Dorothea Rohde

University of Bielefeld

1. Expenditures of Athens in the fifth and fourth century BC

One of the advantages of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) is the broad understanding of institutions, which allows the re-introduction of morals, values and norms into economic theory. This opens the way for an analysis of economic changes over the course of history. The investigation of public finances under the perspective of NIE makes it clear that the way in which any given society spends its money for common purposes mirrors public discourse. In this way, public income as well as public expenditures reflect the values of a specific society.1Cf. Rohde 2012; 2015; 2017; 2019, 35-151 (ch. 2).Athens is, in this respect, an illustrative example: because the Athenians saw themselves as a political, religious and military union and in some ways even as a collective based on kinship, they financed public tasks that may be differentiated into four categories. First, to enable the citizens to participate in politics - in the public courts, as a councillor or as a magistrate - the Athenians introduced the mistophoria: a small amount of money to compensate for expenses or the loss of profit while performing the task.2Cf. for the misthophoria, Gabrielsen 1981; Gauthier 2010; Hansen 2014; Migeotte 2014, 576-577; Pritchard 2014 and 2015, 63-80; Rohde 2019, 37-45.Second, the polis was, from its very beginning, a military alliance in which political rights corresponded to the military obligation to defend the community. But “defending the community” is a broad term that can be used in public discourse for a wide range of activities: securing the core territory, maintaining influence in neighbouring areas or demonstrating dominance in regions of special interest. The polis thus spent much money on fortifications, soldiers, rowers, and war ships. Third, from the conception of the polis as a military unit the idea arises that all citizens share a common destiny.3Cf., for instance, Lys. 24.22: “For, Council, since a god had deprived us of the highest offices, the city voted us this money, regarding the chances of evil and of good as the same for all alike.”This meant that the polis was seen as responsible, on the one hand, for men who were not able to earn a living because of severe war injuries and, on the other hand, for war orphans.4On the disability pension, see Bolkestein 1939, 273-274; Garland 1995, 35-38; Fischer 2012. On war orphans, see Aeschin. In Ctes. 154; Isoc. Or. 8.82; cf. Cudjoe 2010; Bearzot 2015.Fourth, beyond the polis’ character as a political and military unit with mutual responsibilities of citizens and community, it was also a religious community with a number of expensive rituals. Not only did the Athenians sacrifice hundreds of animals year after year.5Cf., for example, the dermatikon accounts (IG II2 1496).They also celebrated the gods with elaborate lyrical performances and athletic contests. Such public tasks, performed in the social, political, military and religious spheres required architectural structures of which the complex on the acropolis is the most impressive today. Nearly all these expenditures came to a sudden end with the victory of the Spartans and the tyrannical regime in 404 BC.

Early scholarship saw in the years after the Peloponnesian War a period of decline - an image of the fourth century that has changed significantly in the scholarship of recent decades. This is not least due to our detailed knowledge of expenditures, which increased considerably in the period after 400 BC.6Cf. Pritchard 2012 and 2015; Rohde 2019, 35-151 (ch. 2).Shortly after the defeat of Athens and her allies, public expenditure was increased. From now on the Athenians received an ekklesiastikon for attending the assembly,7[Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 41.3.the meeting place on the Pnyx was monumentalised,8On the building history of the Pnyx, see Travlos 1971, 466-476; Thompson 1982; Hansen 1995, 131-132; Forsén 1996; Camp 1996; Rotroff 1996; Stanton 1996; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 31-38 with 170, fig. 7; Knell 2000, 55-62; Tozzi 2016, 36-47.the long walls were rebuilt,9Conon was celebrated for having made it possible - partly financed by Persian money - to rebuild the long walls (Xen. Hell. 4.4.2; 4.8.8-14; Dem. Or. 20.68-70; Diod. Sic. 14.84.4-5; 85.2-3; IG II2 1656-1664; SEG 41.102). Archaeological remains prove that the Athenians decided even before Conon to reconstruct the walls, cf. von Eickstedt 1991, 28-29. Moreover, Athenian allies supported the building project (IG II2 1656 and 1657; Xen. Hell. 4.8.10).a new fleet equipped, and soldiers sent campaigning again.10In the years between 396 and 386 BC and then again between 378 and 338 BC, the Athenians were almost continuously engaged in military activities - and therefore more frequently than in the 5th century. Cf. Cawkwell 1962, 383; Austin 1994, 528; Pritchard 2012, 47.

The expenditures increased again significantly after the Social War and once more after the defeat at Chaironeia. From ca. 350 BC on, the Athenians distributed money to citizens for attending the festivals, the so-called theorika.11On the theorika, see Busolt and Swoboda 1920-1926, II, 1143-1145; van Ooteghem 1932; Buchanan 1962; Cawkwell 1963; Valmin 1965; Rhodes 1972, 105-108 and 235-240; Ruschenbusch 1979a; Faraguna 1992, 187-194; Harris 1996; Flament 2007, 223-231; Wilson 2011, 38-43; Migeotte 2014, 433-435; Rohde 2019, 64-66 and 289-293.In the course of the century, the festivals grew bigger and bigger and were celebrated more splendidly with more offerings and more contests on a rising

number of occasions.12In the last third of the 4th century the Athenians expanded their religious program with eight additional festivals. They included, for instance, a feast for the goddess Eirene (IG II2 1496) and a new κωμ?δο?-competition ([Plut.] Vit. X orat. Lyc. 841 f).Additionally, even if Athens was always concerned with feeding its citizens, the polis intensified its efforts to secure moderate prices for staple food and introduced the sitonia, the publicly funded purchase of grain.13Fantasia 1989; Migeotte 1990 and 1991; Pazdera 2006.In the military sphere, the polis implemented a reform in the military training of the youth who henceforth were equipped by the state.14[Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 42.4. On the ephebate of the 4th century, especially for the Lycurgan reform, see Reinmuth 1952; Pélékidis 1962, 83-157; Ruschenbusch 1979b; Humphreys 1985, 206-209; Burckhardt 1996, 26-75.And above all, the fleet of the fourth century was to outnumber the naval forces of the fifth century.15Cf., for instance, IG II2 1627 col. b, 266-278, where for the year 330/329 BC all together 392 triremes and 18 quadriremes were mentioned.In addition, a couple of new building projects was carried out, of which the enlargement of the theatre and the construction of the so-called Pnyx III are probably the best known.16On the Athenian theatre, see Pickard-Cambridge 1946; Travlos 1971, 537-552; Wurster 1979; Townsend 1982, 90-142; Polacco 1990; Kalligas 1994; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 21-29 with 167, fig. 4 and 177, fig. 15. Knell 2000, 126-147; Isler 2002; Gogos 2008; Tozzi 2016, 48-70. On the building history of the Pnyx, see the literature in n. 9 above.Other monuments were rebuilt or enlarged too, for example the Eleusinian sanctuary17In the years between 370 and 360 BC, the Athenians decided an enlargement of the telesterion. And at the end of the 4th century the Eleusinian sanctuary received new buildings. These included, inter alia, a bouleuterion (IG II2 1078.42-43), a triangular area which enclosed the cave of Pluto, the house of the Kerykes and other buildings (IG II2 1672). Cf. Travlos 1988, 91-169.or the Skeuotheke of Philo that would still be praised in Roman times.18A large inscription informs us about the architectural details, which squares with the archaeological remains. The Skeuotheke was built in the years between 347 BC (IG II2 1668) and 329 BC (IG II2 1627.288, 292, 296, 301-302, 407, 420) with interruptions (Philoch. 55b). See Strabo 9.1.15; Linfert and Mausbach 1981; Untermann 1983; Travlos 1988, 343; Gabrielsen 1994, 149 and 247, n. 10. Garland 2001, 156-158; von Eickstedt 1991, 78-79; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 15-17 with 165, Abb. 1 and 2. Plinius (HN 7.125) and Valerius Maximus (8.12) testify to the reputation of the architect and his buildings.Additionally, monuments with strong links to democratic institutions, such as the monument of the eponymous heroes, got expensive and elaborate new appearances.19Cf. for the the monument of the eponymous heroes, Wycherley 1973, 85-90; T. L. Shear 1970; Travlos 1971, 210-212; Thompson and Wycherley 1972, 38-41; Kron 1976, 228-236; Mattusch 1994; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997, 40-42 with 171, fig. 8; Knell 2000, 93-96; Camp 2010, 66-68.All these expenditures testify to a vital polis with enormous resources in the fourth century - although the Athenians could no longer rely on the tribute of their allies. How was this possible, and what were the wider consequences for society?

