周晟全 施余兵

一、問(wèn)題的提出

聯(lián)合國(guó)環(huán)境大會(huì)（United Nations Environment Assembly）在2022 年3 月2日的第5/14 號(hào)決議“結(jié)束塑料污染：制定具有法律約束力的國(guó)際文書(shū)”中要求聯(lián)合國(guó)環(huán)境規(guī)劃署（United Nations Environment Programme，以下簡(jiǎn)稱“UNEP”）召集政府間談判委員會(huì)，并于2022 年下半年開(kāi)始工作，爭(zhēng)取在2024 年底完成相關(guān)工作。1參見(jiàn)United Nations Environment Programme, Scenario note for the first session of the intergovernmental negotiating committee to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, UNEP website (27 Nov 2022), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/4131 3/Scenario_note_E.pdf.UNEP 旨在制定一項(xiàng)具有法律約束力的塑料污染（包括海洋環(huán)境中的塑料污染）國(guó)際文書(shū)的政府間談判委員會(huì)（Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, 以下簡(jiǎn)稱“INC”）第一屆、第二屆會(huì)議（以下簡(jiǎn)稱“INC-1”“INC-2”）已分別于2022 年11 月28 日至12 月2 日、2023 年5 月29 日至6 月2 日在烏拉圭埃斯特角城會(huì)議展覽中心、法國(guó)巴黎聯(lián)合國(guó)教科文組織總部舉行。

在INC-1及INC-2的會(huì)議進(jìn)程中，包括中國(guó)、阿根廷、拉丁美洲和加勒比地區(qū)、2參見(jiàn)International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 28 November 2022, ISSD website (10 Dec 2022), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marineenvironment-negotiating-committee-inc1-daily-report-28nov2022.南非、塞內(nèi)加爾、3參見(jiàn)International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 30 November 2022, ISSD website (10 Dec 2022), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marineenvironment-negotiating-committee-inc1-daily-report-30nov2022.印度、菲律賓4參見(jiàn)International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 31 May 2023,ISSD website (7 Jun 2023), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marine-environmentnegotiating-committee-inc2-daily-report-31may2023;及第二聯(lián)絡(luò)小組5參見(jiàn)International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 1 June 2023,ISSD website (7 Jun 2023), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marine-environmentnegotiating-committee-inc2-daily-report-1jun2023;在內(nèi)的多個(gè)國(guó)家、地區(qū)代表團(tuán)及聯(lián)絡(luò)小組在一般性發(fā)言和文書(shū)結(jié)構(gòu)的范圍、目標(biāo)以及備選方案環(huán)節(jié)中提出，應(yīng)考慮共同但有區(qū)別的責(zé)任原則（以下簡(jiǎn)稱“CBDR 原則”），這些提案體現(xiàn)了部分參加政府間談判國(guó)家的政治意愿，應(yīng)引起國(guó)際社會(huì)的重視。然而，一個(gè)無(wú)法回避的事實(shí)是，CBDR 原則迄今僅明確適用于氣候變化領(lǐng)域，在塑料污染領(lǐng)域，特別是海洋塑料污染領(lǐng)域是否適用該原則仍然存在爭(zhēng)議，需要進(jìn)行更深層次的探討。為了解決這一問(wèn)題，本文將首先討論CBDR 原則的源起與意涵，并總結(jié)CBDR 原則在氣候變化領(lǐng)域外的反映與體現(xiàn)，隨后將就CBDR 原則在海洋塑料污染領(lǐng)域的適用性進(jìn)行分析，并就未來(lái)塑料污染國(guó)際文書(shū)納入CBDR 原則時(shí)的具體方式進(jìn)行展望。

二、CBDR 原則的源起與意涵

CBDR 原則經(jīng)歷了長(zhǎng)期的發(fā)展與內(nèi)涵演變，最終成為氣候變化領(lǐng)域的基本原則。本部分所涉及的源起，即指在氣候變化領(lǐng)域中CBDR 原則的演進(jìn)；而意涵，則指CBDR 原則所映射的本質(zhì)內(nèi)容，即“共同利益”與“實(shí)質(zhì)公平”。6參見(jiàn)季華：《“共同但有區(qū)別責(zé)任”與氣候變化國(guó)際法律機(jī)制》，中國(guó)政法大學(xué)出版社2022 年版，第64-72 頁(yè)。

（一）CBDR 原則的源起

CBDR 原則的演進(jìn)，可分為初步形成、具體確立和進(jìn)一步發(fā)展三個(gè)階段。

1.CBDR 原則的初步形成

學(xué)界一般認(rèn)為，CBDR 原則在國(guó)際環(huán)境法誕生之后才初步形成。1972 年斯德哥爾摩人類環(huán)境會(huì)議以及《聯(lián)合國(guó)人類環(huán)境會(huì)議宣言》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱“《人類環(huán)境宣言》”）的通過(guò)標(biāo)志著國(guó)際環(huán)境法的誕生。7參見(jiàn)林燦鈴等著：《國(guó)際環(huán)境法的產(chǎn)生與發(fā)展》，人民法院出版社2006 年版，第50 頁(yè)。該宣言首次含蓄地提出了環(huán)境領(lǐng)域的共同責(zé)任和區(qū)別責(zé)任的內(nèi)容。例如，《人類環(huán)境宣言》提出，“保護(hù)和改善人類環(huán)境是關(guān)系到全世界各國(guó)人民的幸福和經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的重要問(wèn)題，也是全世界各國(guó)人民的迫切希望和各國(guó)政府的責(zé)任?！?《聯(lián)合國(guó)人類環(huán)境會(huì)議宣言》第一部分第2 條。“所有國(guó)家的環(huán)境政策應(yīng)該提高，而不應(yīng)該損及發(fā)展中國(guó)家現(xiàn)有或?qū)?lái)的發(fā)展?jié)摿??！?《聯(lián)合國(guó)人類環(huán)境會(huì)議宣言》第二部分第11 條。盡管這種表述相當(dāng)審慎，仍然說(shuō)明“共同責(zé)任”與“區(qū)別責(zé)任”的概念在當(dāng)時(shí)已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)。但CBDR 原則并沒(méi)有在當(dāng)時(shí)確立，而僅處在“初步形成”的階段，主要原因在于，在人類環(huán)境會(huì)議舉行時(shí)，作為后續(xù)CBDR 原則主要支持者的發(fā)展中國(guó)家，其關(guān)注重心并不在全球環(huán)境合作，而更注重于國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)新秩序的形成，因此，CBDR 原則的形成條件在當(dāng)時(shí)并不成熟。10參見(jiàn)寇麗：《共同但有區(qū)別責(zé)任原則：演進(jìn)、屬性與功能》，載《法律科學(xué)（西北政法大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)）》2013 年第4 期，第95-103 頁(yè)。

2.CBDR 原則的確立

1992 年5 月9 日通過(guò)并于同年6 月在聯(lián)合國(guó)環(huán)境與發(fā)展會(huì)議上開(kāi)放簽署的《聯(lián)合國(guó)氣候變化框架公約》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱“UNFCCC”），以及前述會(huì)議通過(guò)的《關(guān)于環(huán)境與發(fā)展的里約宣言》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱“《里約宣言》”），均對(duì)CBDR 原則進(jìn)行明確規(guī)定。UNFCCC 在序言中提到，“……承認(rèn)氣候變化的全球性，要求所有國(guó)家根據(jù)其共同但有區(qū)別的責(zé)任和各自的能力及其社會(huì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)條件，盡可能開(kāi)展最廣泛的合作，并參與有效和適當(dāng)?shù)膰?guó)際應(yīng)對(duì)行動(dòng)……”11《聯(lián)合國(guó)氣候變化框架公約》序言。；《里約宣言》則指出，“……鑒于導(dǎo)致全球環(huán)境退化的各種不同因素，各國(guó)負(fù)有共同的但是又有差別的責(zé)任……”。12《關(guān)于環(huán)境與發(fā)展的里約宣言》原則7。

同時(shí)，《里約宣言》中提到，“……發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家承認(rèn)，鑒于他們的社會(huì)給全球環(huán)境帶來(lái)的壓力，以及他們所掌握的技術(shù)和財(cái)力資源，他們?cè)谧非罂沙掷m(xù)發(fā)展的國(guó)際努力中負(fù)有責(zé)任?！?3同上注。這一規(guī)定明確指出，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家在氣候變化領(lǐng)域中負(fù)有歷史責(zé)任，也認(rèn)可發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和發(fā)展中國(guó)家當(dāng)下的國(guó)情區(qū)別，其所體現(xiàn)的“歷史責(zé)任”“國(guó)家能力”兩大要素，被視為CBDR 原則適用的前提條件。

簡(jiǎn)而言之，UNFCCC 和《里約宣言》的規(guī)定均體現(xiàn)了二十世紀(jì)九十年代的國(guó)際社會(huì)對(duì)氣候變化問(wèn)題的理解和態(tài)度，各國(guó)對(duì)CBDR 原則的認(rèn)識(shí)也得到了進(jìn)一步深化，試圖尋求氣候變化領(lǐng)域的“實(shí)質(zhì)公平”。但遺憾的是，二者的規(guī)定均未在明確CBDR 原則的基礎(chǔ)上作出更為細(xì)致且具體的規(guī)定，CBDR 原則的具體應(yīng)用仍然存在發(fā)展的空間。

3.CBDR 原則的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展

1997 年UNFCCC 第三次締約國(guó)會(huì)議通過(guò)的《京都議定書(shū)》對(duì)CBDR 原則作出了具體化的規(guī)定。概而言之，《京都議定書(shū)》明確了發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的溫室氣體減排任務(wù)，卻并未對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家規(guī)定強(qiáng)制減排義務(wù)?！毒┒甲h定書(shū)》所采取的“二分法”是嚴(yán)格適用CBDR 原則的體現(xiàn)，正因如此，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家與發(fā)展中國(guó)家之間就CBDR原則的適用與否產(chǎn)生了極大的分歧，爭(zhēng)論相較此前更加激烈。

2015 年通過(guò)的《巴黎協(xié)定》為 2020 年后全球合作應(yīng)對(duì)氣候變化指明了方向和目標(biāo)，是公認(rèn)的全面平衡、持久有效、具有法律約束力的氣候變化國(guó)際協(xié)議。14參見(jiàn)朱松麗，高翔：《從哥本哈根到巴黎——國(guó)際氣候制度的變遷和發(fā)展》，清華大學(xué)出版社2017 年版，第247 頁(yè)。CBDR 原則在《巴黎協(xié)定》中多次被明確提及，但其內(nèi)涵卻發(fā)生了一定的改變，形成了“共區(qū)責(zé)任+各自能力+不同國(guó)情”的要件形態(tài)：15參見(jiàn)周?。骸墩撎贾泻驮妇跋碌墓餐袇^(qū)別責(zé)任原則》，載《武漢大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)（哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)版）》2023 年第2 期，第152-163 頁(yè)。由《京都議定書(shū)》通過(guò)“二分法”規(guī)定的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家強(qiáng)制減排、發(fā)展中國(guó)家自愿參與減排的溫室氣體減排模式，改為通過(guò)“國(guó)家自主貢獻(xiàn)”進(jìn)行減排的新模式，將所有締約方都納入溫室氣體減排所涵蓋的范圍內(nèi)。16《巴黎協(xié)定》第4 條?！栋屠鑵f(xié)定》之后，UNFCCC 第二十六次締約國(guó)會(huì)議通過(guò)的《格拉斯哥氣候公約》中仍然對(duì)CBDR 原則采堅(jiān)持的態(tài)度，并對(duì)《巴黎協(xié)定》中涉及CBDR 原則的規(guī)定進(jìn)行了回顧與重申。17參見(jiàn)United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Glasgow Climate Pact,UNFCCC website (15 Dec 2022), https://unfccc.int/documents/310475.

