By Wang Lianhe

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Understanding of the U.S. Asia-Pacific Security Strategy: From the "Convergent Security" Perspective

By Wang Lianhe

Institute of International Relations and Diplomacy,Shanghai International Studies University

The foreign policy’s most attraction of the Obama Administration's first term is its focus on the Asia-Pacific region and strategic planning. Modifying the Bush Administration’s style, the Obama Administration high officials, once in office, frequently pay high-profile visits to Asia, attend high-level annual meetings, and on various diplomatic occasions repeatedly stress that the United States is a nation of the Pacific, and political and economic development of the Asia-Pacific region is vital to the U.S. national interests. While showing policy posture different with the past, the Obama Administration also has made significant adjustment and transformation of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy, launched the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy" (also known as the "pivot to Asia-Pacific strategy"), such as strengthening military allied relationship with the Asia-Pacific countries, stationing troops in the Australian Northern garrison, planning multilateral strategic and economic cooperation. The motivation and pragmatic effects of introducing the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy has caused extensive discussions and controversies inside and outside the United States. Before the debate voices die down, in the past year, the United States began a more comprehensive exposition of the Obama Administration's Asia-Pacific policy.1During the 2012 presidential campaign, how to use the U.S. power and the influence in the Asia-Pacific region also became a focus of debate. Then, how will Obama in his second term implement or adjust the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy? With what kind of policy will the United States respond to the changing regional power structure, especially a rising China? Are most Asian countries governments ready as the past four years to give a long-term support to the U.S. more active role played in the Asia-Pacific region? This paper, based on studies of the background, content, characteristics, influence and future direction of the current U.S. Asia-Pacific layout, concludes that the Obama Administration, based on summarizing and evaluating its first term "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy, will mostly engrave the Asia-Pacific strategy with the "convergent security" characteristics in the second term in order to ensure the U.S. interests and the influence in Asia-Pacific. "The convergent security" strategy is not only the continuation of the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy, but also its optimization and upgrading, the purpose of which is to build as Obama calls "a more effective Asian framework beyond bilateral agreements, the occasional summit and ad hoc arrangements".2

Part I. Reality and Theoretical Background of the "Convergent Security" Strategy

Compared to impressive introduction of the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy or "pivot to Asia-Pacific" strategy, the "convergent security" strategy has a similar but more complex background. The importance of the Asia-Pacific region for American economic, political and security interests as in the past constitutes the strategic paradigm for the U.S. high-level decision-making thinking. From the economic perspective, the Asia-Pacific region has already been a key destination for the U.S. export strategy. In 2012, six of U.S. top 15 export markets is located in the southwestern Pacific region, exports of goods only to the six economies reached US$322.2 billion, accounting for 20.7% for its total exports of goods.3In the present situation of U.S. weak economic recovery and growth, the vigorously developing market in the Asia-Pacific region will help expand the U.S. exports, maintain and create high-quality employment opportunities inside the United States, so as to inject new power into the U.S. economic recovery and development.4From the perspective of politics and security, construction and cultivation of the Asia-Pacific regional alliance system is the cornerstone of the U.S. Asia or even global strategy, especially at the time when the current power balance in this region is undergoing structural changes, various security problems are not subtractive and the U.S. traditional dominant position faces greater uncertainty. Regarding this, U.S. former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a pointed comment that the Asia-Pacific region is the center of world strategy and economy in the 21stcentury. As a Pacific nation and a resident diplomatic, military and economic power, the United States is playing a core role in the trans-Pacific system. The 21stcentury will be the U.S. Pacific century. In the next few decades, the U.S. most important task is to greatly increase in the Asia-Pacific region the diplomatic, economic and strategic inputs.5In the mean time, the Asia-Pacific region has increasingly shown new capabilities of development orientation for institutionalized areas and international order, and frequent building of the regional mechanisms is bound to exert an impact on the future structuring of an overall international order. As a resident Pacific power, Washington could not afford to pay the cost of marginalizing Asia. The introduction of the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy, based on profound cognition of the region's importance, aims to reaffirm and strengthen the U.S. interests and the dominant position in the region, and balance China’s rising influence. However, the strategy has only defined the policy goals and shown the determination, but is lack of clear and specific means of implementing it. In Obama's first term, "the Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy did not only fail to completely reverse the U.S. disadvantages in Asia as expected by the U.S. political elite, but on the contrary caused the Chinese uneasiness and suspicion, deepened the existing strategic distrust between China and the United States, and the U.S. domestic questioning became increasingly strong, thus, facing necessity of further adjustment and correction. In the past ten years, China, in the process of regional cooperation, greatly enhanced its own influence, and expanded the opportunities for countries in the region to chooseAccompanied with development of China is the declining U.S. commitment and role in the Asia-Pacific region. Stimulated by the declining domestic economy, many Asian countries condemned Washington as the arch-criminal of the global financial crisis in 2008, and began questioning the U.S. motivation, institution and U.S. leaders credit in economic development. In 2011 during the Seoul G-20 Summit, Obama found himself on the defensive throughout the meeting. One of the important reasons is that many of the participating countries nearly disagree with the U.S. proposal for getting the global economy out of mud-pit, they would rather believe that the United States just seeks its own selfish economic interests, not for the sake of developing the global economy.6In this case, if the Obama Administration would like to integrate once again the leadership posture into the Asia-Pacific economic reorganizing process, it must introduce more positive and more constructive policy.

