally the water is clear. Nothinking, no mind, no mind, no problem.”[2](P101)但概念、思考等讓空靈的心像被糊上了厚厚的泥漿,不能感知“道”。他解釋“孰能濁以靜之徐清”為“Do you have the patience to wait till your mud settles and the water is clear?”并特意注明“‘mud’stands for concepts, judgments, desires... that obscures and narrows reality.”[2](P100)即概念、判斷、欲望讓人無(wú)法感受到真實(shí)的“道”性生活。米歇爾多次提出要去除判斷、概念與欲望:“If you close your mind in judgments and traffic with desires, your heart will be troubled.”(52章)“he empties them of concepts, judgments.... Thus they can return to a state of childlike simplicity?!盵2](P93)
概念、判斷等西方分析思維無(wú)法接近“道”,能夠接近“道”的只能是“內(nèi)視”即“inner vision”,“The Master observes the world but trusts his inner vision”(12章)。概念、判斷都建立在對(duì)外在世界的分析與觀察上,但當(dāng)以所謂“科學(xué)”的方法去分析鮮花的種、類(lèi)、屬,獲取有關(guān)它的“知識(shí)”時(shí),我們無(wú)法以心靈感知美和生命氣息。因而只有剔除傳統(tǒng)的概念、判斷,我們才可以和諧寧?kù)o的心態(tài)去感受和擁抱世界。米歇爾認(rèn)為“內(nèi)視”時(shí),人與外界融為一體,沒(méi)有內(nèi)外區(qū)別,人如鏡子般映照著外界而不是去對(duì)外界做出判斷,不管是花朵還是垃圾,圣人還是罪犯,人都能平和地接受:“His inner vision: there is no inside or outside for him. He reflects whatever appears, without judgment, whether it is a flower or a heap of garbage, a criminal or a saint. Whatever happens is all right.”[2](P99)一般人認(rèn)為科學(xué)家會(huì)反對(duì)這種思維方式,他特地引用科學(xué)家愛(ài)因斯坦的話證明直覺(jué)思維的重要性:“But listen to Einstein: the scientist’s religious feeling takes the form of a rapturous amazement at the harmony of natural law...this feeling is the guiding principle of his life and work.”[2](P102)認(rèn)為正是對(duì)自然法則的直覺(jué)引導(dǎo)了愛(ài)因斯坦的工作和生活。很多時(shí)候,他以“institutions”指代這種直覺(jué)思維能力:“When you have institutions, know where their functions should end.”(32章)A good artist lets his intuition lead him wherever it wants. A good scientist has freed himself of concepts and keeps his mind open to what is.”[2](Pviii)
思維方式的不同也是中西文化之別所在,西方追求現(xiàn)實(shí)世界背后的“真理”,愛(ài)好以概括、分類(lèi)、推理等探知理性世界的奧妙。“從畢達(dá)哥拉斯、柏拉圖到基督教,形成了西方崇尚靈魂的主知文化傳統(tǒng)。靈魂、理念、神在畢達(dá)哥拉斯那里,就是數(shù)學(xué);在柏拉圖那里,就是智慧;在基督教那里,就是真理?!盵3](P48)但過(guò)分的抽象思維會(huì)妨礙人對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)世界的關(guān)注,甚至忽視了人的現(xiàn)實(shí)生活的意義,造成了“生活意義的失落以及生命價(jià)值的空虛等問(wèn)題。”[7](P69-70)另一本著名的道家大眾讀物《小熊維尼之道》的作者本杰明就把追求“知識(shí)”的西方學(xué)者比作毫無(wú)趣味的貓頭鷹:“這些不完整和不平衡的生物完全沒(méi)有去反映道家理想中的完備和獨(dú)立,而是把所有抽象的東西劃分為很少的幾個(gè)種類(lèi)和區(qū)域,同時(shí)在他的日常生活中,只剩下一堆毫無(wú)用處而又雜亂無(wú)章的東西。