Ji ZHOU,Binrui ZHOU
1.Department of Business and Trade,Rongchang Campus,Southwest University,Chongqing402460,China;2.Southwest University of Finance and Economics,Wenjiang 611130,China
In the context of economic downturn and institutional transformation after the financial crisis,some unemployed migrant workers return home,and temporarily lose sources of livelihood;some farmers become the temporarily poor farmers due to natural disasters,family members'diseases and child's schooling.Promoting them to shake off poverty is an important condition for the construction of a comprehensive well-off society.Currently,the scholars have performed many studies on the support for rural development and farmers'income from the perspectives of policy support,industry nurturing,urban support for agriculture and industrial development,but the study from the perspective of credit is still insufficient.Wang Dingxianget al.(2010)carry out the empirical study on the temporarily poor farmers'credit demand and credit behavior,and find that annual household income per capita and the share of agricultural production expenses have a significant positive impact on the farmers'credit demand,so in China's current rural financial service system,the poor farmersare difficult to be truly served by the rural finance,and credit difficulties hinder the rural economic development.
Therefore,based on the research of scholars,in this paper,we take the poor farmers in Rongchang County of Chongqing Municipality as the object of study,to analyze the credit constraints and reasons and seek solutions,in order to provide a reference for better solving the credit issues for farmers,thus promoting the development of China's economy and society.
1.1 Connotation of temporarily poor farmersThe poor farmers are the farmers who are engaged in agricultural production in order to maintain living according to the poverty line stipulated by the state.The temporarily poor farmers,as the group in the poor farmers,are caused by the diseases,disasters,education,accident and other exogenous factors,but they are likely to get rich with the help of outside.
Rongchang County surveyed in this paper is located in the hilly areas at junction of Sichuan Province and Chongqing Municipality,with prominent location advantages and medium level of economic development.It has an area of 1079 square kilometers,and a population of830400.Solving the credit issues for temporarily poor farmers is of some significance to the rural areas of Sichuan Province and Chongqing Municipality and even the entire country.
1.2 The causes of constraints on the credit for temporarily poor farmersSince the reform and opening up,the urban-rural dual economic structure has become increasingly prominent,and there has been a massive outflow of funds in rural areas,leading to credit difficulties for the poor farmers.With the current 26 930 poor people in Rongchang County in early 2014 as the base,we exclude the repeated number of family members and extract 120 farmers with the per capita annual net income below the standard line of 2736 yuan according to 1%of the poor people for extraction.After removing the data on persistent poor farmers,we get86 copies of valid questionnaires on temporarily poor farmers.Although the sample areas are scattered,the typicalmethods of survey effectively reflect the credit impact on the farmers in Rongchang County at present.In the survey,it is found that the respondents have a high demand for credit and the main impact is from the financial institutions.Their expectations are shown in Fig.1(The poor farmers are abbreviated as farmers below).
Fig.1 The poor farmers'expectations of the current rural financial institutions
This indicates that relaxing the loan conditions,lowering lending rates and protecting the property rights or property mortgages for farmers are the factors related to the credit for farmers at present.Therefore,through expert survey and on-site analysis,we sum up the following factors during the factor identification process from the level of national macro-control,farmers and financial institutions.
1.2.1 The impact of the national macro-control.
(i)The government policies do not comply with rural reality.Firstly,the process of developing the rural economy,the government relies first on the model of using city as the core to drive the economic development of surrounding areas,but ignores the exploitation of natural resources in rural areas,leading to the wrong choice dilemma of"extrinsic motivation"and"intrinsic motivation".Secondly,in order to lift farmers out of poverty,the government has implemented the policy of developing rural financial institutions to support preferential loans to farmers,but the property rights of farmers are not clearly defined in fact,and the credit difficulties for farmers are not substantively resolved.
(ii)The services and market mechanism is not perfect.At present,the Chinese government is mainly the management-oriented government in supporting and developing the rural economy.Under the unsound credit guarantee,legal protection and risk-sharing mechanisms,the farmers can not meet the loan requirements due to lack of insufficient income and mortgage loans.In addition,because of the correlation between agriculture and the natural environment,the Chinese government has not yet realized the importance of protecting the interests of farmers from the perspective of the stakeholders,and improving the agricultural insurance and reinsurance risk mechanism,leading to the lack of proper service and market platform for the farmers to shake off poverty and get rich.
