By WU Zhaoli
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Indo-Pacific: Origin and Multinational Strategic Game-play
By WU Zhaoli
Assistant Research Fellow,National Institute of International Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
In recent years, the United States, Australia and India have initiated the Indo-Pacific concept, which is not a simple result of the Indian Ocean plus the Pacific Ocean, but a geo-economic and geo-political development of the two regions. Indo-Pacific reflects the shift of the global economic gravity and strategic center, and the China factor is obvious in this process.The extending Chinese strategic interests are beyond the traditional Asia-Pacific region, but China as a typical Indo-Pacific country should be cautious about the “selective exclusion” and “targeted promotion”
Indo-Pacific has become a hot jargon in the U.S., Australian and Indian media and their political elites start using this term to redefine Asia. Former U.S. Secretary of State H. Clinton, Australian Defense Minister S. Smith and Indian Prime Minister M. Singh use the term “Indo-Pacific” many times. The term originally is a geographic concept across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and is often used in the marine ecological system theory. Now the term is reborn to become a strategic key term with geopolitical significance. What is the motivation behind the initiation of the term by the three countries? Does the Indo-Pacific objectively and truly reflect the new regional geopolitical and economic development trends? As a traditional Asia-Pacific country, how should China deal with the Indo-Pacific strategic design dominated by the three countries? This article tries to study Indo-Pacific from its origin, the rationality of the rising Indo-Pacific from the geo-economic dimension, and relevant countries’ strategic needs, and to give an objective judgment to China’s characteristics as a typical Indo-Pacific country.
The “Indo-Pacific” or “the Indo-Pacific Asia” is the abbreviation of “Indian Ocean + Pacific Ocean” and the term itself is not a new creation.1“Indo-Pacific” first appeared as a marine science terminology and then is used in ethnographic research. In geopolitical field, it is occasionally used in some academic works in early and middle 20thcentury.2However, in recent years and especially since the year of 2010, strategic analysts and political elites in the United States, Australia and India have actively promoted the “Indo-Pacific” concept and tried to integrate the traditional isolated Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean into a unified geopolitical strategic unit.
Actually as a geopolitical concept, the Indo-Pacific has three meanings. Firstly, it is a geographic concept and can be understood in both narrow sense and broad sense. In the narrow sense, some scholars maintain that the region starts from the eastern edge of Siberia and extends to the south, along Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Mainland China, Taiwan and South East Asia, Australia and India except the Indian Ocean region to the west of India.3The narrow region actually covers the Asia-Pacific region and the East Indian Ocean region. In the broad sense, currently there are two definitions. The first definition covers a vast area from the West Pacific Ocean to the West Indian Ocean including the east coast of Africa. Actually the broad region covers the narrow region plus the whole Indian Ocean region.4The second definition maintains that the broad region should cover the east coast of the Pacific Ocean including the United States and the whole Indian Ocean region. So, the broad region covers the whole Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean region.5
Secondly, the Indo-Pacific is a strategic system concept. To certain extent, the concept means that the three countries will strategically unite to shape the regional security framework. Under the background of simultaneously rising China and India, and the extending and overlapping strategic interests and strategic space of the two countries, and the new development of the world economy and military have led to the shifting gravity of the world architecture gradually from the West Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Therefore, U.S. former Secretary of State H. Clinton proposed to extend the western border of the Asia-Pacific region to the Indian Subcontinent. Obviously, for the United States, to shape the future Indian Ocean-Pacific region is of major importance for it to maintain its global leadership. In this region, Australia has its important strategic cooperative partner the United States, its biggest trading partner China and potential marine security partner India. For the United States and Australia, to accept and shape the Indo-Pacific into a major geo-strategic region will be conducive to the maintenance of the existing international rules and norms and their status in the global order during the shifting gravity of global power.6
Thirdly, the “Indo-Pacific” is also a concept of era, which means “the era of Indo-Pacific”. The formation of every geographic concept has a time point. Rory Medcalf maintains that “the Indo-Pacific time” is faintly in sight7and is increasingly recognized by the international community.8Priya Chacko also believes that a new “Indo-Pacific era” is likely to come.9Some scholars are more positively believe that we are living in a new “Indo-Pacific era”, which creates an alien world.10Some scholars even consider that the traditional “Asia-Pacific era” has come to an end and the world has entered “the Indo-Pacific era”.11
Whether in narrow or broad sense, the promoters of the “Indo-Pacific” have actively advocated to replace the traditional Asia-Pacific region with it so as to reflect new development of the regional geopolitical architecture. However, scholars still hold different views on the contents of the “Indo-Pacific” concept either from the perspective of geography or strategy. Scholars with positive views on “the Indo-Pacific concept” maintain that although the two regions of Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean or “the Asia-Pacific region” hardly have any historic connections from the geopolitical analysis, no other region’s concept -- East Asia, West Pacific or even the Asia-Pacific -- is able to more accurately describe the shifting global strategic gravity than the “Indo-Pacific concept” from the current international political and economic development trends.12The emergence of “Indo-Pacific” is irresistible.13Those scholars with skeptical views on “the Indo-Pacific concept” believe that it is not scientific since the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are too broad to hardly become a singe strategic unit. Firstly, many regional hot-spot problems from the Korean Peninsula to Pakistan-Indian relations are mainly sub-regional issues, and it is very hard to say that the problems on the Korean Peninsula can exert any influence on the South Asian region. Secondly, the interaction among countries in “the Indo-Pacific region” especially the impacts of interaction among the United States, India and China go far beyond the scope of “the Indo-Pacific region”. Thirdly, not all sub-regions in the Indo-Pacific have the same influence. Obviously, the South China Sea, the ASEAN region and the Bay of Bengal in the core areas of “Indo-Pacific” have greater impacts.14
Although scholars have different views on the geographic definition and the concrete contents of “the Indo-Pacific concept”, this concept has exerted obvious influence on the decision-makers in the United States., Australia and India. U.S. former Secretary of State H. Clinton wrote in the Journal of Foreign Affairs that the Asia-Pacific region had become a key driving force of the global politics. This region extends from the Indian Subcontinent to the West side of America across the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. Due to communication, transportation and strategic factors, the region has become increasingly and closely linked.15In 2009 National Defense White Paper, the Australian Government uses both the “Asia-Pacific region” and the “wider Asia-Pacific region”, and clearly points out that the geographic range of the “wider Asia-Pacific region” extends from North Asia to the East Indian Ocean region.16Australia in the Asian Century White Paper in October 2012 uses the “Indo-Pacific region” concept limitedly.17However, The Australian National Defense White Paper in April 2013 extensively uses “the Indo-Pacific region” and holds that a new “Indo-Pacific strategic arc belt” linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean via Southeast Asia is taking shape.18Similarly, Indian National Security Advisor S. Menon has used “Indo-Pacific” many times on different occasions. Indian Prime Minister M. Singh uses “the Indo-Pacific region” for the first time in the India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in December 2012.19It can be said that under the active promotion of the U.S., Australian and Indian scholars, “Indo-Pacific” or “Indo-Pacific region” has become a key term in the diplomatic, defense and strategic documents of the three countries.
