杰弗里·D. 薩克斯

China is not an enemy. It is a nation trying to raise its living standards through education， international trade， infrastructure investment， and improved technologies. In short， it is doing what any country should do when confronted with the historical reality of being poor and far behind more powerful countries. Yet the Trump administration is now aiming to stop Chinas development， which could prove to be disastrous for both the United States and the entire world.

China is being made a scapegoat for rising inequality in the United States. While US trade relations with China have been mutually beneficial over the years， some US workers have been left behind， notably Midwestern factory workers facing competition due to rising productivity and comparatively low （though rising） labor costs in China. Instead of blaming China for this normal phenomenon of market competition， we should be taxing the soaring corporate profits of our own multinational corporations and using the revenues to help working-class households， rebuild crumbling infrastructure， promote new job skills and invest in cutting-edge science and technology.

We should understand that China is merely trying to make up for lost time after a very long period of geopolitical setbacks and related economic failures. Here is important historical background that is useful to understand Chinas economic development in the past 40 years.

In 1839， Britain attacked China because it refused to allow British traders to continue providing Chinese people with addictive opium. Britain prevailed， and the humiliation of Chinas defeat in the First Opium War， ending in 1842， contributed in part to a mass uprising against the Qing Dynasty called the Taiping Rebellion that ended up causing more than 20 million deaths. A Second Opium War against Britain and France ultimately led to the continued erosion of Chinas power and internal stability.

Toward the end of the 19th century， China lost a war to the newly industrializing Japan， and was subjected to yet more one-sided demands by Europe and the United States for trade. These humiliations led to another rebellion， followed by yet another defeat， at the hands of foreign powers.

Chinas Qing Dynasty fell in 1911， after which China quickly succumbed to warlords， internal strife and Japans invasion of China beginning in 1931. The end of World War II was followed by civil war， the creation of the Peoples Republic of China in 1949.

Chinas rapid development on a market basis therefore started in 1978， when the government launched sweeping economic reforms. While China has seen incredible growth in the past four decades， the legacy of more than a century of poverty， instability， invasion and foreign threats still looms large.

China is now the second-largest economy in the world， when GDP is measured at market prices. Yet it is a country still in the process of catching up from poverty. In 1980， according to IMF data， Chinas GDP per capita was a mere 2.5% of the United States， and by 2018 had reached only 15.3% of the US level. When GDP is measured in purchasing-power-parity terms， by using a common set of “international prices” to value GDP in all countries， Chinas income per capita in 2018 was a bit higher at 28.9% of the United States.

China has roughly followed the same development strategy as Japan， South Korea and Singapore before it. From an economic standpoint， it is not doing anything particularly unusual for a country that is playing catch up. The constant US refrain that China “steals” technologies is highly simplistic.

Countries that are lagging behind upgrade their technologies in many ways， through study， imitation， purchases， mergers， foreign investments， extensive use of off-patent knowledge and， yes， copying. And with any fast-changing technologies， there are always running battles over intellectual property. Thats true even among US companies today—this kind of competition is simply a part of the global economic system. Technology leaders know they shouldnt count on keeping their lead through protection， but through continued innovation.

The United States relentlessly adopted British technologies in the early 19th century. And when any country wants to close a technology gap， it recruits know-how from abroad. The US ballistic missile program， as it is well known， was built with the help of former Nazi rocket scientists recruited to the United States after World War II.

If China were a less populous Asian country， say like South Korea， with a little more than 50 million people， it would simply be hailed by the United States as a great development success story—which it is. But because it is so big， China refutes Americas pretensions to run the world. The United States， after all， is a mere 4.2% of the worlds population， less than a fourth of Chinas. The truth is that neither country is in a position to dominate the world today， as technologies and know-how are spreading more quickly across the globe than ever before.