(iii)The legitimate credit channel is single.The long-term information asymmetry results in insufficient farmers'demand for applying for loans from financial institutions.The clear information symmetry between farmers has contributed to a wide range of private credit,but the state fails to well distinguish the non-formal financial organizations,private lending interest rates and loan spreads,and takes strict control policy,so the private financial institutions are limited.
1.2.2 The impact of the farmers themselves.
(i)The impact of farmers'education level and personal credit quality.Due to the low education level of farmers'family members,poor understanding of professional knowledge and asymmetry between financing methods and economic knowledge,the farmers can not adapt to economic and social development.In addition to the limited cultural background,the level of far mers'income is not stable so that the probability of farmersmeeting the loan application requirements is reduced.
And farmers lack transparent personal credit and basic guarantee economic capacity,which will increase the cost of bank in identifying the farmers'loans,and cause the lending difficulties and credit trouble.
(ii)The far mers'lack of collateral and circulation difficulties.Currently,the assets owned by farmers can be roughly divided into cash assets,land assets and fixed assets.These assets as creditmeans for farmers have several limitations.
Firstly,farmers who contract land only have the land management rights rather than ownership of property or property rights,thus the land pledge is limited.
Secondly,farmers'houses and other agricultural equipments get no full law recognition and protection,causing trading and financing difficulties.
Thirdly,farmers have low asset liquidity,and they can not fully meet the bank's standard of lending collateral.Therefore,farmers'lack of collateral also causes credit problems for farmers.
1.2.3 The impact of financial institutions.
(i)Changes in the development model of rural financial institutions.Since 1996,after several rounds of reform and improvement,the rural financial system has initially formed the policy,commercial,and cooperative pattern of financial division of labor,but the service system is still not sound,and does not fully play its function and role.Based on the principle of maximizing profits,the commercial banks change the business model into the development model of withdrawing from the city and injecting the capital absorbed from rural areas into urban areas.The rural credit cooperatives characterized by mass organization,democratic management and flexible business operation also change the development model and turn into the rural commercial banks.
(ii)High lending rates of financial services.Currently,the sound risk-sharing mechanism in rural areas,agricultural disaster insurance mechanism,and agricultural price stabilization mechanism have not yet been established.In addition to the information opaqueness and asymmetry for farmers,it increases the loan de-fault risks for the rural financial institutions.Based on three principles of efficiency,liquidity and safety,the banks choose to raise lending rates,creating credit difficulties for farmers.
(iii)Unreasonable term of the loan.Farmers'demand for funds shows strong seasonal trends,with the characteristics of high frequency and urgency.The high-risk agricultural operation makes the term of the loan follow the system of offering loans at the beginning of a year and making collections at the end of a year,inconsistent with the agricultural production cycle.It brings instability of the cash flow and credit difficulties to the credit for farmers who are mainly engaged in agricultural activities.
(iv)Cumbersome loan procedures.The information asymmetry between farmers and financial institutions increases the loan default risks for the rural financial institutions,so the financial institutions develop lengthy and cumbersome lending procedures for the farmers,and raise the lending threshold,thereby reducing the enthusiasm of farmers for loans,and further deepening the credit plight for farmers.
1.3 Three hypotheses of the credit constraints for temporarily poor farmersBased on the above analysis,although the rural financial system has experienced several rounds of reform and improvement,the problem of credit for farmers has not yet been fundamentally solved.This may be due to the fact that the high risks for financial institutions arising from national macro-control and information asymmetry have exacerbated the plight of farmers.
Therefore,in this paper,based on the survey of credit for farmers and the analysis of causes of credit constraints,we put forth the following hypotheses:
H1:The main reason for constraints on credit for farmers is the national macro-control.
H2:The main personal reason for constraints on credit for farmers is the difficulties in circulating of assets for farmers,thus leading to the lack of collateral.
H3:Changing the established mode of thinking on high lending rates and burdensome loan procedures,and effectively solving the problems of property rights definition,collateral and credit for the farmers,is the effective way to solve the information asymmetry between farmers and financial institutions.
In accordance with the requirements of AHP analysis,the threelayer system comprising goal,criteria and indicators is established.By the evaluation of indicator system,we can obtain the impact of factors on the credit for farmers.