2. Liturgies and eisphorai: private wealth for common goods

The Athenian public revenue system consisted of different kinds of income.20Migeotte 2014, 468-548; Rohde 2019, 35-151 (ch. 2) and 189-215.The sources included, for example, traditional forms like the metic tax,21Harpocr. s.v. μετο?κιον. The metoikia as a specific status were established as a consequence of the Periclean citizenship law, so Whitehead 1977, 151-154. Therefore it is to be assumed that the metoikion was introduced at the same time, so Wijma 2014, 159.harbour tolls,22On the harbour tolls, cf. Migeotte 2014, 509-511; Rohde 2019, 51-53.concessions for exploitation of the silver mines,23On the silver mines, see Crosby 1950; Hopper 1953, 1961 and 1968; Kalcyk 1982; Aperghis 1997/1998; Shipton 1998; Thür 2004; Eich 2006, 387-412; Migeotte 2014, 479-483; Shipton 2016.confiscations, fines, and court fees.24Migeotte 2014, 538-540; Rohde 2019, 45-50.If we compare the costs for running the boulé, the assembly, the salary of the magistrates, and the dikasteria on the one hand with the regular and sporadic influx of money on the other hand, it is significant that the “traditional forms of income” - the silver mines, harbour tolls, the fines and confiscations of property etc. - counterbalanced or more likely exceeded the expenditures for financing the democratic institutions.25Rohde 2019, 59.It is not unlikely that the income from these resources could also be used for the support of invalids and war orphans. In addition, the property of the gods and war profits contributed to the religious obligations and to the remuneration of soldiers, sailors and mercenaries, respectively. But as Peter Wilson and David Pritchard have shown, half of the religious activities were not publicly financed but relied on private wealth for the outlays.26Cf. Wilson 2008, 114 for the Dionysia, and Pritchard 2012, 32 and 2015, 27-48 for the Panathenaia. Cf. also Migeotte 2014, 550-552; Rohde 2019, 203-206.That is, public resources, for example sacred property, covered about fifty per cent of the religious expenditures, while liturgists privately financed the other fifty per cent.

The Peloponnesian War - involving long campaigns in distant regions with expensive soldiers and war ships - was a great financial burden, obliging the Athenians to systematically introduce liturgies and eisphorai.27Rohde 2019, 189-215.Liturgies, such as the trierarchy, choregy or other forms shared two basic features. Firstly, they were a somati kai chremasi-task, i.e. financial obligations combined with a personal duty. A citizen had to perform a task, for the choregy to train a chorus and to provide the agents with costumes; for the trierarchy to equip and to accompany a war ship.28On the choregy, see Wilson 2000; on the trierarchy, Gabrielsen 1994.Secondly, not every Athenian, but rather only the wealthiest circa 1,200 men were liable to liturgies.29Dem. Or. 21.155; 14.16-17; Isoc. Or. 15.145; Harpocr. s.v. χ?λιοι διακ?σιοι; Philoch. 45; Poll. 8.100; Schol. Dem. 21.154 and 155.

The amount of money invested in liturgies varied considerably and ranged from circa 300 drachmai to about one talent for the trierarchy, the most expensive liturgy.30For the choregy, cf. the tab. 4.1. in Wilson 2008, 113; for the cost of a trierarchy, cf. Gabrielsen 1994, 216.The comparison between the costs of a trierarchy and the earnings of an average workmen is highly illustrative. A skilled labourer would have had to work more or less constantly for twenty years to earn enough money (1 talent=6,000 drachmai) to defray the minimal costs involved in equipping and maintaining a single war ship for one single year (and this disregards all of the living costs which a labourer would have had, but which would have been incidental to the wealthy who could afford a liturgy).31The daily earnings ranged around one drachma. For the wages in classical times, cf. Zimmermann 1974; Loomis 1998; Eich 2006, 198-204 thinks that the wages to which the Erechtheion-accounts of the year 408/407 BC (IG I3 476) and the Eleusis-accounts of 329/328 BC (IG II2 1672) testify were exceptionally high and caused by specific circumstances. Only skilled labourers earned more than one drachma per day, so Eich (ibid., 201).The economic possibilities in the fourth century must have been enormous otherwise one cannot explain how Athens could constantly run a fleet with more war ships than in the fifth century.32The number of 300 triremes served as an ancient reference point, cf., for instance, Dem. Or. 14.13.That means that, for instance, in its attempts to achieve maritime dominance for securing grain imports, the community depended heavily on the economic resources of its wealthiest members.

But more than that: to optimise this system, several reforms were implemented.33Gabrielsen 1994, 182-213; Rohde 2019, 208-215.They all aimed at equipping the fleet more efficiently and dividing the financial burdens more justly, according to the respective economic capacities of the liturgists. Since the last years of the Peloponnesian War, it was possible for two or more persons to share the financial obligations among themselves. In this case, the so-called syntrierarchs made an agreement. Either every syntrierarch accompanied the trireme for six months, or only one of them performed the personal task and the expenses were split among all of them. In the following years, the trierarchy developed in two different ways. Even if the trierarchy of a single person remained the ideal,34Despite its financial and personal burdens, the trierarchy of a single person did not disappear. Cf., for instance, the speeches [Dem.] Or. 47 and Dem. Or. 51. While the inscription IG II2 1609 registers mainly syntrierarchs, one can find also single trierarchs (IG II2 1609.II.46-47, 57-58, 96, 98). Even after the symmoria-system has been transfered to the trierarchy to relieve the individual, single trierarches are testified (IG II2 1629.730-775; Is. 5.36 and 7.38).the system imposed syntrierarchies on a regular basis. The first step was made by the reform of Periander at the beginning of the Social War in 358/357 BC.35 At that time, the 1,200 wealthiest Athenians were grouped into twenty symmories of sixty persons each. Each synteles - as the member was called - had to contribute an equal sum. In 340 BC, in connection with the preparations for the war against Philip II of Macedon, Demosthenes proposed further modifications.36On the reform of Demosthenes, see Busolt and Swoboda 1920-1926, 1204-1205; Gabrielsen 1989 and 1990; Ruschenbusch 1990; Gabrielsen 1994, 207-213.From now on, the wealthiest 300 men took full responsibility and bore the major part of the financial obligations. They made arrangements for outfitting the required war ships and then allocated the actual costs to the symmory members.37Dem. Or. 18.102-108 and 312. Cf. Dem. Or. 14.17; Aeschin. In Ctes. 222; Din. 1.42; Isoc. Or. 8.128.In consequence, the organisation, pre-payment, and the risks of reimbursement failure lay in the hands of a small group of 300 persons. The other more or less 900 were obliged to contribute according their resources. Thus, for circa 75 per cent the trierarchy consisted in a payment only, and they never set sail. This led to two kinds of trierarchs: on the one hand, wealthy men who contributed financially, and on the other hand those trierachs who escorted the war ship during military campaigns. Thereby the crucial step was taken to convert the somati kai chremasi-task - the personal and financial task - into a solely monetary duty and therefore into a tax in its modern sense. But although the Athenians conducted several reforms of the liturgy-system and the step to convert the personal task into a pure financial burden would not have been a giant leap, they stepped back from it. Instead, they maintained the rather odd practice that a wealthy man had to accompany the warship, although the trierach normally was not a military expert with specific military skills. How can this be explained?