Trade with China provides the United States with low-cost consumer goods and increasingly high-quality products. It also causes job losses in sectors such as manufacturing that compete directly with China. That is how trade works. To accuse China of unfairness in this is wrong—plenty of American companies have reaped the benefits of manufacturing in China or exporting goods there. And US consumers enjoy higher living standards as a result of Chinas low-cost goods. The US and China should continue to negotiate and develop improved rules for bilateral and multilateral trade instead of stoking a trade war with one-sided threats and over-the-top accusations.

The most basic lesson of trade theory， practice and policy is not to stop trade—which would lead to falling living standards， economic crisis and conflict. Instead， we should share the benefits of economic growth so that the winners who benefit compensate the losers.

Yet under American capitalism， which has long strayed from the cooperative spirit of the New Deal era， todays winners flat-out reject sharing their winnings. As a result of this lack of sharing， American politics are fraught with conflicts over trade. Greed comprehensively dominates Washington policies.

The real battle is not with China but with Americas own giant companies， many of which are raking in fortunes while failing to pay their own workers decent wages. Americas business leaders and the mega-rich push for tax cuts， more monopoly power and offshoring—anything to make a bigger profit—while rejecting any policies to make American society fairer.

Trump is lashing out against China， ostensibly believing that it will once again bow to a Western power. It is willfully trying to crush successful companies like Huawei by changing the rules of international trade abruptly and unilaterally. China has been playing by Western rules for the past 40 years， gradually catching up the way that Americas Asian allies did in the past. Now the United States is trying to pull the rug out from under China by launching a new Cold War.

Unless some greater wisdom prevails， we could spin toward conflict with China， first economically， then geopolitically and militarily， with utter disaster for all. There will be no winners in such a conflict. Yet such is the profound shallowness and corruption of US politics today that we are on such a path.

A trade war with China wont solve our economic problems. Instead we need homegrown solutions： affordable health care， better schools， modernized infrastructure， higher minimum wages and a crackdown on corporate greed. In the process， we would also learn that we have far more to gain through cooperation with China rather than reckless and unfair provocation.

中國(guó)不是敵人，而是一個(gè)努力通過(guò)教育、國(guó)際貿(mào)易、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資和技術(shù)改進(jìn)來(lái)提高國(guó)民生活水平的國(guó)家。簡(jiǎn)而言之，面對(duì)貧窮和遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落后于強(qiáng)國(guó)的歷史現(xiàn)實(shí)，中國(guó)所做的是任何國(guó)家都應(yīng)做的。然而，現(xiàn)在特朗普政府卻企圖遏制中國(guó)發(fā)展，這對(duì)美國(guó)和全世界來(lái)說(shuō)可能都是個(gè)災(zāi)難。

中國(guó)被當(dāng)作美國(guó)不平等現(xiàn)象日益加劇的替罪羊。盡管多年來(lái)中美貿(mào)易關(guān)系一直是互惠互利的，但一些美國(guó)工人卻被甩在了后面，尤其是中西部的工人，面臨著中國(guó)生產(chǎn)力提高和勞動(dòng)力成本相對(duì)較低（盡管不斷上升）帶來(lái)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。美國(guó)不應(yīng)將這種正常的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)現(xiàn)象歸咎于中國(guó)，而應(yīng)對(duì)自己的跨國(guó)企業(yè)飛漲的利潤(rùn)征稅，再利用這些收入幫助工薪階層家庭，重建破敗的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，提升新的就業(yè)技能并投資尖端科技。

美國(guó)應(yīng)該明白，中國(guó)遭遇了長(zhǎng)期的地緣政治阻隔和與之相關(guān)的經(jīng)濟(jì)挫折，如今只是在努力彌補(bǔ)損失的時(shí)光。以下重要的歷史背景有助于了解中國(guó)過(guò)去40年的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。

1839年，英國(guó)入侵中國(guó)，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)不允許英商繼續(xù)向中國(guó)輸入致癮的鴉片。1842年，第一次鴉片戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)結(jié)束，英國(guó)勝利。中國(guó)蒙受戰(zhàn)敗恥辱，成為引發(fā)“太平天國(guó)運(yùn)動(dòng)”的一個(gè)誘因，這場(chǎng)大規(guī)模反清起義最終導(dǎo)致超2000萬(wàn)人死亡。抗擊英法兩國(guó)的第二次鴉片戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)最終導(dǎo)致中國(guó)國(guó)力不斷被削弱，內(nèi)部穩(wěn)定受到侵蝕。