The “Indo-Pacific” geographically covers the two regions of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Although there are different concepts of the Indo-Pacific, to integrate traditionally two isolated geopolitical units into a single strategic arc belt and to consider relevant countries’ foreign policy in a broad “Indo-Pacific” framework are the major reasons that “Indo-Pacific” concept shifts from a academic concept to relevant countries’ key term for diplomatic strategy. In summary, the concept not simply puts the two geographic regions of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean together, but is the product of geo-economic and political development of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.
In terms of reality and trends of geo-economic development, integration of the traditional Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean region has accelerated and the economic, trade and investment activities have led to initial features of regional integration of the two traditionally different geographic units.
The Asia-Pacific concept was formally formed in the 1970s and gradually became popular. The main reason is that East Asian and South East Asian economies, especially the economy of Japan and 4 small dragons developed rapidly.20The formation of “the Indo-Pacific concept” is quite similar. On one hand, the Asia-Pacific region continues to be the world economic development engine and has become the stabilizer of the global economy as the European and the U.S. economy undergoes downturn. On the other hand, the emerging economies represented by India in the Indian Ocean costal region are rising fast. Since 1990s, India starts its economic reform and has gradually got out of economic plight and experienced 20-year high economic growth. The economic success has made India a shining star in international community. Different from China’s development pattern, India has developed its economy mainly by relying on domestic market demand and service sector growth with relatively limited investment and export, which has attracted the world expectation. Since the U.S. Goldman Sachs put forward the concept of BRIC in 2001, which considered India and China the driving force of the future world economy, the international community has become very optimistic about India’s market potential and future development. The research report issued by the U.S. Citi financial service group in 2011 holds that China would surpass the United States in 2020 and become the world biggest economy. India would surpass China in 2050 and become the world biggest economy. The report states that India’s economic growth rate from 2010 to 2050 will be 8% and its GDP in nominal term will reach US$86 trillion and predicts that the gravity of the global economy in term of GDP will shift to China and India.21Australian former Foreign Minister G. Evans also argues that due to India’s scale and economic growth rate, it can been seen in the near future that the gravity of economy will further shift to Indo-Pacific from the Asia-Pacific region.22The international community’s judgment on the rising economies represented by India and China and the resulted shift of the world economic gravity is undoubtedly correct, which is the major background for the “the Indo-Pacific concept” to quickly get popular.
Since 1980s, economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region has developed quickly. However, the geopolitical factors and diversified economic, cultural and social characteristics in the region have relatively slowed down the process of regional economic cooperation. APEC has experienced from boom to bust. The different cooperative objectives among member countries and the major powers strategic games-play in the region have made APEC less attractive. Due to geopolitical factors, the negotiation on free trade zone among China, Japan and the ROK has become uncertain. Although ASEAN-centered the “10+X”cooperative mechanism has forged some progress, to turn “10+1” and “10+3” into “10+6” as a base for the RCEP is still very difficult. While the Asia-Pacific regional cooperation still remains stagnant, India has accelerated the development of economic and trade cooperation mechanism with the Asia-Pacific region. As early as 1975, India signed the Bangkok Agreement with the ROK and Laos. While carrying out and implementing the Look East policy, 6 of the 15 regional trade agreements signed by India are with countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia. So far, India has signed comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPA) with Singapore (2005), the ROK (2009), Malaysia (2011), Japan (2011) and signed FTA with ASEAN (2009) and finished freed trade agreement on service trade and investment by the end of 2012.