One hint is given by the practice of hiring out assigned warships.38The hiring of the trierarchy is mentioned six times in all; all testimonies derive from the Corpus Demosthenicum: Dem. Or. 21.80, 163-167; 51.8 and 51.7 with 11; [Dem.] Or. 50.52 and 50.4. For the μ?σθωσι? τριηραρχ?α?, cf. Gabrielsen 1994, 95-102; Rohde 2019, 210-215.This practice is not too well attested - not because it was uncommon but rather because it was executed in a legally grey area. Nevertheless, the sparse testimonies allow the reconstruction of this misthosis trierarchias in the following way. If the trierarch in charge decided not to accompany his trireme, he had the opportunity to pay middlemen for his service.39The middlemen were called ο? παρ? δ.δ. ([Dem.] Or. 50.42).The price ranged from 2,000 drachmai for a syntrierarchy to about 6,000 drachmai for a regular trierarchy.402,000 drachmai: Dem. Or. 21.80; 3,000 drachmai: Dem. Or. 51.11; 6,000 drachmai: Dem. 21.155.The attested prices therefore corresponded to the costs of trierarchies and covered the expected expenditures. This means that middlemen had to meet additional expenses, which went beyond those foreseen, out of their own purses. Hence, it was necessary for the middlemen to make a surplus. For this, they had two options: to reduce the costs of the seagoing trireme, or to make additional profit during the time when they were on the ships. Two conclusions could be drawn. Firstly, there existed a market for the misthosis trierarchias.41Dem. Or. 51.7. Cf. also Schol. Dem. 21.80.Secondly, there were maritime specialists for whom it was - in spite of all war risks and maritime dangers - lucrative to go to sea with a war ship. How did they make profit?

It was a matter of common knowledge that individuals used their trireme for looting, raids, protection racketeering, and taking persons or ships hostage.42Dem. Or. 51.13-14: “(13) When someone who has taken the trierarchy for hire sets sail, he plunders and pillages everybody; the profits he gains for himself, but whoever it may chance to be of you citizens pays the damages; and you alone of all people are unable to travel anywhere without a herald’s staff of truce because of the acts of these men in seizing hostages and in provoking reprisals; (14) so that, if someone takes a closer look at the matter frankly, he will find that these triremes have sailed, not for you, but against you. For a man who serves as trierarch in the interest of the polis ought not to expect to grow rich at the public expense, but ought by means of his own resources to repair the losses of the polis, if you are to have the service which you need.” For “l(fā)egitimate” σ?λη, cf. Bravo 1999 and the episode in Dem. Or. 24.11-14.As war was chronically underfinanced in the fourth century, these practices were accepted methods, if they were used for paying troops and rowers.43Dem. Or. 4.28-29.Normally, the looted goods belonged to the polis.44Lib. arg. Demosthenes 24.1: τ? τιμ?ματα τ?ν κλοπ?ν δημ?σια. Dem. Or. 24.12: το?? ν?μου? ?ν?γνω καθ? ο?? το?τον τ?ν τρ?πον πραχθ?ντων τ?? π?λεω? γ?γνεται τ? χρ?ματα. Pritchett 1971-1991, V, 415-425; Gabrielsen 2001, 78-79.But the spoils were not always declared,45So, for example, two syntrierarchs captured a merchant and looted nine and a half talents (Dem. Or. 24.11-14).and the polis was not able to control every general or trierarch in regions far away from Athens.46Dem. Or. 8.25. Cf. also Lys. 28.1-5.Additionally, it was not always easy or even possible to draw a strict line between private or public war finance.47Cf., for example, Timotheus: he took several loans, of which he used two for maintaining the fleet, one for diplomatic relations, and another for the transport of wood for the construction of ships (Dem. Or. 49.6-8; 11-12; 44; Xen. Hell. 6.2.11-12; cf. also [Aristot.] Oec. 2.2.23). Cf. also Günther 2015 and 2016. Also Apollodorus had to take three loans during his trierarchy because he did not receive money from the strategos ([Dem.] Or. 50.13, 17, 23).

But not every trierarch or middleman acted illegally. Some used other opportunities for making profit. They could use their contacts all over the eastern Mediterranean and their knowledge of local markets for trading activities or maritime loans.48Lys. 29.4: “How strange is it that men of property moan when they have to equip warships, this man, who previously possessed nothing, at that time volunteered this public service! So it was not to penalize him that he [Ergocles] appointed him [Philocrates] to equip a warship, but to let him make profit and also keep guard over his own money, since he had nobody whom he could trust above this man.” Cf. also Lys. 28.2 and 4; Hell. Oxy. 1.1-27.The polis accepted - or ignored - these practices because of a chronic shortage of money and to maintain its war performance. Thus, Athens relied on economically experienced persons who were integrated in maritime networks and who could activate external resources.

The same tendency, namely, the increased dependence of the polis on a small wealthy elite, can be observed in the context of the eisphora, the second way of financing the war.49On the eisphora in general, see de Ste. Croix 1953; Thomsen 1964 and 1977; Rhodes 1982; Brun 1983, 3-73; Christ 2007; Migeotte 2014, 518-524.Although the eisphora was common practice, we know relatively little about this form of public income. It is therefore much debated and many details remain hypothetical. I suggest - against the communis opinio - the following evolution:50In more detail, cf. Rohde 2019, 189-196.The Athenians imposed the eisphora on a regular basis during the Peloponnesian War.51Contributions for financing war activities existed already earlier: IG I3 41.38-39 (for the year 446/445 BC); IG I3 52.B.17 (so-called Callias-decree of the year 434/433 BC). Thucydides (3.19.1) speaks of 200 talents. The meaning is discussed by Boeckh 1886, I 556; Andreades 1931, 355-356; Brun 1983, 22-26; Hornblower 1991-2008, I 403-404; Samons 2000, 205; Christ 2006, 161-162.In this early stage, which lasted until 378/377 BC, all male Athenians and metics had to contribute to the war fund. The early eisphora was hence a direct tax justified by crisis and war. In doing so, the Athenians respected the ability-to-pay principle as they always did regarding the military sphere. It means that the assembly decided to impose an eisphora and the male free inhabitants of Attica paid their share according to their affiliation to the Solonian classes with the exception that the thetes were not obliged to pay anything.52Poll. 8.130; Bleicken 1995, 296; contra de Ste. Croix 1953 and Christ 2007. The assumption that the Solonian classes were used as the basis for levying the eisphora is derived from the combination of four facts. First, the eisphorai were strictly for war purposes. Second, the Solonian classes were important in the military sphere until the first decades of the 4th century. Third, Pollux is not in general untrustworthy. Fourth, in other cases the Solonian classes served as a scheme for calculating graduated sums, too. So, for example, the amount of a dowry of an epikleros should be according to the affiliation of her family. If her family belonged to the Zeugitan class the dowry was 150 drachmai, in the case of hippeis 300 drachmai, and 500 drachmai if they were pentakosimodimnoi (Dem. Or. 43.54).So about fifty per cent of the male citizens were exempted from the war tax.53Number of thetes: Burke 2010, 401; Jones 1957, 81 estimates 9,000 hoplites for the 5th as well as for 4th century. Cf. for the 5th century, Lys. 20.13; Thuc. 8.97.1, and for the 4th century Xen. Hell. 4.2.17.

This was to change in the course of the fourth century. In connection with the war against Sparta and the formation of the Second League in 378/377 BC, the eisphora was fundamentally reorganised.54Philoch. 41. Cf. Dem. Or. 22.44; Pol. 2.62.6-7. For this purpose, the richest 1,200 citizens were identified, who possessed altogether about 6,000 talents. Polybios (2.62.6-7) speaks of 5,750 talents; Philochorus (46) and Demosthenes (14.19) round the sum up to 6,000 talents. Cf. for the τ?μημα, Boeckh 1886, I 571-576; Andreades 1931, 357-359; Davies 1981, 35-36; Bleicken 1995, 614.From now on, only the wealthiest 1,200 citizens (plus metics and other persons of wealth like underage orphans and epikleroi) were to contribute.55Dem. Or. 14.16.So the number of eisphora-payers was diminished from a former fifty to a mere five per cent.56Additionally, the metics contributed in a separate procedure to the eisphora. They had to pay τ? ?κτον μ?ρο? (Dem. Or. 22.61; IG II2 244.20), but it remains unclear what this phrase actually means. Most likely τ? ?κτον μ?ρο? is the sixth of the total eisphora. Cf. Christ 2007, 60 contra de Ste. Croix 1953, 32, n. 5. On the metic eisphora, see Thomsen 1964, 96-102; Brun 1983, 31-32, 57-58, 62-63; Whitehead 1977, 78-80; Christ 2007, 60-63.These individuals were divided into one hundred symmories, each of whom was to pay an equal share, that is one percent, of the total.57Cleidemus. 8; Isoc. 15.145; Dem. Or. 20.21-28; Harpocr. s.v. συμμορ?α; Christ 2007, 63.Fifteen years later, in 362 BC, the system was modified again. From now on, at the latest, the three hundred wealthiest Athenians prepaid the eisphora on behalf of their symmory.58Dem. Or. 18.103 and 312.So the three leaders of each grouping, the hegemones, contributed the symmory’s share in advance and, if they were able to, recovered their share of the war tax from the other symmory members.59Dem. Or. 12.24 and 30; 18.103 and 312; 22.44; 42.25; [Dem.] Or. 50.8-9; Is. 6.60. According to that, the proeisphora existed already in 378/377 BC. For the proeisphora, see also Wallace 1989.