19世紀(jì)末，中國(guó)在與剛剛走上工業(yè)化道路的日本一戰(zhàn)中敗北，同時(shí)也受到歐美更多不平等貿(mào)易影響。這些羞辱使中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)掀起了另一場(chǎng)叛亂，對(duì)外則再次敗于外國(guó)勢(shì)力之手。

1911年清王朝分崩離析，此后中國(guó)很快被軍閥掌控，接著軍閥混戰(zhàn)。1931年日本發(fā)動(dòng)侵華戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。第二次世界大戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后，內(nèi)戰(zhàn)爆發(fā)。1949年中華人民共和國(guó)成立。

1978年中國(guó)政府實(shí)施全面經(jīng)濟(jì)改革，中國(guó)開(kāi)始以市場(chǎng)為基礎(chǔ)快速發(fā)展。雖然中國(guó)在過(guò)去40年的發(fā)展中取得了令人難以置信的成就，但一個(gè)多世紀(jì)以來(lái)，貧困、動(dòng)蕩、外敵入侵和威脅造成的影響依然很大。

當(dāng)今，以市場(chǎng)價(jià)格計(jì)算國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值（GDP），中國(guó)則是世界第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，但其仍在努力擺脫貧困。根據(jù)國(guó)際貨幣基金組織的數(shù)據(jù)，1980年，中國(guó)人均GDP僅相當(dāng)于美國(guó)的2.5%，到2018年，這個(gè)比例也僅是美國(guó)的15.3%。以購(gòu)買(mǎi)力平價(jià)作為衡量GDP的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)時(shí)，即用一套通用的“國(guó)際價(jià)格”來(lái)衡量所有國(guó)家的GDP，則2018年中國(guó)的人均收入略有提高，達(dá)到了美國(guó)的28.9%。

中國(guó)大致仿效了之前日本、韓國(guó)和新加坡的發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略。從經(jīng)濟(jì)角度來(lái)看，對(duì)于一個(gè)正迎頭趕上的國(guó)家來(lái)說(shuō)，它的所作所為并沒(méi)有什么出格之處。美國(guó)總說(shuō)中國(guó)“竊取”技術(shù)，這種看法過(guò)于簡(jiǎn)單化。

落后的國(guó)家通過(guò)很多方式來(lái)升級(jí)自己的技術(shù)，包括學(xué)習(xí)、模仿、購(gòu)買(mǎi)、合并、外國(guó)投資、廣泛運(yùn)用非專利知識(shí)，當(dāng)然，還有借鑒。而且，對(duì)于任何高速發(fā)展的技術(shù)來(lái)說(shuō)，圍繞知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的爭(zhēng)奪總是不可避免，甚至美國(guó)公司之間至今也是如此——這種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)只是全球經(jīng)濟(jì)體系的一部分。技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的龍頭企業(yè)都知道，不應(yīng)指望通過(guò)保護(hù)措施來(lái)保持自己的領(lǐng)先地位，而應(yīng)依靠持續(xù)的創(chuàng)新。

19世紀(jì)初，美國(guó)一直采用英國(guó)的技術(shù)。而且，任何國(guó)家想要縮小技術(shù)差距，都是從海外招募相關(guān)專家。眾所周知，美國(guó)彈道導(dǎo)彈項(xiàng)目就是在前納粹火箭科學(xué)家的幫助下實(shí)施的，這些科學(xué)家在二戰(zhàn)后被美國(guó)招募。