他們不向道家的先哲學(xué)習(xí),不從直接的經(jīng)驗(yàn)中學(xué)習(xí),而是耗用自己的智力,間接地從書(shū)本中學(xué)習(xí)?!盵8](P31-32)所謂“抽象的東西”正是指西方習(xí)慣的科學(xué)知識(shí),而所謂“從直接的經(jīng)驗(yàn)學(xué)習(xí)”則正是指建立在現(xiàn)實(shí)生活經(jīng)驗(yàn)上的直覺(jué)思維。米歇爾看到了西方邏輯思維的不足與中國(guó)直覺(jué)思維的優(yōu)點(diǎn),因而提出以“無(wú)知”應(yīng)對(duì)世界:“Kindly taught them to not-know: the ancient masters taught them the supreme value of don’t -know mind, which is forever fresh, open, and fertile with possibilities.”[2](P109)
米歇爾將最初的源于道的“我”稱(chēng)為“original identity”,認(rèn)為各種概念、定義、欲望使人背離了這個(gè)“original identity”,成了充滿(mǎn)了自我主觀意識(shí)的“conscious self”,他強(qiáng)烈否定這個(gè)“self”,提倡回歸“original identity”。
米歇爾認(rèn)為,從“道”而生的我是“真我”(“本我”),他翻譯“是以君子終日行不離輺重”為“Thus the Master travels all day without leaving home.”(26章),詮釋“Without leaving home”是“she never loses touch with who she really is”[2](P97)。在他看來(lái), “道”是一個(gè)人的家,但“真我”何以離“道”成為漂蕩在外的游子?原因就在于概念、定義、名利等把 “我”從“道”的境界中拐至非“道”的境界,非“道”境界中的人受到“自我”的控制,變成了貪婪虛偽的“小我”。他詮釋第三十章中的“out of control”為“ out of the control of his own, tiny, personal, conscious self”[2](P98),稱(chēng)被自我意識(shí)控制的我是“小我”?!靶∥摇睆?qiáng)調(diào)所謂的自我獨(dú)立性,枉然地反對(duì)“道”,但是,它只是何其褊小而無(wú)能。米歇爾在其文本中多次提到要去除“self”或是“own”,他認(rèn)為圣人“has no mind of her own”(49章),圣人治理天下的時(shí)候是“ freedom from his own ideas”(59章),回到“道”就是“step outside his idea of himself。[2](P108)這和前文所說(shuō)的去除概念、判斷等思想是一致的。
去除自我的污泥,才能回到本我。他主張堅(jiān)持不斷去除自我意識(shí) “It gives itself up continually. That is why it endures。”(56章)他詮釋“虛其心”時(shí)說(shuō)“weakening their ambition: when they have no false self to nourish or defend. They find that greed, hatred, and arrogance vanish by themselves. Toughening their resolves: their innermost intentions. They develop enough self-reliance to give up the idea of self.”[2](P87-88)“假我”即充滿(mǎn)了思想和欲念的我,人如果去掉思想和欲念,則沒(méi)有“本我”與“自我”的沖突:“a good athlete can enter a state of body-awareness in which the right stroke or the right movement happens by itself, effortlessly, without any interference of the conscious will.”[2](Pviii)即好的運(yùn)動(dòng)員與“道”合一,完全不以“自我”干預(yù)肢體活動(dòng),進(jìn)入“忘我”的狀態(tài),這樣就在與道合一的境界中真正地實(shí)現(xiàn)“本我”,這樣的“本我”力量才是無(wú)窮的。