To sum up, the reforms of the eisphora-system were necessary because the tax payers did not contribute fast enough. As the eisphora was a war tax, the polis needed the money on time. So, the first step was to form groups that were responsible for one specific share. But this reform could not solve the problem of delayed payments, so it was logical to put only a small fraction of the taxpayers in charge. Thus, the Athenians depended not only heavily on the private property and economic knowledge of their wealthy elite for financing war, but the number of persons who were responsible for paying the eisphora was also reduced in the course of the fourth century from fifty per cent of the citizens to five per cent and finally to circa 1.25 per cent. In consequence, the Athenians depended heavily on their wealthy elite in various ways.

3. Optimising the revenues by financial experts

The sources of these people’s wealth were manifold. Like the father of Demosthenes, liturgists invested not only in landed property but also in maritime loans and other credit, rented buildings, workshops, and silver-mining concessions.60Cf., for example, the property of Demosthenes’ father (Dem. Or. 27.9-11) or the one of Euktemon (Is. 6).

The liturgies made it necessary for the wealthy Athenians to increase their profit, as the Xenophontian Ischomachus did. He bought neglected plots, cultivated them to make them profitable and sold them for higher prices.61Xen. Oec. 20.22-24. Cf. Unholtz 2011.Although the wealthy elite preferred less chancy investments, some chose risky businesses as well. The importance of private wealth for public tasks had therefore a significant impact on the economic norms and values of the elite. The change of moral institutions can be observed already at the turn from the 5th to the 4th century: Agyrrhius, for example, purchased the right to collect the harbour tolls - an investment that required money and knowledge of local conditions.62And. 1.133-134.The risks of losing invested money could be reduced by practical experience and insights into economic processes.

And this economic knowledge was used to increase the public revenues as well. Here too, Agyrrhius offers an illustrative example. He proposed a law for the reorganisation of cleruchic grain, which was to be transported to Athens by tax-farmers.63SEG 48.96 = Stroud 1998 = Rhodes and Osborne 2003, no. 26. See for the interpretation of the law amongst others, Stroud 1998, 2010 and 2016; Faraguna 1999; Engels 2000; Rosivach 2000; Gauthier 2001; Moreno 2003; 2007, 103-115 and 2009; Fantasia 2004; Eich 2006, 224-228 and 445-446; Jakab 2007; Sorg 2015.It is just a simple modification but had two great advantages: the transportation of grain from the cleruchs of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros - instead of a tax in cash - and the selling of the grain in times of high prices, relaxed the market and declared the revenues as stratiotika. Agyrrhios was a tax-farmer himself and therefore could rely on his experience in the same way as other liturgists did. The capital that had to be raised yearly to finance Athens’ grain trade was so enormous that it was not possible without the investments of wealthy Athenians.64Gabrielsen 2015, 202.The city’s elite was well aware of economic processes and used its knowledge not only for its own profit-making but also to increase public income.

And the Athenian public actually expected a high level of economic knowledge of their politicians. The way in which speakers in the assembly met these expectations is shown by the speech On the Navy-Boards. Demosthenes delivered this oration in 354 BC and proposed a fundamental reform of the symmoriai in order to place the funding of the fleet on firm ground.65Dem. Or. 14; Sch?fer 1885-1887, I 455-471; Link 1940; Bounas 2016, 301-318.He therefore used his experience as a liturgist to reveal the short-comings of the trierarchy-system and to improve public income.

That was in 354 BC, shortly after the disastrous outcome of the Social War. At this time, the increase of the revenues by a sophisticated organisation of public finances was a primary goal. And it was achieved, as Demosthenes states.66Dem. Or. 10.37-38.Four factors led to the increase of public income. Firstly, fortune. It seems, for example, that the rise of the annual revenues from 130 to 400 talents was directly related to the increased output of the silver mines, as Armin Eich pointed out.67Ibid. Cf. Theopomp. 166. In the year 341 BC, Demosthenes (Or. 10.38) called it a fortunate coincidence that the public income rose up to 400 talents. Eich 2006, 389-390 explains this increase with new veins of silver.

Secondly, changes in military strategy. In the 15 years between the Social War and the formation of the anti-Macedonian Alliance, the Athenians generally preferred a less offensive strategy. This required more diplomatic missions, fewer long-lasting and financially intensive military campaigns and a focus on the protection of the grain routes. This does not mean that the Athenians did not conduct war in the period following the Social War, as, for example, the military force that was dispatched to rescue the Olynthians testifies,68Athens sent military support to Olynthos three times: corps in 349 BC under the command of Chares (Dem. Or. 3.7; 21.161; Philoch. 49), a second army in 348 BC, and finally under Charidemos a third force (Philoch. 50; Theopomp. 143).but they did not do so in the same frequency, nor for as long and with the same intensity of financial commitment as before. So, the economic crises increased the pressure to modify the self-perception of the Athenians from a military leader with an aggressive foreign policy to a more defensive stance.

Thirdly, economic improvements. For example, the so-called maritime courts were introduced.69On the dikai emporikai, see Gernet 1955; Cohen 1973; MacDowell 1978, 231-234; Vélissaropoulos 1980, 233-267; Hansen 1983; Todd 1993, 334-337; Lanni 2006, 149-173; Le?o 2006; Bresson 2016, 322-324.Issues that arose in connection with maritime trade had a privileged status. They were handled in less time during the winter months, if one of the traders was an Athenian citizen or metic. All of these improvements apparently were based on empirical experience. But at the same time the literal reflection on financial matters - concerning both private and public economies - reached a new level with Plato, Aristotle, Pseudo-Aristotle - to name only the most influential. Xenophon wrote a whole treatise on the Means and Ways to increase public revenues. It is therefore quite plausible to consider Xenophon a friend of Eubulus, the most influential politician in the time immediately after the Social War.70It fits that a certain Eubulus proposed the return permission for Xenophon (Istros. 32). Cf. Dillery 1993, 1-2; Papazarkadas 2011, 65-66, n. 216.

The fourth and final factor, determining why Athens had more money at its disposal, was the establishment of a new financial office: the commissioner of the theoric fund.71The title ? ?π? τ? θεωρικ?ν is mentioned in IG II2 223.C.5-6 (343/342 BC). For the comissioners of the theorikon-fund, cf. Rhodes 1972, 235-240.The most influential rhetores of the second half of the fourth century - Eubulus, Demosthenes and Lycurgus - were commissioners of the theoric fund. Once again, although the importance of this new magistracy is apparent through the magnitude of spending, especially for building projects, many details remain obscure. The theoric fund was established by Eubulus and received its name according to its main purpose: to make it possible for all Athenians to attend the festivals. But it was more than that. It was the civil equivalent to the stratiotika, the military fund. Here the impact of economic crises on values and norms becomes most apparent.