如果中國(guó)是一個(gè)人口較少的亞洲國(guó)家，就像韓國(guó)那樣，只有5000多萬(wàn)人，那么美國(guó)就會(huì)稱贊中國(guó)的偉大發(fā)展是一個(gè)成功的典范——中國(guó)確實(shí)堪稱成功。但中國(guó)規(guī)模巨大，駁斥了美國(guó)治理全球的妄想。畢竟，美國(guó)人口僅占世界人口的4.2%，不到中國(guó)的四分之一。事實(shí)上，由于技術(shù)和知識(shí)在全球范圍內(nèi)的傳播速度遠(yuǎn)超以往，因此這兩個(gè)國(guó)家都無(wú)法主宰當(dāng)今世界。

中美貿(mào)易為美國(guó)提供了廉價(jià)消費(fèi)品和日益優(yōu)質(zhì)的產(chǎn)品，同時(shí)也會(huì)導(dǎo)致美國(guó)制造業(yè)等和中國(guó)直接競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的行業(yè)工作機(jī)會(huì)的減少。這就是貿(mào)易的運(yùn)作方式。在這方面指責(zé)中國(guó)不公平是錯(cuò)誤的——許多美國(guó)公司已從在中國(guó)制造產(chǎn)品或?qū)θA商品出口中獲益。由于中國(guó)的廉價(jià)商品，美國(guó)消費(fèi)者享受了更高的生活水平。美國(guó)和中國(guó)應(yīng)該繼續(xù)談判，制定完善的雙邊和多邊貿(mào)易規(guī)則，而不是以一邊倒的威脅和過(guò)分的指責(zé)挑起貿(mào)易摩擦。

貿(mào)易理論、實(shí)踐和政策的最基本原則是不要停止貿(mào)易，否則將導(dǎo)致生活水平下降、經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)和沖突。相反，人們應(yīng)共享經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的好處，讓受益者補(bǔ)償受損者。

然而，在長(zhǎng)期背離新政（指羅斯福新政）時(shí)代合作精神的美國(guó)資本主義制度影響下，今天的贏家斷然拒絕分享他們的收益。由于缺乏共享，美國(guó)政治充滿了圍繞貿(mào)易的沖突。貪婪全面主導(dǎo)了國(guó)家政策。

美國(guó)真正的敵人不是中國(guó)，而是自己本國(guó)的大公司。其中很多大公司沒(méi)有給員工支付體面的工資，反而在攫取財(cái)富。美國(guó)的商界領(lǐng)袖和超級(jí)富豪們都在催促減稅、擴(kuò)大壟斷、增加離岸外包等任何能獲取更大利潤(rùn)的事，同時(shí)拒絕任何使美國(guó)社會(huì)更加公平的政策。

特朗普正在猛烈抨擊中國(guó)，從表面上看，他認(rèn)為中國(guó)會(huì)再次向一個(gè)西方大國(guó)低頭。美國(guó)通過(guò)突然單邊地改變國(guó)際貿(mào)易規(guī)則，蓄意打壓華為這樣的成功企業(yè)。過(guò)去40年，中國(guó)一直按照西方的規(guī)則行事，逐漸像美國(guó)的亞洲盟友一樣趕了上來(lái)。現(xiàn)在，美國(guó)試圖通過(guò)發(fā)動(dòng)一場(chǎng)新的冷戰(zhàn)，突然給中國(guó)制造麻煩。

除非有更明智的政策，否則美國(guó)可能會(huì)陷入與中國(guó)的沖突，首先在經(jīng)濟(jì)上，然后在地緣政治和軍事上，最終給所有人帶來(lái)徹底的災(zāi)難。這樣的沖突不會(huì)有贏家。然而，當(dāng)下美國(guó)政治的極端淺薄和腐敗使美國(guó)走上了這樣一條道路。

與中國(guó)產(chǎn)生貿(mào)易摩擦解決不了美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題。相反，美國(guó)需要尋求國(guó)內(nèi)解決方案：減輕醫(yī)療保健費(fèi)用、改善辦學(xué)條件、現(xiàn)代化改建基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、提高最低工資，并遏制企業(yè)的貪念。在此過(guò)程中，美國(guó)還將認(rèn)識(shí)到，相較于魯莽和不公平的挑釁，與中國(guó)合作能使我們獲益更多。

（譯者單位：華北水利水電大學(xué)）