From the domestic political aspect, the U.S. domestic financial situation imposes a request on readjustment of its Asia-Pacific strategy. In order to maintain the war on terror across the globe, the U.S. defense spending compared to the basic budget increased by nearly 100% in the past ten years, excluding the wars supplemental appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan, therefore, the U.S. financial deficits and government debt rise to astronomical heights. In the words of former Defense Secretary R. Gates, the U.S. military spending grows like spurt, but Washington is still unable to consolidate its leading position by expanding military spending.7.In the face of long-term domestic political pressure on keeping a balanced budget, cutting the deficit, capping the debt with a ceiling, the Obama Administration has to make a new strategic adjustment, and vigorously seeks to fine-tune the military spending valve, and promises to its Asian allies that although the Chinese military spending continuously grows, and weapon systems and military theory constantly get updated,8yet, the United States will not compromise its commitments to Asia because of financial reasons, and will continue to maintain or even strengthen its role of the primary provider for regional security.

The evolution and development of the Asia-Pacific regional structure and the U.S. domestic political and economic needs set a realistic background for the transformation of U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy in the next few years. To respond to the pressure of continuous evolving regional situation and highlight geo-political importance of Asia-Pacific for the U.S. interests, from Hilary Clinton to John Kerrey, the two Secretaries of State are continuously committed to strengthening the U.S. relations with Asian security allies, to promote the implementation and adjustment of the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy.9However, a close look at four-year changes of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy, it can be found that it is inadequate just to use the realistic background to explain the reasons. In fact, the reason that the U.S. Asia-Pacific alliance system is recognized as an important strategic asset to maintain the U.S. dominance and leadership for ever in the regional process of changing balance of power is that it theoretically mirrors the dual needs of continuity and adjustment of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy

From the perspective of realist theory, the main purpose of the regional alliance policy is to maintain power balance. Therefore, in the realist view, the main purpose of the U.S. bilateral alliance in the Asia Pacific region should be used to prevent any regional major power from gaining the influence and status equal with the United States or even dominating the region. In the face of changing regional balance of power due to rising China, the United States finds it fully justified to balance the upgrading Chinese strength by continuously strengthening its bilateral alliance system with the traditional regional allies. This theory will also view the regional security threats, such as the existing DPR Korea's nuclear program, as the theoretical basis of maintaining the U.S.-Japan and the U.S.-ROK bilateral alliance deterrent.10From a Liberal perspective, the U.S. bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region is the U.S. special kind of security assets. Even in case of a major threat no longer in existence, needs brought forward by the assets such as the military economic interests, the alliance joint command and joint training and even factor such as the common interests groups derived from the U.S. military bases in the region will also support the continuous existence of the security alliance. From the perspective of structurism, long-term socialized results of bilateral alliances between the United States and Asia-Pacific countries are narrowing cultural and social gaps and shaping common identity, and gradually producing common culture foundation in-depth. For example, the identity between "us" and "them" is a major factor for the continuity of the U.S.-Australia alliance -- the two countries belong to English speaking countries with Anglo-Saxon race as the main composition, and have common or similar values and political traditions. In spite of offering different policy options, these three theories try to reach the same goal in the process of choosing the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy. For more than half a century, the U.S. dominance and reliance on allies have made the U.S. Asia-Pacific alliance system a path option for Asia-Pacific policy framework by the previous U.S. administrations. However, various developments in the Asia-Pacific region indicate that the above three theories are unable to cover realistic pragmatic environment of the U.S. Asia-Pacific security system.

It is evident whether it is from the realistic background or from the theoretical angles, the role and significance of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy and important organizational foundation – the bilateral security alliance system -- face needs of further changes and adjustments for Asia-Pacific security order. A strategy combining a variety of theoretical essence and in response to the changing U.S. regional security interests in the real world is taking shape. In the second term of the Obama Administration, the objectives and means of the strategy get more explicit and detailed: it not only helps to reverse the declining U.S. tendency and to safeguard the U.S. regional leading role, but should also take into account the financial situation of the U.S. overall military spending contraction, and even also touch on the way each ally’s response to this strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, i. e, they are trying to avoid the dilemma of having to choose between Washington and Beijing. In addition, this strategy must be conducive to the fusion of the U.S. bipartisan main characteristics, and can also serve the U.S. short-term and long-term security interests. From the theoretical perspective, it integrates the realism and liberalism on how to protect the U.S. security, showing strong characteristics of pragmatism. This strategy is the "convergent security" strategy studied by this article.11