As was the case for the stratiotika and the water supply,72[Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 43.1.at the beginning, the theoric fund was supervised by one single person.73IG II2 223.C.5-6: ?π? τ? θεωρικ?ν· Κηφισοφ?ν Κεφαλ?ωνο? ?φιδνα?ο? (343/342 BC).Like other important magistrates, he was chosen by election rather than by lot.74[Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 43.1 and 47.2.His term of office lasted for four years, from one Great Panathenaia to another.75[Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 43.1. The wording “from one Panathenaia to the Panathenaia” means in the Athenaion politeia always the Great Panathenaia, cf. Develin 1984. Mitchell 1962, 220-221 assumed a four-year term of office; likewise Hansen 1995, 273 and Leppin 1995, 559. In contrast, Cawkwell 1963, 54; Rhodes 1972, 236-237 resp. 1981, 517 and Bleicken 1995, 303 proposed a one-year term.Together with the council, the commissioner of the theorika oversaw all financial transactions of the polis. This way he supervised nearly all of the administration, as Aischines puts it.76Aeschin. In Ctes. 25.Since all financial decisions and actions of the polis took place in the presence of the commissioner, he would gain incomparable insights in the public finances that used to be in the exclusive competence of the council. In doing this and in combination with the possibility of iteration he accumulated competences as well as knowledge.77For public knowledge of financial administration, cf. the articles of Günther and Pritchard in this volume.

Democratic magistracies were generally characterised by their selection by lot, high number, purely administration functions, constant alternation, and the lack of prominence of the individual - what Jochen Bleicken called Vermassung der Beh?rden (“populising the authorites”).78Bleicken 1995, 281-284 and 362-363.In contrast, the commissioner of the theorika was an individual with great influence, high qualifications, and a long unbroken term of office. Additionally, he was exempted from four maxims that underlay the democratic functions. He could iterate and was not bound to the annual principle.79For the four-year term of office, see n. 76 above. The prohibition of iteration is mentioned in the heliastic oath (Dem. Or. 24.150): ο?δ? ?ρχ?ν καταστ?σω ?στ? [...] δ?? τ?ν α?τ?ν ?ρχ?ν τ?ν α?τ?ν ?νδρα. “I will not suffer the same man to hold the same office twice [...].” The oath, which is cited by Demosthenes (Or. 24.149-150), is doubtless a paraphrase and not a verbatim quotation. Cf. Mirhady 2007.He had no colleagues, was elected, and could cumulate public tasks.80The prohibition of accumulation of offices is also stated in the heliastic oath (Dem. Or. 24.150): ο?δ? ?ρχ?ν καταστ?σω ?στ? [...] δ?ο ?ρχ?? ?ρξαι τ?ν α?τ?ν ?ν τ? α?τ? ?νιαυτ?. “I will not suffer the same man to hold [...] two offices in the same year.” Demosthenes gives, as mentioned in the previous note, a paraphrase. But this does not alter the regulation as such.Even if single elements like election, prominence, and iteration were known from other functions, too,81Single elements - election, the prominence of the individual, iteration - were known from the office of the strategos, for example.the exemption from all four basic principles at the same time was unusual. And it was a complete novelty to cumulate different public functions that were subject to accountability, as Demosthenes for example did.82Demosthenes, for instance, was in 336 BC both commissioner of the theoric fund and teichopoios (Dem. 18.113).

Since the commissioner of the theoric fund had no power of veto, to command actions, or to dictate measures, and because the assembly was the ultimate decision-making body, the office, at least in theory, would seem capable of being integrated into the democratic constitution. But in reality, the commissioner of the theoric fund could gain great authority that gave him considerable impact on the decision-making processes of the council and the assembly. This influence was based not on formal power but on expertise, experience, and individual prestige.

After the defeat at Chaironeia the supervision of the theoric fund was finally transferred to a board of persons, and re-election was prohibited.83Law of Hegemon: Aeschin. In Ctes. 25. Commission (ο? ?π? τ? θεωρικ?ν): [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 43.1.But this did not mean the return to former principles. Rather, the opposite was the case. Lycurgus became controller of finance (ταμ?α? ?π? τ?ν διο?κησιν resp. ?π? τ? διοικ?σει τ?? π?λεω?).84Hyp. frag. 118; [Plut.] Vit. X orat. Lyc. 841 b-c and 852 b-c. For the title, cf. IG II2 463.36 (307/306 BC); SEG 19.119.7-9 (between 334 and 336 BC). For Lycurgus, see [Plut.] Vit. X orat. Lyc. 841 a - 844 a; Colin 1928; Burke 1985; Mossé 1989; Engels 1992; Faraguna 1992, 195-399; Habicht 1995, 33-41; Wirth 1997; Bringmann 1999.From now on, the distribution of the public revenues lay in the hands of this newly created office. Lycurgus influenced decisionmaking not only by his informal prestige but also by his official authority.

4. Conclusions

Expenditures and the way in which they were met were - and still are - a mirror of the values of a given society. If we read Athenian society through its public finances we may reconstruct the self-perception of the Athenians. This means: the expenditures were an expression of Athenian identity, therefore a point of principle and essentially not negotiable. Every speaker in the assembly and hence every decision of the demos reflected the traditional self-image of Athens as the most democratic polis based on the rule of “one man, one vote” and on popular courts. But the self-attribution included also being the “School of Hellas,”85Thuc. 2.41.1.the natural leader of the Greeks,86Dem. Or. 14.12-13.and the organiser of the most splendid festivals in the Greek world.87The Great Panathenaia staged a more extensive programm than the Olympic Games: Pritchard 2012, 36. For the duration of the Great Panathenaia, cf. S. L. Shear 2001, 383-384 and Kyle 2007, 157-158. The Lycurgan theatre of Dionysus could seat as many as 17,000 people: Knell 2000, 131. So the Athenian theatre of the late fourth century was the largest theatre of Greece in Classical resp. Hellenistic as well as in Roman times: ibid., 136.The expenditures thus were more or less fixed; they could be modified in quantity to some extent, yet not in quality.

For every citizen in the assembly it was clear, that he was member of a political, military, and religious community. But what this really meant for the concrete content of Athenian identity was a product of discourse and therefore subject to flexible interpretation. And the interpretations became more flexible the severer the economic crises were: the defeat in the Peloponnesian War, the loss of tribute, and the huge expenditures for the civil war urged the Athenians to find ways to meet public demands. And, against all expectations, their investments even increased in the fourth century. The revenues were increased either by chance, as was the case with the output of the silver mines, or by reflection. The latter included the changes of institutions, which were fundamental for Athenian identity: the modification of military strategy, economic enhancements and the introduction of a central financial office. This function indeed broke with traditional democratic principles, yet it ensured that the Athenians could fulfil all their roles that represented their identity. In their attempt to imitate their forefathers they even surpassed the idealized past. They introduced assembly pay and payment for attending the festivals, purchased publicly funded grain, held assemblies on a Pnyx larger than ever before, they kept a fleet more vast than ever before, they organised more splendid festivals than ever before. That means that over the course of the fourth century Athens financed more public tasks with less cash at its disposal.

This was only possible by using private wealth in a more sophisticated way than in the fifth century. The fourth century witnessed the systematisation of the liturgies and eisphorai as a regular form of using private wealth for public purposes. The reforms aimed at spreading the financial burden more evenly and according to economic capacities. The same holds true for the systematisation of the eisphora. A by-product was that the polis depended heavily on the wealthy elite - not only on their private wealth but also on their economic expertise. It is significant that it was liturgists like Demosthenes who initiated these reforms. The opinion-leaders in the assembly, who were at the same time also liturgists, had the empirical knowledge and a particular interest to make the system efficient, and to balance private and public interests. This correlation between private wealth and public revenues ultimately led to an office that went beyond the scope of the democratic principles of the fifth century. The increased importance of private wealth for public purposes therefore affected fundamentally the institutions of democratic Athens. To put it in the words of Tancredi in “Gattopardo:” “Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga come è, bisogna che tutto cambi. - For everything to remain the same, everything must change!”

Bibliography

Andreades, A. M. 1931.

Geschichte der griechischen Staatswirtschaft. Von der Heroenzeit bis zur Schlacht bei Chaironeia. Munich: Drei Masken Verlag.

Aperghis, G. G. 1997/1998.

“A Reassessment of the Laureion Mining Records.” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 42: 1-21.