（二）CBDR 原則的意涵

從前文所述不難看出，CBDR 原則本身是在不斷發(fā)展、變化的。有學(xué)者認(rèn)為，經(jīng)歷了多年的發(fā)展，CBDR 原則的內(nèi)涵已經(jīng)發(fā)生了重大變化，在其“共同責(zé)任”和“有區(qū)別的責(zé)任”兩個(gè)要素中，后者的內(nèi)涵發(fā)生了較大的變化。18參見(jiàn)SHI Yubing, Climate Change and International Shipping: The Regulatory Framework for the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Brill Nijhoff, 2017, p. 86-89.然而，筆者認(rèn)為，CBDR 原則的意涵并未發(fā)生太大的變化。從CBDR 原則的名稱可以看出，該原則包含兩方面內(nèi)容——共同責(zé)任與區(qū)別責(zé)任，這兩方面內(nèi)容直接體現(xiàn)了CBDR 原則的意涵，即“共同利益”與“實(shí)質(zhì)公平”。19同前注6，季華。

1.共同責(zé)任所體現(xiàn)的共同利益

如前文所述，“共同責(zé)任”這一概念最早體現(xiàn)于《人類環(huán)境宣言》中，并在UNFCCC、《京都議定書(shū)》等后續(xù)文書(shū)中得到進(jìn)一步的確認(rèn)。各國(guó)應(yīng)當(dāng)在環(huán)境領(lǐng)域與氣候變化領(lǐng)域承擔(dān)共同責(zé)任的主要原因在于，地球生態(tài)系統(tǒng)是一個(gè)整體，整體中的任一要素遭受破壞，都必將對(duì)整體產(chǎn)生影響，而人類的共同利益又與作為整體的地球生態(tài)系統(tǒng)之間存在直接聯(lián)系。因此，環(huán)境領(lǐng)域與氣候變化領(lǐng)域的議題，對(duì)人類的影響是在人類的共同利益層面出現(xiàn)的，也正因如此，針對(duì)這些議題，需要所有國(guó)家承擔(dān)共同責(zé)任。

2.區(qū)別責(zé)任所體現(xiàn)的實(shí)質(zhì)公平

為了探求實(shí)質(zhì)上的公平，CBDR 原則引入了“區(qū)別責(zé)任”。正如《里約宣言》原則7 所述，這種區(qū)別責(zé)任的來(lái)源有兩方面，既基于國(guó)家的歷史責(zé)任，也基于當(dāng)下的國(guó)家能力，前文提到，這兩大要素，也被視作適用CBDR 的前提條件。20同前注12，《關(guān)于環(huán)境與發(fā)展的里約宣言》。自工業(yè)革命以來(lái)，老牌的工業(yè)化發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的發(fā)展對(duì)地球生態(tài)環(huán)境產(chǎn)生了前所未有的破壞，這些破壞也是導(dǎo)致當(dāng)下環(huán)境現(xiàn)狀的主要原因。發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家認(rèn)識(shí)到其國(guó)內(nèi)環(huán)境受到破壞后，開(kāi)始嘗試將高污染、高排放的工業(yè)建立在其國(guó)家范圍之外，從而將污染與排放轉(zhuǎn)移至發(fā)展中國(guó)家；同時(shí)，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的人口相比于全球人口，雖然所占基數(shù)較小，卻是造成目前的全球環(huán)境污染的“主要推手”。基于污染者付費(fèi)原則（Polluter-pays Principle），發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家應(yīng)當(dāng)承擔(dān)歷史上的環(huán)境破壞責(zé)任。而發(fā)展中國(guó)家受限于目前的國(guó)家能力，承擔(dān)發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家轉(zhuǎn)移的污染與排放后，在環(huán)境治理上能夠發(fā)揮的能力十分有限，難以通過(guò)自身的能力充分表達(dá)國(guó)家自身的意愿；且發(fā)展中國(guó)家中不乏人口大國(guó)，為保障其人民生活，需要進(jìn)一步發(fā)展工業(yè)以促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。因此，為了在發(fā)展中國(guó)家和發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家之間達(dá)成實(shí)質(zhì)上的公平，需要發(fā)展中國(guó)家和發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家承擔(dān)區(qū)別責(zé)任。

考慮到發(fā)展中國(guó)家的能力和國(guó)情問(wèn)題，《巴黎協(xié)定》認(rèn)可發(fā)展中國(guó)家在落實(shí)溫室氣體減排時(shí)所面臨的困境，對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家作出相對(duì)較為“寬松”的規(guī)定，換言之，《巴黎協(xié)定》為“有區(qū)別的責(zé)任”提供了落實(shí)可能。除引入前文所述的國(guó)家自主貢獻(xiàn)外，《巴黎協(xié)定》還對(duì)包括資金援助、技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓和能力建設(shè)等內(nèi)容進(jìn)行了相對(duì)細(xì)致的規(guī)定，其中著重為加強(qiáng)能力建設(shè)規(guī)定了具體落實(shí)措施。21《巴黎協(xié)定》第11 條。

三、CBDR 原則在氣候變化領(lǐng)域外的反映與體現(xiàn)

盡管CBDR 原則起源并發(fā)展于氣候變化領(lǐng)域，但在氣候變化領(lǐng)域外的其他領(lǐng)域，也存在一些條約和判例實(shí)踐能夠反映、體現(xiàn)CBDR 原則。

（一）《生物多樣性公約》

自1988 年英國(guó)生態(tài)學(xué)家諾曼·邁爾斯確定了植物特有程度高、棲息地喪失嚴(yán)重的熱帶雨林“熱點(diǎn)”（Hotspots）后，22參見(jiàn)Norman Myers, Threatened biotas: “Hot spots” in tropical forests, Environmentalist,Vol. 8:3, p. 187-208 (1988).多個(gè)政府間組織經(jīng)過(guò)多年工作，至2016 年，共認(rèn)定了36 個(gè)“生物多樣性熱點(diǎn)”，這些地區(qū)被視作地球上生物最豐富但仍受到威脅的地區(qū)。23參見(jiàn)Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund, Biodiversity Hotspots Defined, CEPF website (15 Dec 2022), https://www. cepf.net/our-work/biodiversity-hotspots/hotspots-defined.

圖1 生物多樣性熱點(diǎn)全球分布圖24圖1 系Kellee Koenig 制作的生物多樣性熱點(diǎn)全球分布圖，下載自https://zenodo.org/record/4311850#.Y66f FfVBze9。

從生物多樣性熱點(diǎn)的全球分布可以看出，目前絕大多數(shù)的生物多樣性存在于東南亞、非洲以及南美洲的發(fā)展中國(guó)家。但考慮到國(guó)家能力問(wèn)題，發(fā)展中國(guó)家并不能較好地對(duì)生物多樣性進(jìn)行保護(hù)；同時(shí)，在對(duì)生物多樣性加以利用的領(lǐng)域，例如生物技術(shù)等，發(fā)展中國(guó)家直至進(jìn)入21 世紀(jì)后才在相關(guān)領(lǐng)域具有顯著發(fā)展。25參見(jiàn)The World Academy of Science, Biotechnology: A growing field in the developing world, TWAS website (15 Dec 2022), https://twas.org/article/biotechnology-growing-fielddeveloping-world.此前，對(duì)生物多樣性的利用多數(shù)是在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家進(jìn)行，而發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的生物多樣性從目前來(lái)看已經(jīng)損失極大。因此，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家由于其歷史責(zé)任，對(duì)資助發(fā)展中國(guó)家保護(hù)生物多樣性負(fù)有責(zé)任，同樣負(fù)有與發(fā)展中國(guó)家共享其利用生物多樣性所獲利益的責(zé)任。

盡管CBDR 原則并沒(méi)有在《生物多樣性公約》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱“CBD”）中明確被提及，但CBD 的文本中仍含蓄地反映和體現(xiàn)了CBDR 原則。例如，CBD 序言中提到，“確認(rèn)生物多樣性的保護(hù)是全人類的共同關(guān)切事項(xiàng)”、第20 條第2款提到，“發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家締約國(guó)應(yīng)提供新的額外的資金，以使發(fā)展中國(guó)家締約國(guó)能支付它們因執(zhí)行那些履行本公約義務(wù)的措施而承負(fù)的一定的全部增加費(fèi)用，并使它們能享受到本公約條款產(chǎn)生的惠益?！?6《生物多樣性公約》序言、第20 條第2 款。同時(shí)，CBD 第15、16、19 條關(guān)于遺傳資源取得、技術(shù)的取得與轉(zhuǎn)讓、生物技術(shù)的處理與分配等規(guī)定，實(shí)際上都體現(xiàn)了發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家與發(fā)展中國(guó)家在責(zé)任承擔(dān)上的“區(qū)別化”。有學(xué)者提出，包括CBDR 原則在內(nèi)的“里約原則”必須成為CBD 框架的支柱，并指出發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家在生物多樣性喪失問(wèn)題上應(yīng)承擔(dān)歷史責(zé)任。27參見(jiàn)Viviana Mu?oz Tellez, Proposals to Advance the Negotiations of the Post 2020 Biodiversity Framework, the South Centre website, (15 Dec 2022), https://www.southcentre.int/policybrief-90-march-2021/.

