郭一鳴

【摘? 要】研究開發(fā)了兩級閉環(huán)供應鏈（CLSC）的定量模型，以研究制造商對渠道投資、定價的決策，主要考慮了產品價格和消費者的敏感性問題，研究了供應鏈各成員主導情況下的分散決策博弈模型，得出了制造商對渠道的投資與回收率和零售價格成正比這一結論。在研究最佳逆向回收渠道時，由第三方主導的回收模式效率最低，制造商主導與零售商主導兩種模式的選擇由轉讓價格決定，如果轉讓價格超過了每件二手產品的平均回收利潤，則零售商領導的逆向物流是最佳的，否則，制造商主導的回收是最佳的。

【Abstract】A quantitative model of two-level closed loop supply chains （CLSC） is developed to study the manufacturer's decision-making on channel investment and pricing， mainly considering product price and consumer sensitivity. This paper studies the decentralized decision-making game model under the condition that each member of the supply chain dominates. It is concluded that the manufacturer's investment in the channel is directly proportional to the recovery rate and retail price. In the study of the best reverse recycling channel， the efficiency of the third-party led recycling mode is the lowest， and the choice of manufacturer led and retailer led modes is determined by the transfer price. If the transfer price exceeds the average recycling profit of each second-hand product， the retailer led reverse logistics is the best， otherwise， the manufacturer led recycling is the best.

【關鍵詞】閉環(huán)供應鏈;供應鏈協(xié)調;渠道投資

【Keywords】closed loop supply chains; supply chain coordination; channel investment

【中圖分類號】F830.59? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?【文獻標志碼】A? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?【文章編號】1673-1069（2020）06-0085-04