The fact that India strengthens its economic relations with the Asia-Pacific region has accelerated the economic interaction between the Indian Ocean region and the Pacific Ocean region. The increasingly closer economic link has helped the integration of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Although integration of economy, trade and investment in the two large regions is still at the initial stage, the trend becomes more and more obvious. U.S. Undersecretary of State R. O. Blake calls the economic links among South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia “the emerging economic corridor”, which is judged on the basis of regional economic integration.23
The regions of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are key composition of global public goods.24A.T. Mahan, founder of the modern sea power theory, linked Asia and the Indian Ocean long time ago and argued that whoever controlls the Indian Ocean would control Asia, and the Indian Ocean would decide the destiny of the world in 21stcentury.25Actually, the unique geographical features of the Indian Ocean make the provision of public goods including trade and energy lanes in the region vulnerable. As a geographic intermediary region, the India Ocean on the one hand separates countries along the Indian Ocean and on the other hand links the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean. The northern strategic arc area is an important geostrategic arc full of conflicts and disputes of interests. As the global energy demand and maritime trade grow year by year, this region will become not only one of the world most important strategic regions but also one where conflicts break out most frequently due to deep-rooted contradictions and irreconcilable clash of interests.26Meantime, Asian countries represented by China, Japan, the ROK and some ASEAN countries become more and more dependent on the Indian Ocean lanes. 90% of the global commercial trade and 65% of oil trade are transported by sea, and the Indian Ocean takes up half of the global container transportation, and 70% of oil products is transported from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region via the Indian Ocean. Some major strategic points with significant influence on global trade including the Bab El Mandeb Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Malacca Strait are located along the Indian Ocean lanes. 40% of the global trade is transported across the Malacca Strait and 40% of the crude oil trade is transported across the Strait of Hormuz.27As China, Japan and the ROK, etc. many Asian-Pacific countries’ foreign trade develops and their demand for energy resources grows, the Indian Ocean is introduced into the macro strategic thinking by traditional Asia-Pacific countries.
In a word, in addition to the shift of the world economic gravity from the Euro-Atlantic zone to Asia, the trade, investment and production across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are quickly expanding, the geo-economic development trend has made the Indo-Pacific region a single geostrategic arc.28
The deepening economic and trade ties between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean seem to be the reasonable note for the Indo-Pacific concept. However, comparing with the role of geo-economic factors, the Indo-Pacific concept itself is more likely driven by geopolitics. When visiting India in 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe drew attention to the geopolitical reality on the horizon and deemed that the confluence of the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean is forming and the geographic boundaries of “a big Asia” are showing in different ways.29Some Australian scholars also point out that thoroughly analyzing the Indo-Pacific concept initiated by the U.S., Australia and India will help one understand that the envisaged framework of the Indo-Pacific region is a balancing technique taken by some countries in order to strengthen their own strategic interests under the background of rising China’s power and influence. Their purpose is not to promote formation of a common regional vision but to solve their respective economic and diplomatic problems.30
The rapid and continuous rising of China is the major background for initiation and formation of the Indo-Pacific. After the end of the cold war, the most important change of East Asia is China’s continuous economic growth, so it occupies an increasingly important position in East Asia economic pattern, which, to some extent, promotes the transformation of the East Asia strategic pattern.31M. M. Boutton, Chairman of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, also points out that the impact of rising China’s power on Asian security and political order is the changing international balance of power in our time. In fact, China’s rising power and expanded influence have not only exerted influence on the transformation of the East Asia strategic pattern, but also on upgrading the Indo-Pacific from a pure concept to a key strategic term.32Some Chinese scholars emphasize it becomes clearer that two factors deciding the future East Asian order and development, i.e. the changing U.S. East Asian alliance and the growing China’s economic strength.33
In the Western view, China’s change mainly manifests in three aspects. Firstly, China’s economic growth. China’s GDP surpassed Japan in 2010 and became the world second economy only after the U.S. Secondly, China’s rising military power. China’s defense modernization process has accelerated. Thirdly, China’s changing behavior. China has clearly identified its core national interests and is determined to safeguard them. Some strategists even estimate that the whole Asia strategic order is quickly developing into a China uni-polar age and China’s political, economic, diplomatic and military actions since 2010 seem to strengthen Westerners’ judgment that a powerful China becomes increasingly self-confident.
Those countries that have disputes with China in different domains like India, Japan and Viet Nam, etc. have complicated psychology. In 1969, the then Canadian Prime Minister P. E. Trudeau said that the U.S. neighbors like sleeping aside an elephant, and always worry being rolled over.34As for China’s neighbors, they undoubtedly have the same Trudeau Syndrome as China’s power continues growing. Therefore, to restrict China’s influence and balance the rising China has become an important driving factor for the Indo-Pacific concept. One of the major driving factors in the U.S. shift of attention from the Indian Ocean to the Indo-Pacific regional security framework is Chinese navy possible expansion and use of navy in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea region. Seen from the U.S.’ perspective, to effectively manage these issues, the U.S. not only needs to cooperate with India but also with other countries with similar concerns like Australia, Indonesia and Japan.35
The essence of the U.S.’s initiating the Indo-Pacific regional framework is to cope with new development of the power structure in this region. Based on inheriting and strengthening its traditional Asia-Pacific strategy, the United States tries to construct a wider Indo-Pacific regional strategic framework. The U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy Report in 1990s mainly paid attention to East Asia and the Western Pacific region, and did not involve in the sub-regions of Central Asia, South Asia and West Asia.36However, the Obama Administration’s Asia-Pacific strategy has highlighted a broader Asia-Pacific vision and brought the Indian Ocean including South Asian Sub-continent into its Asia-Pacific strategic layout. Joseph Yun, U.S. Undersecretary of State in charge of East Asia and Pacific affairs testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that it became more and more important for the United States to consider the Indian Ocean region and East Asia in a coherent and integrated approach; this new vision would help it deal with key challenges and opportunities in the region. ……from the strategic perspective, the U.S. implementation of the strategic rebalance strategy actually is confirmation of the new “Indo-Pacific” world, which is in formation.37Undoubtedly, the “wider Asia-Pacific” vision of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy actually is reasonable deduction for “Indo-Pacific” to become a key term.