（二）《關(guān)稅與貿(mào)易總協(xié)定》

世界貿(mào)易組織的許多協(xié)定中都對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家提供了諸如特殊優(yōu)惠、技術(shù)援助、分階段實(shí)施等更加寬松的義務(wù)。28參見(jiàn)Joost Pauwelyn, The End of Differential Treatment for Developing Countries? Lessons from the Trade and Climate Change Regimes, Review of European Community &International Environmental Law, Vol. 22:1, p. 29-41 (2013).可以說(shuō)，在貿(mào)易機(jī)制領(lǐng)域，世界貿(mào)易組織承認(rèn)發(fā)展中國(guó)家與發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的國(guó)家能力差異和發(fā)展需要的差異，并相應(yīng)地賦予雙方“區(qū)別化”的義務(wù)。有學(xué)者提出，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家應(yīng)承擔(dān)“相當(dāng)大部分成本的道德責(zé)任”。29參見(jiàn)Robyn Eckersley, Understanding the interplay between the climate and trade regimes,Climate and Trade Polici es in a Post-2012 World, United Nations Environment Programme,2009, p. 11-18.原因在于，在貿(mào)易領(lǐng)域，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家曾經(jīng)或已經(jīng)獲得了相當(dāng)大的收益，而發(fā)展中國(guó)家則面臨更加高昂的貿(mào)易活動(dòng)實(shí)施成本，這種成本的出現(xiàn)，部分原因在于發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家曾經(jīng)對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家的殖民化等行為，換言之，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家高昂的貿(mào)易活動(dòng)實(shí)施成本在一定程度上負(fù)有“歷史責(zé)任”。

《關(guān)稅與貿(mào)易總協(xié)定》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱“GATT”）中也存在對(duì)CBDR 原則的反映和體現(xiàn)。例如，GATT 第三十六條提到，“……（丙）注意到發(fā)展中國(guó)家和其它國(guó)家之間的生活水平有一個(gè)很大的差距；（?。┱J(rèn)為單獨(dú)和聯(lián)合行動(dòng)對(duì)促進(jìn)發(fā)展中的各締約國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，并使這些國(guó)家的生活水平得到迅速提高是必要的；……”“……（丙）在考慮采取本協(xié)定所許可的其它措施以解決某項(xiàng)特殊問(wèn)題時(shí)，應(yīng)特別注意發(fā)展中的締約國(guó)的貿(mào)易利益；……”；30《關(guān)稅與貿(mào)易總協(xié)定》第36、37 條。1979 年“東京回合”所通過(guò)的《對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家的差別、更優(yōu)惠待遇及對(duì)等和更充分參與問(wèn)題的決定》中的規(guī)定也對(duì)CBDR 原則存在一定的反映和體現(xiàn)。

（三）國(guó)際海洋法法庭關(guān)于“擔(dān)保個(gè)人和實(shí)體從事‘區(qū)域’內(nèi)活動(dòng)的國(guó)家的責(zé)任和義務(wù)”的第17 號(hào)咨詢意見(jiàn)案

國(guó)際海洋法法庭（The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea，以下簡(jiǎn)稱“ITLOS”）關(guān)于“擔(dān)保個(gè)人和實(shí)體從事‘區(qū)域’內(nèi)活動(dòng)的國(guó)家的責(zé)任和義務(wù)”的第17 號(hào)咨詢意見(jiàn)案（以下簡(jiǎn)稱“第17 號(hào)咨詢意見(jiàn)案”）由國(guó)際海底管理局理事會(huì)于2010 年5 月6 日向ITLOS 提出請(qǐng)求。在對(duì)“締約國(guó)在擔(dān)?！畢^(qū)域’內(nèi)活動(dòng)方面負(fù)有哪些法律責(zé)任和義務(wù)？”這一問(wèn)題進(jìn)行解答時(shí)，ITLOS 在咨詢意見(jiàn)第七部分“發(fā)展中國(guó)家的利益和需要”中進(jìn)行了說(shuō)明。

ITLOS 在咨詢意見(jiàn)中首先對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家和發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家在關(guān)于擔(dān)保國(guó)責(zé)任和賠償責(zé)任的一般規(guī)定中的平等地位進(jìn)行說(shuō)明，指出這是為了防止方便擔(dān)保國(guó)的擴(kuò)散，并提出這些意見(jiàn)“并不排除規(guī)定擔(dān)保國(guó)直接責(zé)任的規(guī)則可以為發(fā)達(dá)擔(dān)保國(guó)和發(fā)展中擔(dān)保國(guó)提供不同的待遇”。31參見(jiàn)International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), ITLOS website (15 Dec 2022), https://itlos.org/main/cases/list-ofcases/case-no-17/.但I(xiàn)TLOS 在咨詢意見(jiàn)中僅提及規(guī)定這種“區(qū)別”的待遇的理論來(lái)源——《聯(lián)合國(guó)海洋法公約》中涉及確保發(fā)展中國(guó)家開(kāi)展“區(qū)域”內(nèi)的活動(dòng)并特別考慮它們的利益和需要的條款，包括序言、第140 條第1 款、第148條等。換言之，在國(guó)家對(duì)個(gè)人或?qū)嶓w在“區(qū)域”內(nèi)的活動(dòng)承擔(dān)擔(dān)保責(zé)任這一問(wèn)題上，ITLOS 作出對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家的優(yōu)惠待遇，更多考慮的是發(fā)展中國(guó)家在能力上的不足，而未考慮類似氣候變化領(lǐng)域內(nèi)或前文提到的CBD、GATT 中的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家在歷史上的責(zé)任。需要注意的是，ITLOS 考慮的能力也“只是對(duì)發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和發(fā)展中國(guó)家的差異的一種寬泛和不精確的稱謂，重要的是一個(gè)國(guó)家在相關(guān)科學(xué)和技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的科學(xué)知識(shí)和技術(shù)能力水平。”32同上注。

四、CBDR 原則在海洋塑料污染國(guó)際立法中的適用性

（一）海洋塑料污染領(lǐng)域符合CBDR 原則適用的要件

如前所述，CBDR 原則適用的要件包括“發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家應(yīng)對(duì)環(huán)境問(wèn)題承擔(dān)歷史責(zé)任”及“發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和發(fā)展中國(guó)家具備不同的能力”兩方面要求，海洋塑料污染領(lǐng)域的發(fā)展情況與這兩方面要求高度契合。

1.海洋塑料污染問(wèn)題的產(chǎn)生主要?dú)w咎于發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的歷史責(zé)任

UNEP 在其報(bào)告中曾提到，“全球產(chǎn)生的70 億噸塑料垃圾中，只有不到10%被回收。數(shù)以百萬(wàn)噸計(jì)的塑料垃圾流失到環(huán)境中”“全球每年有近80%的河流塑料排放到海洋中，每年的排放量在80 萬(wàn)噸至270 萬(wàn)噸之間，其中小型城市河流污染最嚴(yán)重”。33United Nations Environment Programme, Our planet is choking on plastic, UNEP website(15 Dec 2022), https://www.unep.org/interactives/beat-plastic-pollution/?gclid=EAIaIQobC hMIrur3y62m_AIVDJ1LBR24GQ5dEAAYASAAEgJBTfD_BwE.海洋塑料污染情況日益嚴(yán)重，而陸源塑料垃圾是海洋塑料污染，特別是海洋微塑料污染的主要來(lái)源之一，超過(guò)80%的海洋微塑料來(lái)源于陸源塑料廢物。34參見(jiàn)[希]赫里西·K. 卡拉芭娜吉奧提、揚(yáng)尼斯·K. 卡拉魯吉奧提斯編著：《水和廢水中的微塑料》，安立會(huì)等譯，中國(guó)環(huán)境出版集團(tuán)2022 年版，第1 頁(yè)。

相較于發(fā)展中國(guó)家，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的人均塑料垃圾年產(chǎn)量極高。根據(jù)Kara Lavender Law 等人2020 年的數(shù)據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì)，2016 年，美國(guó)人口產(chǎn)生的塑料垃圾量居世界首位，人均塑料垃圾年產(chǎn)量也以超過(guò)130 千克/年居于世界首位，而歐盟盡管人口總量?jī)H有中國(guó)的40%左右，但其產(chǎn)生的塑料垃圾總量仍超過(guò)中國(guó)；同時(shí)，人均塑料垃圾年產(chǎn)量處于高位的還有英國(guó)、德國(guó)、韓國(guó)等。35參見(jiàn)Kara Lavender Law et al., The United States’ contribution of plastic waste to land and ocean, Science Advances, Vol. 6:44, eabd0288 (2020).

德國(guó) 82.3 81.16歐盟 511.2 54.56中國(guó) 1378.7 15.67

上世紀(jì)七、八十年代，為了應(yīng)對(duì)逐步惡化的環(huán)境問(wèn)題，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的環(huán)境政策日益嚴(yán)格。面對(duì)高昂的垃圾處理費(fèi)用，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家選擇將廢棄物出口到發(fā)展中國(guó)家，以回避垃圾處理問(wèn)題。正如美國(guó)國(guó)家科學(xué)院（National Academy of Sciences）在其2022 年的報(bào)告Reckoning with the U.S. Role in Global Ocean Plastic Waste 中所提到的，“在國(guó)際上，發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體通過(guò)向欠發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體出口塑料廢物來(lái)外部化廢物管理成本，這些經(jīng)濟(jì)體最終首當(dāng)其沖地承受塑料廢物的經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會(huì)和環(huán)境成本。2018 年之前，美國(guó)將大部分塑料垃圾出口到中國(guó)。在中國(guó)禁止大部分塑料垃圾進(jìn)口后，美國(guó)將其出口的垃圾轉(zhuǎn)移到其他東南亞國(guó)家?！?7National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Reckoning with the U.S. Role in Global Ocean Plastic Waste, The National Academies Press, 2022, p. 30.