Part Two. The Contents and Characteristics Of the "Convergent Security" Strategy

The "convergent security" strategy has further reshaped and improved "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy. Although this strategy is still in the process of shaping, its core elements are clear. It not only keeps the strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific region, but also desalinates the bilateral military alliance factors and security threats elements, and pays more attention to institutions building and the multilateral cooperation. In order to highlight the U.S. regional responsibility, this strategy tries to plan the Asia-Pacific regional security structure from the perspective of relatively fewer "threat centers" and will inject more flexible multilateral actions into the regional security and political relations. In short, as the main form of the current U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy, the "convergent security" strategy, based on theoretically taking stocks of the U.S. regional strategic assets, and matching and balancing the target and method, and through aggregating existential regional security alliances, and combining with bilateral and multilateral partnerships, dilute the specific security threat targets, and seek relatively smaller strategic investment to obtain longer-term strategic benefits.

Engagement and dialogue are the general principles of the "convergent security" strategy. The Obama Administration in its firstreport, based on limited understanding of the U.S. ability, states to maintain its positive posture in the global scope by "engagement" method, and makes it clear that United States will lead more and more multilateral mechanisms to realize the goal. The word "engagement" is much more frequently used than the famous "tegy of" by the Clinton Administration.12While, the Obama Administration is committed to acting in the U.S. "modest" national identity, and stresses the importance of building double track dialogues with those regional partners, including "engagement" with those governments not to the U.S. cup of tee. Just as Hillary Clinton argued that listening is as important as speaking. The priority diplomatic mission of the U.S. Government is beyond the absolute hard power, and committed to "neither impulsive-oriented nor ideology-oriented" foreign policy.13Therefore, the United States is actively engaged with Indonesia, a country with the world's biggest Muslim population, lays more emphasis on ASEAN and its led-multilateral mechanism, and repeatedly states that it does not rule out the possibility of having dialogue with DPR Korea. Policy statements and policy actions of Obama’s first term make preparations for implementing "convergent security" strategy. In Obama's second term, the United States shows more active attitude on seeking engagement and dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region. Expounding the U.S. Asia-Pacific policy, Secretary of State Kerrey explains that on the occasion that some Americans want to return from overseas engagement, but absolutely nothing is more important than (we) working together to respond to a series of challenges across the globe.14While, new Secretary of Defense C. Hagel defines the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy as follows, the U.S. "rebalancing" strategy is a major diplomatic, economic and cultural strategy, Washington substantially increases diplomatic and development assistance in Asia. Therefore, the U.S. "DoD does not lead implementation of the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy, and the military must always play a secondary role, but not the leading role" in the U.S. foreign policy.15From the perspective of the Sino-U.S. relations, high-level exchanges between the two countries in Obama’s first term became more frequent and fruitful, and military to military relations also made some progress. Since mid-March 2013American several high-level officials’ consecutive visits to China fully embody a intention of Obama’s new team to further acquire in-depth understanding of China’s new leadership and seek sound working relationship at the top level. Particularly attractive is President Obama rearranged the established schedule, and invited President Xi Jinping to visit the United States in June 2013, so the summit was held three months ahead of schedule. The two heads of state shared in-depth and candid exchanges on issues such as the Asia-Pacific situation, the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, cyber network security, military to military relations, climate change, economic relations, intellectual property rights, exchange rate, and human rights, and reached important consensus, thus, laying a good foundation for building new-type major powers relations between China and the United States.

The regional security structure currently existing in the Asia-Pacific is established on the basis of the post-WWII San Francisco "", and is a complex network system, centered on the United States, and woven and supported by bilateral relations between the United States and a series of Asia-Pacific countries. These U.S. traditional Asia-Pacific bilateral security arrangements are the well-known hub-spoke system, and is still the pillar for regional security. However, the alliance system must adapt to the increasingly changing balance of power situation within the region, and the bilateral alliance exclusiveness is fading. In this regard, Assistant Secretary of State K. Campbell, for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, explains that the new generation of Asian strategists is challenging the inherent link between the United States and the bilateral alliance system, they no longer look at Asia from the Western alliance perspective of either black or white. Asian countries are increasingly devoted to promoting a multilateral regional order with stability and open markets. If in the following four to eight years American policymakers focus only on maintaining and strengthening the traditional bilateral alliances, so they will endanger the U.S. credibility and strategic influence.16Therefore, to seek a kind of cognate balance between bilateral approach and multilateral approach in the Asia-Pacific region has become a major feature of the current U.S. Asia- Pacific strategy. The United States expects its allies and security partners to establish more multilateral contacts, and not just limited to the hub-spoke arrangements. This does not mean weakening the U.S. Asia-Pacific bilateral ties, but strengthens security in the Asia Pacific region by developing multilateral cooperation beyond bilateral ties.