The United States advocates “Indo-Pacific”, which means its good grasp of importance of the Indo-Pacific region. Under the background that the U.S. dominant position is getting relatively weak and the gravity of geopolitics and geo-economy shifts to Indo-Pacific, the United States tries to reconstruct its relations with allies and partners in those major regions so as to cope with the rising China. The Chinese leaders have clearly expressed that China would like to build a new type of relationship with the United States. However, comparing to the 1990s when the United States was the only superpower in the world and China was just an ordinary member of many powers, under the background of the collective rise of emerging powers and the economic slowdown of the Western powers, China’s strength and international status has changed dramatically. The gap of strength between China and the United States is narrowing, which has led to a further change of the public attitude in China and the United States. In recent years, “China threat” in the United States has cropped up endlessly and the U.S. decision-makers’ attitude to China is sensitive and anxious. All this is due to the shift of power between China and the United States. Some scholars in the New American Security Center maintain that the structural shift of global economic gravity and geopolitical influence to the Asian region will become a major geo-strategic trend for decades to come. This trend starts with the rising China. If this trend is not managed well, it will eventually change the global power balance, influence and values in the way not conducive to the U.S. interests. Although the U.S. current policy focus and resources concentrate on the big Middle East, the bigger and longer term challenges to the U.S. global superiority are mainly from Asia.38Some scholars even believe that the biggest challenge to the U.S. leadership in Indo-Pacific is from China.39On the whole, the U.S. elites believe that China is the U.S.’ comprehensive political rival, global economic rival and regional military rival. To deal with the rising China naturally becomes the top priority in the U.S. foreign strategy.
The formulation of the rebalancing strategy symbolizes that the U.S. pivot to Asia strategy has further deepened. Promoting Indo-Pacific to become a unified geo-strategic unit is the natural extension of the U.S. grand strategy. Since the Obama Administration, due to shift of world geo-political and economic gravity brought by the U.S. domestic economic situation, the development of the anti-terrorist war in Afghanistan and the rise of the emerging powers represented by China and India, the U.S. government has attached more and more impaotance to China’s strength and regional influence and the realist thinking in the U.S. policy toward China is obvious. The Obama Administration’s Asia-Pacific strategic framework includes deepening and upgrading the alliance system, expanding engagement with important regional partners like India, participating and cultivating new regional multilateral frameworks. To strengthen coordination and cooperation on West Pacific issues and enhance partnership with India have become the core contents in the Indo-Pacific framework constructed by the United States.40In short, “Indo-Pacific” in the U.S. strategic planning is to bring India into the U.S.’ strategic framework by strengthening its partnership with India so as to restrict China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region especially in the Indian Ocean region and keep the U.S.’ dominant position in the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore the U.S. President Obama has identified the U.S.-India partnership the decisive partnership in the 21stcentury.41H. Clinton, U.S. former Secretary of State made it clear in her speech in Hawaii that the reason that the U.S. strengthened cooperation with Indian navy in the Asia-Pacific region was from its understanding of the Indo-Pacific importance to global trade and commerce.42While answering questions raised by Indian audience on “why the U.S. is so keen on expanding its relations with India”, R. D. Homats, U.S. Undersecretary of State in charge of economic, energy and agricultural affairs points out that India-U.S. relations have geo-strategic significance and geo-economic significance.43The Indo-Pacific region, as a geopolitical concept, is a geographic support for the United States to formulate pivot to Asia-Pacific region and implement the rebalancing strategy. In some respects, the concept can effectively solve the strategic plights in its foreign strategy.
Australia is close to Asia in geography, however, closer to the West in historic links. While maintaining political and military alliance with the United States, Australia has integrated into rapidly growing Asia, which is its main foreign policy in recent years. Different from the geo-political and economic factors behind the U.S. promotion of Indo-Pacific, Australia has actively advocated the Indo-Pacific framework, mainly because it tries to integrate into the M-zone in stead of being marginalized. To put it briefly, the Indo-Pacific in the Australian strategic planning reflects: Firstly, the gravity of the Australian economy has shifted to the west coast from the east cost and the influence of the west cost to national foreign policy has enhanced, and the think tanks in the west coast are an important force to promote the Indo-Pacific concept for the national strategic planning. Secondly, Australia wants to become a bridge linking the East and the West and tries to avoid being marginalized in the shift of global geopolitical and economic gravity. The Indo-Pacific concept has put Australia in the geostrategic center, however the traditional Asia-Pacific concept does not have this function. Using this concept can help Australia justifiably further strengthen bilateral relations with India, etc.44Thirdly, Australia has the Indo-Pacific as an important channel for its economic and strategic interests. Australia in the Asian Century White Paper released in October 2012 pointed out that the Indian Ocean replacing the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean as the world busiest corridor. “The Indo-Pacific concept” means that West Pacific Ocean and East Indian Ocean are considered an integrated part rather than two isolated regions by relevant countries.45fourthly, Australia defines itself as an Indian Ocean country and states that it has security interests and economic interests in South Asia and the wider Indian Ocean region.46
Promotion of Indo-Pacific framework by Australia mainly manifests in the following aspects: Firstly, to maintain political and military alliance with the United States in the east cost of the Pacific Ocean, support its pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, the rebalance strategy and the U.S.-dominated TPP process. Secondly, to actively integrate into Asian economy, especially China, India and Southeast Asian region, support ASEAN to play a central role in regional comprehensive economic partnership. Thirdly, to actively participate in cooperation in the framework of the Indian Ocean rim-Association Regional Cooperation, strengthen maritime security cooperation with India and maintain the security of the Indian Ocean lanes. Fourthly, to play a role of bridge linking the East and the West, support communication and engagement between China and the United States since Australia maintains that China-U.S. relation is the most important force to shape the strategic environment.47
However, it’s undeniable that Australia’s promotion of “Indo-Pacific” is not as strong as that of the United States, to some extent, Australia is still doubtful about China’s growing strength and influence. Its National Defense White Paper released in 2009 stated that the speed, range and structure of China’s military modernization made its neighboring countries worried and required to deal with China’s rising military force and influence in the Asia-Pacific region.48However Australia in the Asian Century White Paper in 2012 said Chinese continuous rise of defense capability and military modernization is a natural and justified result brought by economic growth. Australia National Security Report in 2013 went further, and promoted China’s peaceful rise and held its peaceful rise would bring positive economic interests to Australia.50