2017 年7 月18 日，國(guó)務(wù)院辦公廳印發(fā)《關(guān)于禁止洋垃圾入境推進(jìn)固體廢物進(jìn)口管理制度改革實(shí)施方案》（以下簡(jiǎn)稱“禁廢令”），我國(guó)正式全面禁止“洋垃圾”入境。在此之前，我國(guó)便是全球“洋垃圾”的最大目的地，而廢塑料便是“洋垃圾”的“重要組成部分”。根據(jù)聯(lián)合國(guó)商品貿(mào)易統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)（UN Comtrade）中2000-2004 年、2013-2017 年的進(jìn)出口數(shù)據(jù)，中國(guó)香港、美國(guó)、日本、德國(guó)長(zhǎng)期居于向我國(guó)出口廢塑料的排名高位，換言之，中國(guó)曾經(jīng)長(zhǎng)期扮演發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家“廢塑料收集池”的角色。

需要說(shuō)明的是，雖然根據(jù)表2、表3 的數(shù)據(jù)，我國(guó)香港地區(qū)長(zhǎng)期居于向我國(guó)出口廢塑料國(guó)家（地區(qū)）的排名高位，但其所出口的多是在當(dāng)?shù)剡M(jìn)行轉(zhuǎn)港的廢塑料。從2013 至2017 年香港地區(qū)進(jìn)、出口廢塑料的數(shù)據(jù)的對(duì)比可以看出，香港實(shí)際上也承擔(dān)了一部分進(jìn)口廢塑料的“消化”工作，這些廢塑料的最初主要來(lái)源國(guó)仍是包括美國(guó)、日本、德國(guó)、英國(guó)在內(nèi)的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家。

表2 2000 至2004年我國(guó)廢塑料進(jìn)口數(shù)據(jù)（單位：萬(wàn)噸）38表2 至表6 系作者根據(jù)聯(lián)合國(guó)商品貿(mào)易統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)（UN Comtrade）中的數(shù)據(jù)制作的，數(shù)據(jù)保留小數(shù)點(diǎn)后兩位。

表3 2013 至2017年我國(guó)廢塑料進(jìn)口數(shù)據(jù)（單位：萬(wàn)噸）

德國(guó) 64.09 64.43 45.09 44.49 25.73 243.83英國(guó) 21.91 27.58 19.88 25.2 14.39 108.96

表4 2013 至2017年香港廢塑料進(jìn)口與出口至中國(guó)大陸數(shù)據(jù)（單位：萬(wàn)噸）

在我國(guó)“禁廢令”出臺(tái)后，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家將尋找轉(zhuǎn)嫁廢塑料處理成本的出口目的地的目光轉(zhuǎn)向了東南亞國(guó)家，東南亞國(guó)家成為了發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家出口廢塑料的新傾銷地。根據(jù)綠色和平組織（Greenpeace）發(fā)布的報(bào)告，東盟國(guó)家的廢塑料進(jìn)口全球占比從2016 年的5.38%直升至2018 年的27%。39Greenpeace, Southeast Asia’s Struggles against the Plastic Waste Trade, Greenpeace website, (15 Dec 2022), https://www.greenpeace.org/malaysia/publication/1905/southeastasias-struggle-against-the-plastic-waste-trade/.以越南和馬來(lái)西亞為例，2015 年至2018 年，其廢塑料的進(jìn)口量大幅上升，近乎成倍增長(zhǎng)，而這些廢塑料的來(lái)源國(guó)仍然是發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家。需要指出的是，馬來(lái)西亞2018 年同樣針對(duì)廢塑料進(jìn)口出臺(tái)了多項(xiàng)限制政策，這也是馬來(lái)西亞2018 年進(jìn)口的廢塑料總量相較2017 年減少的原因之一。

表5 我國(guó)“禁廢令”出臺(tái)前后越南廢塑料進(jìn)口數(shù)據(jù)（單位：萬(wàn)噸）

表6 我國(guó)“禁廢令”出臺(tái)前后馬來(lái)西亞廢塑料進(jìn)口數(shù)據(jù)（單位：萬(wàn)噸）

不可否認(rèn)，廢塑料的進(jìn)出口活動(dòng)本身是一種商業(yè)行為，但發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家采取將處理廢塑料的責(zé)任轉(zhuǎn)嫁至發(fā)展中國(guó)家的做法，本質(zhì)上是在逃避其應(yīng)承擔(dān)的環(huán)境責(zé)任。僅以美國(guó)為例，美國(guó)人口僅占世界人口總量的4%，2016 年卻制造了世界上17%的塑料垃圾，而其中大部分被出口到發(fā)展中國(guó)家。40同前注37, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, p. 50.廢塑料向發(fā)展中國(guó)家的涌入，對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家的生態(tài)平衡造成了嚴(yán)重破壞，加劇了當(dāng)?shù)氐乃芰衔廴荆瑢?dǎo)致全球生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的健康狀況進(jìn)一步惡化，可以說(shuō)，塑料污染現(xiàn)狀的根源正是發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的責(zé)任規(guī)避與轉(zhuǎn)移行為。

通過(guò)此前論述可以看出，部分發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家在人均塑料垃圾年產(chǎn)量上遠(yuǎn)超發(fā)展中國(guó)家，且為了規(guī)避處理塑料垃圾的費(fèi)用與責(zé)任，通過(guò)廢塑料進(jìn)出口活動(dòng)將費(fèi)用與責(zé)任轉(zhuǎn)嫁至發(fā)展中國(guó)家。這種行為對(duì)塑料污染的現(xiàn)狀是具有一定的促進(jìn)作用，因此，部分發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家對(duì)塑料污染的現(xiàn)狀是負(fù)有類似氣候變化領(lǐng)域中的“歷史責(zé)任”的，符合CBDR 原則適用的第一項(xiàng)要件。

2.發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和發(fā)展中國(guó)家在治理海洋塑料污染方面存在較大的能力差異

從來(lái)源角度出發(fā)，廢物管理不善是造成塑料污染的最大原因。41參見(jiàn)United Nations Environment Programme, Plastic Science, UNEP website, (27 Nov 2022), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/41263/Plastic_Science_E.pdf.而廢物管理與國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)能力水平、綜合治理能力呈正相關(guān)。同時(shí)，海洋塑料污染治理是一項(xiàng)主要依靠國(guó)家能力完成的工作，涉及陸源廢塑料回收與處理以及海洋微塑料的監(jiān)測(cè)、采集與分析等內(nèi)容。但由于發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和發(fā)展中國(guó)家之間的發(fā)展水平不同，人民的環(huán)保意識(shí)也存在較大的差異，執(zhí)行國(guó)際環(huán)境條約的能力自然有所不同。42參見(jiàn)孫凱：《全球海洋塑料污染問(wèn)題及治理對(duì)策》，載《國(guó)際治理》2021 年第15 期，第44-48 頁(yè)。僅以海洋微塑料污染問(wèn)題為例，目前對(duì)微塑料的來(lái)源與真實(shí)入海量尚存在認(rèn)知上的不明確，也仍尚未形成較為穩(wěn)定的處理方法。43參見(jiàn)尚勝美：《海洋微塑料污染狀況及其應(yīng)對(duì)措施建議》，載《資源節(jié)約與環(huán)?！?022年第2 期，第83-86 頁(yè)。

UNEP 在第5/14 號(hào)決議“結(jié)束塑料污染：制定具有法律約束力的國(guó)際文書(shū)”以及INC-1 的設(shè)想說(shuō)明中，也多次指出“同時(shí)考慮到各國(guó)的國(guó)情和能力”“同時(shí)考慮到《關(guān)于環(huán)境與發(fā)展的里約宣言》的原則以及各國(guó)的國(guó)情和能力等”，并要求政府間談判委員會(huì)對(duì)能力建設(shè)、技術(shù)援助和資金進(jìn)行討論。44同前注1, United Nations Environment Programme; United Nations Environment Programme,End plastic pollution: Towards an international legally binding instrument, UNEP website(27 Nov 2022), https://documents-d ds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/K22/007/33/pdf/K2200733.pdf?OpenElement.

因此，在海洋塑料污染領(lǐng)域，需要特別注重發(fā)展中國(guó)家的需求。發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家在解決本國(guó)塑料污染問(wèn)題的同時(shí)，應(yīng)加強(qiáng)對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家在技術(shù)、資金、能力建設(shè)等方面的支持。45參見(jiàn)聯(lián)合國(guó)環(huán)境規(guī)劃署：《中國(guó)代表團(tuán)在塑料污染國(guó)際文書(shū)政府間談判委員會(huì)第一次會(huì)議的一般性發(fā)言》，載聯(lián)合國(guó)環(huán)境規(guī)劃署網(wǎng)站，https://apps1.unep.org/resolutions/uploads/china_inc-1_statements_0_0.pdf?？梢哉f(shuō)，在海洋塑料污染的治理方面，存在發(fā)展中國(guó)家與發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家之間的較大的能力差別，符合CBDR 原則適用的第二項(xiàng)要件。

（二）海洋塑料污染國(guó)際立法的目的契合CBDR 原則的意涵

如前文所述，CBDR 原則的意涵包括“共同利益”與“實(shí)質(zhì)公平”兩方面內(nèi)容，海洋塑料污染國(guó)際立法的主要目的在于解決這一全球性難題，在保護(hù)全球環(huán)境的同時(shí)，兼顧發(fā)展中國(guó)家的不同發(fā)展需求和能力差異。這意味著，海洋梳理污染的國(guó)際立法在目的上與CBDR 原則高度契合。

1.海洋塑料污染國(guó)際立法的“共同利益”

人類與環(huán)境是不可分割的，對(duì)環(huán)境進(jìn)行保護(hù)也是對(duì)人類的生存進(jìn)行保護(hù)。因此，人類需要共同努力，逐步改善、修復(fù)生存環(huán)境，共同面對(duì)挑戰(zhàn)。

塑料作為上世紀(jì)新出現(xiàn)的高分子材料，以穩(wěn)定的性質(zhì)得到青睞，但也正因其特性，塑料在環(huán)境中并不易降解，而是在環(huán)境中不斷累積。即使是所謂的“可降解塑料”的降解在符合嚴(yán)苛的降解條件下，也需要較長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間，且其最終所能達(dá)到的真正降解水平也與塑料本身的種類與質(zhì)量相關(guān)。46參見(jiàn)金琰等：《生物可降解塑料在不同環(huán)境條件下的降解研究進(jìn)展》，載《生物科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)》2022 年第5 期，第1784-1808 頁(yè)。在海洋塑料污染領(lǐng)域，目前存在的主要問(wèn)題是微塑料污染，基于目前的研究可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，微塑料在海洋各處的表層水體、海底沉積物都被監(jiān)測(cè)到存在。47參見(jiàn)Ian Kane et al., Seafloor microplastic hotspots controlled by deep-sea circulation,Science, Vol. 368:6495, p. 1140-1145 (2020).