The bilateral approach and multilateral approach embodied in two aspects: (1) Carry out mini-multilateral defense cooperation through building allies ability and fostering links between allies. Former Defense Secretary Gates first expounded a policy idea of supporting, encouraging and improving the partners ability, including training and arming the U.S. allies, so at the time of ending its military spending blowout, it can also maintain and improve regional and global security program.17Take relations between South Korea and Australia as an example, by the U.S. encouragement, economic and defense links between South Korea and Australia become increasingly close. Defense secretaries of the two countries hold regular meetings, decide occasionally carry out joint military exercises, and are committed to improving regional and global security cooperation. Similarly, the relations between Japan and Australia develops very fast, the two countries, with already signed "", to jointly plan and expand bilateral long-term cooperation in defense field. More notably, the United States constantly pushes bilateral alliance to carry out mini-multilateral activities, such as formation of the U.S.-Japan-Australian trilateral security dialogue, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea coordination and the U.S.-Japan-India dialogue mechanism. In this mini-multilateral cooperation mechanism, the three parties conduct communication and coordination at policy level on issues of common concern such as the U.S.-Japan-Australian on traditional political security issues of general nature, the U.S.-Japan--South Korean on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, the U.S.-Japan-India on international lane security issue through Indian Ocean via the Malacca Strait until the South China Sea, and correspondingly implement a series of trilateral actions. With flexible arrangements of mini-multilateral cooperation, the United States not only maintains initiatives of its diplomatic strategy and regional leadership position, but also helps solve practical problems through efficient collective actions.18As medium-sized powers in the Asia-Pacific region seek to play a greater role, the two sides other than the U.S. side among these trilateral mechanisms have common interests on the trilateral dialogue, and view the trilateral cooperation with the United States as the response approach to the U.S. requests on more responsibility sharing and partner's ability building.

(2) Structure links between allies and partners.

The "convergent security" strategy facilitates the U.S. Asian alliance system transform towards a more complex and more inclusive defense network, covering allied countries, security partners and even potential adversaries. Under the U.S. go-between, more and more countries involved in annual Pacific Rim military drills as participant and observer countries, even China, Russian and Mongolia have or will join some items of the exercise. Similarly, since the "Cobra Gold" annual military exercise was held first in 1982 with unceasingly expanding scale and scope, it has developed into the biggest multilateral military exercises in Asia-Pacific region from the initial U.S.-Thailand bilateral joint exercises, participating countries reached 15 to 20, and China, Russia and Burma were present as observers in 2013 exercise. Meanwhile, China-U.S. military exchanges have gradually made progress. According to the plan, the U.S. Pacific Command this year has about 40 exchange programs with China, including military medical exchanges, joint maritime search and rescue exercise plan, etc. Australia and China are now discussing to increase joint exercise held before.19China-U.S. in-depth military to military dialogue is extremely important for establishing a new-type relationship between a defending power and a rising power, and eliminating root-causes of insecurity and potential competition existing between the two countries.20

In line of its scale, these joint exercises create more and more security concerns, for example, developing joint security cooperation in personnel training, anti-terrorism, live fire training, amphibious warfare, regional peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance in order to create a regional-global hub for military deployment. In Obama’s second term, accelerated development of these multilateral exercises and military cooperation projects not only enhance the U.S. military capabilities and its allies to respond to a wider range of security challenges, but also promote consensus for the allies within the hub-spokes system and other regional security partners to build security structure, thus, becoming a milepost for the U.S. Pacific alliance framework development. For instance, Australia, South Korea, and Thailand have established independent security relations with China, and at the same time maintained key security ties with the United States. This expanded connotation of security relationship is different from the traditional hub-spokes model, and waters down the estate color of U.S. power in the Asia-Pacific alliance politics.

Although any adjustment of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy cannot ignore the fundamental role of the existential bilateral security alliance, yet, the U.S. policy makers have recognized that in the increasingly complex and changing regional security environment, to achieve its strategic objectives, the United State must pay greater strategic cost, accept potential security alliance partners, and make major improvements for the bilateral alliance system so as to structure a new security framework to respond to traditional and non-traditional security threats. To this end, Washington, with two aspects advantages of bilateralism and multilateralism, emphasis on capacity building and partnership cultivating, has developed a number of mini-multilateral structures in the Asia-Pacific region, thus, shaping a complex mixture of security arrangements dominated by the major powers and relatively smaller regional partners. This bilateralism+multilateralism security structure abandons the democratic alliance strategy doctrine of the U.S. Asian Alliance System upheld by G. John Ikenberry, but partially adopts the minimum, selective and "menu style" multilateralism by Richard N. Haass.21