For the Australian active advocates, “the Indo-Pacific concept” puts Australia on the geo-strategic center and the use of this concept can justify its enhanced engagement with the Indian Ocean region. However, some scholars see the risks in this concept. To advocate “Indo-Pacific concept” will inevitably make Australia a U.S. more important ally in this region. Since the U.S. expectation for Australia will increase, Australia may face new and potential responsibilities, for example, to redefine ANZUS Council in the Indo-Pacific framework, increase presence of the U.S. navy in the Stirling Base, and build a U.S. drone base in Cocos Islands etc. As the United States becomes keen on sharing responsibilities to maintain regional order with new and old friends, the U.S. demand from allies and friends becomes more urgent. If Australia actively advocates and promotes this framework, competition and controversy are likely to grow in the emerging regional order, which will increase Australia’s commitment and responsibility as the U.S. ally and possibly estrange the largest trading partner China. The Indo-Pacific is not able to solve Australia’s strategic dilemma and may even make things worse.51Therefore, some Australian scholars have sober understanding of the concept, arguing that Australia is not a participant for the region, Indo-Pacific is not Australia’s strategic region and the Indo-Pacific concept itself is ambiguous, which should be strictly defined.52
Indian former Foreign Minister S. Saran once pointed out that South Asia in history, geography and culture used to be an independent geopolitical unit.53Indeed, in the large part of the 20thcentury, India’s links with the Asia-Pacific region in politics, economy and strategy were relatively limited, India was not a official member of the Asia-Pacific region and the traditional Asia-Pacific region did not include South Asia Subcontinent of the Indian Ocean. As the geographic center of gravity shifts to the East, and India’s regional and global influence rises, India’s links with the Asia-Pacific region increasingly grow. The emergence of the Indo-Pacific concept basically reflects the reality of the geopolitics and geo-economy.
India has the endowment to become a world power with the size of landmass, population and resources. Since India guards the middle part of the Indian Ocean and is richly endowed by nature, the U.S. consideration of India in its grand strategic framework has changed, which goes beyond the South Asia horizon, regards India a major state in the Indo-Pacific region and actively seeks India’s support in the process of pivoting to Asia and implementing the rebalancing strategy. During her visit to India in July 2011, H. Clinton clearly stated that the United States supports India’s Look East policy and not only encourages India to Look East but to participate in the Eastern affairs with actions.54Therefore, U.S. support of India’s expansion of participation in regional affairs just corresponds to India’s implementation of Look East policy, which provides unprecedented opportunities for India to expand its strategic space from the traditional Indian-Ocean region to the West Pacific region.
Indians views on Indo-Pacific are obviously different, similar to that of Australians. To sum up, the Indian strategists hold 3 different views on the concept: The first view is to embrace the concept; the second is to negate the concept and the third is to use it limitedly. Those with a positive view believe that India should thoroughly accept the Indo-Pacific concept and use it to change India’s foreign policy, and on the base of abandoning the traditional non-aligned position, realize India’s leadership in shaping regional economic and security systems by promoting the Indo-Pacific region to become a single strategic arc belt. However, those with a negative view maintain that Indo-Pacific will likely lead to potential threats to India’s foreign policy goals. Accepting Indo-Pacific means that India and the U.S. will form a close alliance, however, to safeguard India’s sovereign decision-making conforms to India’s fundamental interests in its foreign policy and to India’s strategic goals.55
Comparing with the above-mentioned two extreme views, those with a view on limited use of the concept are relatively moderate. They hope to use the opportunity provided by Indo-Pacific and have a sober judgment on the risks imposed on India in the Indo-Pacific framework. They believe India need not be hostile to the concept and should accept it mildly instead.56India should not only maintain the non-aligned tradition so as to get strategic autonomy but also give priority to the creation of a stable regional environment so as to establish a trade, investment and security environment conducive to India’s economic development. In policy documents, Indian Government frequently mentions that India would like to establish a multiple, open, inclusive security framework in the Indo-Pacific region, which reflects this option.57
From the perspective of India’s foreign policy options, on the one hand, India is worried about “the regional imbalance” and regional tension led by the U.S. implementation of the rebalancing strategy and hopes it to recalibrate the rebalancing strategy; at the same time India also covets the “dividend” produced by the U.S. promotion of “Indo-Pacific” and is attracted by the U.S. promise that it would attach great importance to India rising leadership role in many global issues and would like to work with India to promote stability in South Asia and other regions in the world.58Therefore, the Indian decision-makers have gone beyond the geographical boundaries of the traditional South Asia and the Indian Ocean regions and started defining India’s strategic space and national interests from a wider Indo-Pacific perspective. In the India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit held in December 2012, Indian Prime Minister Singh elaborated the importance of the strategic partnership between India and the ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific framework for the first time. During his visit to Japan in May 2013, Prime Minister Singh also used Indo-Pacific to define the bilateral relations.59In the same month, Indian Defense Minister A. K. Antony respectively visited Singapore, Thailand and Australia. These activities show that the Indian version of “pivot to Asia” is a careful consideration rather than coincidence or indulgence in the wildest fantasy.60
To sum up, the decisive factor of India’s ideal Indo-Pacific regional framework is its domestic economic restructuring needs and continuous adherence to strategic autonomy principles. Therefore, India supports establishment of regional blocs like ASEAN, the East Asia Summit and the relevant standards on freedom of navigation based on international law and peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. At the same time, India’s focus points on the Indo-Pacific region are not only limited to establishing a top-down framework in multilateral mechanism or in alliance. Besides, the United States hopes to build a regional economic framework in its own way including trade, investment, intellectual property rights and labor standards, however India is not interested in doing so. India believes that the U.S.-initiated TPP is likely to weaken India’s strategic autonomy and exert negative influence on India’s economic growth.61At the same time, India still remains skeptical on whether the United States is able to keep long-term attention to the Indo-Pacific region.