米歇爾引用他人的評(píng)論說(shuō)明了從“道”之我到“自我”再回歸的過(guò)程:“there is no selfconsciousness in the newborn child. Later on, the mind wanders into self-images, starts to think Should I do this?...As self-consciousness develops, the muscles become less supple, less like the world. But the young child is fluidity. It isn’t aware of any separation, so all its movements are spontaneous and alive and whole and perfect.[2](P90)自我本處于“道”中,就像魚(yú)在水中,“本我”受到外界的影響而產(chǎn)生“自我”意識(shí),并且意欲以“自我”支配本是順“道”而行的萬(wàn)事萬(wàn)物,它在與“道”的對(duì)立中疲于奔命。只有去除外界強(qiáng)加的“自我”意識(shí),人才能重新在與道的融合中如魚(yú)得水。安樂(lè)哲先生說(shuō),“如果說(shuō)道家圣人讓世界聽(tīng)其自然,這是因?yàn)閺哪撤N意義上說(shuō)他失去了創(chuàng)立客體的自我,而獲得了順應(yīng)的自我?!盵6](P357)這種“創(chuàng)立客體的自我”正是指的與“本我”對(duì)立的意欲改造世界的“自我”。
如上可見(jiàn),米歇爾強(qiáng)烈反對(duì)個(gè)人意識(shí),這與當(dāng)代西方對(duì)個(gè)人主義的反思是相通的:“西方哲學(xué)的傳統(tǒng)一向以強(qiáng)調(diào)個(gè)人之重要為基本主張。但是當(dāng)代的政治和社會(huì)環(huán)境卻有意無(wú)意地演變成反抗個(gè)人主義為時(shí)尚。此現(xiàn)象反映了理性的誤用,不然就是理性的褊狹使用。于是,西方傳統(tǒng)內(nèi)在的沖突不和恰足以為來(lái)自東方的影響鋪路?!盵7](P48)這種對(duì)“本我”“自我”的區(qū)分,則又與西方對(duì)“我”的界定有關(guān)。在中國(guó)文化中,人的更高境界其實(shí)可以于現(xiàn)有境界中修得,而無(wú)需完全脫離現(xiàn)有之我,但在西方文化中,“我”是可以分為眾多個(gè)方面和階段的,人需要脫離某一階段才能進(jìn)入另一階段,正因此,才有“自我”“本我”“超我”之別。米歇爾對(duì)與“道”關(guān)系不同的人的劃分,當(dāng)也與西方文化對(duì)“我”的區(qū)分密切相關(guān)。
萬(wàn)事萬(wàn)物都是道的體現(xiàn),都遵循道的作用,人們自然也需要服從于這一規(guī)律,服從這一規(guī)律的生活就是因任自然的生活:接受事物的發(fā)展?fàn)顟B(tài),不去主動(dòng)地選擇和改造,相信事物有自我轉(zhuǎn)化的力量,這樣的人“He has no goal in mind, doesn’t think that he is doing anything. He’s just along for the ride. No expectations. No regrets.”[2](P100)
首先,體“道”生活是一種愉悅的生活。認(rèn)識(shí)到“道”是事物的本源,就會(huì)相信事物是內(nèi)在統(tǒng)一的整體,平等對(duì)待任何事物而不厚此薄彼。作者翻譯“寵辱若驚”時(shí)說(shuō),“What does it mean that hope is as hollow as fear? Hope and fear are both phantoms that arise from thinking of the self. ”(13 章)認(rèn)為“寵”和“辱”本是同一事物,只是因?yàn)閭€(gè)人偏見(jiàn)而導(dǎo)致“榮”“辱”有好壞之別。以這樣的態(tài)度認(rèn)識(shí)和對(duì)待事物,則會(huì)接納和包容所有人和事,因而“the Master is available to all people and doesn't reject anyone.”( 27章)米歇爾還引用別人的觀點(diǎn)說(shuō)“the mind is originally empty, and only when it remains empty, without grasping or rejecting, can it respond to natural things, without prejudice.”[2](P93)即只有去除先入為主的偏見(jiàn),人才能以包容所有的態(tài)度去擁抱萬(wàn)物,這種因任自然的態(tài)度讓人“Be content with what you have; rejoice in the way things are.”(44章),從而進(jìn)入一種快樂(lè)的生活。米歇爾看到了現(xiàn)代化和工業(yè)化下,極度的征服自然思想導(dǎo)致西方人非常疲累,可以說(shuō),“中國(guó)人以其與自然融洽游樂(lè)的態(tài)度,有一點(diǎn)就享受一點(diǎn),而西洋人風(fēng)馳電掣的向前追求,以至精神淪喪苦悶,所得雖多,實(shí)在未曾從容享受?!盵1](P170)