Austin, M. 1994.

“Society and Economy.” In: D. M. Lewis et al. (eds.), The Fourth Century B.C. The Cambridge Ancient History 6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 527-591.

Bearzot, C. 2015.

“La città e gli orfani.” In: U. Roberto and P. A. Tuci (eds.), Tra marginalità e integrazione. Milan: LED Edizioni Universitarie, 9-31.

Bleicken, J. 1995.

Die athenische Demokratie. 4th ed. Paderborn: Ferdinand Sch?ningh.

Boeckh, A. 1886.

Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener. 3rd ed. Berlin: G. Reimer.

Bolkestein, H. 1939.

Wohlt?tigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchristlichen Altertum. Ein Beitrag zum Problem “Moral und Gesellschaft.” Utrecht: Oosthoek.

Bounas, T. 2016.

Die Kriegsrechtfertigung in der attischen Rhetorik des 4. Jh. v. Chr. Vom Korinthischen Krieg bis zur Schlacht bei Chaironeia (395-338 v. Chr.). Prismata 21. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Bravo, B. 1999.

“Sulan. Représailles et justice privée contre des étrangers dans les cités grecques. études du vocabulaire et des institutions.” Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Classe di Lettere e Filosofia 10: 675-987.

Bresson, A. 2016.

The Making of the Ancient Greek Economy. Institutions, Markets, and Growth in the City-States. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Bringmann, K. 1999.

“Lykurg.” In: K. Brodersen (ed.), Gro?e Gestalten der griechischen Antike. Munich: C. H. Beck, 72-78.

Brun, P. 1983.

Eisphora - Syntaxis - Stratiotika. Recherches sur les finances militaires d’Athènes au IVe siècle av. J.-C. Centre de recherches d’histoire ancienne 50. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Buchanan, J. J. 1962.

Theorika. A Study of Monetary Distributions to the Athenian Citizenry during the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. New York: J. J. Augustin.

Burckhardt, L. 1996.

Bürger und Soldaten. Aspekte der politischen und milit?rischen Rolle athenischer Bürger im Kriegswesen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. Historia Einzelschriften 101. Stuttgart: Steiner.

Burke, E. M. 1985.

“Lycurgan Finances.” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 26: 251-264.— —2010.

“Finances and the Operation of the Athenian Democracy in the ‘Lycurgan Era’.” American Journal of Philology 131: 393-423.

Busolt, G. and Swoboda, H. 1920-1926.

Griechische Staatskunde. 2 vols. Munich: C. H. Beck.

Camp, J. M. 1996.

“The Form of Pnyx III.” In: B. Forsén and G. R. Stanton (eds.), The Pnyx in the History of Athens. Helsinki: Foundation of the Finnish Institute at Athens, 41-46.— — 2010.

The Athenian Agora. Site Guide. 5th ed. Princeton: The American School of Classical Studies at Athens.

Cawkwell, G. L. 1962.

“Demosthenes and the Stratiotic Fund.” Mnemosyne 15: 377-383.— — 1963.

“Eubulus.” Journal of Hellenic Studies 83: 47-67.

Christ, M. R. 2006.

The Bad Citizen in Classical Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.— — 2007.

“The Evolution of the Eisphora in Classical Athens.” Classical Quarterly 57: 53-69.

Cohen, E. E. 1973.

Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Colin, G. 1928.

“Note sur l’administration financière de l’orateur Lycurge.” Revue des études anciennes 30: 189-200.

Crosby, M. 1950.

“The Leases of the Laureion Mines.” Hesperia 19: 189-312.

Cudjoe, R. V. 2010.

The Social and Legal Position of Widows and Orphans in Classical Athens. Symboles 3. Athens: Centre for Ancient Greek and Hellenistic Law, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences.

Davies, J. K. 1981.

Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens. Salem: The Ayer Company.De Ste. Croix, G. E. M. 1953.

“Demosthenes’ TIMHMA and the Athenian Eisphora in the Fourth Century B.C.” Classica et Mediaevalia 14: 30-70.

Develin, R. 1984.

“From Panathenaia to Panathenaia.” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 57: 133-138.

Dillery, J. D. 1993.

“Xenophon’s Poroi and Athenian Imperialism.” Historia 42: 1-11.

Eich, A. 2006.

Die politische ?konomie des antiken Griechenland. (6.-3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.). Passauer Historische Forschungen 14. Cologne et al.: B?hlau.

Engels, J. 1992.

“Zur Stellung Lykurgs und zur Aussagekraft seines Milit?r- und Bauprogramms für die Demokratie vor 322 v. Chr.” Ancient Society 23: 5-29.— — 2000.

“Das athenische Getreidesteuer-Gesetz des Agyrrhios und angebliche ?sozialstaatliche‘ Ziele in den Ma?nahmen zur Getreideversorgung sp?tklassischer und hellenistischer Poleis.” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 132: 97-124.

Fantasia, U. 1989.

“Finanze Cittadine, liberalità privata e sitos demosios. Considerazioni su alcuni documenti epigrafici.” Serta Historica 2: 47-84.— — 2004.

“Appaltatori, grano pubblico, finanze cittadine: Ancora sul ‘nomos’ di Agirrio.” Mediterraneo antico 7: 513-540.

Faraguna, M. 1992.

Atene nell’età di Alessandro. Problemi politici, economici, finanziari. Rome: Accademia nazionale dei Lincei.— — 1999.

“Intorno alla nuova legge ateniese sulla tassazione del grano.” Dike 2: 63-97.

Fischer, J. 2012.

“Behinderung und Gesellschaft im klassischen Athen. Bemerkungen zur 24. Rede des Lysias.” In: R. Breitwieser (ed.), Behinderungen und Beeintr?chtigungen. Oxford: Archaeopress, 41-45.

Flament, C. 2007.

Une économie monétarisée. Athènes à l’époque classique (440-338). Contribution à l’étude du phénomène monétaire en Grèce ancienne. Collection d’études classiques 22. Louvain-Namur: Peeters.

Forsén, B. 1996.

“The Sanctuary of Zeus Hypsistos and the Date and Construction of Pnyx III.” In: id. and G. R. Stanton (eds.), The Pnyx in the History of Athens. Helsinki: Foundation of the Finnish Institute at Athens, 47-55.

Gabrielsen, V. 1981.

Remuneration of State Officials in Fourth Century B.C. Athens. Odense University Classical Studies 11. Odense: Odense University Press.— — 1989.

“The Number of Athenian Trierarchs after ca. 340 B.C.” Classica et Mediaevalia 40: 145-159.— — 1990.“Trierarchic Symmories.” Classica et Mediaevalia 41: 89-118.— — 1994.

Financing the Athenian Fleet. Public Taxation and Social Relations. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.— — 2001.

“Naval Warfare. Its Economic and Social Impact on Greek Cities.” In: T. Bekker-Nielsen and L. Hannestad (eds.), War as a Cultural and Social Force. Historiskfilosofiske skrifter 22. Copenhagen: Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, 72-89.— — 2015.

“Naval and Grain Networks and Associations in Fourth-Century Athens.” In: C. Taylor and K. Vlassopoulos (eds.), Communities and Networks in the Ancient Greek World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 177-212.

Garland, R. 1995.

The Eye of the Beholder. Deformity and Disability in the Graeco-Roman World. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.— — 2001.

The Piraeus from the Fifth to the First Century B.C. 2nd ed. Bristol: Bristol Classical Press.

Gauthier, P. 2001.

“Bulletin épigraphique, Nr. 164.” Revue des études grecques 114: 509.— — 2010.

“Xenophon’s Programme in the Poroi.” In: V. J. Gray (ed.), Xenophon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 113-136.

Gernet, L. 1955.

“Sur les actions commerciales en droit Athénien.” In: id. (ed.), Droit et société dans la Grèce Ancienne. Paris: Sirey, 173-200.

Gogos, S. 2008.

Das Dionysostheater von Athen. Architektonische Gestalt und Funktion. Vienna: Phoibos.

Günther, S. 2015.

“Feldherr, Manager, ?konom: Timotheus und die Wirtschaft des Krieges im Griechenland des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.” MünzenRevue 47/4: 13-16.— — 2016.