Since Indo-Pacific is actively advocated by the United States, India and Australia, and the U.S.’ rebalancing strategy and its intention to balance China, so some Chinese scholars remain skeptical about them. Comparing to some regional concept like East Asia and the Asia-Pacific, undeniably, Indo-Pacific undoubtedly dilutes China’s regional influence. Under the background that the U.S. continues to strengthen its traditional Asia-Pacific alliance, the global strategic partnership between India and Japan has increasingly deepened, the topics of the “2+2” bilateral dialogues involved in foreign and defense affairs are extensive and sensitive, the U.S.-Japan-India trilateral strategic dialogues develop quickly, the contents of which are increasingly enriched, the dialogues have been gradually institutionalized and normalized, the value-driven call for the U.S.-Japan-Australia- India quadrilateral dialogues is loud. All these mechanisms or arrangements are potentially related to rising China. As the disputes on territory and territorial seas between China and its neighboring countries become increasingly sharp and China’s peripheral security environment becomes more complicated, its quite natural that some Chinese scholars remain cautious of the U.S.-dominated “Indo-Pacific” designing.
It’s needless to say that as China’s economy develops, China’s dependence on foreign trade and energy becomes heavier and China’s strategic interests also extend from the Pacific Ocean region to the Indian Ocean region. Therefore, extension of China’s strategic interests has turned China from the traditional “Asia-Pacific country” into a typical “Indo-Pacific power”. As strategic maritime lane linking Asia, Africa and Australia, Indian Ocean for China is getting more and more important. In recent years, China’s foreign trade has grown quickly and is dependent on transportation by sea. China’s energy demand grows quickly and its dependence on oil and gas import grows continuously (58% of oil, 56.5% of crude oil and 29% of gas of China’s import in 2012).62More than 85% of energy import travels on the Indian Ocean-lanes and the life-line of the Malacca Strait.63It can be said that the considerations of foreign trade and energy shipment security are the two important driving factors for China to shift from an Asia-Pacific country to an Indo-Pacific country. U.S. scholar R. K. Kaplan argues that urgent need for economic growth and the demands for foreign energy resources have forced Chinese navy to enhance its capacity to protect the important sea lanes. The current situation is driven by economic needs rather than a comprehensive strategy.64As China’s dependence on the India Ocean lanes becomes heavier, the problem of “the Malacca predicament” becomes increasingly obvious. China’s choice to break up “the Malacca predicament” (for example, China’s bridgehead strategy which opens up itself to Southwest Asia) can bypass the Malacca Strait but can not steer clear of the Indian Ocean. That is to say that China’s dependence on the India Ocean will not change even after it solves “the Malacca predicament”.
“The Indo-Pacific” concept truly reflects the geo-economic development trend in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean regions. Besides the “eastern ward” extension of India’s strategic space spreads to west Pacific Ocean region; another important trend is “western ward” extension of China’s economic and security interests. Western scholars argue that the Indo-Pacific concept is mainly driven by the globalization of economy, energy and maritime transportation, China’s energy import is heavily dependent on the Indian Ocean, which means China just like India has no other choice but to accept itself as a typical Indo-Pacific country instead of only a Asian country.65Therefore, as an important member in the region, China should be integrated into the Indo-Pacific framework and become an organic composition of its strategic system, which conforms to every country’s interests in the Indo-Pacific region. However, some U.S., Australian and Indian conservative scholars attempt to exclude China from the Indo-Pacific framework through an exclusive Indo-Pacific so as to weaken, check and balance China. These scholars only emphasize economic and security links between India and the Pacific region in the “Indo-Pacific” framework and overlook or even deliberately deny the inclusiveness of “Indo-Pacific”.66In fact, relatively independent geographic units of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean get increasingly integrated. This logic of existence, on one hand, originates from increasingly dependence of China and other East Asian countries on the India Ocean in many areas like resources, energy, economy and trade; on the other hand, originates from India strengthened links with the Pacific region, especially with the West Pacific countries. Both the eastward extension and the westward extension are indispensable. Indian Foreign Minister S. Khurshid acknowledges that China’s presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean that India considers its exclusive regions is a new reality that India must learn to face.67
“Indo-Pacific” reflects regional geo-economic development trends, however, if the United States deliberately emphasizes the geopolitical intent of Indo-Pacific and overlooks the internal economic trends, Indo-Pacific will inevitably make the Australian and Indian strategists suspicious. Given China becomes a typical Indo-Pacific state, the Chinese scholars need not resist Indo-Pacific concept. However they should be cautious about the U.S.’ “selective exclusion” and “targeted promotion”. In a word, on the one hand the Indo-Pacific concept has made the traditional geographic boundaries between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean ambiguous and overlapping. On the other hand, sub-regions in the Indo-Pacific region still exist and every sub-region has its unique security problems including the Korea Peninsula, South China Sea, the Malacca Straits and the Bay of Bengal, etc. Although Indo-Pacific reflects the geo-economic and geopolitical new development,68Just as H. Clinton said that how to make the increasingly growing links between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean an operational concept is still a question to be answered.69
1.David Scott, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’— New Regional Formulations and New Maritime Frameworks for US-India Strategic Convergence”,Vol.19, No.2, 2012, p.88.