其次,體“道”的生活中人能“無(wú)為而無(wú)不為”。得道者“Acts without doing anything: her actions are appropriate responses.…she never has to make a decision; decisions arise by themselves.”[2](P87)“圣人”和“道”“無(wú)為”,他們順應(yīng)而不去掌控他者,讓事物遵循著“反者道之用”的規(guī)律循環(huán)往復(fù):“The Master sees things as they are, without trying to control them. She lets them go their own way”。”(29章)翻譯“去人事天”為“The mark of a moderate man is freedom from his own ideas....he has no destination in view and makes use of anything life happens to bring his way。”(59章)這都是任由事物憑借其本性自由發(fā)展,它體現(xiàn)了中國(guó)學(xué)說(shuō)中重自然的特點(diǎn):“這種學(xué)說(shuō)異于西方征服自然說(shuō)的地方在于:它以為人在自然中處于輔助參贊的地位,人既然應(yīng)改造自然,亦應(yīng)適應(yīng)自然,人類(lèi)活動(dòng)的目標(biāo)不是統(tǒng)治自然,而是把自然調(diào)整、改造得更符合人類(lèi)的需要,與此同時(shí),必須注意不破壞自然,讓自然界的萬(wàn)物都能生成發(fā)展。要而言之,就是比較注重人與自然的和諧?!盵4](P53)米歇爾對(duì)因任自然生活的重視,也與近年來(lái)西方傳統(tǒng)的征服自然思想所遇到的困局有關(guān)。西方的征服自然曾經(jīng)帶來(lái)了偉大的生產(chǎn)力,但是其長(zhǎng)期結(jié)果中卻出現(xiàn)了環(huán)境惡化、局域沖突不斷等種種惡果??茖W(xué)與知識(shí)、暴力與征服不是萬(wàn)能的,不少西方人開(kāi)始追求另外一種更為根本的解決問(wèn)題的方式,并認(rèn)為“道”是智者的方案,米歇爾的主張正是這種潮流的體現(xiàn)。
因任自然、隨遇而安的人生態(tài)度,歸根結(jié)底,是前文所說(shuō)的體“道”——去除不適合于“道”的思維方式與欲念——的結(jié)果。安樂(lè)哲提出道家的“自我”,正是“由無(wú)知、無(wú)為和無(wú)欲引導(dǎo)的它的順應(yīng)活動(dòng)所引起的。”[6](P346)無(wú)知、無(wú)為、無(wú)欲,所以不欲以自我的意識(shí)去干預(yù)他者,這種“順應(yīng)活動(dòng)”才能 “以無(wú)事取天下”:“If you want to be a great leader,you must learn to follow the Tao. Stop trying to control. Let go of fixed plans and concepts, and the world will govern itself.”(57章)要成為偉大的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,最重要的是順應(yīng)“道”,給予他人發(fā)展的空間,讓世界自由發(fā)展。
值得注意的是,西方文化中的米歇爾,其對(duì)基督的愛(ài)不可能不影響到對(duì)“道”的認(rèn)識(shí),例如,他雖然強(qiáng)調(diào)“道”生萬(wàn)物是自然的而不是“創(chuàng)造”的,但他仍以上帝做例證:“God doesn’t say, ‘let there be light.’ The light simply is, and is God.”[2](P99)實(shí)際上,自然之“道”與人格神的“上帝”在這一方面是區(qū)別很大的。某種程度上,對(duì)“道”的忠實(shí)與對(duì)基督的愛(ài)緊密糾結(jié)在一起,他的回到“道”的“本我”往往與基督教中的充滿(mǎn)愛(ài)的“本我”相契合,因任自然的生活最終也不免基督教的影子。正因?yàn)榇耍囊蛉巫匀坏纳钤谔蕹烁拍钆c定義后,“in fact, we are that fluid of love.”[2](P90)生活中充滿(mǎn)的是愛(ài)。