“Die S?ldner und das liebe Geld. überlegungen zum Zusammenhang zwischen Münzpr?gung, S?ldnertum und Marktgeschehen im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.” In: B. Eckhardt and K. Martin (eds.), Eine neue Pr?gung. Innovationspotentiale von Münzen in der griechisch-r?mischen Antike. Philippika 102. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 93-108.

Habicht, C. 1995.

Athen. Die Geschichte der Stadt in hellenistischer Zeit. Munich: C. H. Beck.

Hansen, M. H. 1983.

“Two Notes on the Athenian Dikai Emporikai.” In: P. Dimakis (ed.), Symposion 1979. Cologne & Vienna: B?hlau, 167-175.— — 1995.

Die Athenische Demokratie im Zeitalter des Demosthenes. Struktur, Prinzipien und Selbstverst?ndnis. Berlin: De Gruyter.— — 2014.

“Misthos for Magistrates in Fourth-Century Athens?” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 54: 404-419.

Harris, E. M. 1996.

“Demosthenes and the Theoric Fund.” In: R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harris (eds.), Transitions to Empire. Norman & London: University of Oklahoma Press, 57-76.

Hintzen-Bohlen, B. 1997.

Die Kulturpolitik des Eubulos und des Lykurg. Die Denkm?ler- und Bauprojekte in Athen zwischen 355 und 322 v. Chr. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Hopper, R. J. 1953.

“The Attic Silver Mines in the Fourth Century B.C.” Annual of the British School at Athens 48: 200-254.— — 1961.

“The Mines and Miners of Ancient Athens.” Greece and Rome 8: 138-151.— — 1968.

“The Laureion Mines. A Reconsideration.” Annual of the British School at Athens 63: 293-326.

Hornblower, S. 1991-2008.

A Commentary on Thucydides. 3 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Humphreys, S. C. 1985.

“Lycurgus of Butadae.” In: C. G. Starr, J. W. Eadie and J. Ober (eds.), The Craft of the Ancient Historian. Lanham: University Press of America, 199-252.

Isler, H. P. 2002.

“Das Dionysos-Theater in Athen.” In: F. Zimmer (ed.), Die griechische Klassik. Idee oder Wirklichkeit. Munich: Zabern, 533-541.

Jakab, E. 2007.

“SEG XLVIII 96: Steuergesetz oder Frachtvertrag?” In: E. Cantarella (ed.), Symposion 2005. Vienna: Verlag der ?sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 105-122.

Jones, A. H. M. 1957.

Athenian Democracy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Kalcyk, H. 1982.

Untersuchungen zum attischen Silberbergbau. Gebietsstruktur, Geschichte und Technik. Europ?ische Hochschulschriften. Reihe III: Geschichte und ihre Hilfswissenschaften 160. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Kalligas, P. G. 1994.

“Η περιoχ? τoυ ιερo? και τoυ θε?τρoυ τoυ Διoν?σoυ στην Aθ?να.” In: W. D. E. Coulson et al. (eds.), The Archaeology of Athens and Attica under the Democracy. Oxbow Monographs in Archaeology 37. Oxford: Oxbow Books, 25-30.

Knell, H. 2000.

Athen im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. - eine Stadt ver?ndert ihr Gesicht. Arch?ologisch-kulturgeschichtliche Betrachtungen. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.Kron, U. 1976.

Die zehn attischen Phylenheroen. Geschichte, Mythos, Kult und Darstellungen. Mitteilungen des Deutschen Arch?ologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung, Beiheft 5. Berlin: Mann.

Kyle, D. G. 2007.

Sport and Spectacle in the Ancient World. Malden, MA & Oxford: Blackwell.

Lanni, A. 2006.

Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Le?o, D. F. 2006.

“Dikai emporikai: processos relativos a comerciantes marítimos na Grécia antiga.” In: F. d. Oliveira, P. Thiercy and R. Vila?a (eds.), Mar Greco-latino.

Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 127-137.

Leppin, H. 1995.

“Zur Entwicklung der Verwaltung ?ffentlicher Gelder im Athen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.” In: W. Eder (ed.), Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Stuttgart: Steiner, 557-571.

Linfert, A. and Mausbach, J. 1981.

Die Skeuothek des Philon im Pir?us. Cologne: Arch?ologisches Institut der Universit?t zu K?ln.

Link, E. 1940.

Untersuchungen zur Symmorienrede (XIV) des Demosthenes. Limburg a. d. Lahn: Limburger Vereinsdruckerei.

Loomis, W. T. 1998.

Wages, Welfare Costs and Inflation in Classical Athens. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

MacDowell, D. M. 1978.

The Law in Classical Athens. London: Thames and Hudson.— — 1986.

“The Law of Periandros about Symmories.” Classical Quarterly 36: 438-449.

Mattusch, C. C. 1994.

“The Eponymous Heroes. The Idea of Sculptural Groups.” In: W. D. E. Coulson et al. (eds.), The Archeology of Athens and Attica under the Democracy. Oxbow Monograph 37. Oxford: Oxbow Books, 73-81.

Migeotte, L. 1990.

“Le pain quotidien dans les cités hellénistiques. une ‘a(chǎn)ffaire d’Etat’?” Cahiers des études anciennes 24: 291-300.— — 1991.

“Le pain quotidien dans les cités hellénistiques. à propos des fonds permanents pur l’approvisionnement en grain.” Cahiers du Centre Gustave-Glotz 2: 19-41.— — 2014.

Les finances des cités grecques. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Mirhady, D. C. 2007.

“The Dikast’s Oath and the Question of Fact.” In: A. H. Sommerstein and J. Fletcher (eds.), Horkos. The Oath in Greek Society. Exeter: Liverpool University Press, 48-59.

Mitchell, F. W. 1962.

“Demades of Paeania and IG II21493-5.” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 93: 213-229.

Moreno, A. 2003.

“Athenian Bread-Baskets. The Grain-Tax Law of 374/3 B.C. Reinterpreted.” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 145: 97-105.— — 2007.

Feeding the Democracy. The Athenian Grain Supply in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC. Oxford: Oxford University Press.— — 2009.

“‘The Attic Neighbour’. The Cleruchy in the Athenian Empire.” In: J. Ma, N. Papazarkadas and R. Parker (eds.), Interpreting the Athenian Empire. London: Duckworth, 211-221.

Mossé, C. 1989.

“Lycurge l’Athénien. Homme du passé ou précurseur de l’avenir?” Quaderni di storia 30: 25-36.

Papazarkadas, N. 2011.

Sacred and Public Land in Ancient Athens. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pazdera, M. 2006.

Getreide für Griechenland. Untersuchungen zu den Ursachen der Versorgungskrisen im Zeitalter Alexanders des Gro?en und der Diadochen. Antike Kulturen und Geschichte 9. Munster: LIT.

Pélékidis, C. 1962.

Histoire de l’éphébie attique des origines à 31 av. J.-C. Paris: E. de Boccard.

Pickard-Cambridge, A. W. 1946.

The Theatre of Dionysus in Athens. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Polacco, L. 1990.

Il teatro di Dioniso Eleutereo ad Atene. Monografie della Scuola Archeologica di Atene e delle Missioni Italiane in Oriente 4. Rome: L’Erma di Bretschneider.

Pritchard, D. M. 2012.

“Costing Festivals and War. Spending Priorities of the Athenian Democracy.” Historia 61: 18-65.— — 2014.

“The Public Payment of Magistrates in Fourth-Century Athens.” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 54: 1-16.— — 2015.

Public Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Pritchett, W. K. 1971-1991.

The Greek State at War. 5 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Reinmuth, O. W. 1952.

“The Genesis of the Athenian Ephebia.” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 83: 34-50.

Rhodes, P. J. 1972.

The Athenian Boule. Oxford: Oxford University Press.— — 1981.

A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.— — 1982.

“Problems in Athenian Eisphora and Liturgies.” American Journal of Ancient History 7. 1-19.

Rhodes, P. J. and Osborne, R. (eds.). 2003.

Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rohde, D. 2012.