2.1 Building the judgment matrix and determining the eigenvector
2.1.1 Building the criteria layer judgment matrix and determining the eigenvector.In this paper,we use 1-9 grade scale method to build the judgment matrix of the relative importance of lower-level elements to upper-level elements,as is shown in Table 1.
Fig.2 AHP analysis of constraints on the credit for temporarily poor farmers
Table 1 The value range and meaning of the relative importance of judgment matrix
According to the above values of relative importance,we build the pairwise importance judgment matrix of criteria layer B to evaluation A:
whereBis the relative importance judgment matrix of influencing factors in the criteria layer;Nis the number of influencing factors in the criteria layer;bijis the relative importance of influencing factors in the criteria layer to the goal layer.
After obtaining the judgment matrix,we normalize it and use ANC method to calculate the eigenvector:
The derived eigenvectorwis the weight vector of influencing factors in the criteria layer relative to the goal layer,namely the contribution of influencing factors in the criteria layer.
The expert survey method is used to score the contribution of influencing factors,and the relative importance judgment matrix of various indicators in the criteria layer can be shown in Table 2.
Table 2 A-B judgment matrix
2.1.2 Building the indicator layer judgment matrix and determining the eigenvector.After building the pairwise comparison judgment matrix of the criteria layer,we build the pairwise comparison judgment matrix of influencing factorsCiin the indicator layer relative to the dominant influencing factorsBxin the criteria layer:
whereBxis the relative importance judgment matrix of influencing factors in the indicator layer;Mis the number of influencing factors in the indicator layer;cijis the importance of influencing factors in the indicator layer relative to the goal layer.
We normalize the judgment matrixBx,and calculate the eigenvectorVx=(v1v2…vi…vm)T.The derived eigenvectorVxis the weight vector of influencing factors in the indicator layerCirelative to the criteria layerBx.After calculating all the weight vectors of influencing factorsBxin the criteria layer,we get the weight vector set of all influencing factors in the indicator layerV=(V1V2…Vi…Vn)T,where n is the number of influencing factors in the criteria layer.
The expert survey method is used to score the contribution,and we get the importance judgment matrix of various indicators in the criteria layer,as shown in Table 3 to Table 5.
Table 3 B1-c judgment matrix
Table4 B2-c judgment matrix
Table5 B3-c judgment matrix
2.2 Consistency test of judgment matrix
2.2.1 Calculation of consistency index CI.
whereλmaxis the maximum eigenvalue of judgment matrix;nis the number of order of judgment matrix.
We seek for the average random consistency index RIrelative to n.RImeans that the computer randomly samples17 scale values(1/9,1/8…,1…,9)to filln(n-1)/2 elements in the upper triangle ofn-order matrix,uses characteristic root method to calculateλmax,substitutes it into the formula to calculate CI,and obtains the average after multiple repetitions.
Table 6 RI value
According to the matrix built,we calculate the characteristic roots of the criteria and indicator layers as follows:
2.2.2 Calculation of consistency ratio CR.After getting the RI values from the table,the CR values are calculated according to the CI values.When CR<0.1,the consistency of judgment matrix is considered acceptable;conversely,when CR>0.1,the consistency of judgment matrix is considered inadequate,and there is a need to appropriately adjust the judgment matrix in order to ensure the proper consistency of judgment matrix.
2.3 The comprehensive weight of factors in the indicator layer to constraints on credit for farmers There is a need to sequence the importance of all influencing factors in the indicator layer,in order to make the decision-makers have a comprehensive and specific quantitative understanding of credit for farmers.According to the eigenvector setVof indicator layerCrelative to criteria layerB,the eigenvectorWof criteria layerBrelative to evaluation goalA,we get the system weight vectorUof indicator layerCrelative to evaluation goalAas follows:
Table7 Consistency judgment
After calculating the weight vector of influencing factors in the criteria and indicator layers relative to the dominant factors in the upper layer,we calculate the comprehensive weightUof influencing factors in the criteria layer to the causes of constraints on credit for farmers.The comprehensive weight shows the contribution of influencing factors in the indicator layer to credit for farmers.The system weight vector is calculated as follows:
We get the weight of contribution of influencing factors to the overall impact of credit for farmers,and sequence the weight of factors.The results are shown in Table 8 and Tables9.