22Common threats have ceased to exist, even non-traditional threat such as international terrorism is not a security issue concerned by all regional countries. The "convergent security" strategy certainly in no way can take "China threat" as the convergent basis to re-establish the U.S. leadership on security issues. Therefore, this strategy is gradually removing the obvious containment factors, and will associate more security with regional order-building. On the South China Sea disputes, Kerry expresses the U.S. concerns to reached "a clear-cut Code of Conduct in the South China Sea" to prevent escalation of tension from leading to poor communication and producing mis-judgements.23Even on some traditional and sensitive security issues, the United States also stresses the importance of multilateral joint solution and institutionalized crisis management. For example, on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, the United States comparatively pays more attention to the role of the Six-Party Talks mechanism and its relevance with the U.S. security interests, and also tries to "find a diplomatic means to persuade North Korea to comply with international norms".24Of course, Washington is more willing to obtain the future U.S. initiative in building a regional multilateral system by supporting development of the regional multilateral mechanism of its choice.

Concretely, the "order-centered" "convergent security" approach has two aspects. ⑴ Pay more attention to regional multilateral mechanisms. During the Bush Administration, the United States, by strengthening the traditional bilateral security arrangements and alliances system to pursue and implement regional strategy, placed the focus of defense-security relationship in the Asia-Pacific region above the Washington-centered multi-national doctrine, while little progress was made in building an effective multilateral mechanism.25However, the profound geopolitical changes and several key-regional actors appeared in this region, which imposed challenges to the U.S. traditional Asia-Pacific strategy. In response to the Asia-Pacific complex and changing security environment, the United States must reach consensus on the practical rules through bilateral consultations and equal voices of various parties in multilateral institutions and forums like ASEAN, East Asia Summit, APEC, etc. all provide an important mechanism framework, and are favorable for creatively solving international problems. Thus, in the Obama Administration, the United States begins supporting the Asia-Pacific multilateral mechanisms development such as the East Asia Summit.26In July 2009, the United States signed the, formally joined the East Asia Summit the following year, and also played the key role in amending the ADMM-PLus agenda. Meanwhile, the United States builds and strengthens new mini-multilateral cooperation mechanisms such as the U.S.-Japan-Australia, the U.S.-Japan-ROK, and the U.S.-Japan-India trilateral dialogues, as well as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), etc.. It is true that Washington takes a more active stance posture towards Asia-Pacific regional multilateral mechanisms, but it uses different strategies to differential cases to promote development of multilateral arrangements for specific agenda. For example, it takes negotiating the TPP as a main approach to expand U.S. strategic economic interests and encourages the East Asia Summit to become the premier forum for dealing with Asian political and security issues. In comparison, the Obama Administration's second term is still cautious and selective to support multilateral mechanism, and is devoted to promoting development of allies multilateral defense ties.

(2) Equal stress on partner-oriented and problem-oriented approaches. The so-called partner-oriented approach refers to with whom the United States works together rather than for what purpose to work; while the so-called problem-oriented approach emphasizes that different partnerships are determined by the existing problems to be solved, and their choice of partners depends on to what extent it can help solve a specific problem. In a partnership-oriented approach, a collective action is more driven by "threat centric" and ideological considerations, it seeks links between Asia-Pacific democratic countries based on similar thinking with the help of existing bilateral alliance with other democratic countries in the region to promote comprehensive security arrangements.27For example, in 2007, the U.S.-Australia, and U.S.-Japan alliances plus India, the four countries proposed establishment of a multilateral regional group to balance so-called those "non-democratic forces" in the region, not named but clear though. However, with new leaders coming to power in these countries, this democratic alliance strategy shows too much aggressiveness but nothing useful for the Asia-Pacific security environment, thus, losing the political feasibility and policies operability.

On the contrary, a problem-oriented approach will help the United States to work with a number of countries that are able to alleviate the security challenges and to negotiate to find effective solutions. Diplomatic, economic and security challenges, climate change, energy security, and other stern transnational issues attract more attention from the regional countries and the United States than ever before and requires Washington to enhance participation in problem-oriented cooperation mini-multilaterally or multilaterally.28So while strengthening relations with traditional allies, the Obama Administration seeks to develop deeper partnerships with problem-oriented emerging countries such as China, India, Indonesia and others. These issues are essential for the interests of the United States and the Asia-Pacific region, and these challenges cannot be addressed without China's participation, without an extensive, effective and constructive China-U.S. relations. Therefore, the United States and other Asia-Pacific countries must build new partnerships, and alliances based on common interests in order to ensure a future peace and prosperity in the region.29