“Bürgerpflicht und Gleichheitsideal. ‘Besteuerung’ und ihre diskursiven Grundlagen in Sparta und Athen.” In: S. Günther (ed.), Ordnungsrahmen antiker ?konomien. Ordnungskonzepte und Steuerungsmechanismen antiker Wirtschaftssysteme im Vergleich. Philippika 53. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 23-40.— — 2015.

“Die Finanzierung ?ffentlicher Aufgaben als Ausdruck politischer Mentalit?ten im Athen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.” Hannoversche Numismatische Beitr?ge 2: 59-77.— — 2017.

“?Weder haben wir in der Staatskasse Geld, noch zahlen wir gerne aus unserer eigenen Tasche?. Die ?ffentlichen Finanzen Spartas in klassischer Zeit.” In: V. Pothou and A. Powell (eds.), Das antike Sparta. Proceedings of the International Conference Regensburg, 24.-26. September 2009. Stuttgart: Steiner, 247-272.— — 2019.

Von der Deliberationsdemokratie zur Zustimmungsdemokratie. Die ?ffentlichen Finanzen Athens und die Ausbildung einer Kompetenzelite im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Schriften zur Alten Geschichte. Stuttgart: Metzler.

Rosivach, V. J. 2000.

“Some Economic Aspects of the Fourth-Century Athenian Market in Grain.” Chiron 30: 31-64.

Rotroff, S. I. 1996.

“Pnyx III: Pottery and Stratigraphy.” In: B. Forsén and G. R. Stanton (eds.), The Pnyx in the History of Athens. Helsinki: Foundation of the Finnish Institute at Athens, 35-40.

Ruschenbusch, E. 1979a.

“Die Einführung des Theorikon.” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 36: 303-308.— — 1979b.

“Die soziale Herkunft der Epheben um 330.” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 35: 173-176.— — 1990.

“Die Zahl der athenischen Trierarchen in der Zeit nach 340 v. Chr.” Classica et Mediaevalia 41: 79-88.

Samons, L. J. 2000.

Empire of the Owl. Athenian Imperial Finance. Historia Einzelschriften 142. Stuttgart: Steiner.

Sch?fer, A. 1885-1887.

Demosthenes und seine Zeit. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner (Imprint Hildesheim: Olms, [1966]).

Shear, J. L. 2001.

Polis and Panathenaia: The History and Development of Athena’s Festival. Ann Arbor: University of Pennsylvania.

Shear, T. L. 1970.

“The Monument of the Eponymous Heroes in the Athenian Agora.” Hesperia 39: 145-222.

Shipton, K. 1998.

“The Prices of the Athenian Silver Mines.” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 120: 57-63.— — 2016.

“The Silver Mines of 4th BC Democratic Athens. An Economic Nexus.” In: C. Tiersch (ed.), Die Athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert zwischen Modernisierung und Tradition. Stuttgart: Steiner, 253-260.

Sorg, T. 2015.

“Agyrrhios Beyond Attica: Tax-Farming and Imperial Recovery in the Second Athenian League.” Historia 64: 49-76.

Stanton, G. R. 1996.

“The Shape and Size of the Athenian Assembly Place in Its Second Phase.” In: B. Forsén and G. R. Stanton (eds.), The Pnyx in the History of Athens. Helsinki: Foundation of the Finnish Institute at Athens, 7-21.

Stroud, R. S. 1998.

The Athenian Grain-Tax Law of 374/3 B.C. Hesperia Supplement 29. Princeton: The American School of Classical Studies at Athens.— — 2010.

“Introduction.” In: A. Magnetto, D. Erdas and C. Carusi (eds.), Nuove ricerche sulla legge granaria ateniese del 374/3 a.C. Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 11-25.— — 2016.

“The Athenian Grain-tax Law of 374/3 B. C.: Unfinished Business.” In: C. Tiersch (ed.), Die Athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert zwischen Modernisierung und Tradition. Stuttgart: Steiner, 185-193.

Thompson, H. A. 1982.

“The Pnyx in Models.” In: A. L. Boegehold (ed.), Studies in Attic Epigraphy, History and Topography. Princeton: The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 133-147.

Thompson, H. A. and Wycherley, R. E. 1972.

The Agora of Athens. The History, Shape and Uses of an Ancient City Center. The Athenian Agora 14. Princeton: The American School of Classical Studies at Athens.

Thomsen, R. 1964.

Eisphora. A Study of Direct Taxation in Ancient Athens. Humanitas 3. Copenhagen: Gyldendal.— — 1977.

“War Taxes in Classical Athens.” In: A. Chastagnol, C. Nicolet and H. Van Effenterre (eds.), Armées et fiscalité dans le monde antique. Paris: Editions du CNRS, 135-144.

Thür, G. 2004.

“Pachtzins und Vergabe der Silberminen im Laurion.” In: L. Ruscu et al. (eds.), Orbis antiquus. Cluj-Napoca: Nereamia Napocae Press, 159-163.

Todd, S. C. 1993.

The Shape of Athenian Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Townsend, R. F. 1982.

Aspects of Athenian Architectural Activity in the Second Half of the Fourth Century B.C. Ann Arbor: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Tozzi, G. 2016.

Assemblee politiche e spazio teatrale ad Atene. Padova: CLEUP.

Travlos, I. N. 1971.

Bildlexikon zur Topographie des antiken Athen. Tubingen: Wasmuth.— — 1988.

Bildlexikon zur Topographie des antiken Attika. Tubingen: Wasmuth.

Unholtz, J. 2011.

“Der Oikos-Vorstand als Entrepreneur. Gewinntr?chtige Praxis in Xenophons Oikonomikos.” In: P. Seele (ed.), ?konomie, Politik und Ethik in der praktischen Philosophie der Antike. Berlin: De Gruyter, 49-60.

Untermann, M. 1983.

“Neues zur Skeuothek des Philon.” In: W. Hoepfner (ed.), Bauplanung und Bautheorie der Antike. Diskussionen zur arch?ologischen Bauforschung 4. Berlin: Deutsches Arch?ologisches Institut, 81-86.

Valmin, N. 1965.

“Diobelia and Theorikon.” Opuscula Atheniensia 6: 171-206.

Van Ooteghem, J. 1932.

“Démosthène et le théorikon.” Les études classiques 1: 388-407.

Vélissaropoulos, J. 1980.

Les nauclères grecs. Recherches sur les institutions maritimes en Grèce et dans l’Orient hellénisé. Geneve: Minard.

Von Eickstedt, K.-V. 1991.

Beitr?ge zur Topographie des antiken Pir?us. Athens: Archaiologikē Hetaireia.Wallace, R. W. 1989.

“The Athenian Proeispherontes.” Hesperia 58: 473-490.

Whitehead, D. 1977.

The Ideology of the Athenian Metic. Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society.Wijma, S. M. 2014.

Embracing the Immigrant. The Participation of Metics in Athenian Polis Religion (5th - 4th century BC). Historia Einzelschriften 233. Stuttgart: Steiner.

Wilson, P. 2000.

The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia. The Chorus, the City and the Stage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.— — 2008.

“Costing the Dionysia.” In: M. Revermann and P. Wilson (eds.), Performance, Iconography, Reception. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 88-127.— — 2011.

“The Glue of Democracy? Tragedy, Structure, and Finance.” In: D. M. Carter (ed.), Why Athens? A Reappraisal of Tragic Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19-43.

Wirth, G. 1997.

“Lykurg und Athen im Schatten Philipps II.” In: W. Eder (ed.), Volk und Verfassung im vorhellenistischen Griechenland. Stuttgart: Steiner, 191-225.

Wurster, W. W. 1979.

“Die neuen Untersuchungen am Dionysostheater in Athen.” Architectura 9: 58-76.Wycherley, R. E. 1973.

Literary and Epigraphical Testimonia. The Athenian Agora 3. Princeton: The American School of Classical Studies at Athens.

Zimmermann, H.-D. 1974.

“Freie Arbeit, Preise und L?hne.” In: E. C. Welskopf (ed.), Hellenische Poleis. Krise - Wandlung - Wirkung 1. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 92-107.