2. Rory Medcalf, “A Term Whose Time Has Come: The Indo-Pacific”, http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog /2012 /12 /04 /a-term-whose-time-h(huán)as-come-the-indo-pacific/.
3. Michael Auslin,“Security In The Indo-Pacific Commons: Toward a Regional Strategy”,A Report of the American Enterprise Institute,December 2010 p.7,http://www.aei.org/docLib/AuslinReportWedDec152010.pdf.
4. Lisa Curtis,Walter Lohman and Rory Medcalf et al.,“Shared Goals,Converging Interests: A Plan for US-Australia-India Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”,Heritage Foundation,November 3, 2011,p.1, https: //thf _media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf /sr99.pdf.
5. Rory Medcalf,“Australia's Place in the ‘Asian Century’”,,November 4,2012,http: //thediplomat.com/2012/11/04/australias-place-in-the-asian-century/.
6. Priya Chacko,“India and the Indo-Pacific An Emerging Regional Vision”,Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre Policy Brief,Issue 5,November 2012,p2.
7. Rory Medcalf,“The Era of the Indo-Pacific”,The Indian Express,October 16,2012,http: //www.indianexpress.com/news/The-era-of-the-indopacific/1017130/.
8. Ibid(5).
9. Priya Chacko,“Three Countries,One Centre of Gravity”,The Hindu,December 12,2012,http: / /www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/three-countries-one-centre-of-gravity /article4188788. ece.
10.Michael Wesley,“Irresistible Rise of the Indo-Pacific”,,May 4,2011,http: //www.theaustralian.com.au/arts/books /irresistible-rise-of-the-indo-pacific /story-e6frg8nf-1226047014015.
11. Rory Medcalf,“Unselfish Giants? Understanding China and India as Security Providers”,,Vol.66,No. 5,2012,p.13.
12. Rory Medcalf, “A Term Whose Time Has Come: The Indo-Pacific”.
13. Michael Wesley, “Irresistible Rise of the Indo-Pacific”.
14. Ibid (12).
15. Hillary Clinton, “America's Pacific Century”, Foreign Policy, November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles /2011 /10 /11 /americas_pacific_century? page = full.
16. Australian Government, Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 ( Defence White Paper 2009), p.12, http://www.defence.gov.au /capability /_home /cdaf_docs /defence_white_paper_2009.pdf.
17. Australian Government, Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, October 2012, pp.74,232,http://asiancentury.dpmc.gov.au /sites /default /files /white-paper/translations/asian_century_white_paper_exec_summary_chinese.pdf.
18. Australian Government, Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, p.7, http://www.defence.gov.au /WhitePaper2013/docs /WP_2013_web.pdf.
19. “Opening Statement by Prime Minister at Plenary Session of India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit”, December 20, 2012,http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm? dtl/20981 /Opening+Statement+by+Prime+Minister+at+Plenary+Session+of+IndiaASEAN+Commemorative+Summit.
20. Chen Junfeng: “Analysis on the Asia-Pacific Concepts”,Vol. 7, 1997, p. 6.
21. Knight Frank, Citi Private Bank, “The Wealth Report 2012: A Global Perspective On Prime Property And Wealth”, February 2011, http://www.thewealthreport.net /The-Wealth-Report-2012.pdf.
22. Gareth Evans, “Global Issues of the Future: Challenges for South Asian Policymakers”, October 30, 2011,http://www.gevans.org /speeches/speech451.html.
23. Robert O.Blake Jr, “Looking East, Looking West: U.S.Support for India's Regional Leadership”, April 12, 2013, http://translationssstate.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/04 /20130415145780.html#axzz2Tifn5062.
24. Kim Beazley, “Australia in the Indo-Pacific Century”, Policy, Vol.28, No.3, Spring 2012,p.50,http://www.cis.org.au /images/stories /policy-magazine/2012-spring/28-3-12-kim-beazley.pdf.
25. A. J.Cotterell, R. M.Burrell: “The Indian Ocean: Importance in Politics, Economy and Military”, Shanghai People’s Press, p. 108.
(26) Sun Dexing, Bai Jun: “Ocean in the 21stCentury—the Indian Ocean from the Geo-strategic Perspective”, South Asia Studies, Volume 3, 2009, P. 36-37.
27. Robert D.Kaplan, “Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean”,, Vol.88, No.2, 2009, pp.19-20.
(28)Priya Chacko, “India and the Indo-Pacific: Three Approaches”, 24 Jan. 2013, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-and-the-indo-pacific/.
29.“Confluence of the Two Seas”, Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India, August 22, 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp /region /asia-paci/pmv0708 /speech-2.html.
30. Priya Chacko, “Three Countries, One Centre of Gravity”.
31. Zhou Fangying, “The Big Powers’ Strategic Adjustments in the Asia-Pacific Region and China’s Response”, Asia-Pacific Blue Book: the Asia-Pacific Development Report (2013), Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013, p.77-78.
32. Marshall M. Bouton, “U.S-India Initiative Series: America's Interests in India”, Center for a New American Security Working Paper, October 2010, p.9, http://www.cnas.org /files /documents/publications /CNAS_USInterestsinIndia_Bouton.pdf.
33. Sun Xuefeng, Huan Yuxing: “China Rise and the Evolution of the East Asia Order”,Vol.1, 2011, p. 21.
34. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, addressing the National Press Club in Washington, DC. on US-Canada Relations, 26 March, 1969, in Jutta Brunnee, “The United States and International Environmental Law: Living with an Elephant”,p.1, http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content /15 /4 /617.full.pdf.