Offshore balancing is a major branch of realist strategy, originally developed by C. Layne, and later expanded by J. J. Mearsheimer and S. M. Walt, and is often applied to discussions on how to deal with Asia-Pacific security issues.30This theory holds that, as the economic leader and the super power paying tremendous geopolitical costs, the United States can stay out of the competition for global hegemony, and watch from a distance other contenders to consume each other by competing for dominance in Asia and the world, meanwhile play a balancing role, and choose an opportunity to bet to ensure the U.S. security and hegemony. During most of the time after the cold war, Washington with the offshore balancer posture presents itself in the multi-polarised regional balance of power, and "monitors" developments of the situation and evolution of the power pattern. However, as the "Asian inherent" importance on the U.S. economic, political, security interests has become increasingly prominent, Washington must also "unanimously" and actively respond to the changing regional situation,31so the possibility of real involvement as complementarity to offshore balancing and last means of support are increasingly clearly demonstrated. Hagel clearly stated at June 2013 "Shangri-La Dialogue" that the U.S. military deployment in the Asia-Pacific region is not affected by the impact of military spending cuts, Washington maintains the plan on deploying 60% of the naval warships in the Pacific by 2020 and already has 60% of overseas-based air forces deployed to the Pacific. The United States will input more air power, ground forces and high-tech weapons in the Asia-Pacific region in the future.32At present, the United States, on the one hand, withdraws the troops stationed in Japan from the first island chain, and increases the possibility of de facto involvement in the Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea disputes.The U.S. naval and air forces occasionally show off power or hold military exercises, or carry out close reconnaissance in the waters surrounding China. Its purpose is, through the offshore balancing role and displaying the U.S. ability and willingness as a credible security partner, to address the security concerns of its allies. Whether this approach can achieve multilateral stability, or will eventually lead to the geopolitical alliances and deteriorating security dilemma, and how the United States can properly coordinate between the offshore balancing and the real involvement remains to be seen.

Finally, it is worth noting that the "convergent security" strategy emphasizes "smart power," i.e. combining diplomatic, political, economic, military, law and culture factors together to promote the implementation of foreign policy.33Since having revised its soft power theory in 2006, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. pointed out that neither hard power nor soft power should be solely relied, but should be combined to shape "smart power". Then the Obama Administration's diplomatic security team repeatedly reiterates on different occasions that the United States should implement a foreign policy that can flexibly use various forces and combine various resources. This of course does not mean that the military option is excluded from the "toolbox" for promoting national interests, but this is really the most proper option for the United States in the absence of sufficient material resources, and in difficulties to prevent all regional countries from stern security threats. So in Obama second term, "smart power" will continue to lead the "convergent security" strategy thinking.

In short, the "convergent security" strategy is a complex strategy, born from the multilateral security order assumption by liberal institutionalism, but not giving up the realist theory of checks and balances and constructivist essence. It, through pooling together the U.S. various strategic resources and using various strategic means, promotes the U.S. strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific region by joint efforts rather than going it alone. The starting point of the strategy is to try to spend the least strategic costs to ensure the U.S. dominant position in the Asia-Pacific region through integrating diverse demands of the regional countries, re-emphasis on the political and cultural influence ignored by the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy, relying on the U.S. Asia-Pacific bilateral alliance system inherited from the history, and being committed to introducing complementary multilateral security framework into this system. In the words of Donilon, former National Security Adviser, that the "convergent security" strategy can be summed up as a comprehensive and multi-dimensional strategy being implemented by the United States, and It's not just the matter of maintaining the U.S. military presence, but an effort to take advantage of all elements of U.S. power. It is dedicated to strengthening the alliance ties, deepening partnerships with emerging countries, building a constructive relationship with China, strengthening the role of regional mechanisms and helping build an inclusive universal regional economic structure, thus, contributing to peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.34

Part three. Impacts of the "Convergent Security" Strategy

In the evolving Asia-Pacific security environment, the impacts that are or will be produced by the "convergent security" strategy are mainly reflected in the changing U.S. Asia-Pacific alliance system and the future Asian security structure. The U.S. Asia-Pacific bilateral alliance system still has the existence reality and theoretical significance. However, how to more effectively respond to regional security threats without giving up the benefits of the bilateral security alliance has become the main topic of the Obama Administration's second-term Asia-Pacific agenda. In order to satisfy the interests of the small and medium-sized allies in the deepening interdependence of Asia-Pacific security environment, the "convergent security" strategy relaxes traditional dependence of Asian allies on the United States, and provides them the opportunity to develop relationships with other countries. The U.S. Asia-Pacific alliance system is obviously shifting from an exclusive hub-spokes arrangement into a more dynamic alliance system with dual values, so every ally will exert an increasingly significant impact on other countries, and not just relies on support of the U.S. power. In the overall framework of such alliance system, and a closer and more effective cooperation between "spokes" will be shaped. Meanwhile, the United States will continue to lead the future security partners alliance with more confidence and supportive role. Such a partnerships system can nurture a comprehensive cooperative spirit transcending past differences, without compromising the integrity of the existing security structure. The development of a series of major regional issues such as the evolving DPR Korea nuclear issue, and the strengthening ASEAN autonomy requires the United States to enhance the shared interests and values among its Asia-Pacific allies, promotes the alliance network shifting from an exclusive bilateral structure into an inclusive structure more and more based on institutions and consensus building. In this changing framework, although bilateral alliance continues to play a key role, such as frequent interaction in annual consultations with its allies, the U.S. military continues to participate in allies’ military exercises and other traditional defense actions, has intelligence exchange with allies and so on, but its relationship with allies will be more equal, less hierarchical. It is a sound start for the security cooperation program of the U.S. Pacific Command moving in this direction.35