如上所述,米歇爾認(rèn)為“道”是宇宙的起源和規(guī)律,人應(yīng)該以直覺(jué)思維去體“道”,在體“道”中回歸自我,過(guò)一種因任自然的生活。他以西方文化為參照,因而強(qiáng)調(diào)與西方文化相異之處,例如強(qiáng)調(diào)與西方二元論相反的整體論,強(qiáng)調(diào)與西方的靜止相反的生生不息;強(qiáng)調(diào)與西方邏輯思維相反的直覺(jué)思維;強(qiáng)烈與西方個(gè)人意識(shí)相反的去除“自我”。他的這種變化是現(xiàn)代西方社會(huì)變化使然。當(dāng)代學(xué)者成中英先生認(rèn)為“中國(guó)文化的世界定位在顯示其對(duì)整體性的尊崇,對(duì)直接經(jīng)驗(yàn)的依賴(lài)和對(duì)關(guān)系與過(guò)程的依持,以及對(duì)和諧社會(huì)的追求”[7](P6-7)提出應(yīng)該發(fā)揚(yáng)對(duì)世界文化的深度互補(bǔ)性。當(dāng)代無(wú)數(shù)知識(shí)分子也提出重建中華傳統(tǒng)文化,他們都看到了中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)文化對(duì)西方文化的作用。米歇爾既是道家文化的接受者,又是道家文化的“輸出”者,他的成功值得正在尋求中學(xué)西漸方式的中國(guó)學(xué)者的注意,可以啟發(fā)我們發(fā)現(xiàn)中學(xué)西漸的最佳方式。
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[2] Stephen, Mitchell.Tao Te Ching[M].New York:Harper Perennial,1990.
[3] 高旭東.知識(shí)之樹(shù)與生命之樹(shù)[M].北京:北京大學(xué)出版社,2010.
[4] 張岱年,程宜山.中國(guó)文化論爭(zhēng)[M].北京:中國(guó)人民大學(xué)出版社,2006.
[5] 漢斯-格奧爾格·梅勒.《道德經(jīng)》的哲學(xué)[M].北京:人民出版社,2010.
[6] 安樂(lè)哲.自我的圓成:中西互鏡下的古典儒學(xué)與道家[M].石家莊:河北人民出版社,2006.
[7] 成中英.從中西互釋中挺立[M].北京:人民大學(xué)出版社,2005.
[8] Benjamin, Hoff.小熊維尼之道[M].重慶:重慶大學(xué)出版社,2011.
責(zé)任編輯:馮濟(jì)平
The Modern Interpretation of "Tao"in Tao Te Ching Translated by Michell
CAI Jue-min
( Tianjin Foreign Studies University, Tianjin 300221, China )
Tao Te Ching translated by Stephen Mitchell is one of the most infl uential translated versions of Tao Te Ching published in contemporary America. Mitchell's version emphasizes the differences between the Oriental culture and the Western culture: holism contrary to dualism; life and growth of the universe contrary to the absolute rest; intuitive thinking versus logical thinking. According to his interpretation, Tao should be understood as the fountain of the universe. He also stressed the denial of concepts and logical reasoning, "the inner self", the life-style of letting everything alone. This kind of interpretation embodies the appreciation of "Tao" in Western culture.
Mitchell; Tao Te Ching; Tao; interpretation
B223
A
1005-7110(2014)02-0107-06
2013-10-26
教育部基金項(xiàng)目“中醫(yī)的英譯及其語(yǔ)料庫(kù)的建設(shè)”(項(xiàng)目號(hào)13YJC740053)的階段性成果。
蔡覺(jué)敏(1975-),女,湖南岳陽(yáng)人,天津外國(guó)語(yǔ)大學(xué)副教授,文學(xué)博士,主要從事古代文學(xué)研究。