35. Dennis Rumley, ed, “The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century”, March 2013, p.34.http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default /files /IOTF.pdf.
36. Wu Xingbuo: “The Obama Administration’s Asia Pacific Strategy”, The Asia-Pacific Blue Book: the Asia-Pacific Development Report” (2013), Social Sciences Academic Press, p. 25.
37. Joseph Yun, “The Rebalance to Asia: Why South Asia Matters (Part 1) ”, Testimony Statement Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC, February 26, 2013, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2013/02/205208/htm.
38. Marshall M.Bouton, “U.S.-India Initiative Series: America's Interests in India”.
39. Walter Lohman, “Shaping U.S.’s Future in the Indo-Pacific”,April 20, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/apr/20/lohman-shaping-uss-future-in-the-indo-pacific/?utm_source =feedburner&utm_medium=feedutm_campaign=Feed%3A+Front-TheWashingtonTimesAmericasNewspaper+%28Front+Page+-+The+Washington+Times%29.
40. Kurt M.Campbell, “Asia Overview: Protecting American Interests in China and Asia”, Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC, March 31, 2011, http://www.State.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/03/159450/htm.
41. Remarks by President Mr. Barack Obama to Members of both Houses of Parliament in the Central Hall, November 8, 2010, http: //www.mea.gov.in/incoming-visit-detail.htm? 823 /Remarks+by+President+Mr+Barack+Obama+to+Members+of+both+Houses+of+Parliament+in+the+Central+Hall.
(42)“Clinton's Speech on U.S. Agenda in Asia-Pacific Region”, 28 October, 2010, http://translations.state.gov/st/English/texttrans/2010 /10 /20101028191722su0.9814875.html#axzz2Tifn 5062.
43. Robert D.Hormats, “The New Emerging Global Economic Order: Taking the U.S.-India Example”, Agra, India, January 28, 2013, http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/203348.htm.
44. Nick Bisley and Andrew Phillips, “The Indo-Pacific: What Does It Actually Mean?”, October 6th, 2012, http://www.eastasiaforum.Org/2012/10/06/the-indo-pacific-what-does-it-actually-mean/.
45. Australian Government, “Australia in the Asian Century White Paper”, October 2012, p.74 .
(46)Ibid, (44) p.236.
47. Australian Government, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Strong and Secure A Strategy for Australia's National Security”, January 2013 , p.ii, http://www.dpmc.gov.au/national_security/docs/national_security_strategy.pdf.
48.Australian Government, Department of Defence, “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, p.34.
49. Ibid, (44) p.228.
50. Ibid, (47) p.28.
51. Nick Bisley and Andrew Phillips, “The Indo-Pacific: What Does It Actually Mean?”.
52. Ben Moles, “Australia in the ‘Asia-Pacific', ‘Asian' or ‘Indo-Pacific' Century: Great, Greater, and yet Greater-still Expectations?”, August 25, 2012, http://internationalsecuritydiscipulus.Wordpress.com/2012 /08 /25 /Australia-in-the-asia-pacific-asian-or-indo-pacific-century-great-greater-and-yet-greater-stil-expectations/.
53. Shyam Saran, “Mapping the Indo-Pacific”, The Indian Express, http://www.Indianexpress.com/news /mapping-the-indopacific/867004 /3.
54. Hillary Clinton, “Remarks on India and the United States: A Vision for the 21st Century”, July 20, 2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary /rm/2011 /07 /168840.htm.
55. Priya Chacko, “India and the Indo-Pacific: Three Approaches”, Jan. 24, 2013, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/india-and-the-indo-pacific/.
56. Vikash Yadav, “The Indo-Pacific”, Nov. 30, 2011, http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/2011/11 /indo-pacific-html.
57. Ibid (56).
58. The White House, “National Security Strategy”, May 2010, pp.4-44, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
59. Prime Minister's address to Japan-India Association, Japan-India Parliamentary Friendship League and International Friendship Exchange Council, May 28, 2013, http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm/dtl/2175.
60. Pratyush, “India's Pivot to Asia’”,, June 4, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/the-pulse/.
61. Ibid (56).
62. http://news.Cnpc.com.cn /system/2013 /02 /05 /001412134.shtml.
63. Robert D.Kaplan, “China's Two-Ocean Strategy”, in Abraham Denmark and Nirav Pate, eds, China's Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship, September 2009, p.49, http://www.cnas.org /files /documents /publications /CNAS % 20 China's %20Arrival_Final %20Report.pdf.
64. Nirav Patel, “The Strategic Environment of US-Sino Relations”, in Abraham Denmark and Nirav Pate, eds., China's Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship, September 2009, p.13, http://www.cnas.org /files /documents /publications /CNAS%20China's %20 Arrival_Final%20Report.pdf.
65. Rory Medcalf, “Straightening the Straits”, http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx? 284514.
66. Dennis Rumley, ed., “The Indian Ocean Region: Security, Stability and Sustainability in the 21st Century”, Report of the Australia India Institute Task Force on Indian Ocean Security, March 2013, p.13, http://www.aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/IOTF.pdf.
67. “India Has to Accept China's Presence in ‘Exclusive' Areas: Salman Khurshid”, The Times of India, December 10, 2012, http://Timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-has-to-accept-Chinas-presence-in-exclusive-areas-Salman-Khurshid /articleshow/17562035.cms.
68. C. Raja Mohan,“India And Australia: Maritime Partners in The Indo-Pacific”,The Asia Link Essays,Vol.3,No.6,November 2011,p.2.
69. Hillary Clinton,“America's Pacific Century”,,November 2011,http: / /www.foreignpolicy.com/articles /2011/10 /11 /americas_pacific_century? p. = full.