塑料導(dǎo)致的對(duì)海洋環(huán)境的危害是多角度、深層次的。具體而言，首先，微生物和藻類可在塑料表面附著、生長(zhǎng)，受到洋流的影響，易跨界導(dǎo)致外來(lái)生物入侵，進(jìn)而破壞被入侵區(qū)域內(nèi)的原生生物棲息地；其次，由于微塑料的體積小，被海洋生物誤食并進(jìn)行消化后，在海洋生物鏈內(nèi)形成富集，并最終隨著人類對(duì)海洋生物的捕撈、食用而進(jìn)入人體內(nèi)部。48參見(jiàn)夏斌等：《微塑料在海洋漁業(yè)水域中的污染現(xiàn)狀及其生物效應(yīng)研究進(jìn)展》，載《漁業(yè)科學(xué)進(jìn)展》2019 年第3 期，第178-180 頁(yè)。研究表明，在人類的血液內(nèi)已發(fā)現(xiàn)微塑料的存在，49參見(jiàn)Chukwuma Muanya, Okra, Aloe employed to filter microplastics out of wastewater,the Guardian (31 Mar 2022), https://guardian.ng/features/health/okra-aloe-employed-tofilter-microplastics-out-of-wastewater/.盡管學(xué)者認(rèn)為微塑料的人體的影響尚待證明，但世界衛(wèi)生組織認(rèn)為，人體對(duì)極小的微塑料吸收的可能性較高。50參見(jiàn)世界衛(wèi)生組織：《世衛(wèi)組織呼吁進(jìn)一步研究微塑料并大力處理塑料污染問(wèn)題》，載世界衛(wèi)生組織網(wǎng)站，https://www.who.int/zh/news-room/detail/22-08-2019-who-callsfor-more-research-into-microplastics-and-a-crackdown-on-plastic-pollution。此外，未降解的塑料也容易被海洋生物誤食并無(wú)法消化，導(dǎo)致海洋生物最終死亡。

圖2 海洋微塑料的全球分布51圖2 系美國(guó)國(guó)家海洋和大氣管理局制作的海洋微塑料濃度分布圖，下載自https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/b296879cc1984fda833a8acc93e31476/page/Page/?views=Map-Viewer%2CDisplay-Filters。

海洋是地球生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的重要組成部分，而對(duì)地球生態(tài)環(huán)境的保護(hù)責(zé)任，世界各國(guó)都應(yīng)承擔(dān)，沒(méi)有國(guó)家可以逃避這一責(zé)任。正如習(xí)近平總書(shū)記所言，“人類是命運(yùn)共同體，保護(hù)生態(tài)環(huán)境是全球面臨的共同挑戰(zhàn)和共同責(zé)任。”52習(xí)近平：《推動(dòng)我國(guó)生態(tài)文明建設(shè)邁上新臺(tái)階》，載《奮斗》2019 年第3 期，第1-16 頁(yè)。塑料對(duì)海洋環(huán)境造成的影響，正在逐漸破壞海洋生態(tài)系統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)定性，且對(duì)人類的健康安全造成潛在威脅，國(guó)際社會(huì)因此應(yīng)當(dāng)對(duì)海洋環(huán)境中的塑料污染承擔(dān)共同責(zé)任。有學(xué)者認(rèn)為，引入全生命周期方法（Full Life Cycle Approach, FLCA）將使CBDR 原則在未來(lái)的文書(shū)中被支持，但存在難以在情況和能力不同的國(guó)家間準(zhǔn)確分配這種責(zé)任的問(wèn)題。53參見(jiàn)WANG Sen, International law-making process of combating plastic pollution: Status Quo, debates and prospects, Marine Policy, Vol. 147, 105376 (2023).因此，在塑料污染國(guó)際文書(shū)的后續(xù)談判中，尚需進(jìn)一步對(duì)國(guó)家能力等內(nèi)容進(jìn)行更深層次的討論。

2.海洋塑料污染國(guó)際立法的“實(shí)質(zhì)公平”

發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家將大量的廢塑料向發(fā)展中國(guó)家轉(zhuǎn)移，既極大減輕了處理廢塑料所需的成本，又避免了處理廢塑料過(guò)程中可能對(duì)其國(guó)內(nèi)環(huán)境造成的潛在影響；發(fā)展中國(guó)家雖然從利用廢塑料的過(guò)程中獲得些許有限的利益，但受限于其能力，往往無(wú)法在處理廢塑料的過(guò)程中避免污染擴(kuò)散，從而導(dǎo)致其國(guó)內(nèi)環(huán)境受到直接破壞。前文已對(duì)海洋塑料污染領(lǐng)域的“歷史責(zé)任”與“國(guó)家能力”進(jìn)行論述，而“歷史責(zé)任”與“國(guó)家能力”兩項(xiàng)要素也正是對(duì)實(shí)質(zhì)公平的真正落實(shí)的兩項(xiàng)決定性因素。因此，在海洋塑料污染領(lǐng)域內(nèi)也存在“實(shí)質(zhì)公平”的落實(shí)可能。

但是，這種落實(shí)可能需要建立在科學(xué)的分析與評(píng)估基礎(chǔ)之上。筆者認(rèn)為，結(jié)合目前的談判情況，UNEP 在未來(lái)規(guī)制塑料污染的國(guó)際文書(shū)中，可以參考《巴黎協(xié)定》現(xiàn)有的規(guī)制模式，在對(duì)歷史責(zé)任、國(guó)家能力和不同國(guó)情進(jìn)行科學(xué)分析與評(píng)估的基礎(chǔ)上，將對(duì)塑料污染，特別是海洋塑料污染應(yīng)負(fù)較高責(zé)任的國(guó)家與受污染影響較大的國(guó)家進(jìn)行區(qū)分，通過(guò)對(duì)國(guó)家自主貢獻(xiàn)的通報(bào)與執(zhí)行、技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓、資金援助與能力建設(shè)等方式進(jìn)行具體規(guī)定，賦予不同國(guó)家不同的責(zé)任，以期實(shí)質(zhì)公平的最終落實(shí)，并將有利于塑料污染的實(shí)際治理。

五、結(jié) 語(yǔ)

盡管在現(xiàn)有的氣候變化領(lǐng)域外的實(shí)踐中并未明確將CBDR 原則列為一般原則，但其中的具體規(guī)定亦在一定程度上反映和體現(xiàn)了CBDR 原則，也有學(xué)者認(rèn)為可以將CBDR 原則引入氣候變化領(lǐng)域外的其他領(lǐng)域。通過(guò)對(duì)CBDR 原則的內(nèi)涵、條約實(shí)踐和判例的考察，并結(jié)合對(duì)該原則兩大要素的分析，不難看出，在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家負(fù)有歷史責(zé)任的塑料污染治理中，引入CBDR 原則具有一定的可行性。筆者認(rèn)為，在INC-1 及INC-2 的會(huì)議進(jìn)程中，部分國(guó)家代表團(tuán)要求考慮在塑料污染的國(guó)際立法中納入CBDR 原則的提議具有充分的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)基礎(chǔ)。

然而，從目前的談判進(jìn)展看，CBDR 原則的適用需要考慮多方面因素，特別是發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家與發(fā)展中國(guó)家之間的政治意愿不同，如何在兩大陣營(yíng)中達(dá)成一致是一個(gè)巨大的挑戰(zhàn)。因此，CBDR 原則最終能否引入新國(guó)際文書(shū)，仍需要參考INC 主席古斯塔沃·梅薩-夸德拉未來(lái)準(zhǔn)備的國(guó)際文書(shū)“零草案”以及定于2023 年11 月13 至19 日于肯尼亞內(nèi)羅畢召開(kāi)的政府間談判委員會(huì)第三屆會(huì)議（INC-3）以及未來(lái)的后續(xù)談判工作。

On the Applicability of the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Legislation on Marine Plastic Pollution

ZHOU Shengquan, SHI Yubing*

Abstract: The second session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, established by the United Nations Environment Programme to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, came to a close on 2 June 2023. Since the first session, delegations from several States, including China, have advocated for the incorporation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in the future international instrument. However, there is currently no treaty practice that directly applies this principle in areas beyond climate change. In this context,this paper delves into the origins and implications of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and takes an empirical approach to analyze its applicability in international legislation on plastic pollution, particularly in the marine environment. The aim is to enable future international instruments regulating marine plastic pollution to effectively strike a balance between the interests of developed and developing States.

Key Words: Principle of common but differentiated responsibilities; Plastic pollution; Marine plastic pollution; UNEP; INC-2

* ZHOU Shengquan, South China Sea Institute, Xiamen University, China, e-mail:zhoushengquan@stu.xmu.edu.cn; SHI Yubing, Professor, South China Sea Institute, Ph.D in Law, Xiamen University, China.

?THE AUTHORS AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

I. Introduction

In resolution 5/14 of 2 March 2022 entitledEndplasticpollution:Towards aninternationallegallybindinginstrument, the United Nations Environment Assembly requested the United Nations Environment Programme (hereinafter “UNEP”) to convene an intergovernmental negotiating committee to begin its work during the second half of 2022, with the ambition of completing that work by the end of 2024. The first and second sessions of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (hereinafter “INC”), established by1See United Nations Environment Programme, Scenario note for the first session of the intergovernmental negotiating committee to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment, UNEP website (27 Nov 2022), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/4131 3/Scenario_note_E.pdf.UNEP to develop an international legally binding instrument on plastic pollution, including in the marine environment(hereinafter “INC-1” and “INC-2”, respectively), took place at Punta del Este Convention and Exhibition Center in Uruguay from 28 November to 2 December 2022, and at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO) Headquarters in Paris, France, from 29 May to 2 June 2023.

During the proceedings of INC-1 and INC-2, several delegations and contact groups, including those from States and regions including China, Argentina, Latin America and the Caribbean,2See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 28 November 2022, ISSD website (10 Dec 2022), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marineenvironment-negotiating-committee-inc1-daily-report-28nov2022.South Africa, Senegal,3See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 30 November 2022, ISSD website (10 Dec 2022), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marineenvironment-negotiating-committee-inc1-daily-report-30nov2022.India, the Philippines,4See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 31 May 2023,ISSD website (7 Jun 2023), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marine-environmentnegotiating-committee-inc2-daily-report-31may2023;and Contact Group 2,5See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Daily report for 1 June 2023, ISSD website (7 Jun 2023), https://enb.iisd.org/plastic-pollution-marine-environment-negotiatingcommittee-inc2-daily-report-1jun2023;called for the consideration of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (hereinafter “CBDR Principle”) in their general statements and discussions regarding the scope, objectives, and options for the structure of the instrument. These proposals represent the political will of some participating governments and should garner attention from the international community. However, there is no getting around the fact that the CBDR Principle has, thus far, been explicitly applicable only in the context of climate change. There remains a debate on whether this principle should be applicable to plastic pollution,particularly in the marine environment, which requires further exploration. To address this issue, this paper will embark on a two-fold journey. First, we will delve into the origins and implications of the CBDR Principle and provide a summary of its reflection and embodiment outside the field of climate change. Subsequently,we will conduct an in-depth analysis of the applicability of the CBDR Principle in the context of marine plastic pollution and provide insights into the specific ways it might be incorporated into future international instruments addressing plastic pollution.