In shaping the future Asian security structure, an important regional impact of the "convergent security" strategy is, through a historic shift, moving from a "threat center"-oriented alliance to a new joint group playing a role in building regional security structure and order, with the U.S. Asia-Pacific allies becoming more autonomous and in the whole region having interactions with different security actors. This does not mean that they intend to end the bilateral alliance with the United States, but strongly urge the traditional bilateral security alliance to become more flexible and multi-faceted, not necessarily always in the presence of containment or threats.

This structural change from the hub-spokes system to the "convergent security" strategy, by building and strengthening identity between different allies, plays down the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific security hard power factors, and highlights the smart power role in regional security order. Required to respond adequately to the rapidly changing situation in the Asia-Pacific region with relatively limited military resources, the U.S. inherent Asia-Pacific alliance system has to develop into a potential tool for building a more dynamic regional security structure. In such a regional structure, not only capacity of weaker allies in the asymmetric bilateral alliance is improved, and the existing traditional basis of the Asia-Pacific alliance exclusive politics will get weakened, because regional interrelated hot spots issues and different policies adopted by allies to deal with potential crisis make the exclusive alliance unable to respond effectively. In the Asia-Pacific region, the bilateral alliance is still a major security organization and conducts carrier, but in order to stabilize the region, the United States will become more accustomed to the use of the "convergent security" strategy, and give the interdependent multilateral approach a proper status and role. With commencement of the "convergent security" strategy, the regional security structure will shift from focus on bilateral patterns to more concerns with multilateral arrangements. In the future, the key matter of this restructuring process is whether it will result in the regional peace and multilateral community-building,

Conclusion

Comprehensive development and implementation of the "convergent security" strategy faces a number of challenges. Interactions between the U.S. domestic political and economic situation, rapidly evolving Asia-Pacific situation, and the Sino-U.S. relations pattern roughly demarcate boundaries for the strategic vision and policy practice of this strategy. In view of the U.S. global strategic deployment, outside world has no way to know whether the current turmoil in the Middle East and Northern Africa region will affect, to some extent, its Asia-Pacific strategic layout. In the future, bilateralism will continue to lead the U.S. alliance security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, the connotation and the main features of the "convergent security" strategy are clearly outlined. It intends not only to repair and enrich the core values of hub-spokes system, and will inevitably lead to innovative changes in bilateral relations between the United States and its allies, so as to shape the Asia-Pacific security structure based on interconnection and coordination between its allies and partners.36It is expected that in the future the United States will continue to maintain an offensive posture in the Asia-Pacific region, but will use more multilateral arrangements, moderate approaches and non-military induction, such as continuing to promote a higher level alliance burden-sharing, strengthening and broadening defense links between "spokes", building various mini-multilateral security mechanisms, shaping extensive and in-depth partnerships, and other strategic arrangements, etc., which will become the basic performance for Asia-Pacific "convergent security" strategy.

1. “Beijing’s Brand Ambassador, A conversation with Cui Tiankai, May 16, 2013, Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/ beijings- brand-ambassador? page=show.

2. Barack Obama, “Renewing American Leadership,”vol.86，No.4（July/August 2007,）p.12.

3. The United States Census Bureau, “Top Trading Partners-Total Trade，Exports, Imports, “ Year-to-date December 2012, Available at: http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1212yr.html.

4.USTR, “Trans-Pacific-Partnership-Announcement,” Availablepress-office/press-release/2009/december/ trans-pacific-partnership-announcement.

5. Hillary Rodham Clinton，“America’s Pacific Century,” November 10, 2011, Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/11176999.htm.

6. Sewell Chan, Sheryl Gay Stolberg and David E. Sanger, “Obama’s Trade Strategy Runs into Stiff Resistance,”, November 11, 2010.

7. Robert M. Gates, “Remarks in Eisenhower Library (Defense spending),”Abilene, KS. May 8, 2010, Available at: http://www.defense.gov/speeches.aspx?speechid=1467.

8. According to SIPRI estimate, Chinese military spending will overtake that of the United States in 2035 in line with the current growth momentum. See “China’s Military Rise: The Dragon’s New Teeth,”, April 7, 2012, p.27.