2.4 Testing of three hypo theses First of all,the influence of the national macro-control is the main reason for constraints on credit for farmers.From the sequencing about layer B(Table 9),we see that in terms of the relative importance in descending order,the three factors in the constraints on credit for farmers are the national macro-control(B1),farmers themselves(B2)and financial institutions(B3),and the national macro-control has the greatest influence,accounting for nearly 64%of the total influence.Therefore,as for the obstacles to credit for farmers,it is necessary to first consider the role of national macro-control,which verifies the first hypothesis.
Table 8 The weight of factors influencing credit constraints
Table 9 The sequencing of weight of factors influencing credit constraints
Secondly,strengthening the construction of rural property rights system,increasing the state support for rural service system and protecting the farmers'circulating of assets,is a necessary condition for improving the constraints on credit for farmers and improving farmers'income.From the sequencing about layer C(Table 9),we see that unsound services and market mechanism(C2),policy direction is not consistent with the rural reality(C3)and lack of mortgage collateral and circulation difficulties(C5)have the greatest influence on the constraints on credit for farmers,all accounting for more than 10%of the total influence,which verifies the second hypothesis.
The weight of farmers'own influence(B2)is greater than that of financial institutions(C4),and the influence of C4 and C5 is higher than that of C6,C7,C8 and C9.It can be found that changing the est ablishedmode of thinking of financial institutions,exploring the reasons for the plight from the perspective of farmers and solving the problems of property rights and credit,is essentially the effective way to reduce the risk of default for financial institutions,enhance the confidence of financial institutions and resolve the constraints on credit for farmers,which verifies the third hypothesis.
Therefore,in the credit for farmers,it is necessary to pay particular attention to whether the service and policy direction in the national macro-control is in line with the actual situation of farmers,whether the collateral and property rights policies concerning credit for farmers are perfect,improve the competitiveness of the farmers themselves,and reduce the information asymmetry between farmers and financial institutions,thus improving the plight of credit for farmers,promoting farmers'income and developing the rural economy.
3.1 Improving the national macro-controlIt is necessary to correctly implement the government guidance to ensure farmers'stable income,define the property rightsof farmers,and stimulate the enthusiasm of businesses,farmers and other stakeholders for participating in the farmers'entrepreneurial activities;accelerate the improvement of service-oriented poverty alleviation mechanism,change the management-oriented government to service-oriented government to create a favorable creditenvironment for farmers,and establish unified urban-rural public goods supply to reduce farmers'agricultural financing input and vigorously promote the rural medical insurance and other public undertakings;pay attention to the financial needs of farmers,expand the credit channel,and increase the effective supply and demand of rural finance from the perspectives of enriching the credit products for farmers,liberalizing the access to rural financial market,developing the multi-level agricultural insurance and expanding the borrowing channels for farmer entrepreneurs.
3.2 Improving the competitive ability of farmers To assist farmers to correctly understand their own ability problem,it is necessary to innovate upon the training system,ensure full funding for poverty alleviation technology development and farmer education and training projects,establish the step-by-step training system of comprehensive universities,vocational training centers,research institutes and policy research institutions,and hire the professionals to offer entrepreneurship skills and risk prevention knowledge training for the farmers with a strong sense of entrepreneurship;establish the effective support platform in the late period of entrepreneurial activities,improve the ability of entrepreneurs to ensure continuity of entrepreneurship and reduce the risks;improve the farmers'agricultural production capacity,market participating ability,social employment skills and teamwork ability,to ensure the stable and orderly income growth sources.
3.3 Strengthening the lending relationship between financial institutions and farmersIt is necessary to simplify the loan process,develop the special credit products for farmers from the interests of farmers,and establish the reasonable lending rates;go to the countryside to establish a"relationship"with farmers and pay the important role of"relationship"in promoting the money supply in China's rural credit market;help farmer entrepreneurs and lenders to plan out the funds,implement fair treatment,strengthen the two-way communication between the lenders and borrowers and evaluate the borrowers'credit rating and ability to pay,to effective control risks and achieve a win-win;establish the rural cooperative economic organizations suitable for farmers and rural economic development,absorb the single farmers to be integrated into cooperative organizations,and offer loans to farmers through the rural cooperative economic organization model;further strengthen the construction of rural economic organizations and brokers,and reward the rural brokers for their part in increasing the employment and start-ups,in order to ensure farmers'stable income growth and promote rural economic development.
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Asian Agricultural Research2014年11期