II. Origins and Implications of the CBDR Principle

The CBDR Principle has gone through a significant period of development and intensive transformation, ultimately evolving to become a fundamental principle in the realm of climate change. In this section, the term “origins” refers to the evolution of the CBDR Principle specifically within the field of climate change,and the term “implications” refers to the essential concepts embodied by the CBDR Principle, namely, “common interests” and “substantive fairness”.6See JI Hua, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and International Climate Change Legal Regime, China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2022, p. 64-72.

A.OriginsoftheCBDRPrinciple

The evolution of the CBDR Principle can be categorized into three stages:Initial formation, concrete establishment, and further development.

1. Initial Formation of the CBDR Principle

It is widely acknowledged in the academic community that the CBDR Principle began to take shape after the emergence of international environmental law. The birth of international environmental law was marked by the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm and the adoption of theDeclarationofthe UnitedNationsConferenceontheHumanEnvironment(hereinafter “Stockholm Declaration”). For the first time,7See LIN Canling, et al., The Emergence and Development of International Environmental Law, People’s Court Press, 2006, p. 50. (in Chinese)theStockholmDeclarationintroduced the concepts of common and differentiated responsibilities in the field of the environment. For instance, theStockholmDeclarationprovided that “the protection and improvement of the human environment is a major issue which affects the wellbeing of peoples and economic development throughout the world; it is the urgent desire of the peoples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments”8Art. 2 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.and that “the environmental policies of all States should enhance and not adversely affect the present or future development potential of developing countries…”9Art. 11 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.Despite the cautiously phrased expression, it indeed implies the emergence of the concepts of “common responsibility” and “differentiated responsibility” at the time. However,the CBDR Principle was not firmly established during that period but rather in the “initial formation” stage. This was primarily due to the fact that the developing States, which later became key proponents of the CBDR Principle, had different priorities during the Conference on the Human Environment. Their focus was more on shaping a new international economic order rather than global environmental cooperation. Consequently, the conditions for solidifying the CBDR Principle were not yet ripe at that time.10See KOU Li, Common-but-differentiated Responsibilities: Its Evolution, Attributes and Functions, Science of Law (Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law),Vol. 4, p. 95-103. (in Chinese)

2. Establishment of the CBDR Principle

The CBDR Principle was explicitly set out in theUnitedNationsFramework ConventiononClimateChange(hereinafter “UNFCCC”), which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 9 May 1992 and opened for signature at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June that same year, as well as in theRioDeclarationon EnvironmentandDevelopment(hereinafter “RioDeclaration”) adopted during the conference. It is provided in the preamble of UNFCCC that “… Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all States and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions …”11Preamble of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.Similarly,theRioDeclarationstates that “… In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities…”12Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.

In the meantime, theRioDeclarationalso mentions that “… The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command.”13Ibid.This provision highlights the historical responsibility of developed States in addressing climate change, while also recognizing the current varying circumstances between developed and developing States. The two key elements of “historical responsibility” and “national capacity” embodied therein are seen as the foundational prerequisites for the application of the CBDR Principle.

In a nutshell, the provisions of the UNFCCC and theRioDeclarationreflect the global community’s perspective and stance towards climate change during the 1990s. They mark a period when countries were deepening their understanding of the CBDR Principle and seeking “substantive fairness” in addressing climate change. Regrettably, both instruments, while acknowledging the CBDR Principle,did not provide more detailed and specific provisions on that basis, leaving room for further development in the practical application of the CBDR Principle.

3. Further Development of the CBDR Principle

The CBDR Principle was made concrete in theKyotoProtocol, which was adopted at the third session of the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC in 1997. In simple terms, theKyotoProtocoldelineated greenhouse gas reduction commitments for developed States while not imposing mandatory reduction obligations on developing States. The protocol’s dichotomy approach, characterized by strict adherence to the CBDR Principle, ignited substantial disagreements and more heated debates between developed and developing States regarding the principle’s applicability, surpassing previous levels of contention.

TheParisAgreement, adopted in 2015, set a clear course and objectives for global collaboration in addressing climate change beyond 2020. It is widely recognized as a holistically balanced, long-lasting, and effective international climate accord that is legally binding.14ZHU Lisong & GAO Xiang, From Copenhagen to Paris: Changes and Developments in the International Climate Regime, Tsinghua University Press, 2017, p. 247. (in Chinese)While the CBDR Principle is explicitly mentioned multiple times in theParisAgreement, its content has evolved to include elements of “common but differentiated responsibilities, respective capabilities, and different national circumstances”.15ZHOU Chen, On the Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Principle In the Context of Carbon Neutrality, Wuhan University Journal (Philosophy & Social Science), Vol. 2, p.152-163 (2023). (in Chinese)The previous dichotomy approach established by theKyotoProtocol, which mandated emission reductions for developed States and voluntary participation for developing States, has transitioned into a new model based on “nationally determined contributions”, where all parties are included in the scope of greenhouse gas emissions reduction efforts.16Art. 4 of the Paris Agreement.Following theParis Agreement, theGlasgowClimatePact, adopted at the twenty-sixth session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, maintained a steadfast stance on the CBDR Principle, and it reviewed and reaffirmed the provisions related to the CBDR Principle outlined in theParisAgreement.17United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Glasgow Climate Pact,UNFCCC website (15 Dec 2022), https://unfccc.int/documents/310475.

B.ImplicationsoftheCBDRPrinciple

It is evident from the above that the CBDR Principle itself is constantly evolving and changing. Some scholars argue that, over the years, there has been a significant shift in the implications of the CBDR Principle, particularly in relation to its two elements: “Common responsibility” and “differentiated responsibility”.18See SHI Yubing, Climate Change and International Shipping: The Regulatory Framework for the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Brill Nijhoff, 2017, p. 86-89.However, this paper holds that the essence of the CBDR Principle has not undergone substantial changes. As indicated by the name itself, the principle encompasses two aspects - common and differentiated responsibility -which directly convey the implications of the CBDR Principle, namely, “common interests” and “substantive fairness”.19Supra note 6, JI Hua. (in Chinese)

1. Common Interests Embodied in Common Responsibility

As previously mentioned, the concept of “common responsibility” initially appeared in theStockholmDeclarationand was further acknowledged in subsequent instruments such as the UNFCCC and theKyotoProtocol. The primary rationale behind advocating for common responsibility among States in the realms of both environment and climate change lies in the holistic nature of Earth’s ecosystem. Any harm inflicted on a component within this interconnected system will inevitably have repercussions on the entire ecosystem. Furthermore, there exists a direct correlation between the common interests of humanity and Earth’s ecosystem as a whole. Therefore, issues related to the environment and climate change have impacts on humanity at the level of common interests. It is for this reason that all States need to assume common responsibility for these issues.

2. Substantive Fairness Embodied in Differentiated Responsibility

In the pursuit of substantive fairness, the CBDR Principle introduces the concept of “differentiated responsibility”. According to Principle 7 of theRio Declaration, this differentiated responsibility arises from two main sources:the historical responsibility of a State and its current national capacity. As previously mentioned, these two key elements are considered prerequisites for the application of the CBDR Principle.20Supra note 12.Since the Industrial Revolution, long-standing industrialized developed States have caused unprecedented destruction to Earth’s ecosystem, which is a major contributor to the current environmental status. In response to the environmental damage within their own borders, these developed States have started relocating high-pollution and high-emission industries to areas outside their borders, shifting pollution and emissions to developing States.Additionally, developed States, albeit having a relatively small population in the global context, constitute the major contributors to the current global environmental pollution. Based on the Polluter-pays Principle, developed States should take historical responsibility for environmental damage. On the other hand, developing States, constrained by their current national capacity, have limited capabilities for environmental governance after undertaking the pollution and emissions transferred to them from developed States. They often struggle to fully express their intentions through their own resources. Furthermore, many developing States are populous nations, and to protect their people’s livelihoods, they must further industrialize to boost economic growth. Therefore, to achieve substantive fairness between developing and developed States, it is essential for these nations to shoulder differentiated responsibilities.

Considering the varying capacities and unique national circumstances of developing States, theParisAgreementacknowledges the challenges these nations encounter when it comes to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, it offers relatively flexible provisions for developing States, essentially allowing the practical application of differentiated responsibilities. Beyond the previously mentioned nationally determined contributions, theParisAgreementalso includes detailed provisions concerning financial support, technology transfer, and capacitybuilding. Notably, it provides concrete measures for strengthening capacitybuilding efforts.21See Art. 11 of the Paris Agreement.

III. Reflection and Embodiment of the CBDR Principle Outside the Field of Climate Change

While the CBDR Principle initially emerged and evolved within the realm of climate change, there exist treaties and precedents that can reflect and embody the CBDR Principle in fields beyond climate change.

A.ConventiononBiologicalDiversity

Since 1988, when British ecologist Norman Myers first identified tropical rainforest “hotspots” with exceptional levels of plant endemism and serious levels of habitat loss,22See Norman Myers, Threatened biotas: “Hot spots” in tropical forests, Environmentalist,Vol. 8:3, p. 187-208 (1988).multiple intergovernmental organizations have worked for years to identify a total of 36 “biodiversity hotspots” by 2016. These hotspots are recognized as Earth’s most biologically rich—yet threatened—terrestrial regions.23See Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund, Biodiversity Hotspots Defined, CEPF website (15 Dec 2022), https://www. cepf.net/our-work/biodiversity-hotspots/hotspots-defined.

Figure 1 Global Distribution Map of Biodiversity Hotspots24Figure 1 is a map of the global distribution of biodiversity hotspots produced by Kellee Koenig, see https://zenodo.org/record/4311850#.Y66f FfVBze9。

The global distribution of biodiversity hotspots reveals that the majority of biodiversity is currently found in developing States across South-East Asia, Africa,and South America. However, due to capacity constraints, developing States often struggle to effectively protect their biodiversity. Additionally, in the realm related to biodiversity utilization like biotechnology, it wasn’t until the 21st century that significant advancements emerged in these nations.25See The World Academy of Science, Biotechnology: A growing field in the developing world, TWAS website (15 Dec 2022), https://twas.org/article/biotechnology-growing-fielddeveloping-world.Historically, the utilization of biodiversity was primarily the domain of developed States. As a consequence,many of these nations have already witnessed substantial losses in their own biodiversity. Therefore, developed States, owing to their historical responsibility,have a duty to financially support biodiversity conservation efforts in developing States and to share the benefits reaped from utilizing biodiversity with developing States.