9 Hillary Rodham Clinton，”Remarks with Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone,” Tokyo, Japan, February 17, 2009, Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/117465.htm.; John Kerry, Remarks on 21stCentury Pacific Partnership, Tokyo, Japan, April 15, 2013, Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/04/207487.htm. ;

10. Victor Cha, “Values after Victory: the Future of U.S.-Japan-Korean Relations,” PacNet, No. 30, August 2, 2002.

11. Convergent Security is not born in the international political science, but originally refers to a mode of reducing costs, raising efficiency or better utilizing the technical investment. According to definition of William T. Tow, an Australian scholar who first came up with the idea of Convergent Security. Convergent Security refers to a strategy to respond to changing regional security system, and to pushing transformation of a regional security system based on exclusive bilateral security arrangements to combined bilateral and multilateral security structure arrangements. See William T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Security Relations: Seeking Convergent Security (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2002), William T. Tow and Amitav Acharya, Obstinate or Obsolete, The US Alliance Structure in Asia-Pacific, p32. However, on the above-mentioned, the author extends and expands the thinking of Convergent Security.

12. Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy,” Washington, D.C., May 2010. Obama uses engage/engagement for 61 times in his report, much more than 20 times used by President Clinton in his report.

13. Hillary Rodham Clinton，”O(jiān)verview of Trip to Asia, Tokyo, Japan,” February 15, 2009, Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/117345.htm.; Hillary Rodham Clinton，U.S.-Asia Relations: Indispensable to Our Future,，New York, February 13, 2009, Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/117333.htm.

14. John Kerry, “John Kerry on Forging a Pacific Future,”O(jiān)ctober 18, 2013.

15. Chuck Hagel, Speech in International Institute for Strategic Studies (Shangri-La Dialogue), Singapore, June 1, 2012, Available at: http://www.defense.gov/speeches.aspx?speechid=1785；Chuck Hagel, Speech in CSIS Global Security Forum, Washington, D.C. November 5, 2013, Available at: http://www.defense.gov/speeches.aspx?speechid=1814.

16 .Kurt M. Campbell, Nirav Patel and Vikram Singh, “The Power of Balance: America in Asia,” Washington D.C.; Center for a New American Security, June 2008, p.72.

17 .Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defending Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,”Vol. 89, No.3 (May/June2010)，pp.2-6.

18. Zhang Yong，”The Obama Administration’s Asia-Pacific Diplomacy, “, No.2, 2012, p.67,p.77.

19. Peter Epps, “Analysis: From Opera to Exercises, U.S. and China Deepen Military Ties,” Reuters， May 22，2012，Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/20134/05/22/ us-usa-china-military-analysis-idUS-BRE94LOX920130522.

20.Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,”, New York, March 11, 2013, Available at http://www. Whitehopuse.gov/the –press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-doniln –national-security-adviseory-president- united-states-a.

21.William T. Tow, “Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security,” pp.186-187.

22. William T. Tow and Beverley Loke, “Rules of Engagement: America’s Asia-Pacific Security Policy under an Obama Administration,”, Vol.63, No.4, December 2009, p.444.

23. John Kerry, “John Kerry on Forging a Pacific Future.”

24 Ibid.

25. Multi-nationalism is different with multilateralism, the former is centered on and led by the United States. See William T. Tow and Beverley Loke, “Rules of Engagement: America’s Asia-Pacific Security Policy under an Obama Administration.”

26. John Kerry,” Remarks at the 21stCentury Pacific Partnership.”

27.Tobias Samuel Harris, “A Problem-oriented or Partner-oriented US Asia Policy,”June 2008, Available at http://www. observingjapan.com/2008/06/problem-oriented- -or-partner-oriented-us.html.

28.Choi Kang, “A Changing East Asia and U.S. Foreign Policy,” May 2012, Available at http://www.cfr.org/ south-korea-changing-east-asia-us-foreign-policy/p28385.

29. Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,” Chuck Hagel, “Speech in International Institute for Strategic Studies (Shangri-La Dialogue).”

30.Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America Future Grand Strategy,”Vol. 22, No.1 (Summer 1997), pp-86-124, John J. Mearsheimer, “Pull Those Boots off the Ground,”, December 30, 2008, Stephen M. Walt, “Offshore Balancing: An Idea Whose Time has Come,” November 2, 2011, Available at http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/02/offshore_balancing_an_idea_whose_time_ha_come.

31. Michael H Armacost and J. Staplelon Roy, “American Overview: Asian Policy Challenges for the Next President,”American Role in Asia: Asian and American Views，San Francisco， California，2008，pp.74-75.

32. Chuck Hagel, “Speech in International Institute for Strategic Studies (Shangri-La Dialogue).”

33. Hillary R. Klinton, “Nomination Hearing To Be Secretary of State,” Washington, D.C. January 13, 2009, Available at http://www. state. Gov/secretary/rm/2009a/01/115196.htm.

34. Tom Donilon, The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013.

35.William T. Tow and Amitav Acharya, “Obstinate or Obsolete, The US Alliance Structure in Asia-Pacific,” pp.40-41.

36.Wu Xinbo, “The Obama Administration’s Asia-Pacific Strategy,”May/June 2012, p.92.