Although the CBDR Principle is not explicitly mentioned in theConvention onBiologicalDiversity(hereinafter “CBD”), it is implicitly reflected and embodied in the CBD’s text. For instance, the preamble of CBD states that “Affirming that the conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind”.Article 20, paragraph 2 thereof provides that “The developed country Parties shall provide new and additional financial resources to enable developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of implementing measures which fulfill the obligations of this Convention and to benefit from its provisions”.26Preamble, Article 20 (2) of the Convention on Biological Diversity.Additionally, Articles 15, 16, and 19 of the CBD, which address access to genetic resources, access to and transfer of technology, and handling of biotechnology and distribution of its benefits, respectively, effectively manifest the differentiation in responsibility between developed and developing States. Some scholars argue that the “Rio Principles”, including the CBDR Principle, should serve as the foundational pillars of the CBD framework, emphasizing that developed States should acknowledge their historical responsibility regarding biodiversity loss.27See Viviana Mu?oz Tellez, Proposals to Advance the Negotiations of the Post 2020 Biodiversity Framework, the South Centre website, (15 Dec 2022), https://www.southcentre.int/policy-brief-90-march-2021/.

B.GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade

Within numerous agreements of the World Trade Organization (hereinafter “WTO”), developing States are offered more lenient obligations, such as special preferences, technical assistance, and phased implementation.28See Joost Pauwelyn, The End of Differential Treatment for Developing Countries?Lessons from the Trade and Climate Change Regimes, Review of European Community &International Environmental Law, Vol. 22:1, p. 29-41 (2013).In the realm of trade mechanisms, it can be said that the WTO acknowledges the disparities in national capacity and development needs between developing and developed States, and as a result, grants them correspondingly “differentiated” obligations.Some scholars argue that developed States should shoulder “a moral responsibility to pay a disproportionate share of the costs”.29See Robyn Eckersley, Understanding the interplay between the climate and trade regimes,Climate and Trade Polici es in a Post-2012 World, United Nations Environment Programme,2009, p. 11-18.This perspective stems from the fact that developed States have historically reaped significant benefits from trade, while developing States face considerably higher costs in conducting trade activities.These costs can be attributed, in part, to historical actions such as the colonization perpetrated by developed States against developing States. In other words,developed States bear a certain level of “historical responsibility” for the elevated costs associated with trade activities in developing States.

The CBDR Principle is also reflected and embodied in theGeneralAgreement onTariffsandTrade(hereinafter “GATT”). For instance, Article XXXVI of the GATT mentions that “… (c) noting, that there is a wide gap between standards of living in less-developed countries and other countries; (d) recognizing that individual and joint action is essential to further the development of the economies of less-developed contracting parties and to bring about a rapid advance in the standards of living in these countries; … ”, and that “… (c) have special regard to the trade interests of less-developed contracting parties when considering the application of other measures permitted under this Agreement to meet particular problems …”30Arts. 36, 37 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.Additionally, provisions within theDecisiononDifferential&More FavorableTreatment,Reciprocity&FullerParticipationofDevelopingCountries,adopted in the Tokyo Round in 1979, also reflect and embody the CBDR Principle to some extent.

C.AdvisoryOpinionNo.17oftheInternationalTribunalfortheLawof theSeaontheResponsibilitiesandObligationsofStatesSponsoring PersonsandEntitieswithRespecttoActivitiesintheArea

Advisory Opinion No. 17 of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea(hereinafter “ITLOS”) on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area (hereinafter “Advisory Opinion No. 17”) was requested by the Council of the International Seabed Authority and submitted to ITLOS on 6 May 2010. In addressing the question “What are the legal responsibilities and obligations of States Parties to the Convention with respect to the sponsorship of activities in the Area”, ITLOS provided explanations in Part VII “Interests and needs of developing States” of the advisory opinion.

In the Advisory Opinion, ITLOS first clarified that the general provisions concerning the responsibilities and liability of the sponsoring State apply equally to all sponsoring States, whether developing or developed. This is to prevent the spread of sponsoring States “of convenience”. ITLOS also noted that these observations “do not exclude that rules setting out direct obligations of the sponsoring State could provide for different treatment for developed and developing sponsoring States.”31See International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), ITLOS website (15 Dec 2022), https://itlos.org/main/cases/list-ofcases/case-no-17/.However, in the Advisory Opinion, ITLOS only mentioned the theoretical basis for such “differentiated” treatment, which stems from provisions in theUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS)concerning the facilitation of activities in the Area by developing States and special consideration for their interests and needs, as found in the preamble, Article 140(1),Article 148, among others. In other words, concerning the issue of States assuming sponsoring responsibilities for persons or entities with respect to activities in the Area, ITLOS extends preferential treatment to developing States, primarily considering their inadequate capabilities while leaving out of consideration the historical responsibilities of developed States akin to those discussed in the context of climate change or as mentioned in CBD and GATT. It is important to note that the reference to “capabilities” by ITLOS “is only a broad and imprecise reference to the differences in developed and developing States. What counts in a specific situation is the level of scientific knowledge and technical capability available to a given State in the relevant scientific and technical fields.”32Ibid.

IV. Applicability of the CBDR Principle in International Legislation on Marine Plastic Pollution

A.TheFieldofMarinePlasticPollutionMeetstheElementsforthe ApplicationoftheCBDRPrinciple

As noted earlier, the elements for the application of the CBDR Principle include two key aspects: “developed States bearing historical responsibility for environmental issues” and “differing capabilities between developed and developing States.” The development situation of marine plastic pollution aligns closely with these two requirements.

1. The Emergence of Marine Plastic Pollution Largely Attributable to the Historical Responsibility of Developed States

According to a report by UNEP, “Of the seven billion tonnes of plastic waste generated globally so far, less than 10 per cent has been recycled. Millions of tonnes of plastic waste are lost to the environment,” and “nearly 80% of global annual riverine plastic emissions into the ocean, which range between 0.8 and 2.7 million tonnes per year, with small urban rivers amongst the most polluting.”33United Nations Environment Programme, Our planet is choking on plastic, UNEP website(15 Dec 2022), https://www.unep.org/interactives/beat-plastic-pollution/?gclid=EAIaIQobC hMIrur3y62m_AIVDJ1LBR24GQ5dEAAYASAAEgJBTfD_BwE.With regard to the increasingly serious situation of marine plastic pollution, landbased plastic waste constitutes a major contributor to marine plastic pollution, in particular marine microplastic pollution. Over 80 per cent of marine microplastics originate from land-based plastic waste.34See Hrissi K. Karapanagioti, Ioannis K. Kalavrouziotis: Microplastics in Water and Wastewater, translated by AN Lihui, et al., China Environment Publishing Group, 2022, p. 1.(in Chinese)

Compared to developing States, developed States exhibit extremely high per capita plastic waste generation. According to data from Kara Lavender Law et al. in 2020, in 2016, the United States population generated the world’s largest amount of plastic waste, as did its annual per capita plastic waste production, surpassing 130 kilograms per person per year. The European Union, despite having a population roughly 40% that of China, still generated more plastic waste than China in total.Additionally, States like the United Kingdom, Germany, and South Korea also showed notably high per capita plastic waste production.35See Kara Lavender Law et al., The United States’ contribution of plastic waste to land and ocean, Science Advances, Vol. 6:44, eabd0288 (2020).

Table 1 Ranking of Annual per Capita Plastic Waste Production in Selected Countries, 201636Table 1 was produced by this paper based on data from the paper The United States’contribution of plastic waste to land and ocean by Kara Lavender Law et al.

The 1970s and 1980s saw increasingly stringent environmental policies in developed States in response to progressively worsening environmental issues.These States, faced with high waste disposal costs, chose to export their waste to developing States in order to avoid the problem of waste disposal. As the National Academy of Sciences highlighted in its 2022 reportReckoningwiththeU.S.Rolein GlobalOceanPlasticWaste, “Internationally, advanced economies externalize the cost of waste management by exporting plastic waste to less advanced economies,who ultimately bear the brunt of the economic, social, and environmental costs of plastic waste. Before 2018, the United States exported most of its plastic waste to China. After China banned most plastic waste imports, the United States diverted its exported waste to other Southeastern Asian countries.”37National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Reckoning with the U.S. Role in Global Ocean Plastic Waste, The National Academies Press, 2022, p. 30.

On 18 July 2017, the General Office of the State Council issued theImplementationPlanforProhibitingtheEntryofForeignGarbageandAdvancing theReformoftheSolidWasteImportAdministrationSystem(hereinafter “Waste Ban”), marking China’s official ban on the entry of “foreign waste”. Prior to this,China was the largest destination for “foreign waste” worldwide, and plastic waste was a vital part of it. According to the import and export data from 2000 to 2004 and 2013 to 2017 in the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), Hong Kong, China, the United States, Japan, and Germany had long been among the top exporters of plastic waste to China, which means that China had long served as a “plastic waste collection pool” for developed States.

Note that, in spite of the Hong Kong region’s longstanding high ranking in the list of countries (regions) exporting plastic waste to China, as shown in Tables 2 and 3, much of this exported plastic waste was actually transshipped locally within Hong Kong. By comparing the import and export data of plastic waste in Hong Kong from 2013 to 2017, it becomes evident that Hong Kong had played a part in processing and handling a portion of the imported plastic waste, which still originally came from developed States including the United States, Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom.

Table 2 China’s Plastic Waste Import Data in 2000-2004 (unit: 10,000 tons)38Tables 2-6 were produced by this paper based on data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), with the data retained to two decimal places.

Table 3 China’s Plastic Waste Import Data in 2013-2017 (unit: 10,000 tons)

United Kingdom 21.91 27.58 19.88 25.2 14.39 108.96

Table 4 Hong Kong’s Imports of Plastic Waste and Exports to the Chinese Mainland, 2013-2017 (unit: 10,000 tons)

Following China’s implementation of the Waste Ban, developed States shifted their focus to Southeast Asian nations as new destinations for exporting plastic waste in an attempt to transfer the cost of waste disposal. According to a report by Greenpeace, the global share of waste plastic imports from ASEAN countries rose dramatically from 5.38% in 2016 to 27% in 2018.39Greenpeace, Southeast Asia’s Struggles against the Plastic Waste Trade, Greenpeace website, (15 Dec 2022), https://www.greenpeace.org/malaysia/publication/1905/southeastasias-struggle-against-the-plastic-waste-trade/.For instance, Vietnam and Malaysia experienced a sharp and almost exponential rise in their imports of plastic waste from 2015 to 2018, with the waste source countries remaining developed States. It is worth noting that Malaysia also implemented a number of restrictive policies on plastic waste imports in 2018, which contributed to a decrease in the total amount of plastic waste it imported compared to 2017.

Table 5 Vietnam’s Plastic Waste Imports before and after China’s Introduction of Waste Ban (unit: 10,000 tons)

Table 6 Malaysia’s Plastic Waste Imports before and after China’s Introduction of Waste Ban (unit: 10,000 tons)

Undoubtedly, the import and export of plastic waste is a commercial activity in itself. However, the practice adopted by developed States of shifting the responsibility for waste plastic disposal to developing States is essentially an attempt to evade their environmental responsibility. Taking the United States alone as an example, albeit having only 4% of the world’s total population, it produced 17% of the world’s plastic waste in 2016, most of which was exported to developing States.40Supra note 37, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, p. 50.This influx of plastic waste into developing States has led to severe disruptions in their ecological balance, exacerbating local plastic pollution,which, in turn, contributes to the further deterioration of the global ecosystem’s health. It can be argued that the root cause of the current plastic pollution situation lies precisely in the behavior of developed States seeking to evade and transfer their responsibility.

As discussed earlier, it is evident that some developed States have significantly higher per capita plastic waste production compared to developing States.Furthermore, in an attempt to evade the costs and responsibilities associated with plastic waste disposal, they have transferred these burdens to developing States through plastic waste import and export activities. Such behavior has contributed to the current state of plastic pollution. It follows that some developed States bear a “historical responsibility” for the current state of plastic pollution similar to that in the field of climate change, which is in line with the first element for the application of the CBDR Principle.

2. Large Differences in Capacity between Developed and Developing States to Address Marine Plastic Pollution

From a source perspective, inadequate waste management stands out as the primary driver of plastic pollution.41See United Nations Environment Programme, Plastic Science, UNEP website, (27 Nov 2022), https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/41263/Plastic_Science_E.pdf.Waste management correlates positively with a State’s economic capacity and overall governance capabilities. Additionally,addressing marine plastic pollution involves a range of activities that largely depend on a State’s capabilities, including the recycling and disposal of land-based plastic waste, as well as monitoring, collection, and analysis of microplastics in the oceans. However, the capacity of developed and developing States to implement international environmental instruments varies from each other due to their differing levels of development and varying levels of environmental awareness among their populations.42See SUN Kai, Global Marine Plastic Pollution and Its Countermeasures, Governance, Vol.15, p. 44-48. (in Chinese)To illustrate, when it comes to microplastic pollution in the oceans, there is still uncertainty surrounding the sources and actual quantity of microplastics entering the marine environment. Furthermore, a more reliable method for dealing with microplastics has yet to be developed.43See SHANG Shengmei: Pollution Status of Marine Microplastics and Countermeasures,Resources Economization & Environmental Protection, Vol. 2, p. 83-86. (in Chinese)

In UNEA Resolution 5/14 entitled “End plastic pollution: Towards an international legally binding instrument” and the concept note for INC-1, there are multiple instances where it emphasizes “taking into account national circumstances and capabilities” and “taking into account, among other things, the principles of theRioDeclaration, as well as national circumstances and capabilities”. It also calls for the intergovernmental negotiating committee to engage in discussions regarding capacity building, technology transfer, and financial support.44Supra note 1, UNEP; United Nations Environment Programme, End plastic pollution:towards an international legally binding instrument, UNEP website (27 Nov 2022),https://documents-d ds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/K22/007/33/pdf/K2200733.pdf?OpenElement.

Hence, in tackling marine plastic pollution, it is crucial to prioritize the needs of developing States. Developed States should not only address their own plastic pollution issues but also enhance their assistance to developing States in terms of technology, funding, and capacity building.45See UNEP, General Statement by the Delegation of China at the First Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to Develop an International Legally Binding Instrument on Plastic Pollution, UNEP website, https://apps1.unep.org/resolutions/uploads/china_inc-1_statements_0_0.pdf. (in Chinese)It can be contended that there exists a significant disparity in the capacity of developing and developed States to manage marine plastic pollution, thereby fulfilling the second element for the application of the CBDR Principle.

B.ThePurposeofInternationalLegislationonMarinePlasticPollution AlignswiththeImplicationsoftheCBDRPrinciple

As previously discussed, the implications of the CBDR Principle encompass two elements: “common interests” and “substantial fairness”. The primary objective of international legislation on marine plastic pollution is to tackle this global issue and safeguard the global environment, all while considering the varying development needs and capacity disparities among developing States. This implies that international legislation on marine plastic pollution aligns closely with the CBDR Principle.

1. “Common Interests” in International Legislation on Marine Plastic Pollution

The interdependence of humans and the environment underscores the vital need to protect both. Preserving the environment is, fundamentally, preserving the essence of human survival. Consequently, a joint global effort is imperative to progressively enhance and restore the living environment, while confronting the challenges collectively.

Plastics, as new polymer materials that emerged in the last century, have gained popularity due to their stability. However, it is precisely these characteristics that make plastics challenging in the environment because they don’t readily break down but rather accumulate over time. Even plastics labeled as “degradable” will take a considerable amount of time to degrade under strict degradation conditions,and the ultimate extent of degradation depends on the type and quality of the plastic itself.46See JIN Yan, et al., Advance in the degradation of biodegradable plastics in different environments, Chinese Journal of Biotechnology, Vol. 5, p.1784-1808 (2021).In the realm of marine plastic pollution, the prevailing issue is microplastic pollution. Current research indicates that microplastics have been detected in surface waters and seafloor sediments across various marine regions.47See Ian Kane, et al., Seafloor microplastic hotspots controlled by deep-sea circulation,Science, Vol. 368:6495, p. 1140-1145 (2020).

Figure 2 Global distribution of marine microplastics48Figure 2 is a map of marine microplastic concentrations produced by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the United States, see https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/b296879cc1984fda833a8acc93e31476/page/Page/?views=Map-Viewer%2CDisplay-Filters.

Plastic pollution poses multidimensional and deep-seated threats to the marine environment. Firstly, microorganisms and algae can attach to and grow on the surface of plastics. Due to ocean currents, these plastics can be easily carried across borders, allowing foreign organisms to invade and destroy the habitats of native organisms in the affected areas. Secondly, microplastics, being very small in size,can be mistakenly ingested by marine organisms.49See XIA Bing, et al., Research Progress on Microplastics Pollution in Marine Fishery Water and Their Biological Effects, Progress in Fishery Sciences, Vol. 3, p. 178-180 (2019).Once ingested, they accumulate within the marine food chain, eventually making their way into the human body when humanity fish and consume seafood.50See Chukwuma Muanya, Okra, Aloe employed to filter microplastics out of wastewater, the Guardian (31 Mar 2022), https://guardian.ng/features/health/okra-aloe-employed-to-filtermicroplastics-out-of-wastewater/.Research has found microplastics in human blood, and although scholars believe that the exact effects on human health are still uncertain, the World Health Organization acknowledges that there is a higher likelihood of human absorption of tiny microplastics.51See WHO, WHO calls for more research into microplastics and a crackdown on plastic pollution, WHO website (22 Aug 2019), https://www.who.int/zh/news-room/detail/22-08-2019-who-calls-for-more-research-into-microplastics-and-a-crackdown-on-plasticpollution. (in Chinese)Additionally, marine life often ingests by mistake undegraded plastics, which they cannot digest, leading to their eventual death.

The oceans and seas constitute a crucial element within earth’s ecosystem,and the responsibility for safeguarding the planet’s ecological environment is a shared obligation among all States. No State can shirk that duty. As XI Jinping has articulated, “Humanity is a community with a shared future, and thus protecting the environment is a challenge and a duty which all of us around the globe must face together.”52XI Jinping, Pushing China’s Development of an Ecological Civilization to a New Stage,Fendou, Vol. 2019:3, p. 1-16.Plastic pollution is gradually eroding the stability of marine ecosystems and potentially jeopardizing human health and safety. Consequently,the international community must take collective responsibility for addressing this issue. Some scholars argue that incorporating the Full Life Cycle Approach (FLCA)could garner support for the CBDR Principle in future instruments. However, it poses challenges in accurately allocating responsibilities among States with varying national circumstances and capabilities.53See WANG Sen, International law-making process of combating plastic pollution: Status Quo, debates and prospects, Marine Policy, Vol. 147, 105376 (2023).Hence, in the subsequent negotiations regarding international instruments on plastic pollution, there is a need for more indepth discussions on topics such as national capacities.

2. “Substantive Fairness” in International Legislation on Marine Plastic Pollution

Developed States’ transfer of significant amounts of plastic waste to developing States substantially reduces their costs associated with waste disposal and also sidesteps the potential environmental ramifications that might emerge during the waste disposal process within their own territories. In contrast, developing States,albeit with limited benefits from the utilization of plastic waste, are often unable to avoid the spread of contamination during the waste disposal process due to their restricted capacities, leading to direct damage to their domestic environments. As discussed earlier, the elements of “historical responsibility” and “national capacity” in the context of marine plastic pollution have been elucidated. These two elements are also two determinants in the practical implementation of substantive fairness.Therefore, there is potential for the realization of substantive fairness in the realm of marine plastic pollution.

Nonetheless, this practical implementation may need to be underpinned by thorough scientific analysis and assessment. In light of the current state of negotiations, as this paper holds, UNEP can take a page from the regulatory model seen in theParisAgreementfor future international instruments on plastic pollution. Building upon a scientific analysis and assessment of the historical responsibility, national capacity, and unique national circumstances, UNEP can differentiate between States with greater responsibility for plastic pollution,particularly in the marine environment, and those significantly affected by it.Also, specific provisions can be made for the notification and implementation of nationally determined contributions, technology transfer, financial support, and capacity-building to assign responsibilities to various States. The aim is to finalize the implementation of substantive fairness, which will be conducive to the actual management of plastic pollution.

V. Conclusion

Notwithstanding an absence of the CBDR Principle being explicitly listed as a general principle in existing practices outside the field of climate change,the specific provisions therein do, to some extent, reflect and embody the CBDR Principle. There are also some scholars arguing that the CBDR Principle can be extended to fields beyond climate change. By delving into the essence of the CBDR Principle, treaty practices, and precedents, along with an analysis of the two main elements of the CBDR Principle, it becomes evident that introducing the CBDR Principle into the governance of plastic pollution, where developed States bear historical responsibility, is feasible. In the opinion of this paper, the proposal made by certain State delegations during the INC-1 and INC-2 to consider incorporating the CBDR Principle into international legislation on plastic pollution is wellfounded, both theoretically and practically.

However, the current progress of negotiations reveals that the application of the CBDR Principle must be carefully considered in light of various factors.Notably, given the divergent political wills between developed and developing States, reaching consensus among the two major camps poses a significant challenge. As such, whether the CBDR principle can ultimately be integrated into new international instruments hinges on the “zero draft” international instrument being prepared by INC Chair Gustavo Meza-Cuadra, as well as the upcoming third session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC-3) scheduled to convene in Nairobi, Kenya from 13 to 19 November 2023, and subsequent negotiations.

Translators: CHEN Cong, YAN Lilan

Editor (English): HUANG Yuxin